Illiberal Partners: How Russia Foments Sedition and Secession in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska

Image of Milorad Dodik and Vladimir Putin shaking hands Image of President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik shaking hands. Source: Wikimedia Commons

In November 2023, Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General of NATO, began a four-day tour of the Western Balkans in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a way, the visit served as a commemoration of NATO's increasing cooperation with the government of the former Yugoslav country, one which has also made great strides in developing its economic ties to the European Union in recent years. Bosnia, a member of the NATO Partnership for Peace program since 2006,[i] had just months to go before receiving a defense capacity-building package valued at around $50 million from the alliance. Polling has revealed fairly broad support for this type of transatlantic engagement among the Bosnian populace, with 63% of Bosnians across all ethnic groups supporting closer cooperation with or membership in NATO.

Significant obstacles, however, stand in the way of this path to transatlantic integration. Persistent in Stoltenberg's messaging in Sarajevo was concern over the growing threat of Russian interference in the country's politics—a threat that could paralyze Bosnia’s Atlantic integration or even lead it into civil strife. This paper aims to analyze the strength and nature of this interference and how it threatens to throw Bosnia off its westward course.

Russia disrupts NATO and EU integration processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina by channeling strong support to the government of Milorad Dodik, the Serb nationalist leader of Republika Srpska (RS), a subnational division of Bosnia established after the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. To do this, Moscow directs significant diplomatic support for Dodik’s secessionist aims while also providing training for its rapidly militarizing security units in contravention of international law. The Kremlin props up the subnational Dodik regime in order to undermine Bosnian national unity, thereby keeping the country off the path of continued Euro-Atlantic integration. To this end, such policies of domestic destabilization have been quite successful, with RS leadership regularly calling for secession and obstructing the implementation of Russian-opposed policy from Sarajevo. Simultaneously, Russian support to Republika Srpska has earned the Kremlin a strong rhetorical and diplomatic ally on the international stage.

Milorad Dodik – The Face of Republika Srpska

Milorad Dodik is the longtime President of Republika Srpska, an increasingly autonomous subnational entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The entity was created along with the rest of Bosnia’s modern structure by the Dayton Agreement, a 1995 peace treaty brokered by the international community whose provisions aimed to prevent the future resurgence of the extreme ethnic violence of the Yugoslav Wars by creating a single sovereign state—Bosnia and Herzegovina—in which political power would be shared between previously warring Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs. To achieve this, the Dayton Agreement carved the former Yugoslav Republic into two constituent power-sharing entities: the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (Serb Republic or RS) and the Croat-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Dayton Agreement of 1995 divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into two constituent power-sharing entities: the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and the Croat-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Source: Wikimedia Commons

For over a decade, Milorad Dodik has dominated politics in the Serb Republic and held significant sway in Bosnia's national governance, making headlines for his denial of the Srebrenica Genocide, glorification of convicted war criminals, and close relationship with Vladimir Putin. Dodik does not conceal his anti-Western sentiments: In February, he described his Republika Srpska as "pro-Russian, anti-Western, and anti-American." The Serb leader has repeatedly shown extreme resistance to integration with NATO, an opposition that has been facilitated by Kremlin support. Further, the disintegration of the Bosnian state is an overt objective for Dodik, who pledged that “whether U.S. [sic] and Britain like it or not, [Bosnian Serbs] will turn the administrative boundary between [Bosnia’s two] entities into our national border” in the hopes of joining neighboring Serbia and unifying the two ethnic Serb populations. 

Even if the geopolitical feasibility of such a unification is dubious, with Serbia preferring to not upset its highly lucrative relationship with the EU or aspirations for membership therein , Republika Srpska would not need to join Serbia or even declare formal independence to risk instability in the region. According to the US Director of National Intelligence’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment, Dodik’s provocative steps towards merely de facto secession could still “lead to violent conflicts that could overwhelm peacekeeping forces.”[ii] Whether an independent Republika Srpska would be truly viable on the international stage is not as relevant as the real steps that the Dodik regime takes to undermine international oversight and promote Serb nationalism within Bosnia. To these ends, Dodik’s inflammatory rhetoric and divisive policy actions are enabled and supported both directly and indirectly by Russia's political and military support.

Putin and Dodik – A Privileged Relationship

Vladimir Putin has cultivated strong personal and political ties with Dodik, providing him with international validation and diplomatic support in pursuit of his nationalist aims. Dodik has angered Western leaders by making repeated trips to Russia and has met with Putin personally at least five times since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As a symbol of their closeness, Dodik and Putin have even exchanged decorations of honor: Dodik awarded Putin with Republika Srpska's highest medal of honor for “patriotic care and love” in January 2023, while Putin decorated his homologue with the prestigious Order of Alexander Nevsky the following June.[iii]

Since February 2022, Milorad Dodik and Vladimir Putin have met personally at least five times, angering many Western leaders who hope to see Bosnia continue on its westward path. Source: Wikimedia Commons

In recent months, Russia's personal support for Dodik has enabled Republika Srpska to come remarkably close to secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina, a favor that Dodik has repaid in diplomatic patronage. On June 27th, 2023, RS lawmakers voted to suspend rulings by Bosnia's Constitutional Court, a move described by one legal expert as the "long announced legal secession" Dodik had been threatening for years. Soon after, the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia annulled the decision as a clear violation of the Dayton Agreement and initiated criminal proceedings. Less than two weeks later, however, President Dodik signed a decree effectively nullifying the decisions of the High Representative on RS territory. Throughout this saga, which one area expert called "by far the most serious threat to peace and security in the Dayton post-war order," Russian diplomats called the moves "logical" while echoing Dodik's sharp criticisms of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia. EU member states and parliamentary representatives have condemned Dodik's actions as irreconcilable with Bosnia's EU membership, meaning that this Russia-backed series of events has effectively pushed the country further away from European integration.

