Society

FSI researchers work to understand continuity and change in societies as they confront their problems and opportunities. This includes the implications of migration and human trafficking. What happens to a society when young girls exit the sex trade? How do groups moving between locations impact societies, economies, self-identity and citizenship? What are the ethnic challenges faced by an increasingly diverse European Union? From a policy perspective, scholars also work to investigate the consequences of security-related measures for society and its values.

The Europe Center reflects much of FSI’s agenda of investigating societies, serving as a forum for experts to research the cultures, religions and people of Europe. The Center sponsors several seminars and lectures, as well as visiting scholars.

Societal research also addresses issues of demography and aging, such as the social and economic challenges of providing health care for an aging population. How do older adults make decisions, and what societal tools need to be in place to ensure the resulting decisions are well-informed? FSI regularly brings in international scholars to look at these issues. They discuss how adults care for their older parents in rural China as well as the economic aspects of aging populations in China and India.

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The following is Part 2 of a two-article series on facilitating cross-cultural online learning. For Part 1, please go here.


Last month, I shared my reflections on a March 20, 2020 virtual class (VC) session that SPICE facilitated for high school students in Japan and the United States to engage in a cross-cultural online exchange. This online discussion engaged my U.S.-based students of the 2020 Reischauer Scholars Program and Waka Brown’s Japan-based students of the Spring 2020 Stanford e-Japan Program in a Zoom session, during which they talked and learned with and from one another on a range of topics, including the impact of COVID-19 within their respective communities.

During the main portion of the session, the 45 students were divided into six small breakout rooms to engage in 40 minutes of discussion. Each group had a designated volunteer student moderator and a notetaker/reporter; the latter was asked to share the key points of discussion from his or her small group when we reconvened towards the end of the 90-minute VC. All discussions were conducted in English, with the exception of one group, which was designated as a bilingual space for students who felt comfortable conversing in both English and Japanese.

Since this was the 2020 students’ first opportunity to meet (another joint VC on comparative education took place on April 10), we felt it important to preface the session by setting a few ground rules for discussion. Communication styles and norms—particularly in group settings—tend to be quite different in Japan and the United States. We have found it helpful, for example, to address these differences up-front to alleviate potential cross-cultural misunderstandings.

For assessment purposes, we also asked students to send feedback on their experiences in the session. Some of their comments are included below as we turn to the student perspectives on what they experienced in this joint online discussion. More specific points from our observations and students’ feedback fall into five areas.

First, the session provided a platform for students to talk openly about the COVID-19 pandemic and also to learn about perspectives from another country. Risako of Stanford e-Japan reflected, “I could … learn about the way American students perceive political issues and coronavirus through an absorbing discussion and was surprised to discover that their perspectives were much more similar to Japanese students than I had expected.” Alika of the RSP noted, “It was really interesting to me to see how different countries are coping with the virus. I was pretty surprised to hear that many Japanese people still use public transport/eat out at restaurants and go on with their daily lives in the face of the global pandemic.” She continued, “I think some of the e-Japan students were also surprised to hear that California has a ‘6 feet apart’ rule and that many restaurants have closed as a precaution.” Yasuyuki from Japan added, “It’s not difficult to look up the news to find out about what’s going on in America, but living in Japan, you hardly ever get the chance to talk with people in America and hear from the horse’s mouth.”

Second, the session underscored the importance of empathy at times like this. Kristie from the RSP commented, “I always enjoy finding commonalities between me and others, and I think our shared experiences with the coronavirus really allowed us to connect and understand one another. I think the most important thing I will take away from this experience is that youth in Japan and America are really no different—despite our varied experiences and interests we were able to communicate about issues facing our countries and relate to one another on a deeper level.” Similarly, Yuna of Stanford e-Japan noted, “Since I have had only [a] few opportunities to interact with American high schoolers, it was a precious time for me. It was wonderful especially because we both were interested in each other. Talking ... with them made me realize how [thin] the border between our minds actually are. We were, after all, just friends.”

Third, the session prompted students to reexamine their own culture. For example, Hiromu of Stanford e-Japan noted, “I feel very pleased to have such a wonderful opportunity to teach them [the RSP students about Japanese language] and, simultaneously, however, recognized how I lack information about Japanese culture. I think this integrated meeting is vital in that it provides us opportunities for looking back on our culture and broaden[ing] our narrow-minded thoughts.” Jin of the RSP added, “What’s more, they [the Stanford e-Japan students] all spoke fluent English. This made me reflect on the world languages education in the U.S. I think the U.S. should incorporate more global studies (both language and culture) in the education system. America-centric curriculum will cause the younger generation to lose a global vision, and become unaware of Japan as a major political and economic ally in East Asia.”

Fourth, the session shed light upon how diverse both countries are. Jin of the RSP noted, “I’ve always thought that Japan has a rather homogeneous population, but talking to e-Japan students has given me a new perspective on Japanese society. I encountered a student from Myanmar who is living in Japan currently, a Japanese student who used to live in NYC for four years, and a student from Singapore who has been studying abroad in Europe for a couple years.” Rinako of Stanford e-Japan reflected, “Up until now, even when I had the chance to communicate with people outside of Japan, it was usually done in English. However, this time, all three of the Reischauer Scholar students [in her small group] spoke fluent Japanese which made me very happy as we were able to use both English and Japanese.”

