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The United States has a growing inventory of spent nuclear fuel from commercial power plants that continues to accumulate at reactor sites around the country.

In addition, the legacy waste from U.S. defense programs remains at Department of Energy sites around the country, mainly at Hanford, WA, Savannah River, SC, and at Idaho National Laboratory.

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But now the U.S. nuclear waste storage program is “frozen in place”, according to Rod Ewing, Frank Stanton professor in nuclear security at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

“The processing and handling of waste is slow to stopped and in this environment the pressure has become very great to do something.”

Currently, more than seventy thousand metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from civilian reactors is sitting in temporary aboveground storage facilities spread across 35 states, with many of the reactors that produced it shut down.  And U.S. taxpayers are paying the utilities billions of dollars to keep it there.

Meanwhile, the deep geologic repository where all that waste was supposed to go, in Yucca Mountain Nevada, is now permanently on hold, after strong resistance from Nevada residents and politicians led by U.S. Senator Harry Reid.

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad New Mexico, the world’s first geologic repository for transuranic waste, has been closed for over a year due to a release of radioactivity.

And other parts of the system, such as the vitrification plant at Hanford and the mixed oxide fuel plant at Savannah River , SC, are way behind schedule and over budget.

It’s a growing problem that’s unlikely to change this political season.

“The chances of dealing with it in the current Congress are pretty much nil, in my view,” said former U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM).

“We’re not going to see a solution to this problem this year or next year.”

The issue in Congress is generally divided along political lines, with Republicans wanting to move forward with the original plan to build a repository at Yucca Mountain, while Democrats support the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to create a new organization to manage nuclear waste in the U.S. and start looking for a new repository location using an inclusive, consent-based process.

“One of the big worries that I have with momentum loss is loss of nuclear competency,” said David Clark, a Fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

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“So we have a whole set of workers who have been trained, and have been working on these programs for a number of years. When you put a program on hold, people go find something else to do.”

Meanwhile, other countries are moving ahead with plans for their own repositories, with Finland and Sweden leading the pack, leaving the U.S. lagging behind.

So Ewing decided to convene a series of high-level conferences, where leading academics and nuclear experts from around the world can discuss the issues in a respectful environment with a diverse range of stakeholders – including former politicians and policy makers, scientists and representatives of Indian tribes and other effected communities.

“For many of these people and many of these constituencies, I’ve seen them argue at length, and it’s usually in a situation where a lot seems to be at stake and it’s very adversarial,” said Ewing.

“So by having the meeting at Stanford, we’ve all taken a deep breath, the program is frozen in place, nothing’s going to go anywhere tomorrow, we have the opportunity to sit and discuss things. And I think that may help.”

Former Senator Bingaman said he hoped the multidisciplinary meetings, known at the “Reset of Nuclear Waste Management Strategy and Policy Series”, would help spur progress on this pressing problem.

“There is a high level of frustration by people who are trying to find a solution to this problem of nuclear waste, and there’s no question that the actions that we’ve taken thus far have not gotten us very far,” Bingaman said.

“I think that’s why this conference that is occurring is a good thing, trying to think through what are the problems that got us into the mess we’re in, and how do we avoid them in the future.”

The latest conference, held earlier this month, considered the question of how to structure a new nuclear waste management organization in the U.S.

Speakers from Sweden, Canada and France brought an international perspective and provided lessons learned from their countries nuclear waste storage programs.

“The other…major programs, France, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Canada, they all reached a crisis point, not too different from our own,” said Ewing.

“And at this crisis point they had to reevaluate how they would go forward. They each chose a slightly different path, but having thought about it, and having selected a new path, one can also observe that their programs are moving forward.”

France has chosen to adopt a closed nuclear cycle to recycle spent fuel and reuse it to generate more electricity.

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“It means that the amount of waste that we have to dispose of is only four percent of the total volume of spent nuclear fuel which comes out of the reactor,” said Christophe Poinssot of the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission.

“We also reduce the toxicity because…we are removing the plutonium. And finally, we are conditioning the final waste under the form of nuclear glass, the lifetime of which is very long, in the range of a million years in repository conditions.”

Clark said that Stanford was the perfect place to convene a multidisciplinary group of thought leaders in the field who could have a real impact on the future of nuclear waste storage policy.

“The beauty of a conference like this, and holding it at a place like Stanford University and CISAC, is that all the right people are here,” he said.

“All the people who are here have the ability to influence, through some level of authority and scholarship, and they’ll be able to take the ideas that they’ve heard back to their different offices and different organizations.  I think it will make a difference, and I’m really happy to be part of it.”

Ewing said it was also important to include students in the conversation.

“There’s a next generation of researchers coming online, and I want to save them the time that it took me to realize what the problems are,” Ewing said.