A further testament to Russia's support came at this April's annual International Security Meeting in St. Petersburg, where Putin welcomed Dodik by having Republika Srpska's Serbia-inspired flag placed alongside those of other international delegations (and in the absence of Bosnia's)—a strong statement of support for the Serb leader's sovereigntist ambitions. In international fora, the Kremlin has also provided diplomatic support for Bosnian Serbs by defending convicted war criminals like the martyrized Ratko Mladic and refusing to endorse a contentious 2024 UN resolution commemorating the Srebrenica genocide.

Dodik has returned the favor on the international stage, filing a lawsuit against Bosnia's ambassador to the UN for voting in February 2023 to condemn Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and repeatedly frustrating the implementation of Bosnian sanctions applied on Russia after the start of the war. More recently, Dodik flirted with the idea of his republic joining BRICS, an international organization often considered a rival to the US-led global order and in which Russia plays a significant role. These pro-Kremlin actions are perhaps not surprising given that 94% of Bosnian Serbs describe themselves as favorable to Russia, and 87% as favorable to Vladimir Putin. Even still, the depth of Dodik's relationship with Russia has raised major concerns from Western leaders and empowered the secessionist ambitions of Republika Srpska on the international stage. This has—much to the Kremlin's delight—had the effect of sowing political division within Bosnia and further stalling its Western integration.

Russia’s Role in the Indigenization of Republika Srpska's Armed Forces

Also central to the current crisis of Bosnian sovereignty are concerns about the unity of the country's armed forces. The Dayton Agreement stipulates that "all armed forces" in the country must "operate consistently with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina." However, Republika Srpska's police force has grown increasingly independent in recent years, signing cooperation agreements and performing training with Russian forces. Often referred to as the Republika's de facto "security force," the entity's police signed a significant agreement with their Russian counterpart in 2016 to partner security assets on "intelligence collection, counterterrorism, and cybercrime.”[iv] The Kremlin has also committed to training Serb special forces on Russian soil and at a new police facility constructed in a former army barracks outside the Srpska capital of Banja Luka. In late 2023, Bosnia's Defense Minister claimed to have intelligence that "Russians [were] conducting training" in "several camps" across Republika Srpska using Russian weapons.

While police cooperation between allies is not entirely unusual, recent weapon acquisitions by Republika Srpska's police force and Moscow's revealing decision to partner with Banja Luka rather than Sarajevo, the national capital, have created concerns that the subnational force is militarizing and indigenizing in contravention of the Dayton Agreement. According to interviews with national security officials in Sarajevo, Serb police forces are attempting to procure Russian-manufactured anti-aircraft missiles designed for helicopter mounting. Furthermore, between 2016 and 2018, Republika Srpska purchased over 4,000 automatic rifles from diverse sources, enough to equip at least 75% of its police force and representing a near quintupling in stock compared to 2004. Such resources are likely well beyond those necessary for the police's crime prevention and anti-terrorism duties and more probably indicate an illegal militarization and indigenization of the Republika's armed forces. In the event that RS were to declare independence from Bosnia or otherwise challenge the national government, a militarized security force would allow it to defend itself against the Bosnian Army and international peacekeeping forces.

Cooperation with Russian forces and recent weapons acquisitions by Republika Srpska’s police force have created concerns that the subnational force is militarizing and indigenizing in contravention of the Dayton Agreement. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Conclusion

The case of Republika Srpska represents the height of Russian influence in the Balkans. Political and military resources are used to prop up a highly sympathetic statelet proxy, with the goal of destabilizing Bosnia’s growing relationship with the West. Putin’s political endorsement and military support have empowered the entity's secessionist ambitions, greatly threatening the unity of the Bosnian state and achieving Moscow's foreign policy objective of frustrating EU and NATO ascension efforts. In return, Putin's patronage has earned him a strong ally in Milorad Dodik, who provides the Kremlin with diplomatic support for its anti-Western rhetoric surrounding the War in Ukraine. The ties between Moscow and Republika Srpska represent more than a simple partnership of convenience. The leaders of both nations hold common nationalist convictions and share the goal of thwarting Western influence in the Balkans. With each step in this direction, they work to further erode the post-Dayton regional order.

 


[i] Rrustemi et al., “Geopolitical Influences of External Powers in the Western Balkans,” 124.

[ii] Zweers, Drost, and Henry, “Little Substance, Considerable Impact,” 16.

[iii] “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 27

[iv] Cancar et al., “The Western Balkans 2024.” 5


 

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent those of any previous or current employers, the editorial body of SIPR, the Freeman Spogli Institute, or Stanford University.

 

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