As right-wing populism surges around the world, immigrants and their descendants often face discrimination and become targets of political scapegoating. Yet, the question of which groups of immigrants are targeted by anti-immigrant rhetoric is dependent on a host of factors, and there remains a lack of clear evidence on the reasons underlying xenophobic behavior and the othering of immigrant populations.

A new study, published in the American Political Science Review, introduces a novel international relations perspective, particularly the concept of geopolitical rivalry, into the literature on anti-immigrant sentiment. The study indicates citizens strongly prefer immigrants from non-rival countries over those from rival countries.

The study’s co-authors — including Kiyoteru Tsutsui, APARC deputy director and director of APARC’s Japan Program and Dartmouth College’s Charles Crabtree, a former visiting professor with the Japan Program, shift the research focus of anti-immigrant sentiment to the political dynamics between the immigrants' countries of origin and the destination countries. In doing so, the authors emphasize the importance of going beyond the existing preoccupation with the individual background characteristics of migrants and integrating the study of xenophobia within the global context of political competition and alliances.

Geopolitical Relations and Public Perceptions 

Traditionally, research on anti-immigrant attitudes has concentrated on factors such as race, culture, and labor market impacts. By contrast, Tsutsui and his co-authors build on the view that the political relations between immigrants’ origin and host countries shape citizen attitudes toward them. The researchers draw on this international relations perspective to argue that immigrants (as opposed to refugees) from countries with contentious or conflictual relationships with the host country are generally less welcomed than those from allied nations.

To test this argument, the researchers used a method known as a forced-choice conjoint experiment, a technique whereby social scientists present survey participants with a series of hypothetical scenarios in which they must choose between two or more options — in this case, potential immigrants — each described by a set of varying attributes. Tsutsui and his co-authors had survey participants choose between two candidates for permanent residency, differentiated by their country of origin and various other attributes typically used in experiments to determine if labor market concerns outweigh preferences for specific immigrants.

The researchers fielded the experiment with nationally representative samples in 22 democracies, mostly in Europe and the Americas but also Asia and South Africa. They assigned four countries of origin to the immigrant profiles: two countries of origin with a similar racial and cultural make-up as the majority of the survey respondents, a rival country and an ally; and two countries with a different racial and cultural make-up.

The results strongly support the geopolitical rivalry argument: “In each of the survey countries, immigrants from non-rival countries are strongly preferred over those from rival countries,” the co-authors write. “The effect is so large that it results in a net preference for immigrants from countries with a dissimilar racial and cultural makeup than the majority of the host country.”

The researchers also show that the greater the respondents’ sense of their own country’s superiority, the stronger the international relations of their governments are mirrored in their preferences for immigrants. Furthermore, they find that members of ethno-racial majorities are more prone to the rivalry effect because they are more strongly identified with their nation compared to minority members.

The authors demonstrate that, for instance, in Western Europe, immigrants from Russia are less favored, while in East Asia, Chinese immigrants face similar hostility. This animosity towards immigrants from rival nations leads to a net preference for those with different racial or cultural backgrounds compared to the more favorable reception of immigrants from allied countries.

“The mechanisms we document in this article play an important part in the overall dynamic leading to the selective rejection or acceptance of immigrants,” Tsutsui and his colleagues summarize.

Addressing Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

In their empirical analysis, the researchers found minimal evidence of broad anti-Asian sentiment or “Sinophobia” beyond the effects of political rivalry. This conclusion holds consistently across various survey countries, continents, and immigrant origin countries. The detailed examination by survey country indicates that generalized racial or cultural biases did not significantly influence the observed preference for immigrants from politically aligned countries. The authors propose that future research expand the sample of survey countries, update and refine measures of political rivalry, and include a broader range of immigrant origins.

The study offers a new lens connecting geopolitical rivalries with xenophobia, providing a more nuanced understanding of public attitudes toward immigrants. Policymakers and researchers can use this framework to better anticipate and address potential backlash against immigrants from countries with politically contentious relations. Informed immigration policies that promote multiculturalism and social inclusion start with a deeper grasp of the forces shaping public perceptions and attitudes toward immigrants.