Fifth, we came to realize how invaluable international and cross-cultural dialog—especially during times of crisis—can be for students. Having a session during such an unprecedented time seemed to add special significance to the experience. Brandon of the RSP noted, “Overall, it was an extremely memorable discussion, and I hope that we can continue this kind of online cross-cultural connection throughout the rest of the program.” Many Stanford e-Japan students like Fuka also reflected upon the opportunity to discuss critical topics like the coronavirus at this time. She noted, “It gave me a chance to think about familiar issues not just with people of my own country but with people from all kinds of backgrounds.”

Students are among those most acutely experiencing the direct impact of this global pandemic. As they look into the future with confusion and uncertainty about their educational prospects and options, our students seemed to find comfort in this opportunity to connect with their like-minded peers across the Pacific. As they reflected upon their differences, they deepened their understanding of one another and forged what I hope become lasting friendships.


For more information about the Reischauer Scholars Program or the Stanford e-Japan Program, please visit our programs’ webpages at reischauerscholars.org and stanfordejapan.org. SPICE also offers other online courses to U.S. high school students on China (China Scholars Program) and Korea (Sejong Korea Scholars Program), and an online course to Chinese high school students on the United States (Stanford e-China Program).

To stay informed of SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.


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To celebrate its May release, contributors Karen Eggleston, Barry Naughton, and Andrew Walder will join editors Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi for a panel discussion of their volume Fateful Decisions: Choices That Will Shape China’s Future (Stanford University Press).  China has enjoyed an extraordinary run of rapid growth and development over the last 40 years.  Yet, as Fingar and Oi point out, China’s future is hardly set in stone.  Sustained economic growth, social welfare and stability will depend upon tough policy decisions confronting Beijing’s leaders today in what is a watershed moment.  Casting doubt on Beijing’s aversion to major reforms and its return to certain Mao-era policy tools, Oi and Fingar argue that China’s challenges are not only complex, but high-stakes – challenges that have become even more daunting in the aftermath of COVID-19.  As China battles the difficulties caused by an aging population, the loss of comparative economic advantage, a politically entrenched elite, and a population with rising expectations, today’s policy decisions will weigh heavily on its future. Topics explored in the volume include China's healthcare challenges in a slowing economy, its global ambitions and track record, economic aims and realities, the country’s mounting governance pressures, and more. 

 

Fateful Decisions is available for purchase here.

 

Fore more information on Fateful Decisions, check out these articles:

Karen Eggleston Examines China’s Looming Demographic Crisis, in Fateful Decisions

Now It Gets Much Harder: Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi Discuss China’s Challenges in The Washington Quarterly

China’s Challenges: Now It Gets Much Harder

 

Portrait of Karen EgglestonKaren Eggleston is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University, director of the Stanford Asia Health Policy Program, and deputy director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI. She is also a fellow with the Stanford Center for Innovation in Global Health and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Eggleston earned her PhD in public policy from Harvard University, studied in China for two years, and was a Fulbright scholar in South Korea. Her research focuses on comparative health systems and health reform in Asia, especially China; government and market roles in the health sector; supply-side incentives; healthcare productivity; and economic aspects of demographic change.

 

Portrait of Thomas FingarThomas Fingar is a Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Previous positions include assistant secretary of state for Intelligence and Research (2000-2001, 2004–2005), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001–2003), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994–2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, and chief of the China Division. Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (AB in government and history) and Stanford University (MA and PhD, both in political science). His most recent books are Uneasy Partnerships: China’s Engagement with Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (editor) (Stanford University Press, 2017); The New Great Game: China’s Relations with South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform (editor) (Stanford University Press, 2016); and Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011).

 

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Barry Naughton is the So Kwanlok Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California–San Diego. Naughton’s work on the Chinese economy focuses on market transition; industry and technology; foreign trade; and political economy. His first book, Growing Out of the Plan, won the Ohira Prize in 1996, and a new edition of his popular survey and textbook, The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth, appeared in 2018. Naughton did his dissertation research in China in 1982 and received his PhD in economics from Yale University.

 

Jean C. OiJean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. She directs the China Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and is the Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. Oi has published extensively on China’s reforms. Recent books include Zouping Revisited: Adaptive Governance in a Chinese County, coedited with Steven Goldstein (Stanford University Press, 2018), and Challenges in the Process of China’s Urbanization, coedited with Karen Eggleston and Yiming Wang (2017). Current research is on fiscal reform and local government debt, continuing SOE reforms, and the Belt and Road Initiative.

 

Portrait of Andrew WalderAndrew G. Walder is the Denise O’Leary and Kent Thiry Professor of Sociology in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. A political sociologist, Walder has long specialized in the study of contemporary Chinese society and political economy. After receiving his PhD at the University of Michigan, he taught at Columbia, Harvard, and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. At Stanford he has served as chair of the Department of Sociology, director of the Asia-Pacific Research Center, and director of the Division of International, Comparative, and Area Studies in the School of Humanities and Sciences. His most recent books are Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement (2009), China under Mao: A Revolution Derailed (2015), and Agents of Disorder: Inside China’s Cultural Revolution (2019).

