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Transcript: Andrew Kim on North Korea Denuclearization and U.S.-DPRK Diplomacy

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In his much-anticipated first public speech, former head of the CIA’s Korea Mission Center Andrew Kim, currently our William J. Perry Visiting Scholar, provided insights into the process of diplomatic engagement with the DPRK and outlined a roadmap for achieving the U.S. goal of North Korea denuclearization. Kim, who helped orchestrate the 2018 Singapore summit between President Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, spoke at APARC on February 22 to a packed audience and members of the media. The full transcript of his remarks follows below. 

Prices for Denuclearization of North Korea

Andrew Kim
Remarks delivered at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center | February 22, 2019
 
 
We have a long history of negotiating with Pyongyang on denuclearization. These negotiations have been in different formats from bilateral talks to trilateral talks to four-party talks to six party talks. We learned many lessons through these engagements. These lessons provide a useful reference, but they should not close our minds to new possibilities.  
 
The North Korea that we are currently facing has the ability to produce and test ICBM and nuclear weapons that threaten its neighbors and even U.S. territories. 
 
The North Korean WMD issue has become worse over the years to the point that we can no longer wait for this problem to naturally go away. We now have a new leader in North Korea who says he wants to engage and appears to want to take his country on a new path. South Korean President Moon strongly wants to bring North Korea out of isolation. At the same time, we have a U.S. administration focused on proactively trying to resolve this national security challenge.  
 
We have new players, like President Trump, Chairman Kim Jong Un, and South Korea President Moon, who want to make this work. I can say that the stars have lined up. Personally, based on the last two years of my own engagements as a senior U.S. official with Chairman Kim, his senior officials, as well as key South Korean officials, I have come to believe that we have a great window of opportunity to engage Pyongyang and resolve this long-standing North Korean nuclear issue once and for all. 
 
To me, Chairman Kim appears to have a strong desire to improve North Korea’s relationship with the U.S., as he appears to believe that it is the only way to lead his country into prosperity and to enhance regime security at the same time. However, there is still a strong debate as to whether Kim would truly denuclearize. 
 
As the old Korean saying “dong-sang-yi-mong” goes, we are thinking the same, but dreaming differently. Perhaps that is where we are. But I believe that there is only one way to find out what Chairman Kim’s true intentions are, namely, to continue to engage him directly and test his willingness to proceed with the diplomacy of denuclearization. Let me share what I observed and heard. 
 
In early April 2018, I accompanied then-CIA Director Pompeo to Pyongyang to meet with Chairman Kim. Our main objective was to confirm one single most important point that the South Korean special envoy relayed to us a couple of weeks prior. According to the South Korean envoy, Chairman Kim stated to the South Korean delegation that he is willing to denuclearize. When Director Pompeo asked Chairman Kim directly whether the Chairman intended to denuclearize, the Chairman said that he is a father and husband and he does not want his children to live their lives carrying nuclear weapons on their back. 
 
During the meeting, Kim not only confirmed his previous statement about his willingness to denuclearize, but he also strongly emphasized the need to improve U.S.-North Korea relations in order to build trust before North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons. 
 
What Kim appeared to have meant was that after over 70 years of hostilities between the United States and North Korea, both countries need to focus on building a warm relationship and confidence before he can trust the United States enough to give up his nuclear ambitions.
 
Against this backdrop, it appears that the overarching challenge has been how the two countries can improve bilateral relationship and built trust while pursuing denuclearization. It is clear that both processes of denuclearization and improving relationship include many secondary issues and questions that must be addressed.
 
It is clear that establishing effective communication is a good starting point in establishing a new relationship and engaging in the diplomacy of denuclearization. Building mutual trust is a process that takes considerable efforts and it begins with enhancing and increasing communication. Specifically, the denuclearization process requires intense negotiations and involves not only technical and political-based communication, but also communication that is culture-informed.
 
Increasing speed and bandwidth, combined with a positive attitude, are key to successful communication, which is yet to come. Also, it is not just the content that matters, but also how you deliver it. 
 
It appears that the current Trump administration officials are fully aware of the need to increase communication with North Korea and have attempted to speed up and raise the volume of communication with their North Korean counterparts in every occasion since the 2018 Singapore summit.
 
On the other hand, North Korea continues to proceed in a measured pace and has not demonstrated its willingness to change its traditional communication method, i.e., communicate only when it is required. It is doubtful whether North Korea can strike a new friendship with the United States if it only choses to talk when it is necessary. 
 
