What might an unclaimed network of sensationalist, pro-Bolsonaro Facebook accounts sharing misinformation about previous and upcoming Brazilian elections reflect about election integrity policies, at both the platform and governmental level? 

Voters were bombarded with misinformation in the 2022 Brazilian presidential elections. While winning leftist candidate Lula Inácio da Silva and now former president Jair Bolsonaro were both targeted by misinformation, most attacks were directed against Lula by Bolsonaro’s supporters. These attacks were often waged by sophisticated disinformation networks on social media which, in the face of Bolsonaro’s declining approval and growing national support for Lula, argued that Brazil’s electronic ballot system was vulnerable to fraud and elections were rigged.

This article highlights a network of over 10 Brazilian accounts on Facebook potentially engaging in Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) by sharing sensationalist, right-bent content from the same alternative news website, “News Atual”. Moreover, it situates them within the context and controversy of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s unlawful use of social media campaigns to spread politically-favoring misinformation and undermine electoral trust.

The continued presence of these accounts on Facebook serves as an opportunity to reflect on the limitations of, and potential lack of synergy between, norms enforced by technology platforms and Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE) for moderating election-related content. These limitations warrant attention from both parties as we approach Brazil’s forthcoming general election in 2026.

Background

In June 2018, O Globo, a respected Brazilian newspaper, reported the existence of multiple unclaimed pro-Bolsonaro Facebook accounts. Two of the three accounts investigated by O Globo had posted articles from the same alternative news website, unassumingly called News Atual (or “Current News”), which O Globo claimed to be a prominent sharer of misinformation favoring the then-presidential pre-candidate – now former Brazilian President – Jair Bolsonaro.

Two of the accounts, named Jair Bolsonaro 2018, a última esperança da nação (“Jair Bolsonaro 2018, the nation’s last hope”) and Bolsonaro - eu apoio (“Bolsonaro - I support”), were unlawfully running boosted political ads. According to Brazilian electoral law, boosted political ads only can only be run by electoral candidates and their respective party or coalition. Additionally, only websites that are registered with the TSE and directly managed by candidates, parties, or coalitions are allowed to broadcast electoral propaganda.

On August 18, 2017, one of the accounts, Jair Bolsonaro 2018, a última esperança da nação, posted a 9-minute live video in which Jair Bolsonaro himself, as well as his son, congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro, commented on the moment during which a protester in Ribeirão Preto, SP pressed an egg to the aspiring President’s chest during a campaign event in August. When reported by O Globo, the video had over 16 thousand views. In the video, after criticizing the protestor, Jair Bolsonaro looks at the camera and speaks to his audience: “I’m only here because I believe in you.” The video had no clear interviewer behind the camera, and when asked by O Globo about it, Bolsonaro claimed they recorded it for his son’s Facebook account, and that someone else must have reposted it on their account. But that seems unlikely: while videos on Facebook Live can be reposted by other accounts after they end, they cannot be reposted while live, nor do they retain the “Live” label once reposted. 

Misinformation and Pro-Bolsonaro Content

Since O Globo’s article was published, Projeto Comprova, a leading fact-checking coalition of over 24 Brazilian news organizations, has debunked multiple instances of misinformation by News Atual, the website linking the aforementioned accounts. These include incorrect attribution of assets to President Lula da Silva’s deceased wife Marisa Letícia (August 2018), claims that Lula’s son had admitted to stealing R$317 million (around $1.16 million) in an inexistent plea bargain (August 2018), and omitting that Bolsonaro-favoring poll results were for only one Brazilian state and not the entire country (July 2021). Notably, all cases of identified misinformation favor Bolsonaro, directly or indirectly.

These posts have since been taken down on Facebook. It is possible that more misinformation has been shared and gone undetected since then, especially since fact-checkers are most active during election season, when digital environments are flooded with electoral mis- and disinformation.