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Karen Eggleston <br> Senior Fellow at FSI; Director of the Asia Health Policy Program, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University <br><br>
Thomas Fingar <br> Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Stanford University <br><br>
Barry Naughton <br> Sokwanlok Chair of Chinese International Affairs, School of Global Policy and Strategy, UC San Diego <br><br>
Jean C. Oi <br> Director, Stanford China Program; William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Stanford University <br><br>
Andrew Walder <br> Senior Fellow at FSI; Denise O'Leary and Kent Thiry Professor, Stanford University <br><br>
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WATARU FUKUDA
Chief Representative of the Shizuoka Prefectural Government in Singapore
Global Affiliates Program Fellow, 2014-16

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Wataru Fukuda
In Singapore, the government is strongly restricting our business activities and daily life. Foreign companies like the one I work for worry about receiving penalties from the government for violating COVID-19 prevention measures. In Japan, the government is asking people to self-isolate in their communities. It seems like there is a big difference between Japan and Singapore in how the authorities are handling COVID-19.

 

TSUYOSHI KOSHIKAWA
Chief Advisor, Japan International Cooperation Agency Expert for the Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Industry in Myanmar
Global Affiliates Program Fellow, 2014-15

Tsuyoshi KoshikawaI currently live in Naypyitaw, Myanmar, though I am originally from Japan. Naypyitaw is currently not under shelter-in-place, though the city of Yangon is. In Naypyitaw, restaurants are serving only take-out meals, and most amusement facilities like movie theaters, karaoke boxes, bars, and beauty salons have been closed. There are still a few big department stores open, as well as the public golf course and tennis courts.

At the time of this writing, the number of known COVID-19 cases in Myanmar is nearly 150, and I am worried about the potential risks because the healthcare and medical information systems here are not as organized as in countries like Japan, the UK, or the United States.

Anyone with a fever of 37.5 degrees C (99.5 F) or higher is being kept from entering Yangon. The Ministry of Health is taking all traveler’s temperatures at the airport, railways stations, and the exits of all highway interchanges throughout Yangon. Foreigners with a fever of 38 degrees C (100.4 F) have been told that they will not be permitted into private hospitals anywhere in Myanmar at present. Isolation wards in general hospitals will accommodate foreigners. The situation is frightening, but with frequent handwashing and hygiene, we are trying to take care of each other.

XIAOYUAN SHI
Deputy General Manager in the Internal Audit Bureau at the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
Global Affiliates Program Fellow, 2012-13

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Xiaoyuan Shi
In China, we’ve been dealing with COVID-19 since last December. The government locked down Wuhan City starting in January and asked all people to avoid gatherings or unnecessary trips out. Wearing masks in public and frequently washing hands have also been required. We've strictly followed these directives. As manufacturing, entertainment, social activities, and travel have been suspended, society has slowed down and the economy has experienced significant losses.

Thankfully, our efforts have worked. The new confirmed cases are mostly coming in from foreign travel. Big cities like Beijing and Shanghai have low infection rates, and people feel much less stressed. Social life, work, and production are recovering, and the lockdown of Wuhan City has been lifted. Most schools will continue to use online classes for the time being and restaurants are still not fully open, but I think the most difficult time is behind us.

It’s impossible to spot all of the potential virus carriers, and therefore precautionary measures like avoiding going out unnecessarily, wearing masks in public, and handwashing are still recommended. I’ve not heard of COVID-19 cases or deaths among my acquaintances, thankfully, but the conditions here have proven that this virus is highly infectious and death is possible. I hope our practices here can provide some references for other places where it is spreading.

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Karen Eggleston Examines China’s Looming Demographic Crisis, in Fateful Decisions

Karen Eggleston Examines China’s Looming Demographic Crisis, in Fateful Decisions
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We've asked some of our former scholars how COVID-19 is changing life in the many places around the world they call home.

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Early this year, Vladimir Putin had big plans for an excellent spring:  first, constitutional amendments approved by the legislative branch and public allowing him the opportunity to remain in power until 2036, followed by a huge patriotic celebration of the 75th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany.  Well, stuff happens—specifically, COVID-19.  Putin’s spring has turned out quite differently from what he had hoped.

Big Plans for the Spring

The president surprised Russians on January 15 in his annual speech to the Federal Assembly (the lower house of the Russian legislative branch).  He proposed amending the constitution to reduce the authority of the presidency, increase the power of the Federal Assembly, and provide a legal basis for a State Council.

The amendments prompted speculation that Putin, who likes to have options, sought to create ways to hold on to power after 2024, when term limits would require him to step down from the presidency.  He might become an empowered prime minister or head the State Council.

Then, on March 10, another surprise.  A Federal Assembly deputy proposed an additional amendment that would, in effect, allow Putin to run for president twice more, opening the possibility that he could remain in office until 2036.  He had consistently argued in the past against ending term limits.  However, according to the Kremlin spokesperson, Putin was so taken with the deputy’s justification that he changed his mind on the spot.

Things can move fast in Russia—especially when Putin wants them.  On March 11, the Federal Assembly approved the constitutional amendments by a vote of 383-0, and the Federal Council (Russia’s senate) gave its approval 160-1.  (Nothing like having a rubber-stamp legislative branch.)  Within two days, all 85 regional parliaments had approved the amendments.  The Constitutional Court worked over a weekend and, on March 16, unsurprisingly found the amendments consistent with the constitution.

All told, it took just six days to check the legal requirements for amending the constitution.  Putin, however, desired more.  He called in January for a nationwide referendum on April 22 to approve the package of amendments.  The constitution provides no requirement for such a vote.  Putin wanted it to further legitimize the changes to the constitution.  Popular endorsement would undercut any future challenge should he decide to run for reelection in 2024.