It is understandable that Chairman Kim’s diplomatic engagements in 2018 can be described as truly high-speed and unprecedented, as he had three meetings with South Korean President Moon, three meetings with PRC President Xi, and a summit with President Trump. All these events required an extremely large amount of resources before and after the meetings. It is particularly interesting to see that North Korea uses the same officials to prepare these meetings and follow up afterward. How much these officials are stretched during this period? Have they had capacity to keep up with the U.S. demand for increased communication and meetings? 
 
North Korea's government is built on a typical top-down model. Currently, the most powerful individual is the Chairman of State Affairs Commission (KJU) and the Worker's Party has the largest decision-making power. Within the Worker’s Party, various departments follow a top-down system under the Central Committee. The current main counterpart of the U.S. negotiation team is a department within the Worker’s Party, which is appointed by Chairman Kim. Unlike the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, functioning outside of the Worker’s Party, this department has a rather small pool of resources, but maintains a strong pride being a department within the Worker’s Party.
 
I raise this background of real communication challenges because it is a very important element to overcome in order to create the right atmosphere for success in the negotiation process.
 
Let’s go back to 2017. We all remember how intense the situation was at the time, as North Korea tested missiles of all kinds almost every other month and tested the largest nuclear weapon to date. I witnessed for the first time how many South Koreans, who had been immune to the North’s threats before, were taking this threatening situation seriously. I received many phone calls from friends in Seoul asking whether it would be safe to be in Seoul at the time. I told them that my daughter had been staying in Seoul for her study abroad program and would continue to be there. I think that reassured them. It is just an illustration of the situation at the time.
 
During that intense period, critics were very vocal about the lack of U.S. engagement with North Korea. Many were concerned about the situation and asked the U.S. to engage with North Korea to defuse the tension. Now that we are engaging, the critics have changed their tune and say we are going to be played by the North. Well, I have strong confidence in our folks as they are fully aware of the challenges they are facing. As Secretary of State Pompeo says all the time, the United States is going into this path with eyes wide open. 
 
I know there is a concern that President Trump or Secretary of State Pompeo may make concessions to North Korea because they might buy into Kim Jong Un’s appeasement strategy. But, based on my own experience sitting down with our current policymakers many times to discuss our strategies forward, I assure you that they have a clear understanding that the diplomatic engagement is one of many tools in their toolbox. They assume nothing and are consistently re-evaluating their approach to North Korea at every critical juncture. 
 
Before discussing what would be the prices to be paid by both the United States and North Korea to resolve the nuclear issue, let’s review what have been done so far since 2017. Also, I would like to point out what the United States provided North Korea during the past engagements. These are important data point as we are moving into a new set of negotiation: 
  • During the Agreed Framework from 1994-2002, the international community provided approximately 1.5 billion U.S. dollars and the U.S. government provided 400 million U.S. dollars in heavy fuel oil (HFO).
  • During the Six-Party Talks from 2003-2009, the United States provided approximately 200 million dollars for the cost of HFO and dismantling a part of Yongbyon.
  • We even released over 20 million U.S. dollars back to North Korea, an amount that was blocked by a Banco Delta Asia investigation.
  • We also removed North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.
 
Since 2017, the United States has taken the following steps:
  • The Secretary of State rolled up his sleeves and proactively engaged the North Korean leadership by visiting Pyongyang four times within one year. This level of commitment is unprecedented and a remarkable demonstration of active problem solving from our country’s top diplomat. This was the first positive response from the United States to North Korea since the 2017 Missile crisis. 
  • President Trump provided a world stage for Kim Jong Un to debut and got him the global attention that he wanted.
  • The United States and South Korea also agreed to suspend joint military exercises. I recall how, during a meeting with Chairman Kim, the Chairman noted that he understood both the U.S. and South Korea claim that the joint military exercises were defensive in nature, but that the North Korean public feels these exercises are offensive. 
 
What are the actions that North Korea side has taken since 2017?
  • It suspended missile and nuclear testing. 
  • Pyongyang released detainees without protracted negotiations.
  • The North returned the remains of U.S. servicemen killed in action during the Korean War.
  • It partially dismantled Yunsong missiles engine testing site and dismantled Punggeri nuclear weapon testing site.
  • It once again tabled Yongbyon nuclear research facilities.
 