The problem, Fayyad said, is that a two-state solution has never been defined with adequate precision. “Part of this is to be expected if something is going to be the product of negotiations,” as was not the case in prior years with proposals such as the Oslo Accords.

On Oct. 7, 2023, Palestinian militants led by Hamas attacked Israel, killing almost 1,200 people, and Israel responded by launching an invasion of Gaza that has killed more than 34,000 Palestinians as of April 2024. With the war ongoing for seven months now, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict goes back many decades to 1948, when Israel was established. The question now is, what does the future hold for Gaza, the Palestinian people, Israel, and stability in the Middle East?

Fayyad raised the issue of what the key organizing principle to determine a future State of Palestine and a peaceful solution with Israel could be.

He said, “That process must be preceded by formal recognition of our rights as a people, our national rights. It's very important. Oslo was not about that. Oslo was very transactional.”

‘Voices in these discussions’

Sallam, a moderator, said in an email prior to the event that “the ongoing war has caused a grave humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza with tens of thousands of deaths, a serious risk of famine, and a pressing public health crisis. It is important for us to advance as many conversations as possible about how we got to this reality and how we can find a peaceful exit out of it. And it is imperative to elevate and center Palestinian voices in these discussions.”

He added, “Dr. Fayyad’s visit to CDDRL’s Program on Arab Reform and Democracy promises to shed light on a host of pressing questions that the Stanford community has been grappling with since last year. It is a timely opportunity to learn, engage, and deliberate.”

Fayyad is an economist who served as minister of finance for the Palestinian Authority from 2002 to 2005 and as prime minister from 2007 to 2013. During his tenure, he introduced a number of economic and governance reforms. Afterward, he founded "Future for Palestine," a nonprofit development foundation. He also worked for the International Monetary Fund, including as the resident representative in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Currently, he is a Visiting Senior Scholar and Daniella Lipper Coules '95 Distinguished Visitor in Foreign Affairs at the Princeton School of Public Affairs. He is also a distinguished statesman at the Atlantic Council and a distinguished fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Recognition of Rights

Fayyad said that the recognition of Palestinian rights is critical to any future negotiations. “One of the key lessons learned is that it's a mistake to engage in a problematic process that is not defined well in terms of outcome – what it is supposed to lead to if it is not based particularly from our point of view, or on recognition of our national rights as a people? Because so far, we have gotten none of that.”

He added, “I, like many Palestinians, would find it reasonable to engage in a process that could take us there in agreement and through negotiation.”

Fayyad said that if Palestinians' interests and those of all countries in the region are ultimately to live in peace and sustainable harmony, then the process must be recalibrated. “It has to be more principled.”

Asymmetry and Conflict History

Fayyad said that asymmetry exists between Palestinians and Israelis. “You see this everywhere, in terms of power relations, you see it everywhere, all facets of life. You see it on college campuses; you see it everywhere.”

For example, he said that Israel, over 75 years, has built a strong, vibrant economy with a strong military. “So, to deny people (Palestinians) the right to self-determination, which is a right that is absolute for us under international law, just like any other people anywhere in the world,” is asymmetrical.

He noted, “It is equally important, if not more important, for us Palestinians to understand that just because we are the weaker party in this balance of power … that we must actively assume full agency in the act of our liberation. We must.”

During the conversation, Diamond told Fayyad, “Everything you've talked about was challenging enough on Oct. 6.” But, he asked, how have the last seven months after a devastating terrorist attack affected everything, including the war in Gaza that has leveled much of the physical infrastructure of the country? “Where do we go from here?”

Fayyad described Oct. 7 as a “major shock” that has made a solution more difficult and distant than it already was. He added that Israel’s response to eliminate Hamas is likely impossible to extremely unlikely.

A Sisyphean Task

Our freedom is an inalienable right, Fayyad said about the Palestinian people, and it's an inseparable component of them as human beings. 

“As human beings and members of the human race, like everyone, we have that to share with everyone else. You have to have that kind of recalibration.”

Future conversations between Palestinians and Israelis have to begin from the recognition that two equal parties exist to this disagreement, he said. “Not the oppressor, not the oppressed, not the master and the slave. Not the master and the surrogate.”