Topping off the spring would be the May 9 celebration of the 75th anniversary of VE Day.  Putin has built this holiday up to rival New Year’s Day, traditionally the biggest holiday for Russians.  The celebration of World War II veterans and a large military parade on Red Square not only remind Russians of their country’s part in defeating Hitler, but they also play well to the themes of nationalism and Russia’s place as a great power on the world stage that Putin has embraced and perpetuated, particularly over the past eight years.

COVID-19 Intrudes

Alas for Putin, reality intruded.  The number of COVID-19 cases began to grow in mid-March.  As of April 21, the country reported over 52,000 cases, with more than half of those just in Moscow.  The number undoubtedly is understated—as in many countries—if for no other reason than some are asymptomatic or suffer mild symptoms.  There are also indications that local health authorities are underreporting cases.

Moscow’s mayor adopted a shelter-at-home policy, but with lots of exceptions.  While the mayor asserted that the city’s hospitals had sufficient capacity, medical staff described more difficult situations, and videos showed ambulances in line to wait hours to admit patients.  The health infrastructure outside of Moscow and other large cities is weaker, raising concern about the virus’s impact in rural areas.

Much like his American counterpart, Putin responded slowly to the mushrooming health crisis, leaving it to mayors and regional authorities to manage.  Sounding a lot like Donald Trump in February, Putin told Russians on April 19 (Orthodox Easter) “the situation is under full control.”  He has raised his public profile the past ten days, conducting videoconferences from his residence outside Moscow.  Russia, however, may be just beginning its COVID-19 trial.

As the number of cases grew in March, questions arose about the feasibility of the April 22 referendum.  Putin apparently very much desired it, and the Kremlin wanted a large turnout to bolster the referendum’s legitimacy.  Some suggested the referendum could be conducted over several days, allowing voters to space out visits to polling stations.  But the Kremlin bowed to reality and announced on March 25 that the referendum would be postponed.

Likewise, the Kremlin hoped that the May 9 commemoration could go forward, and troops began practicing for the military parade (one video showed thousands of soldiers in close formation with no masks).  However, the day’s heroes—World War II veterans now in their 90s—constitute an age-group very vulnerable to COVID-19.  Going forward with a celebration that could devastate their ranks hardly made sense.  On April 16, Putin announced a postponement.

The Economic Prognosis Looks Grim

Instead of a big public endorsement of his constitutional amendments and a patriotic gala on May 9, Putin faces a daunting challenge:  the combination of COVID-19 and an economy in trouble.  Under the virus’s impact, Russia’s already anemic economy is headed for recession.  The International Monetary Fund expects it to contract by 5.5 percent in 2020.

Complicating the economic picture for the Kremlin is continued application of Western sanctions due to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its conflict with Ukraine in Donbas.  Economists estimate they cost Russia 1-1.5 percent of its gross domestic product.  While Russian officials downplay the effect, they miss few opportunities to ask for their removal.  For example, Putin used his intervention in the March 26 videoconference of G20 leaders to call for an end to all international sanctions.

COVID-19 has another negative impact on the Russian economy.  It has crashed global demand for oil, by far Russia’s most important export.  Perhaps not expecting the economic consequences of the virus, Russia on March 6 did not agree to an OPEC proposal to reduce production.  Igor Sechin, head of the Rosneft Oil Company and a close associate of Putin, reportedly wanted to drive the price down to push U.S. shale oil producers out of the market (their production has boosted the United States to supplant Russia and Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer).

The price dropped, more than Sechin might have anticipated.  Saudi Arabia responded to Russia’s refusal to cut production by boosting its own output and cutting the price.  On March 8, the price of oil fell 30 percent.  The resulting havoc hurt both sides.  On April 9, Russia and OPEC agreed to cut production by about 10 million barrels per day.

Whether that will suffice is uncertain.  The global economic slowdown has caused demand for oil to drop by 20-25 millions barrels per day.  On April 21, the price of a barrel of Brent oil fell below $20, a price not seen since 2002.  That was down from $74 one year earlier (the Russian government budget was designed to balance at a price of $42 per barrel).  The per barrel export duty collected by the Russian government fell to below $1, also the lowest since 2002.  Russia has to cut 2.5 million of barrels per day of production to meet its part of the April 9 agreement.  With oil storage facilities nearing capacity, there may well be further price drops before things turn around.

None of this is good news for the Russian economy, but how hard a hit it will take remains to be seen.  Thus far, the Kremlin has adopted a stimulus package to counter the COVID-19 economic consequences that is relatively modest, especially compared to programs being implemented by the United States, Germany, Britain and other industrial countries.

Managing the health crisis and its economic consequences, which could affect Putin’s approval rating—something to which the Kremlin pays extraordinarily close attention—is now the Russian president’s top preoccupation.  This is not anything like he anticipated three months ago.

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Co-sponsored by the King Center on Global Development and Shorenstein APARC, this virtual panel discusses the impacts of the coronavirus pandemics on China's urban and rural employment and its health care sectors. Karen Eggleston, Hongbin Li, Scott Rozelle, and Xueguang Zhou will share their expertise during this critical time as China lifts its lockdown and U.S. cases of COVID-19 ramp up.