North Korea probably believes and publicly claims that it partially dismantled its WMD programs, and they are asking for immediate rewards. 
 
I personally heard that the North claimed their concessions are much more valuable than reciprocal actions the U.S. side has taken so far. They said they took these actions as part of their commitment to build trust with the United States on denuclearization. North Korea demanded several times to evaluate all the actions Pyongyang has taken since the June 2018 Singapore summit as some sort of a major denuclearization milestone. 
 
I believe that North Korea still has a long way to go and that it needs to further demonstrate its sincerity by dismantling key strategic weapons production infrastructure. Lessons of the past place the burden of proof on the North. Pyongyang needs to convince the international community that it means what it says, because the level of skepticism is sky high, and for a reason.
 
In the end, whatever horse-trading Washington decides to do with Pyongyang, our objective needs to remain crystal clear and not waver. Our leaders need to continue to stop and check our assumptions and check what demonstrable progress we are making against our goal. 
 
And our goal is simple, although it may be long and difficult to achieve: Final Fully Verifiable Denuclearization (FFVD). What does FFVD mean?
It means:
  • The North is to halt the testing of Nuclear weapons and launches of ballistic missiles.
  • North Korea is to permit U.S. and international technical experts access to key WMD-related sites throughout the process.
  • Pyongyang is to declare and shut down all nuclear facilities.
  • The North is to completely dismantle and remove its nuclear weapons, delivery systems, facilities, and associated material from the Korean peninsula with an agreed timeline.
  • North Korea is to provide a comprehensive declaration of its nuclear and ballistic missiles, as well as chemical and biological programs.
  • North Korea is to rejoin the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
 
And what are North Korea’s goals?
  • Pyongyang wants the removal all U.N. designated sanctions.
  • The North wants resumption of inter-Korea economic projects, including Kaesong industrial Park and Kumkang mountain tourism project.
  • The North wants to obtain an End-of-War declaration.
  • It wants to be recognized as a nuclear state, if possible.
  • It wants to improve its relationship with the United States, with an eye towards establishing a diplomatic relationship.
  • It wants to place a long-lasting peace mechanism in the Korean peninsula that reassures continued Kim family rule in the North.
 
What price would the United States and North Korea each be willing to pay?
On the U.S. side, I see three incentive categories:
 
Within the Economic Incentive category:
  • The United States would be able to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea;
  • It could ease restrictions on North Korean banking transactions;
  • It could modify or ease existing import and export gaps;
  • It could provide exemptions for joint ventures to be implemented in economic zones.
 
In the Political Incentives category:
  • The United States could lift its travel ban;
  • It could establish a liaison office;
  • It could start promoting cultural exchanges;
  • It could lift the U.S. sanctions on Kim family members and senior officials;
  • It could delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.
 
In terms of Security Incentives:
  • The United States could sign an End-of-War declaration;
  • It could begin military-to-military engagement;
  • It could sign a Peace treaty;
  • It could establish a diplomatic relationship.
And for the last step, when FFVD is seen approaching,
  • The United States could lift U.N. sanctions.
 
What are the prices that North Korea should pay?
  • The North needs to completely shut down all nuclear facilities;
  • It needs to eventually hand over a comprehensive declaration of its nuclear and ballistic missiles, as well as its chemical and biological programs;
  • It needs to accept U.S. and international experts and provide access to its WMD facilities; 
  • It needs to agree to set a timeline and work with the United States and international experts to dismantle and remove its nuclear weapons, missiles, facilities and associated material from Korea;
  • It needs to agree to rejoin the NPT; 
  • It should reform its foreign investment rules and regulation to make investment a friendly environment for the international community;
  • It should improve its human rights record. And, perhaps, they should start with ease on freedom of religion. (There was a rich history of Christianity in Pyongyang 100 years ago.) 
 
Does all of this look like an impossible mission? Probably not. I believe these are all achievable. During the diplomatic process, I assumed that the North would push the U.S. counterparts hard to obtain as much concessions as possible and would demand a concession-for-concession approach. I also assumed that it would be a one-step-back and two-steps-forward process. In the end, North Korea would prefer a transactional negotiation, but Kim Jong Un recognizes that he has to compromise, and his negotiation position has evolved throughout the process.
 