Fayyad compared the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to a Sisyphean task of sorts. 

“But I never really understood Sisyphus to be an exercise in futility myself,” he said. “You learn something every time that boulder rolls back on. It's really about empowerment. That’s why it is most inspiring to try it. Even if you fail, even if you know you’re going to fail, you learn from it, you learn from it, and you keep pushing that boulder up the hill. There will come a point in time when the stars align for that which is just.”

The Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University examines the different social and political dynamics within Arab countries and the evolution of their political systems, focusing on the prospects, conditions, and possible pathways for democratic reform in the region.

Click the link for a full transcript of “What We Need To Talk About When We Talk About Taiwan.“

The Likelihood of Invasion

In stark terms, Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, believes there’s a 100% chance China will use some sort of force against Taiwan in the next five years. For the last twenty years, China has been making concerted efforts to modernize its military and increase its capabilities not only to assert force against Taiwan, but to deter intervention from the United States.

In the majority of scenarios, the United States wins in a conflict with China over Taiwan. But the United States also carries a distinct geographic disadvantage. The distance across the Taiwan Strait between the island and mainland China is approximately 100 miles, which is roughly the distance between Richmond, Virginia and Washington D.C. If China moves quickly, PRC forces could take Taiwan before U.S. forces have time to move into position.

When considering possible outcomes in Taiwan, it is equally important to consider the motivations driving Beijing’s ambitions. The leadership on the mainland has been planning and thinking about how to retake Taiwan since 1949. With the modernized capabilities coming online, the balance of power has shifted in China’s military favor, and the cost-benefit calculus favors Beijing’s ambitions. The long-term planning stage is now reaching its end, and the prospects of direct action are increasing.

The View from Taipei

Political leaders in Taiwan recognize the growing danger they face across the Strait. In Larry Diamond’s assessment, the end of Hong Kong's autonomy and the suppression of the “one country, two systems” model, the rising military incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone and coastal waters, and the whole rising pace of Chinese military intimidation has sobered Taiwan and visibly impacted Taiwanese public opinion.

Concerningly though, while the political elite recognize the real and present danger of the situation, polling of the general Taiwan public suggests that the vast majority of citizens still feel like an attack or an invasion by China is unlikely. Similar majorities suggest that they would be willing to fight in Taiwan’s defense, but volunteering for military service remains at a minimum.

To maximize safety, Taiwan needs to find ways to strengthen itself in its ability to defend, resist, and deter China, while still avoiding any appearance of moving toward permanent independence or any other action that could be deemed by Beijing as a provocation, says Diamond.

What the United States Can Do

When it comes to the defense of Taiwan, the strategic crutch hobbling the United States is geography. Most of the U.S. Pacific forces are not in Asia. The majority are in Hawaii and California, as well as a few bases and airfields in Japan. To be able to effectively deter China, the U.S. needs far greater forward deployed military capability in order to be able to either stop or stall the movement of Chinese troops into Taiwan, says Mastro.

Taiwan needs greater onshore military deterrence capabilities as well. One such strategy is the “porcupine approach,” which increases the number of smaller mobile lethal weapons. By Larry Diamond’s assessment, increased citizen participation in military training is also crucial, with an emphasis on weapons training and urban defense tactics. The U.S. could support these aims by overhauling the current system for weapons procurement to speed up the production and delivery of weapons systems not just for Taiwan, but to the benefit of U.S. defense and other contingencies as well. Working with leadership to create strategic stockpiles of food, and energy should also be a priority, says Diamond.

The U.S. also needs to put much more effort into its diplomatic efforts on behalf of Taiwan. Many U.S. allies and partners are reluctant to ostracize China because of economic ties and concerns over sparking their own conflict with China in the future. A key ally in all of this is Japan. If Japan fights with the United States on behalf of Taiwan, it is a guaranteed win and enough to effectively deter China. But much more needs to be done much more quickly in order to secure those guarantees and present them in a convincing way to Beijing.

“The clock is ticking,” Larry Diamond says. “And the problem is we don’t know how fast it’s ticking. “Taiwan is moving in the right direction. But we need to move faster than we're moving.”