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Dr. Karen Eggleston
Karen Eggleston is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University, and director of the Stanford Asia Health Policy Program and deputy director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI. She is also a fellow with the Center for Innovation in Global Health at Stanford University School of Medicine, and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Eggleston earned her PhD in public policy from Harvard University and has MA degrees in economics and Asian studies from the University of Hawaii and a BA in Asian studies summa cum laude (valedictorian) from Dartmouth College. Eggleston studied in China for two years and was a Fulbright scholar in Korea. Her research focuses on government and market roles in the health sector and Asia health policy, especially in China, India, Japan, and Korea; healthcare productivity; and the economics of the demographic transition. She served on the Strategic Technical Advisory Committee for the Asia Pacific Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, and has been a consultant to the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the WHO regarding health system reforms in the PRC.

 

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Dr. Hongbin Li
Hongbin Li is the James Liang Director of the China Program at the Stanford King Center on Global Development, and a senior fellow of Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR). Hongbin Li obtained a PhD in economics from Stanford University in 2001 and joined the economics department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), where he became full professor in 2007. He was also one of the two founding directors of the Institute of Economics and Finance at the CUHK. He taught at Tsinghua University in Beijing 2007-2016 and was C.V. Starr Chair Professor of Economics in the School of Economics and Management. He also founded and served as the executive associate director of the China Data Center at Tsinghua. He also co-directs the China Enterprise Survey and Data Center at Wuhan University, which conducts the China Employer-Employee Survey (CEES).

 

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Dr. Scott Rozelle
Scott Rozelle is the Helen F. Farnsworth Senior Fellow and the co-director of the Rural Education Action Program in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He received his BS from the University of California, Berkeley, and his MS and PhD from Cornell University. Previously, Rozelle was a professor at the University of California, Davis and an assistant professor in Stanford’s Food Research Institute and department of economics. He currently is a member of several organizations, including the American Economics Association, the International Association for Agricultural Economists, and the Association for Asian Studies. Rozelle also serves on the editorial boards of Economic Development and Cultural Change, Agricultural Economics, the Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, and the China Economic Review.

 

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Dr. Xueguang Zhou
Xueguang Zhou is the Kwoh-Ting Li Professor in Economic Development, a professor of sociology and a Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies senior fellow. His main area of research is institutional changes in contemporary Chinese society, focusing on Chinese organizations and management, social inequality, and state-society relationships. One of his current research projects is a study of the rise of the bureaucratic state in China. He works with students and colleagues to conduct participatory observations of government behaviors in the area of environmental regulation enforcement, in policy implementation, in bureaucratic bargaining, and in incentive designs. With colleagues and students, he also studies patterns of career mobility and personnel flow among different government offices to understand intra-organizational relationships in the Chinese bureaucracy.

 

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Center Fellow at the Center for Health Policy and the Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research
Faculty Research Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research
Faculty Affiliate at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
karen-0320_cropprd.jpg PhD

Karen Eggleston is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University and Director of the Stanford Asia Health Policy Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI. She is also a Fellow with the Center for Innovation in Global Health at Stanford University School of Medicine, and a Faculty Research Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Her research focuses on government and market roles in the health sector and Asia health policy, especially in China, India, Japan, and Korea; healthcare productivity; and the economics of the demographic transition.

Eggleston earned her PhD in public policy from Harvard University and has MA degrees in economics and Asian studies from the University of Hawaii and a BA in Asian studies summa cum laude (valedictorian) from Dartmouth College. Eggleston studied in China for two years and was a Fulbright scholar in Korea. She served on the Strategic Technical Advisory Committee for the Asia Pacific Observatory on Health Systems and Policies and has been a consultant to the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the WHO regarding health system reforms in the PRC.

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Scott Rozelle is the Helen F. Farnsworth Senior Fellow and the co-director of Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University. He received his BS from the University of California, Berkeley, and his MS and PhD from Cornell University. Previously, Rozelle was a professor at the University of California, Davis and an assistant professor in Stanford’s Food Research Institute and department of economics. He currently is a member of several organizations, including the American Economics Association, the International Association for Agricultural Economists, and the Association for Asian Studies. Rozelle also serves on the editorial boards of Economic Development and Cultural Change, Agricultural Economics, the Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, and the China Economic Review.

His research focuses almost exclusively on China and is concerned with: agricultural policy, including the supply, demand, and trade in agricultural projects; the emergence and evolution of markets and other economic institutions in the transition process and their implications for equity and efficiency; and the economics of poverty and inequality, with an emphasis on rural education, health and nutrition.

Rozelle's papers have been published in top academic journals, including Science, Nature, American Economic Review, and the Journal of Economic Literature. His book, Invisible China: How the Urban-Rural Divide Threatens China’s Rise, was published in 2020 by The University of Chicago Press. He is fluent in Chinese and has established a research program in which he has close working ties with several Chinese collaborators and policymakers. For the past 20 years, Rozelle has been the chair of the International Advisory Board of the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy; a co-director of the University of California's Agricultural Issues Center; and a member of Stanford's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Center on Food Security and the Environment.

In recognition of his outstanding achievements, Rozelle has received numerous honors and awards, including the Friendship Award in 2008, the highest award given to a non-Chinese by the Premier; and the National Science and Technology Collaboration Award in 2009 for scientific achievement in collaborative research.