A Network of Accounts

The two accounts highlighted in the O Globo article are still on Facebook today. They have been renamed multiple times: Jair Bolsonaro 2018, a última esperança da nação is now Brasil com Bolsonaro (“Brazil with Bolsonaro”) and has accumulated over one million followers. Meanwhile, Bolsonaro - eu apoio is currently Eu quero Bolsonaro elegível (“I want Bolsonaro eligible”) and boasts over 462 thousand followers. Its new name alludes to Bolsonaro’s inability to seek public office until 2030, after making baseless claims of electoral fraud in the last presidential election. 

The accounts are similar in that both have “newsatual.com” linked on their pages and continue to post content from the News Atual website. At least another 10 Facebook pages “liked” by News Atual’s Facebook account conduct similar activities, all of which display a clear conservative, right-wing, and pro-Bolsonaro bent. These include accounts that posted messages that support the current President Luiz Inácio da Silva’s removal from office (FORA LULA), celebrate the controversial former First Lady Michelle Bolsonaro (Michelle Bolsonaro Eu Apoio), and praise conservative reporters that “deserve our respect” (Jornalistas que merecem nosso respeito).

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Accounts liked by “News Atual” on Facebook (November 7, 2023)

A Potential Case of Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior

Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) is the term used to “describe when people or social media pages work together to mislead others about who they are and what they are doing.” Often associated with influence operations designed to shift public perception on political issues, CIB posted with the intent to “mislead people or Facebook” is not allowed under Meta Inauthentic Behavior policies. Still, shared characteristics between the accounts, such as their consistently pro-Bolsonaro rhetoric and identical posts featuring articles from News Atual, suggest that the network is actively engaging in CIB in violation of Facebook policies.

A characteristic feature of CIB is coordinated posting. The accounts in the table below, all of which have been liked by News Atual, post content from the News Atual website at least once a day, often the same article across multiple accounts within five minutes. Other accounts post less frequently, but nevertheless routinely (and sometimes exclusively) share links to the News Atual website. 

Temporal patterns in activity across accounts may indicate coordination. In other words, the patterns observed below may show that the same person or group is behind the accounts, systematically posting for increased visibility.

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Pro-Bolsonaro accounts share the same link to multiple articles on NewsAtual.com within 5 minutes (September 7, 2023)

Additionally, the accounts are densely interconnected. The graph below illustrates follower relations between accounts (whether an account follows, or is followed by, another account). The nodes (dots) are Facebook accounts, and lines are follower relationships. 

The dot in the center represents News Atual on Facebook. The accounts followed by News Atual also tend to follow each other, demonstrating strong interconnections among the accounts. Previous research by prominent online investigation organizations such as Bellingcat suggests that accounts engaging in CIB often follow each other.

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Following network based on accounts followed by News Atual on Facebook (August 3, 2023)

Finally, the layouts of the accounts are incredibly similar. In the side-by-side comparison below of the first four accounts “liked” by News Atual on Facebook, they all either link the News Atual website in their “Intro” sections or as a pinned post under the “Featured” section. Three of the four accounts also share the same link to an alleged book about Bolsonaro. Under the Photos box, one can see similar or identical images posted by each account using the same format: a photo with a yellow text box.

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A side-by-side comparison of “Bolsonaro Elegível”, “Brasil com Bolslonaro”, “Figura pública que não faz parte da lacrolândia”, and “FORA LULA” on Facebook (November 10, 2023)

Government Policies for Electoral Propaganda on Social Media in Brazil

Brazil’s Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) is responsible for developing and enforcing norms and laws governing all aspects of the country’s elections, including political advertising on social media. 

According to Brazilian electoral law, it is illegal for anyone except political candidates, their respective parties, and their respective coalitions to pay for electoral ads online. Moreover, it is illegal to broadcast political propaganda on the websites and social networks of people and organizations other than political candidates and their political party or coalition. When these authorized entities publish political propaganda online, it must be clearly labeled as such, for example in the case of a social media post. If propaganda is published on the website of a candidate, party, or coalition, its address must be communicated to the TSE. Individuals may broadcast political propaganda on their websites and social networks only if they are doing it as themselves (i.e. not behind a fake organization or fake identity) and insofar as they do not use content-boosting tools.