Click the link for a transcript of "Putin's Failed War."

The following commentary from Michael McFaul has been excerpted from his original conversation and edited for length and clarity.

Russia and China’s Relationship

Publicly, there’s still support and solidarity between XI Jinping and Vladimir Putin. But we have to look at what’s happening between the lines. I think it’s pretty tense. At the most recent Shanghai Cooperation Summit in Kazakhstan, Putin acknowledged that one of his agenda items was to address Chinese concerns about what he called “the Ukraine crisis.”

“Concerns” is not a very friendly word. In the Russian readout of that meeting, Putin expressed his appreciation for Xi’s “balanced approach” to Russia’s operations in Ukraine.  But a “balanced approach” is hardly a big sign of support. In the Chinese readout of the meeting, Xi doesn’t even mention Ukraine.

I think the Chinese are shocked, quite frankly, by how poorly the Russian Armed Forces are performing. So many countries, China and the U.S. included, assumed that Russia had the world’s third most powerful military. But it turns out that just counting tanks and the GDP per capita spend on your military does not capture the full extent of its capabilities. If you’re China and you thought you had a loyal, powerful partner, I think this is raising a lot of doubts right now.

Conflict, Economics, and Energy

I have a hard time thinking of a single Russian living in Russia, who's benefiting from this war.

Some people say that sanctions aren’t working. Right now the aggregate numbers do look good for Russia, and that’s because the price of oil and gas went up as a result of their war. But that’s only a short-term gain.

Over 1,000 Western companies have left. That means the innovation, that technology that comes with those companies is also being pulling out. When Exxon Mobil pulled out of Russia, that means technology for their oil industry that we would have been seeing the results of for decades and the future is going to be lost.

And it’s important to remember that the biggest sanctions haven't come yet. Those will happen in December when the Europeans are going to reduce their imports of gas from Russia by a significant amount, and the G7 countries are going to lead an effort to put a price cap on all exports of Russian oil.

Russia thinks it can use energy to blackmail Europe and the West. I think they’ve miscalculated on this. I think they're underestimating the reaction many Europeans might have to being coerced. Nobody likes to be extorted. Nobody likes to be blackmailed.

I thinks it’s a basic psychological thing that when someone is trying to extort you, your response is not going to be, “Oh my goodness, we’ve got to lift sanctions and be friends with this guy that's freezing us.” I think it will be just the opposite, that people are going to be a little colder and be willing to pay a little more to get back at the guy who tired to do this to them.

The War Ahead

I sometimes get accused of being a warmonger. I see it exactly the opposite. Putin will not stop fighting until the Ukrainian army stops him on the battlefield. So if we really want peace in Ukraine, we must continue to arm the Ukrainians.

Putin has already radically failed in this conflict. He thought the Russian army would be embraced as liberators, and it didn’t happen. He thought he could take Kyiv, and it didn’t happen.

This is a horrific war. The Russian Armed Forces attack civilian targets. That's terrorism. I'm not an expert; I don't know what the exact definition of terrorism is, but that feels like a terrorist act to me. They're not counter attacking the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They're literally trying to shut down the electricity grid and literally trying to drown people.

Putin doesn't care about basic human existence, and he's demonstrated that by the way he is fighting and by the way he is shipping innocent people into his country. He doesn't play by basic rules of the game that we thought were in place after 1945.

A month or two into the war, the Ukrainian government in Kyiv was talking in a much more limited way. Now that they've had these achievements and these victories, they're much more optimistic about their capabilities. And who are we to judge whether they're right or wrong? Because we've been wrong in judging their capabilities several times before. So, who am I to say, and who is anybody to say, that they don't have the capabilities to achieve these bigger objectives?

The following commentary has been edited for clarity and length, and does not represent the full extent of the panel’s discussion.
 