Faculty affiliate at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Faculty Affiliate at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
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Scott Rozelle Helen F. Farnsworth Senior Fellow, Co-director of REAP Freeman Spogli Institute

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-6392 (650) 723-6530
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Kwoh-Ting Li Professor in Economic Development
Professor of Sociology
Faculty Affiliate at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
Xueguang Zhou_0.jpg PhD

Xueguang Zhou is the Kwoh-Ting Li Professor in Economic Development, a professor of sociology, and a Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies senior fellow. His main area of research is on institutional changes in contemporary Chinese society, focusing on Chinese organizations and management, social inequality, and state-society relationships.

One of Zhou's current research projects is a study of the rise of the bureaucratic state in China. He works with students and colleagues to conduct participatory observations of government behaviors in the areas of environmental regulation enforcement, in policy implementation, in bureaucratic bargaining, and in incentive designs. He also studies patterns of career mobility and personnel flow among different government offices to understand intra-organizational relationships in the Chinese bureaucracy.

Another ongoing project is an ethnographic study of rural governance in China. Zhou adopts a microscopic approach to understand how peasants, village cadres, and local governments encounter and search for solutions to emerging problems and challenges in their everyday lives, and how institutions are created, reinforced, altered, and recombined in response to these problems. Research topics are related to the making of markets, village elections, and local government behaviors.

His recent publications examine the role of bureaucracy in public goods provision in rural China (Modern China, 2011); interactions among peasants, markets, and capital (China Quarterly, 2011); access to financial resources in Chinese enterprises (Chinese Sociological Review, 2011, with Lulu Li); multiple logics in village elections (Social Sciences in China, 2010, with Ai Yun); and collusion among local governments in policy implementation (Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 2011, with Ai Yun and Lian Hong; and Modern China, 2010).

Before joining Stanford in 2006, Zhou taught at Cornell University, Duke University, and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He is a guest professor at Peking University, Tsinghua University, and the People's University of China. Zhou received his Ph.D. in sociology from Stanford University in 1991.

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Xueguang Zhouu Senior Fellow Shorenstein APARC
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On April 15, 2020, South Korea became the first country in the world to hold a national election amidst the coronavirus pandemic. Gi-Wook Shin, APARC's director, joined the Korea Society's Stephen Noerper and Jonathan Corrado for an open analysis of the election results and its implications.

While the safe execution of the election is certainly a success, Shin cautions that the real challenge for Moon Jae-In's reelected administration will now be to bolster the Korean economy.

“Even before the health crisis, the Korean economy was going through a very tough time . . . My worry is that the [Moon administration] might interpret the election outcome as a confidence vote on their policy, and they might push forward more aggressively even though the performance of the last three years has not been that great.”

Watch Dr. Shin's full analysis and commentary with the Korea Society below.

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A Zoom panel of Jonathan Corrado, Gi-Wook Shin, and Stephen Noerper
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The Korea Society hosts APARC's director for a timely discussion of the recent South Korean national election.

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Data-intensive technologies such as AI may reshape the modern world. We propose that two features of data interact to shape innovation in data-intensive economies: first, states are key collectors and repositories of data; second, data is a non-rival input in innovation. We document the importance of state-collected data for innovation using comprehensive data on Chinese facial recognition AI firms and government contracts. Firms produce more commercial software and patents, particularly data-intensive ones, after receiving government public security contracts. Moreover, effects are largest when contracts provide more data. We then build a directed technical change model to study the state's role in three applications: autocracies demanding AI for surveillance purposes, data-driven industrial policy, and data regulation due to privacy concerns. When the degree of non-rivalry is as strong as our empirical evidence suggests, the state's collection and processing of data can shape the direction of innovation and growth of data-intensive economies.

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Portrait of David Yang
David Yang’s research focuses on political economy, behavioral and experimental economics, economic history, and cultural economics. In particular, David studies the forces of stability and forces of changes in authoritarian regimes, drawing lessons from historical and contemporary China. David received a B.A. in Statistics and B.S. in Business Administration from University of California at Berkeley, and PhD in Economics from Stanford. David is currently a Prize Fellow in Economics, History, and Politics at Harvard and a Postdoctoral Fellow at J-PAL at MIT. He also joined Harvard’s Economics Department as an Assistant Professor as of 2020.

Via Zoom Webinar.
Register at: https://bit.ly/2VlhaMm

David Yang Prize Fellow in Economics, History, and Politics; Department of Economics, Harvard University
Seminars
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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/j9S_CKmku00

 

About this Event:

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bryan

Bryan Metzger

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Lobbyists, Public Relations and “Malign Activities”: The JCPOA as a Case Study of Foreign Influence

Abstract: In July 2015, the P5+1 announced the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known colloquially as the “Iran nuclear deal,” an agreement between Iran and the P5+1 to place limits on the Iranian nuclear program. The agreement was controversial not only within American domestic politics, but also in the eyes of American allies in the Middle East that are commonly thought to exercise significant influence over American foreign policy. Using the JCPOA as a case study on foreign influence in American political decision-making, this thesis analyzes the influence strategies of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran from 2013 to 2018 while assessing the efficacy of these strategies. Based on the theoretical literature, I propose four different influence strategies: direct and indirect lobbying, and direct and indirect shaping of the information space. As a result of nearly forty interviews with former government officials, ambassadors, policy advocates, and regional experts, this thesis finds that while foreign influence does not drive US foreign policy, it can act as an important intervening factor, raising or lowering the costs of political decision-making and amplifying existing preferences within the American political system. Thus, this thesis provides a nuanced perspective on foreign influence in American decision-making, showing the real impact that such campaigns can have while eschewing the idea that American policymakers lack agency in important foreign policy matters.

