Moscow’s failure to secure its initial vision of a swift victory in Ukraine has forced Russian leadership to commit copious amounts of manpower and material to an ongoing war. This strategic preoccupation has resulted in the erosion of Russia’s previous bilateral relationships with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. This piece examines shifts in Russia’s relationships with these states following the invasion of Ukraine.

The Caucasus After Karabakh, Before Ukraine

As explored in the November 2020 Stanford International Policy Review piece “The Autumn War in Nagorno-Karabakh,” the oldest “frozen conflict” of the South Caucasus became a flashpoint during the COVID-19 pandemic. The “November 9th Agreement” signed following Azerbaijan’s capture of the strategic city of Shusha called for the immediate surrender of several territories by the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh to Azerbaijan. A crucial element of this agreement was the deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The deployment of Russian peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh represented a major advancement for Russian interests in the South Caucasus. Rather than simply arming both sides of the conflict, Moscow became the mediator for any future normalization or peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Analysts have suggested that Russia’s main interest in this role was not the promotion of stability in the South Caucasus or assisting its nominal ally Armenia but rather creating conditions that allowed for the renewal of the peacekeeping mission’s five-year mandate. This would mean that Baku would maintain an outstanding claim over the remaining territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in perpetuity, while Yerevan would remain dependent on Russia as a security guarantor for the territory’s Armenian population. 

This regional security paradigm established in the aftermath of the 2020 Karabakh War directly benefited Russia. Analysts suggest that Russia minimized its support for Armenia as part of a punitive strategy of “bloodletting” designed to punish Yerevan for a perceived reorientation towards Western interests. Nikol Pashinyan’s government, previously an example of reform and democratization, has since been mired in disapproval from an increasingly entrenched opposition. Parallel to this, Azerbaijan’s victory in 2020 has led to the veneration of President Ilham Aliyev and further marginalization of Azerbaijan’s political opposition. Ultimately, the combination of Moscow’s newfound military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh, the precarious state of Armenian politics and national security in the wake of the 2020 Karabakh War, and the reinforcement of Azerbaijan’s authoritarian government resulted in the height of Russian strategic posturing and power projection in the South Caucasus.

Strategic Erosion

Before turning our focus to current conditions in the South Caucasus, it is crucial to understand how Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has leached material and manpower from its deployments abroad. Estimates place the size of Russian forces mustered prior to the invasion of Ukraine at around 190,000 troops. Reporting from early in the invasion describes conscripts being redeployed to the line of contact amid previously scheduled training exercises in Belarus. A captured Russian schedule from the start of the invasion circulated by Ukrainian intelligence lists police tactical units from Belgorod oblast as part of the invasion force. It is likely that the limited utility of these forces and underwhelming performance of the Russian military during the opening stages of the invasion served as the pretext for the redeployment of Russian professional soldiers from bases abroad. By spring 2022, the Russian military had begun to redeploy assets and manpower from Syria and Africa. The Russian military would later transfer forces stationed in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Ukraine. These redeployments have minimized Russia’s operating capacity abroad and have left a power vacuum in states dependent on Russian security. The war in Ukraine has also led to a substantial loss of Russian armor and vehicles. Although the exact figures of the amount of vehicles and aircraft captured, destroyed, or rotated out of service are currently unavailable, visual evidence suggests a five-digit figure for total losses. 

The wide-spanning sanctions levied by the United States, European Union, and other members of the international community have renewed Moscow’s dependence on trading energy commodities amidst a flight of capital and international business from Russia. Between 820,000 and 920,000 Russian citizens are estimated to have emigrated from the Russian Federation in response to the war, while numerous enterprises and thousands of Russians have relocated to all three states of the South Caucasus. The economic impact of Western sanctions and ongoing demands for manpower and material for the war effort have undoubtedly limited Russia’s power projection capabilities outside of Ukraine. Observers examining Russian decision-making in the South Caucasus should consider how the prioritization of the war effort and cascading impact of Western sanctions have reshaped Russia’s current bilateral relationships with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

Armenia

Russia’s most precipitous decline in strategic posturing among the South Caucasus states can be seen in its deteriorating bilateral relationship with Armenia. Russia has historically positioned itself as a guarantor of Armenian security. Legally this concept is cemented through both states’ participation in the CSTO and the articles of the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Russia maintains a presence in Armenia through its forces stationed at the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, the Erebuni Military Airport, and in smaller garrisons throughout the country. Russia’s importance in this role is reflected in Armenia’s National Security Strategy (July 2020), which lists expanding the “strategic alliance” with Russia as one of several foreign policy priorities. Despite the physical presence of Russian forces and broader sentiment towards Russia’s “brotherly relations” with Armenia, Russia has yet to actualize any of these bilateral security commitments to Armenia in a meaningful way. Russia refused to provide direct support to Armenia during the 2020 Karabakh War, while the Russian-led CSTO has twice denied Armenia’s calls for aid during attacks on Armenian territory in 2021 and 2022.

The repeated failures of Moscow and its security structures to either deter further aggression from Azerbaijan or deliver meaningful aid in response to attack has led to the Armenian government launching a process of “strategic decoupling.” While Armenia remains a nominal member of the CSTO and Russia maintains a military presence, Moscow no longer has a monopoly on security assurances and arms sales. In late 2022, Armenia purchased several Pinaka MLRS from Indian arms manufacturer Defence Research and Development Organisation. Described by some observers as being “at par with HIMARS,” this was Armenia’s first major arms purchase outside of a Russian manufacturer. This was followed by the purchase of French air defense systems, anti-drone systems produced by Indian manufacturer Zen Technologies Limited, and French ACMAT Bastion armored personnel carriers. The Armenian Security Council has even discussed a full withdrawal from the CSTO following the alliance’s second rejection of aid–a development that would have been unthinkable prior to the invasion of Ukraine.