Rethinking Assumptions about Russia and Putin

Kathryn Stoner

Right now, Putin is the most vulnerable he's ever been in 22 years in power. But I don’t believe he's under so much pressure at this point that he is about to leave office anytime soon. Autocracies do not usually die by popular mobilization, unfortunately. More often they end through an elite coup or turnover. And since the end of WWII, the research has shown that about 75% of the time autocracies are typically replaced by another autocracy, or the perpetuation of the same autocracy, just with a different leader. So, if Putin were replaced, you might get a milder form of autocracy in Russia, but I don't think you are suddenly going to create a liberal democracy.

This means that we in the West, and particularly in the U.S., need to think very hard about our strategies and how we are going to manage our relationships with Putin and his allies. This time last year, the U.S. broadcast that we basically wanted Russia to calm down so we could pivot to China. That’s an invitation to not calm down, and I think it was a mistake to transmit that as policy.

We need to pay attention to what Russia has been doing. They are the second biggest purveyor of weapons globally after the United States. They will sell to anyone. They’ve been forgiving loans throughout Sub Saharan Africa from the Soviet period and using that as a way of bargaining for access to natural resources. They’re marketing oil, selling infrastructure, and building railroads. Wherever there is a vacuum, someone will fill it, and that includes Russia every bit as much as China. We need to realize that we are in competition with both Russia and China, and develop our policies and outreach accordingly.

Confronting Autocracy at Home and Abroad

Anna Grzymala-Busse

Why is Putin in Ukraine? Because the fact that there is a democratic country right next door to Russia is an affront to him. Putin doesn’t care that much about NATO. The fact that nothing happened when Sweden joined is some evidence of this. That’s something to keep in mind as people are debating NATO and Ukraine and Ukraine’s possible future as a member.

NATO membership and EU membership are both wonderful things. But more fundamental that that, this war has to be won first. That’s why I think it’s necessary in the next six months to speed up the support for Ukraine by ensuring there’s a steady stream of armaments, training personnel, and providing other military support.

There’s been incredible unity on Ukraine over the last seven months across the EU, NATO, and amongst our allies. But our recent history with President Trump reminds us how fragile these international commitments can be. In foreign policy, it used to be understood that America stands for liberal democracy. But we had a president of the United States who was more than happy to sidle up to some of the worst autocrats in the world. That’s why we can’t afford to leave rising populism around the world unaddressed and fail to engage with voters. When we do that, we allow far right parties to grab those votes and go unopposed. Whatever happens domestically impacts what happens internationally.

The Consequences of Nuclear Sabre-Rattling

Scott Sagan

We have to very clear-eyed when we’re talking about the threat, however improbable, of the use of a nuclear weapon. When it comes to the deployment of a tactical nuclear weapon, its kinetic effects depend on both the size of the weapon, the yield, and the target. Tactical weapons range in yield from very low — 5-10% of what was in the Hiroshima bomb — to as large as what was used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If that kind of weapon was used on an urban target, it would produce widescale effects. In a battlefield or rural area, it would have a relatively small impact.

But in the bigger picture, what any use of a weapon like this does is break a 70+ year tradition of non-use. Those seventy years have been dicey and fragile, but they have held so far. A tradition that is broken creates a precedent, and once there’s a precedent, it makes it much easier for someone to transgress the tradition again. So even if a decision was made to use a tactical weapon with little kinetic importance for strategic effect, I think we still need to be worried about it.

Personalistic dictators surround themselves with yes men. They make lonely decisions by themselves, often filled with vengeance and delusion because no one can tell them otherwise. They don't have the checks and balances. But I want to make one point about a potential coup or overthrow. Putin has done a lot to protect himself against that. But improbable events happen all the time, especially when leaders make really, really bad decisions. That’s not something we should be calling for as official U.S. policy, but it should be our hope.

Cycles of Conflict, Climate Change, and Food Insecurity

Marshall Burke

The estimates right now project that there are 350 million people around the world facing acute food insecurity. That means 350 million people who literally don’t have enough to eat. That’s roughly double what it was pre-COVID. The factors driving that are things like supply chain disruptions from the pandemic and climate shocks, but also because of ongoing conflict happening around the world, Ukraine included.