 

 

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Andrew Lokay

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: The Repatriation Dilemma: European Countries and Islamic State Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Abstract: This thesis explains differences in European countries’ approaches to the repatriation of Islamic State foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Following the territorial defeat of the Islamic State, the United States urged European countries to take back their citizens who travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the caliphate. Some have done so, while others have not. This thesis is the first study to analyze the variation in responses to this request and uses an original dataset of FTF repatriation across 16 European countries. I apply a nested analysis research design to evaluate four explanatory variables: a country’s history of jihadist attacks, justice system capability, desire for a better relationship with the United States, and domestic political pressure. I arbitrate among these potential explanations though a medium-N analysis and case studies of the United Kingdom and the Republic of North Macedonia. I suggest that NATO aspirants are more likely to repatriate FTFs. The empirical evidence I collect does not support the other three hypotheses. I also propose that high evidentiary requirements in legal systems present a challenge to FTF repatriation. This thesis advances the literature’s understanding of the responsiveness of U.S. allies and partners to Washington’s demands, and it expands the counterterrorism scholarship to address a novel question regarding a salient and divisive policy debate.

 

 

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Adam Elliott

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Keeping Pace: Addressing Life Sciences Dual Use Risk Across U.S. Government Agencies

Abstract: Why do different institutions address the same security challenge in different ways? Global biosecurity governance is ill-equipped to stay apace with advances in biotechnology. While almost all necessary life sciences research incurs the risk for misuse, certain experiments with higher risk to human health if misused are labelled dual use research of concern (DURC). U.S. government policies to guide public funding for DURC experiments attempt to outline lists of experiment types or select agents that constitute DURC. However, experts argue some experiments are definitionally DURC, but they do not fall within the scope of the U.S. policy. This thesis analyzes how the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) approach funding two of these experiment types: gene drives and virus engineering for pandemic preparedness. Tracing each agency’s approach to funding these experiments, as well as their institutional history and culture, leads to several findings. First, when experiment types test the limits of what biosecurity policies are scoped to address, agencies tend to respond in accordance with their mission. However, decisions by agency directors may influence the response as well. Coherent leadership and strategies are critical for preserving the integrity of the scientific enterprise and for protecting humanity from biological threats – including natural, accidental, and deliberate release of biological products that could cause human suffering. By studying the ways different agencies respond when they have to address new biosecurity challenges, governments can better assess the effectiveness of existing biosecurity policies and design future policies in a way that allows society to enjoy the benefits of life sciences advances without undue exposure to risk.

Virtual Seminar

Bryan Metzger, Andrew Lokay, and Adam Elliott
Seminars
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Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/sQynE60SFTc

 

About this Event:

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sophia

Sophia Boyer

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: AK-47s, Tanks, and F-16s: Understanding Shifts in Pakistan's Conventional Military Strategy in the post-Cold war era

Abstract: The United States has navigated a complex relationship with Pakistan since the country’s inception in 1947. The behavior of the Pakistan Army has been a central factor in that relationship. This thesis analyzes when, how and why the Pakistan Army has shifted its conventional military strategy in the post-Cold war era. An investigation of the Pakistan Army’s capabilities, doctrines, rhetoric and force distribution suggests that Pakistan shifted its conventional military strategy four times since 1989: a ‘Post-Cold war Strategy’ from 1989-1994, a ‘Defense Minimal strategy’ from 1994-2001, a ‘Two-Front Commitment Strategy’ from 2001-2010, and a ‘Three-Front Commitment Strategy’ from 2010-2019. Based on existing literature and interviews, this thesis argues that external threats, specifically those emanating from India and the U.S., and bureaucratic politics driven by leadership changes have impacted shifts in Pakistan’s conventional military strategy substantially. These findings can inform a calibrated US South Asia policy comprising the management of conventional military balance in nuclear South Asia.

 

 

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Samantha Feuer

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: From the Shadows to the Front Page: State Use of Proxies for Cyber Operations.

Abstract: Why do some states delegate cyber operations to proxies while others rely on central commands? This thesis explores state use of cyber proxies in light of principal-agent problems. In particular, this work examines cyber proxies allegedly acting at the behest of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea by considering three variables: cost, skills and specialization, and plausible deniability. The use of case studies and process tracing analyses evaluate their explanatory power in the cyber realm. The data suggest that states may use cyber proxies to differing degrees and with differing motivations depending upon the type of mission or strategic aim, as well as their ability to pose credible threats to misbehaving proxies. Although cyber operations are comparatively “cheap” relative to physical missions - hence their appeal - some evidence suggests that using cyber proxies may provide additional cost savings compared to the use of their central commands for certain missions. States’ need for skills and specializations, not immediately attainable through central commands, may also lead them to use cyber proxies. Based on available evidence, it remains inconclusive whether states’ potential desire for plausible deniability influences their use of cyber proxies. During a period of global uncertainty in which our everyday lives have been forced online, critical infrastructure, the public sector and private industry are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks from adverse actors. As data in this field improves, this thesis hopes to serve as a framework for future researchers to test, with more certainty, the causal links between these explanations and the use of cyber proxies within these four states.