“By mixing students into this meeting, letting them interact with all the parties, including the distinguished scientists and engineers, I’m hoping it speeds up the process.”

Professor Ewing is already planning his next conference, next March, which will focus on the consent-based process that will be used to identify a new location within the U.S. for a repository.

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Three CISAC scientists have joined 26 of the nation’s top nuclear experts to send an open letter to President Obama in support of the Iran deal struck in July.

“The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the United States and its partners negotiated with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and can serve as a guidepost for future non-proliferation agreements,” the group of renowned scientists, academics and former government officials wrote in the letter dated August 8, 2015.

“This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent constraints than any previously negotiated non-proliferation framework.”

CISAC senior fellow and former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Sig Hecker is a signatory to the letter, along with CISAC co-founder Sid Drell, and cybersecurity expert and CISAC affiliate Martin Hellman.

Six Nobel laureates also signed, including FSI senior fellow by courtesy and former Stanford Linear Accelerator director Burton Richter.

The letter arrives at a crucial time for the Obama administration as it rallies public opinion and lobbies Congress to support the Iran agreement.

You can read the full letter along with analysis from the New York Times at this link.

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Introduction and Contribution


The ongoing wars in Iran and Gaza have led to a marked increase in global attention to Israel’s military power, and in particular to the nuclear weapons that it is widely believed to possess. This is especially notable given Israel’s longstanding concern over Iran’s nuclear program as well as its refusal to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and place safeguards on its Dimona reactor.

Israeli nuclear policy cannot be understood apart from (1) its decades-long strategy of “deliberate ambiguity,” (2) its diplomatic emphasis on the NPT’s definition of nuclear-weapons states as those that have overtly tested a nuclear weapon, and (3) continued American support for Israel’s position. In “Israel and the NPT: new insights into old questions,” Or Rabinowitz examines the origins and consequences of this status quo, which began with a 1969 agreement between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir. What Rabinowitz calls the “Nixon-Meir understanding” — whereby Israel would not test, declare, or openly advertise its nuclear weapons and the US would not press Israel to accede to the NPT — has persisted ever since. Rabinowitz’s article draws on American, Israeli, British, and Canadian archival research, as well as secondary literature and media reports.

The Nixon-Meir understanding has delivered significant strategic benefits for Israel, but it has also imposed costs, particularly by limiting Israel’s ability to acquire civilian nuclear infrastructure from other Western countries. It remains to be seen whether this status quo will persist in light of the nuclear ambitions of Israel’s neighbors, the possibility of wider regional proliferation, and Israel’s growing international isolation. 

Origins, Development, and Challenges of Israel’s Nuclear Policy


Israel began constructing its French-supplied Dimona reactor in the late 1950s. The Eisenhower administration largely pursued what Rabinowitz terms a “policy of benign neglect” (p. 3). This approach was partly upended by the Kennedy administration, which pressured Israel to halt its nuclear development and submit its Dimona reactor to periodic inspections. In response, Israel adopted a range of tactics to conceal its nuclear program, including hiding its plutonium production plant in what appeared to be an ordinary administrative building. Kennedy’s death led to a more sympathetic Johnson administration, during which time Israel’s clandestine program grew.

For Rabinowitz, the late 1960s marked a watershed in Israeli nuclear policy. By the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel had likely crossed the nuclear threshold for the first time. In 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was finalized; critical to the treaty was Article IX, which stated that nuclear-weapon states were those that had “manufactured and exploded [i.e., tested] a nuclear weapon.” The test criterion became foundational to Israel’s policy of deliberate ambiguity, and Israeli officials invoked it quite consciously in their international relations. In 1969, Nixon and Meir agreed to the aforementioned bilateral understanding, which was kept secret from many American allies. For example, British officials remained uncertain about whether Israel possessed nuclear weapons until the early 1980s. 

Israel’s nuclear ambiguity faced several challenges in the 1970s. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel allegedly placed its nuclear forces on alert twice. Then, during the 1979 “Vela incident,” a US satellite detected a signal consistent with a nuclear test, and Israel was widely suspected of being involved. However, the Carter administration avoided formally attributing the incident to Israel, in part because doing so could have jeopardized US-Israeli relations and the Egypt-Israel peace process, not to mention the prospects of Carter’s reelection. The Reagan administration likewise maintained the status quo, despite renewed international pressure following Israel’s 1981 strike on an Iraqi reactor.

With the end of the Cold War, Israel feared that the first George Bush administration would pressure it into joining the NPT. Although Bush Sr.’s cooperation with Egypt on nuclear safeguarding initiatives represented the clearest challenge to the Nixon-Meir understanding, the administration ultimately did not depart from the arrangement. Thereafter, the Bill Clinton administration adopted a more lenient approach to Israel’s NPT status and reportedly assured Israel that the US would help preserve its strategic position.