Armenia’s strategic pivot away from Russia extends beyond military procurement and has included the deployment of EU monitors in Armenia. Following a meeting of the European Political Community in fall of 2022, the EU External Action Service announced a temporary civilian monitoring mission would be deployed to Armenia’s eastern frontier with Azerbaijan. This was later expanded into a larger two-year mission. With Moscow’s initial unwillingness to assist Armenia transforming into a deeper inability to deliver security guarantees, Russia’s previous monopoly over arms sales and security deployments in Armenia has eroded. 

Azerbaijan

The wide-spanning “Declaration on Allied Interaction Between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation,” signed two days prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, outlines a vision for a comprehensive and deep bilateral relationship. Rather than pursuing cooperation in Russian-dominated regional formats like the Collective Security Treaty Organization or Eurasian Economic Union, this agreement envisions Baku and Moscow cooperating on a strictly bilateral basis. Moscow likely crafted its “Declaration on Allied Interaction” with Azerbaijan as part of a strategy for mitigating future retaliation from the EU and US. An example of this strategic hedging may be seen in the clause “integration of payment systems,” a section that observers speculated may have been included to provide a means of bypassing a SWIFT disconnect in Russia. As identified by Azerbaijani analyst Zaur Shiriyev, it would be in Russia’s interest to induct Azerbaijan into a Russia-dominated regional body. However, the repeated emphasis on strictly bilateral means of cooperation suggests Moscow is now required to engage with Azerbaijan as a peer rather than a junior partner.

While Azerbaijan has not vocally supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there are signs of a tacit partnership between Baku and Moscow. Azerbaijan does not object to Russia’s usage of Caspian Sea airspace to launch cruise missiles at Ukrainian targets despite both states being party to non-militarization agreements in the Caspian Sea Treaty. Additionally, after announcing a major energy deal with the EU, Azerbaijani gas company SOCAR announced that it would begin importing Russian energy. This has raised concerns by outside observers that Azerbaijan was acting as a willing partner in sanctions circumvention and effectively “laundering” Russian energy.

In exchange for Azerbaijan enabling the war effort, Moscow has gradually deferred to Azerbaijani interests in Nagorno-Karabakh. In late 2022, the Azerbaijani government launched a blockade of the Republic of Artsakh via the Lachin Corridor. While Russian peacekeeping forces were present, no actions were taken by the Russian government to clear the blockade or dissuade the Azerbaijani government from further aggression. After months of inaction from Moscow and protest from the Armenian government, the Azerbaijani government launched an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” against the Republic of Artsakh, leading to the ethnic cleansing of the remainder of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population and the end of the Republic of Artsakh. Observers have described Russia’s inaction as part of a wider “managed decline” in the region.  

Georgia

Unlike neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia’s trajectory remains the same as it did prior to the invasion of Ukraine. Tbilisi remains committed to Euro-Atlantic integration and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated Georgia’s timeline for EU membership. In late 2021, the Georgian government aimed to submit its EU membership application in 2024. In the days following the start of the invasion of Ukraine, Tbilisi announced that it would formally apply for EU membership on 3 March 2022. Following a brief delay over outstanding reform issues in summer 2022, Georgia was granted candidate status in late fall 2023.  

Parallel to the galvanization of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration process, a sense of uncertainty has fallen over the breakaway states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both unrecognized states have economically benefited from their partial incorporation into the Russian Federation and are broadly considered allies of Moscow. However, these two unrecognized states’ security dependence on Russia has led to new instabilities following the invasion of Ukraine. During the opening weeks of the invasion, South Ossetian leader Anatoly Bibilov announced that the military of the unrecognized republic would be joining the Russian military in eastern Ukraine. In a secretly recorded meeting between Bibilov and South Ossetian soldiers after their deployment to Ukraine, members of the South Ossetian military described a complete lack of coordination among Russian forces along the frontline and dependence on dilapidated, malfunctioning vehicles and equipment. Within days of their deployment, the bulk of the South Ossetian military in eastern Ukraine had deserted their positions and began hitchhiking home. With the growing frequency of Ukrainian loitering munition and aquatic drone attacks on Russian positions in Crimea, the Russian military has planned to relocate the Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol to new facilities in Abkhazia. This has led to renewed tensions between Tbilisi and Sokhumi and has raised the question of future Ukrainian strikes on Russian naval assets in Abkhazia.

Conclusion

As the war in Ukraine approaches its second anniversary, we must consider how any geostrategic gains made by Moscow have come at the cost of Russian interests in the South Caucasus. While the prospects for future Ukrainian NATO membership remain an ongoing debate, the invasion of Ukraine has undoubtedly accelerated Georgia’s process of European integration and brought new security challenges to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In deepening its bilateral partnership with Azerbaijan, Moscow has conceded its previous role as peacekeeper and mediator in Nagorno-Karabakh and is now forced to approach a former junior partner as a peer. Russia’s historic unwillingness to actualize its security commitments to Armenia has given way to a larger inability to provide security guarantees to Yerevan, resulting in Armenia’s pronounced security realignment towards the EU and US. With these factors in mind, it is evident that the war in Ukraine has had an undeniable impact on Russia’s bilateral relationships in the South Caucasus and has eroded Russia’s strategic footing in the region. 

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent those of any previous or current employers, the editorial body of SIPR, the Freeman Spogili Institute, or Stanford University.