I believe that Kim Jong Un delivered on his promise to his people already: better life and economic prosperity. It appears that most North Koreans welcome Kim’s engagement policy and support his attempt to improve the economic situation in North Korea. It gives them hope. It is not a good idea for Chairman Kim to walk back and ask his people to abandon hope at this point. 
 
Past engagements, including the Agreed Framework and Six-Party Talks, all started with ambitious goals focusing on denuclearization of North Korea, improving relations between the United States and North Korea, and establishing a lasting peace regime on the Korean peninsula. However, they did not work out because both sides tried to solve all the issues tactically rather than strategically. 
 
The conflict is not only about denuclearization, it is also about redrawing the geopolitical and geo-economic map for North Korea. I hope that this time around, both sides would continue to keep a clear eye on the objectives and approach the process strategically. Imagine how a successful outcome of the current negotiations would positively impact the people of North Korea, the Korean Peninsula as a whole, the entire region, and the entire world in three to five years.   
 
Thank You.
 
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Andrew Kim speaking at a lectern during an APARC event. Thom Holme
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Nuclear Disarmament Verification via Resonant Phenomena

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Abstract: Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them towards a treaty partner’s obligation. A team of scientists working at MIT has developed two novel concepts which leverage isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead's fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template.  Most actinides such as uranium and plutonium exhibit unique sets of resonances when interacting with MeV photons and eV neutrons. When measured, these resonances produce isotope-specific features in the spectral data, thus creating an isotopic  "fingerprint" of an object. All information in these measurement has to be and is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experimental proof-of-concept measurements these techniques are shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. These new methodologies can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.  The talk will discuss the concepts and recent results, and will give a general overview of nuclear security research pursued at MIT.

 

Bio: Areg Danagoulian is an Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT.  He did his PhD research in Experimental Nuclear Physics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Areg’s PhD thesis focused on experiments that used real Compton scattering on the proton at 2-6 GeV, allowing to probe the proton's internal structure and understand how it couples to external excitations. After his PhD Areg worked at Los Alamos as a postdoctoral researcher, and then as a senior scientist at Passport Systems, Inc. (PSI). At PSI Areg focused on the development of Prompt Neutron from Photofission (PNPF) technique, which allows to rapidly detect shielded fissionable materials in the commercial cargo traffic. Areg's current research interests focus on scientific applications in nuclear security, such areas nuclear nonproliferation, technologies for treaty verification, nuclear safeguards, and cargo security. Current specific research areas include:  warhead verification using nuclear resonances;  use of nuclear reactions for high precision radiography in nuclear security applications.

 

Areg Danagoulian Assistant Professor, Nuclear Science and Engineering MIT
Seminars
Research Seminar Series

The Stopping Power of Norms

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Abstract: Sagan and Valentino's path-breaking survey of public opinion American attitudes towards the laws of war found Americans are relatively insensitive to international norms and taboos against the use of nuclear weapons and the targeting of civilian populations. We replicated a key question on this study – where respondents were asked if they would support saturation bombing an Iranian city to end a war. We also introduced some variations into the experiment to disaggregate any potential influence of international norms and laws from the effect of historical analogies and interest-based frames embedded in the original experiment. Overall, our quantitative and qualitative findings are more optimistic about Americans' sensitivity to the civilian immunity norm. Nonetheless, our findings suggest much depends on whether legal/ethical considerations, rather than tactical ones alone, are part of any national conversation about war policy.    

Charli's Bio: Charli Carpenter is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at University of Massachusetts-Amherst. Her teaching and research interests include the laws of war, protection of civilians, humanitarian disarmament, global advocacy networks, and the role of popular culture in global affairs. She has a particular interest in the gap between intentions and outcomes among advocates of human security. She has published three books and numerous journal articles, has served as a consultant for the United Nations, and contributed to Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs. In addition to teaching and research, Dr. Carpenter spends her time raising future members of the American electorate, snowboarding, and rambling about international politics and popular culture at Duck of Minerva.  

 

Alexander's Bio: Alexander H. Montgomery is associate professor of Political Science at Reed College. He has a B.A. in Physics from the University of Chicago, an M.A. in Energy and Resources from UC-Berkeley, and an M.A. in Sociology and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University. He has been a fellow at the Belfer Center, CISAC, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Woodrow Wilson Center. He has published articles on nuclear proliferation and on the effects of social networks of international organizations on interstate conflict, and is the co-editor of the Oxford Handbook of Political Networks (2017).