While Israel’s policy of deliberate ambiguity has delivered substantial benefits, it has also generated trade-offs. In particular, the Nixon-Meir understanding has hindered Israel in importing civilian nuclear reactors. Western nuclear suppliers have all made nuclear cooperation conditional on Israel’s accession to the NPT or equivalent safeguards. Israel’s refusal to do so was deemed too politically costly, as these countries were wary of generating political backlash from Arab countries.

Rabinowitz’s conclusion is that whether Israel maintains its nuclear policy status quo will likely depend on the actions of its neighbors, several of whom have nuclear ambitions. If Iran or Saudi Arabia cross the nuclear threshold, a more aggressive and overt policy may prove beneficial as an Israeli deterrent. Ultimately, the article unpacks a very murky yet consequential dynamic in world politics. It shows how Israeli policy has relied not only on covert possession of nuclear weapons, but on a diplomatic strategy of ambiguity, leveraging the NPT’s “test” criterion and American commitments not to force Israel’s hand.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

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Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir standing with President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, outside the White House, Nov. 1973.
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir standing with President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, outside the White House, Nov. 1973. | Marion S. Trikosko / Library of Congress
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CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]

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In late August 2021, United States President Joseph Biden hosted the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister, Naftali Bennet, at the White House for an official meeting. Shortly after, Israeli journalist Barak Ravid reported that Biden and Bennet ‘reaffirmed the strategic understandings’ between the two allies on Israel’s ‘alleged undeclared military nuclear program’, noting that this reaffirmation of policy has been repeated by every US President since Richard Nixon.1 As shall be explored below, this statement is mostly accurate, with the seemingly glaring exception of President George H.W. Bush. Upon its publication, Ravid’s story became the most recent in a long line of reports detailing this repeated commitment by US presidents to their Israeli counterparts.2

What role does this commitment play in Israel’s long history with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? The primary aim of this article is to answer this question by charting Israel’s relationship with the NPT and its decades-long fear of American coercion to join it. A secondary aim of this article is to provide a concise primer, or introduction, to this nuanced question for scholars and students alike, by reviewing the existing literature and adding insights from new archival sources to this growing body of work.

The paper proceeds in three parts. The first charts the emergence of Israel’s NPT policy and the technical-diplomatic road which led to the emergence of the policy in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The second charts how this policy impacted Israel’s nuclear energy policy in the following decades, ultimately preventing it from pursuing its plan of launching a massive civilian nuclear infrastructure program, specifically nuclear power plants for electricity production. The third concludes with charting Israel’s NPT policy at the end of the Cold War. Research for this study was conducted in archives in the US, United Kingdom, Canada, and Israel, and taps both primary and secondary sources; Hebrew translations are by the author, unless otherwise noted.3

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Cold War History
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Or (Ori) Rabinowitz
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Republican President George H.W. Bush announced a unilateral moratorium on full-scale nuclear testing in 1992. Other countries soon followed, and since this century began, none except the pariah North Korea has tested nuclear weapons. The ban has meant that states with nuclear weapons have had to depend on other ways to ensure that their bombs are safe and effective.

In the United States, this work has unfolded on a firm scientific basis, depending on careful experimentation and, importantly, on modeling and simulations that have driven progress on high-speed computing in this country for the past 30 years. At the same time, the moratorium has meant that no country can surge ahead with new weapon designs — not established nuclear states such as China and Russia, nor developing nuclear states such as Pakistan and India. The nuclear brakes are on.

Now, Donald Trump’s allies are threatening to undo these achievements with a return to explosive nuclear testing. Their notorious Project 2025 calls for the United States to “Reject ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and indicate a willingness to conduct nuclear tests in response to adversary nuclear developments if necessary.”

This is a bad idea, for three reasons.

Continue reading at lasvegassun.com

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The nuclear taboo, a term coined by political scientist Nina Tannenwald in the 1990s, has become one of the most influential ideas in contemporary international relations, appearing not only in the pages of major scholarly publications but also in statements from the United Nations secretary-general and lectures from Nobel winners. It holds that in the wake of World War II, the prospect of using nuclear weapons became so utterly and universally opprobrious that leaders will shy away from the option even when it would be strategically sensible.

The nuclear taboo thesis has been challenged by research in countries such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Israel. Yet, for many, one country is still seen as the standard-bearer for the taboo in the 21st century: China. While this may come as a surprise to hawks in Washington, numerous scholars of Chinese politics have argued that China’s distinctive cultural traditions predispose its leaders and citizens toward moderation in war. John Fairbank, the father of modern China studies in the United States, observed in 1974 that China’s Confucian culture encourages its leaders and people to prioritize the “downgrading of warfare,” writing, “The moral absolute is all on the side of peace.”