There was an early concern that the war in Ukraine would be a huge threat to global food security. That largely has not been the case so far, at least directly. Opening the grain corridors through the Black Sea has been crucial to this, and it’s critical that we keep those open and keep the wheat flowing out. Research shows that unrest increases when food prices spike, so it’s important for security everywhere to keep wheat prices down.

What I’m worried about now is natural gas prices. With high global natural gas prices, that means making fertilizer is also very expensive and prices have increased up to 300% relative to a few years ago. If they stay that high, this is going to be a long-term problem we will have to find a way of reckoning with on top of the other effects from climate change already impacting global crop production and the global economy.

Ukraine After the War

Francis Fukuyama

I've been more optimistic about the prospects for Ukraine taking back territory for more of this war, just because of the vast difference in motivation between the two sides and the supply of modern weapons that Ukraine has been getting. But I don’t know what the conditions on the ground will look like when the decision to negotiate comes. Will Russia still be sitting on occupied territory? Are they kicked out entirely? Or are the frontlines close to where they are now?

As I’ve observed, Ukraine's demands have shifted depending on how they perceive the war going on. There was a point earlier this summer where they hinted that a return to the February 23 borderlines would be acceptable. But now with their recent successes, they're saying they want everything back to the 2014 lines. What actually happens will depend on what the military situation looks like next spring, by my guess.

However the war does end, I think Ukraine actually has a big opportunity ahead of them. Putin has unwittingly become the father of a new Ukrainian nation. The stresses of the war have created a very strong sense of national identity in Ukraine that didn’t exist previously. It’s accurate that Ukraine had significant problems with corruption and defective institutions before, but I think there’s going to be a great push to rout that out. Even things like the Azov steel factory being bombed out of existence is probably a good thing in the long run, because Ukraine was far too dependent on 20^th-century coal, steel, and heavy industry. Now they have an opportunity to make a break from all of that.

There are going to be challenges, obviously. We’ll have to watch very carefully what Zelenskyy chooses to do with the commanding position he has at the moment, and whether the government will be able to release power back to the people and restore its institutions. But Europe and the West and our allies are going to have a really big role in the reconstruction of Ukraine, and that should be regarded by everyone as a tremendous opportunity.

Victory in Ukraine, Victory for Democracy

Michael McFaul

Nobody likes a loser, and right now, Putin is losing strategically, tactically, and morally. Now, he doesn’t really care about what Biden or NATO or the West think about him. But he does care about what the autocrats think about him, especially Xi Jinping. And with reports coming out of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that Xi has “concerns” about what’s happening in Ukraine, Putin is feeling that pressure. I think that's why he has decided he needs to double down, not to negotiate, but to try and “win” in some way as defined by him.

In my view, that’s what’s behind the seizure of these four regions. If he feels like he can unequivocally claim them as part of Russia, then maybe he will sue for peace. And that’s exactly what President Zelenskyy fears. Why? Because that’s exactly what happened in 2014. Putin took Crimea, then turned around to the countries of the world and said, “Aren’t we all tired of war? Can’t we just have peace? I’m ready to end the war, as long as you recognize the new borders.” And, let’s be honest, we did.

We keep hearing politicians say we should put pressure for peace negotiations. I challenge any of them to explain their strategy for getting Putin to talk about peace. There is no doubt in my mind that President Zelenskyy would sit down tomorrow to negotiate if there was a real prospect for peace negotiations. But there's also no doubt in my mind right now that Putin has zero interest in peace talks.

Like Dr. Fukuyama, I don’t know how this war will end. But there's nobody inside or outside of Russia that thinks it’s going well. I personally know a lot of people that believe in democracy in Russia. They believe in democracy just as much as you or I. I’ve no doubt of their convictions. But they’re in jail, or in exile today.

If we want to help Russia in the post-Putin world, we have to think about democracy. There’s not a lot we can do to directly help democracy in Russia right now. But we should be doing everything to help democracy in Ukraine.  It didn’t happen in 1991. It didn’t happen in 2004. It didn’t happen in 2014. They had those breakthroughs and those revolutionary moments, but we as the democratic world collectively didn’t get it right. This is our moment to get it right, both as a way of helping Ukraine secure its future, and to give inspiration to “small-d” democrats fighting for rights across the world.