 

 

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Elena Crespo

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Blood and Treasure, but Mostly Blood: U.S. Electoral Accountability and the All-Volunteer Force

Abstract: In the wake of the American military’s transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF), scholars and military leaders alike cautioned that the Armed Forces defending the nation would come to disproportionately draw from the least advantaged and least politically powerful populations. Should that be the case, certain communities would pay higher costs of war while others would be relatively untouched, leaving the Executive free to command with little public accountability. This thesis adopts an experimental statistical counterfactual approach to examine the geographic casualty distribution across states during the Iraq War had there been a conscripted force. The data presented suggest that the conventional logic is partially correct: an all-volunteer force is not egalitarian. It disproportionately burdened certain states—predominantly in the South and Midwest—with higher casualty rates than would have a conscripted force. However, many of the states that shouldered the costs of war under an AVF also carry disproportionate political gravity as electoral swing states. These findings suggest that a President who chooses to use force is more likely to face electoral backlash for his or her decisions under an all-volunteer force than under a conscripted force. Ultimately, the thesis proposes that President George W. Bush may have increased the margin of his victory in the 2004 Presidential election and contributed to greater Republican victories in the 2006 Senate election had the Iraq War been fought with a conscripted force that more equally distributed casualties. This finding runs contrary to the popular contention that a conscripted force is inherently more democratic and will lead to better electoral accountability for use of force.

Virtual Seminar

Sophia Boyer, Samantha Feuer, and Elena Crespo
Seminars
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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/yh5HVfzLgy0

 

About this Event:

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antigone

Antigone Xenopoulos

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Alliance or Vulnerable Reliance: U.S. Dependence on China for Critical Dual-Use Products

Abstract: Why has the United States become economically dependent on China for the supply of critical dual-use products—those which have both military and commercial applications? Examples of such dependence include pharmaceutical drugs, rare earth metals, printed circuit boards, and more. I propose three theoretical models as likely explaining this phenomenon: the formerly low prioritization of China as a security threat, uncoordinated economic and security policies, and interest group influence. Next, by systemizing evidence from plethora of sources such as trade data, industry assessments, and government speeches and reports, I show that the U.S.’ dual-use dependence on China is measurable, has increased with time, and manifests across industries and defense applications. I find that entities within the U.S. government long recognized the threat of dual-use dependence on China. Nevertheless, because China was not prioritized as a security threat or portrayed as a competitor, this dependence was not responded to; instead, it persisted. Finally, and surprisingly, I find that U.S. industry associations did not uniformly support offshoring to China; even industries which would be expected to take such a position acknowledged the national security imperative of maintaining robust domestic supply chains. Combined, these findings demonstrate that US government’s internal dynamics rather than private-sector factors better explain the U.S.’ dual-use dependence on China.

 

 

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Kelly Devens

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Assessing Russian Noncompliance in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

Abstract: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was a landmark bilateral arms control agreement created by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987. However, the United States formally withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, citing years of Russian violation of the Treaty with the development of its 9M729 missile system. This thesis explains the major underlying motivations behind Russian development of this ground-launched, intermediate-range missile, which was a violation of the INF. It utilizes a single case process tracing approach and presents two datasets: (1) a robust timeline of events detailing the development of the missile system, the mechanics of the violation, Russian public commentary on the Treaty, and the American response, and (2) a collection of interviews of high-level American officials heavily involved in the investigation of the violation and American and European academic subject experts. The thesis finds that 9M729 missile system was likely not developed for any one mission in particular. The Ministry of Defense and Russian military industry wanted the missile system to provide flexibility in response to an increasing number of military threats in several theaters, believed they could develop the missile with plausible deniability, and used factors such as U.S. missile defense systems, the expanding size of NATO, rising influence of China, weapons proliferation to unstable neighboring regions, and the opportunity to divide NATO as justification to receive program approval. Determining the rationale for developing a treaty-noncompliant weapons system presents opportunity to consider how existing and future arms control agreements are developed and considered.

 

 

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Jonah Martin Glick-Unterman

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: “All Options Are On The Table”: The Correlates of Compellence and Coalition Effects

Abstract: Why do some militarized threats compel an opponent state to change its policy or behavior while others do not? This thesis is the first study to comprehensively evaluate the major theories of compellence by considering individual signals. An original data set compiled by surveying 124,000 archival documents catalogues every major military mobilization and verbal threat by the U.S. President with compellent intent since strategic parity. The results contest theories regarding “cost-sinking” and “hand-tying” signals, reputation, and assurances. Moreover, they challenge the conventional “costly” signaling framework. Instead of a simple positive relationship between a signal’s cost and coercive utility, this thesis proposes a different dynamic: at some point, cost can diminish coercive value by conveying that concessions may not prevent later demands or the use of force. The effect of international support for intervention is instructive: although associated with a higher rate of some concessions, international backing has no bearing on whether a target fully capitulates. Case studies of compellence prior to the First Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War suggest that this phenomenon may be explained by the sequencing and expense of coalition building. Ultimately, policymakers should consider that effective signaling is rare and that demonstrating an unflinching commitment to the use of force can backfire.

Virtual Seminar

Antigone Xenopoulos, Kelly Devens, and Jonah Martin Glick-Unterman
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