 

Charli Carpenter & Alexander Montgomery
Research Seminar Series

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

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This seminar will provide analysis and implications of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review from the perspectives of three people who spent a significant portion of their careers working on the nuclear deterrent.  First, a brief history of nuclear posture reviews will be presented.  The results from the former reviews will be analyzed and the evolution of the nuclear posture reviews will be elucidated.  Next, a summary of the current security environment and the resulting important elements of the 2018 review will be presented.  The reasoning and rationale for the elements of the nuclear posture will be described.  Finally, a perspective of the implication of the 2018 nuclear posture review to the challenging issue of infrastructure and capabilities at the U.S. national laboratories responsible for the nuclear deterrent will be discussed.   The views of the speakers will differ from each other in some cases, and there will be time for questions from the audience to the panelists.

 

John R. Harvey Bio

Dr. John R. Harvey is a physicist with over 35 years of experience working nuclear weapons and national security issues, first at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, then at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Arms Control and in senior positions in the Departments of Defense (twice) and Energy.  From 2009-2013, he served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs under then Undersecretary Ash Carter.  He was Dr. Carter’s “go to” person for the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, as well as for interactions with the Department of Energy on joint oversight of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.  Dr. Harvey also provided oversight to DoD acquisition programs to sustain and modernize nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems for their command and control.  Since retiring from government service in 2013, he consults with the Defense Science Board, Institute for Defense Analysis, Los Alamos National Laboratory, National Institute for Public Policy, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Strategic Command’s Strategic Advisory Group Panel on Nuclear Weapons Command and Control.

 

Charles McMillan Bio

Dr. Charles McMillan served as the tenth Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory from 2011 through 2017. The Laboratory is a principal contributor to the Department of Energy mission of maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. McMillan began his career as an experimental physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 1983. As a scientific leader, he helped create the Stockpile Stewardship Program, developing and applying advanced experimental and computational tools to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without additional full-scale nuclear testing. He continues to serve as an adviser to the government, laboratories and industry.

 

Jill Hruby Bio

Jill Hruby is currently the inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Her work at NTI focuses on the intersection of technology and nuclear non-proliferation policy.

Hruby served as the Director of Sandia National Laboratories from July 2015 to May 2017. Sandia is a Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) national laboratory with over 12,000 employees and $3B annual revenue.  Sandia’s broad national security missions include nuclear weapons, cyberspace, energy, non-proliferation, biological defense, and space sensors and systems.

Hruby spent 34 years at Sandia in roles with increasing responsibilities.  In 2010, Hruby moved to Sandia’s New Mexico site after 27 years at Sandia’s California location to become vice president of the Energy, Nonproliferation, and High-Consequence Security Division, and leader of Sandia’s International, Homeland, and Nuclear Security Program.  

 

 

Jill Hruby, Charlie McMillan, and John Harvey
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Rodney Ewing awarded for distinguished public service in mineral and geologic science

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Rodney C. Ewing, Frank Stanton professor in nuclear security and co-director at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), was awarded the Distinguished Public Service (DPS) Medal by the Mineralogical Society of America.

The DPS Medal is awarded to those who have made outstanding contributions relating to mineralogical sciences which further the vitality of the geological sciences.

Dr. Ewing – a professor in the Department of Geological Sciences in the School of Earth, Energy, & Environmental Sciences at Stanford, a Regents’ Professor Emeritus at the University of New Mexico, the Edward H. Kraus Distinguished University Professor Emeritus in the Department of Earth & Environmental Sciences at the University of Michigan — has also recently started his term as President of the American Geoscience Institute.

Read more about the Distinguished Public Service Medal on the Mineralogical Society of America website.

 

 

 

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Rodney Ewing, Frank Stanton professor in nuclear security at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.
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Fourth Young Nuclear Professionals forum brings together U.S. and Russian scholars in Moscow

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Stanford-led group of young American and Russian scholars meet in Moscow on nuclear policy

Persistent nuclear threats and the recent erosion of relations between the United States and Russia paint a gloomy picture for the future of cooperation between nuclear powers. Despite these enormous challenges, Stanford is leading an effort to bring young nuclear scholars from the United States and Russia together to tackle urgent problems together and share ideas.