Such statements reflect an assumption that culturally informed preferences shape states’ strategic behavior. As political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston put it, if Chinese cultural traditions uniquely stress “nonviolent political or diplomatic means to deal with adversaries,” China’s strategy in wartime should have a “distinctive minimally violent character.” One might thus presume that the use of nuclear weapons, which would likely kill hundreds of thousands of noncombatants, should be downright anathematic to adherents of such a culture.

Continue reading at foreignpolicy.com

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New research casts doubt on a long-standing theory.

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Changwook Ju
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The United States and Russia have not signed a new nuclear arms control agreement in a decade and the New START Treaty is set to expire next year if not extended. The development of so-called disruptive nuclear weapons technologies, such as hypersonic and autonomous capabilities, not explicitly addressed under existing treaties further complicates bilateral negotiations to reach agreement on a future for nuclear arms control. In this paper, we develop a set of criteria to assess the disruptiveness of these technologies and evaluate their implications on potential arms control mechanisms. We review historic and theoretical motivations for pursuing bilateral arms control and analyze the U.S. and Russian nuclear postures through public government documents. We consider three potential mechanisms for future nuclear arms control agreements and argue in favor of a U.S.-Russia co-sponsored treaty in an international forum to constrain the deployment of those nuclear technologies assessed to be disruptive to strategic stability.

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Earlier this month, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol set off alarms. In an off-the-cuff remark, he warned that Seoul might need to develop nuclear weapons—or demand redeployment of U.S. nuclear arms to the Korean Peninsula—to counter North Korean nuclear threats. In doing so, Yoon spotlighted a popular view once reserved for hawkish commentators, defense intellectuals, and former military officials. Keeping nuclear weapons out of South Korea will ultimately be a U.S. responsibility that requires addressing both the deteriorating security environment and the domestic drivers underlying Yoon’s statement.

Continue reading at carnegieendowment.org.

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Yoon Suk-yeol’s call to develop nuclear weapons is fundamentally a call for South Korea to know it can protect itself in a changing security environment.

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Co-sponsored with Stanford University Libraries

About the Event: Join us for an engaging conversation with the Ambassador of Estonia to the U.S. Kristjan Prikk, Rose Gottemoeller, and Steven Pifer, who will discuss Russia's war in Ukraine - what's at stake and what we should do about it.
Russia's unprovoked war against Ukraine has brought about the most serious reassessment of the European security realities since the end of the Cold War. The epic clash of political wills, the magnitude of military operations, and the scale of atrocities against the Ukrainian people are beyond anything Europe has seen since World War II. The past nine months have forced many to reassess what is possible and impossible in international security A.D. 2022. What is this war about, after all? What's at stake in this – to paraphrase former British PM Chamberlain – "quarrel in a faraway country, between people of whom most Americans know nothing?" What should be the lessons for U.S. strategists and policymakers? What are the wider implications for U.S. national security interests, particularly those related to the Indo-Pacific? How has the Alliance supported Ukraine since the war started? What should the end of this war look like and how to get there?

All these questions are relevant and should be carefully weighed with current information from the war as well as historic perspective and regional knowledge in mind.

About the Speakers: 

Estonia's Ambassador to the U.S. Mr. Kristjan Prikk started his mission in Washington, D.C. in May 2021. He is a graduate of the USA Army War College and has served as the National Security Coordinator to the Prime Minister. Prior to arriving in D.C., he was the Permanent Secretary of the Estonian Ministry of Defense. Among his previous assignments are two other tours in Washington as an Estonian diplomat and work on NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine topics at a time when these relationships were considerably less charged than today.

Rose Gottemoeller is the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and its Center for International Security and Cooperation. Before joining Stanford, Gottemoeller was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019, where she helped to drive forward NATO's adaptation to new security challenges in Europe and in the fight against terrorism.  Prior to NATO, she served for nearly five years as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, advising the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation and political-military affairs. 

Steven Pifer is an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation as well as a non-resident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution. He was a William J. Perry Fellow at the center from 2018-2022 and a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin from January-May 2021. Pifer's research focuses on nuclear arms control, Ukraine, Russia, and European security. A retired Foreign Service officer, Pifer's more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as arms control and security issues, and included service as the third US ambassador to Ukraine.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Green Library, East Wing 

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Rose Gottemoeller
Steven Pifer
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The United Nations kicks off the 10th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on Monday, gathering 191 treaty members in New York. It’s an NPT review that typically takes place every five years, though the pandemic pushed the date back two years.

Read more at The Washington Post.

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Latin American countries will push again for nuclear disarmament at this month’s review conference

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