Concerns for Oversight

O Globo argues that some of the accounts unlawfully ran boosted political ads around 2018, in violation of Brazilian electoral law. Meanwhile, independent fact-checkers confirm the accounts have spread Bolsonaro-favoring misinformation. Yet the accounts were never identified by the TSE. Meta alleges to actively seek for and remove CIB from Facebook, but the aforementioned network, which clearly coordinates posts, remains active on its platforms.

When O Globo reached out to Facebook and pointed out accounts like Brasil com Bolsonaro and Eu quero Bolsonaro elegível, Facebook replied that it could only remove accounts for violating electoral laws per judicial order – for example, by the TSE. A Facebook representative pointed out that the Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet protects users' identity online, so the accounts’ owners’ identities can only be revealed if requested by the TSE. 

It is inevitable that some cases of misinformation and CIB will fall through the cracks of the platform and governmental policies – the internet is, after all, vast and filled with problematic content. Nevertheless, it is concerning that such a large network, the main nexus of which has over one million followers (News Atual), continues to operate in apparent violation of both Brazil’s TSE election integrity laws and Facebook’s Community Guidelines and inauthentic behavior policies. Furthermore, the accounts’ owner and financier remain unknown.

Bolsonaro and Social Media Controversies

Independently proving a direct link between the network and Bolsonaro seems unlikely at worst and difficult at best. But the network would be in line with Bolsonaro’s track record of adversarial use of social media and the internet.

For example, in September 2022, days before the first round of the Brazilian presidential election, it was reported that an anti-Lula website called “Lulaflix” had been created by Bolsonaro’s campaign (on the 30th of August) and was actively boosted through Google Ads. The website violated multiple electoral laws and was fined by the TSE twice, since Bolsonaro’s campaign originally doubled the amount of money spent on boosting the website instead of complying with the court’s ruling. In June of 2023, the TSE ruled that Bolsonaro would be blocked from seeking office until 2030 for making baseless claims of electoral fraud, including that Brazil’s voting system was rigged against him, in the last presidential election. 

Currently, the TSE has multiple open lawsuits against Bolsonaro and his use of social media and direct messaging. The lawsuits investigate other networks allegedly spreading Bolsonaro-favoring disinformation online, as well as the illegal mass spamming of thousands of phone numbers with pro-Bolsonaro text messages from an unidentified source.

Continued Influence

The last presidential election was marked by ravaging misinformation efforts by Bolsonaro’s campaign, the majority of which directly targeted Lula’s campaign and questioned the integrity of Brazil’s electronic voting system. Despite partnerships between Meta, Brazilian authorities, and independent fact-checkers to crack down on election-related misinformation, the NGO Global Witness found that Meta often approved purposely misleading ads – urging people not to vote, providing false election dates – in the lead-up to the 2022 election. In response to Global Witness’ findings, a Meta spokesperson said the reports were very small and not representative given the number of political ads reviewed daily across the world. The spokesperson stressed that Meta rejected 135,000 Brazil-related ad submissions between 16 August and 30 September 2022.

Cases of CIB can and do go undetected. But this network’s continued presence on Facebook, dating back to 2016 for some accounts, highlights not only the challenges of combating CIB on social media, but of operating at the intersection of local laws and platform policies. Though Bolsonaro will remain barred from running for office until 2030, his online influence lives on, augmented by his political allies, family, and hyper-nationalist online following.

Of the 12 accounts currently liked by News Atual, 5 have over 100,000 followers. Including News Atual, 3 accounts have over 1 million followers. In upcoming elections, coordinated efforts between the TSE and social media companies to combat CIB should focus on high-profile individuals and accounts with substantial followings. Given limited resources, a strategic focus on these entities may maximize platforms and governments’ ability to address CIB and misinformation propagated by political elites, in order to safeguard democratic integrity.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent those of any previous or current employers, the editorial body of SIPR, the Freeman Spogili Institute, or Stanford University.