At the end of October, a group of six scholars from Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation—Senior Fellow Siegfried Hecker, Visiting Scholar Chaim Braun, Postdoctoral Fellows Chantell Murphy and Kristen Ven Bruusgaard, Research Assistant Elliot Serbin and Senior Research Associate Alla Kassianova—and other American graduate students and postdoctoral fellows from Washington State University, University of Tennessee, Harvard, University of Michigan and Los Alamos National Laboratory traveled to Moscow for the Fourth Young Professionals Nuclear Forum.  The Americans joined a group of undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral students at the Moscow Engineering Physics University (MEPhI), Russia’s principal school training nuclear professionals.

The Forum, first launched between CISAC and MEPhI in 2016, provides a venue for young generation of American and Russian nuclear professionals to learn about current issues of nuclear safety, nuclear proliferation, and the role of nuclear power in the world’s evolving energy balance from a perspective of more than one country and more than one discipline.

In the weeks leading up to this Forum, participants on both sides of the ocean attended a series of online presentations by U.S. and Russian experts covering the complexity of the Iran nuclear program and the challenges facing further development of nuclear power.

When they met in person, the young scholars heard lectures from and participated in discussions with experts from Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Russian Center for Energy and Security, and others.

The participants then broke into small groups to work on tabletop problem solving activities. The first exercise, a crisis simulation concerning Iran’s nuclear program, brought together separate Russian and American teams to represent their government’s positions on Iran’s nuclear program and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Presented with a hypothetical problem—a scenario in which Iran decides to enhance its nuclear capabilities in violation of the JCPOA and President Trump threatens retaliation via Twitter—the participants gathered in small groups to see what type of cooperative Russian-American policies could be brokered in response.

The second exercise brought the group together to imagine the future of nuclear power and how to manage it. Working in small teams of 2-4 people, the participants formulated responses to eight pressing questions regarding the global future of nuclear power, including whether nuclear power is necessary to mitigate the consequences of climate change and whether nuclear proliferation challenges will limit the expansion of nuclear power. The teams presented their answers in Moscow and will continue to develop their assessments, to be published in a report next month.

Both Americans and Russians commonly remarked that the most valuable lesson they took from the exercises was the fact that both sides held remarkably different, but valuable, perspectives on issues of common concern. On the topic of nuclear energy, for example, Russians appreciated American perspectives on the value of startups in the nuclear power industry and new modes of thinking that encapsulated non-monetary aspects of nuclear power in broader economic analyses. Americans came to understand the deep Russian fascination with nuclear energy and optimistic views about the future role of nuclear energy in society, and how deeply that passion is engraved in the university system in a way wholly different from the United States.

Forum participants also had an opportunity to meet with the leadership of two committees of the Russian State Duma, the lower Chamber of the Russian legislature, the Committee on International Affairs and the Committee on Education and Science. The meeting was hosted by Ms. Inga Yumasheva,  an MP from the United Russia party. The Forum also included a visit to research labs and MEPhI facilities, which was hosted by their scientists.

View photos from the forum

About CISAC
The Center for International Security and Cooperation tackles the most critical security issues in the world today. Founded in 1983, CISAC has built on its research strengths to better understand an increasingly complex international environment. It is part of Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). Though scholarly research, fellowships, and teaching, CISAC is educating the next generation of leaders in international security and creating policy impact on a wide variety of issues to help build a safer world.

 

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CISAC young nuclear professionals visit Red Square, Moscow.
CISAC young nuclear professionals visit Red Square, Moscow.
Elliot Serbin
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The INF Treaty’s Demise: What it Means for Arms Control, Europe and U.S.-Russia Relations

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INF Public Panel Discussion

President Trump announced on October 20 that the United States will withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. That will end one of two agreements that constrain U.S. and Russian nuclear force levels, the other being the New START Treaty. What does the president’s decision mean for arms control, for European security and for an already troubled U.S.-Russia relationship?

 

SPEAKER

Steven Pifer
William J. Perry fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Steven Pifer is a William J. Perry fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), where he is affiliated with FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and Europe Center.  He is also a nonresident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution. Pifer’s research focuses on nuclear arms control, Ukraine, Russia and European security. A retired Foreign Service officer, his assignments included deputy assistant secretary of state, U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, and special assistant to the President and senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia on the National Security Council. He also served at the U.S. embassies in Warsaw, Moscow and London as well as with the U.S. delegation to the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations in Geneva.

 

COMMENTATORS

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
MacArthur Postdoctoral Fellow, CISAC

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard is a MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC. Her research focuses on Russian nuclear strategy and on deterrence dynamics. Dr. Bruusgaard has previously been a research fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), a senior security policy analyst in the Norwegian Armed Forces, a junior researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), and an intern at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in Washington, D.C., and at NATO HQ. She holds a Ph.D in Defence Studies from Kings College London, an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University, and a B.A. (Hons) from Warwick University. Her work has been published in Security Dialogue, U.S. Army War College Quarterly Parameters, Survival, War on the Rocks, Texas National Security Review and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Michael McFaul
Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Director of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy

Michael McFaul is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in Political Science, Director and Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, all at Stanford University. He was also the Distinguished Mingde Faculty Fellow at the Stanford Center at Peking University from June to August of 2015. He joined the Stanford faculty in 1995. He is also an analyst for NBC News and a contributing columnist to The Washington Post. McFaul served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014).

Kathryn E. Stoner
Deputy Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Deputy Director of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy

Kathryn Stoner is the Deputy Director at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and a Senior Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, as well as the Deputy Director of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy at Stanford University. She teaches in the Department of Political Science at Stanford, and in the Program on International Relations, as well as in the Ford Dorsey Program. Prior to coming to Stanford in 2004, she was on the faculty at Princeton University for nine years, jointly appointed to the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School for International and Public Affairs. At Princeton she received the Ralph O. Glendinning Preceptorship awarded to outstanding junior faculty. She also served as a Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and an Assistant Professor of Political Science at McGill University. She has held fellowships at Harvard University as well as the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC.

 

Steven Pifer William J. Perry fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Video: Siegfried Hecker at DARPA's 60th Anniversary Symposium on Combating Emerging Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terror Threats

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Siegfried S. Hecker
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In this session from DARPA’s 60th anniversary symposium, D60, Dr. Valerie Browning, director of the agency’s Defense Sciences Office (DSO); keynote speaker Dr. Vincent Tang, program manager for DSO; and a panel of notable experts, including CISAC's Siegfried Hecker, explore the challenges and opportunities for combatting WMD use and preventing proliferation in the emerging global landscape.

Moderator Dr. Valerie Browning – DARPA, DSO
Keynote Dr. Vincent Tang – DARPA, DSO
Panelists Mr. Peter Bergen – Journalist, Dr. Siegfried Hecker – Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University The Honorable Andrew “Andy” Weber – Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs

 

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Law as Discursive Resource: The Politics of the Nuclear/Non-Nuclear Distinction in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

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Abstract: The purpose and force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty hinges on a legal distinction between "nuclear weapons states" and "non-nuclear weapons states." But rather than being a self-evident distinction based entirely on material differences, the distinction is constructed and negotiated—not just by the conventionally powerful but by disempowered states. This article argues that the NPT is a discursive resource for states that the treaty does not legitimate. The NPT’s power comes from the legal categories it institutionalizes and perpetuates. In order to understand the origins and effects of dividing the terrain of nuclear politics into nuclear and non-nuclear states, I analyze the meeting documents of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) which negotiated the treaty from 1962-1969. I find that the “non-nuclear” states used the designation as an identity that set them apart from nuclear states. Using these categories like identities is not without political consequence—for example, India’s unique diplomatic approach toward the NPT shapes both the discourses it advances and policies it pursues.  In contrast to existing approaches that examine the distinction primarily through material terms, this article turns to state practice to reveal how being nuclear or non-nuclear is used as a legitimating tool in nuclear politics. The article also shows that, while most approaches to international law presume that the law either constrains state power or has no effect on it, the case of the nuclear/non-nuclear distinction illustrates that international law does matter, but perhaps not in the way assumed by IR realists or institutionalists.

Speaker Bio: Sidra Hamidi is a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC. She completed her PhD in Political Science from Northwestern University in 2018. Her research explores the role of identity and discourse in contemporary and historical nuclear politics. Specifically, she studies the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states in technical, legal, and normative contexts. She locates the politics of this distinction in the diplomatic practices of Israel, India, and Iran. She completed her MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago. Her commentary has appeared in The Washington Post, Duck of Minerva, and E-IR. She is also interested in international relations theory and political science conceptualization and methodology.

Sidra Hamidi Stanton Post-doctoral Fellow CISAC, Stanford University
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