Congressional Decision-making in Great Power Politics

In addition to its role in funding the federal government, approving trade agreements and treaties, and authorizing the use of force, Congress is an influential player in foreign policy and great power politics. As the most democratically representative body in the federal government, the institution’s internal dynamics and political compositions exert sway over the actions of the executive branch, including in the realm of foreign affairs. This view contrasts with the perspective of many realists on the nature of great power conflict. John Mearsheimer, among others, has argued that great power politics are determined by innate national interests that supersede internal dynamics and domestic political considerations. States are “black boxes or billiard balls” whose actions are ultimately determined by their relative power in the international arena.(Mearsheimer 2001, 6) The historical record does not support this view. While there has always been a push and pull dynamic between Congress and the White House, the legislative branch has meaningfully impacted the conduct of foreign policy, especially during periods of armed conflict. As William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse have noted, “Members of Congress can exert a great deal of influence over the conduct of war. They can enact laws that dictate how long military campaigns may last, control the purse strings that determine how well they are funded, and dictate how appropriations may be spent.” Current conflicts and those of the past bear the marks of Congressional involvement.

Congress’ actions in response to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine show the impact the institution – and members within it – can have on U.S. foreign policy. In the former case, the legislative branch encouraged the Reagan administration on a bipartisan basis to provide more and better support to Afghan rebels. Congressman Charlie Wilson (D-TX) played a key role in ensuring military aid improved substantially over time. In the latter case, Congress has provided security assistance to Ukraine along increasingly partisan lines. While being influenced by a group of isolationists in the Republican Party, one individual, House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA), held up the passage of an aid package that had negative tactical and strategic implications for Ukraine, an important U.S. partner. In both instances, Congress significantly influenced the direction and strength of American foreign policy. This calls into question the view that actors within governments play insignificant roles in a country’s decisions.

Case Study 1 – Congressional Aid to Afghan Rebels During Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Congressional aid to the Afghan mujahideen began under President Jimmy Carter, was galvanized by Congressman Charlie Wilson, and found a permanent ally in President Ronald Reagan. While these individuals were crucial to the provision of military assistance to the mujahideen, Congress as a whole played an important role in supporting the insurgency throughout the early 1980s. In fact, the legislative branch often led the charge in increasing aid to the Afghan rebels. In contrast to debates about providing assistance to Ukraine in Congress today, legislators in the 1980s did not question the wisdom of supporting an ally facing an invasion. As James M. Scott has observed, “The policy debate that did occur concerned the appropriate level, extent, and implementation of the aid…not whether or not the United States should provide assistance.” (Scott 1996, 40) The bipartisan nature of Congress’ behavior was a result of the broader Cold War-era alignment between Republicans and Democrats on opposing communist military aggression. It was perhaps also a result of limited isolationist sentiments among party leaders and the American public.

After the Soviet invasion of Kabul in December 1979, the Carter administration launched a covert assistance program to support Afghan partisans resisting the Soviet occupation. Jimmy Carter, a staunch progressive who initially sought to build closer ties to the Soviet leadership during his term in office, was “radicalized” by the Soviet Union’s attack on its southern neighbor. He publicly condemned the invasion, recalled the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, and put a series of trade and diplomatic agreements with the Kremlin on hold. Internally, Carter issued a directive ordering the provision of nonlethal assistance to the rebels. Within two weeks of the Soviet invasion, U.S. coordination with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan led to the shipment of the first arms to the mujahideen.(Coll 2004, 46; Scott 1996, 44-45).

The first period of U.S. support to the Afghan resistance was defined by clandestine assistance that was approved by Congress but largely led by the CIA. After these initial White House-driven actions, Congress would increasingly play a more influential role. Although administration officials acted with the consent of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, they worried about provoking the USSR into attacking Pakistan. Not confident the insurgents could achieve their goals, the administration crafted its initial assistance to ensure its own plausible deniability. The program cost an estimated $30-40 million on an annual basis in the first two years of the conflict. (Scott 1996, 46-48)

Beginning in 1982, however, Congressional action led to a substantial increase in support to the Afghan rebels. At this time, members of the Senate were concerned the Reagan administration was not doing enough to support the rebels, so Senator Paul Tsongas (D-MA) introduced a bill –co-sponsored by the entire U.S. Senate – proclaiming U.S. support for the people of Afghanistan. Although the bill was not voted on, it signaled to the White House that Congress expected the administration to improve its assistance efforts. Along with a concerning increase in Soviet military operations in Afghanistan, the initiative led to President Reagan signing National Security Directive 75, which ordered the provision of more advanced weaponry and more overall assistance to the mujahideen. (Scott 1996, 50)

In 1983, while facing some resistance from the Reagan administration, Congress began to play an even more assertive role. Senator Tsongas – joined by 68 cosponsors this time – introduced an amendment to a continuing resolution that called for increased assistance, noting that “it would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance their cause of freedom.” (Coll 2004, 91-92) In the House, Representative Don Ritter (R-PA) introduced a companion resolution with 168 cosponsors. Both efforts were seemingly unsuccessful – the CIA did not want its efforts to be discussed publicly, and the State Department opposed the framing of U.S. support as “direct material assistance.” (Scott 1996, 51-52) However, even though the resolutions did not pass, they positively influenced internal discussions about increasing aid. (Scott 1996, 51-52)

Later that same year, an intensive lobbying effort by Congressman Charlie Wilson (D-TX) resulted in a remarkable doubling of assistance to the Afghan rebels. Through a series of political maneuvers and bargains, Wilson used his position on the House Appropriation Committee to guarantee $40 million in funding to the insurgents. Likewise, he expanded the type of assistance available to the rebels by arguing for the provision of anti-aircraft guns. By this time, due in part to Congressional prodding, the CIA was more comfortable with expanding support; in 1985, the rebels received 20 Oerliken antiaircraft cannons. (Crile 2003; Scott 1996, 53)

Another large-scale increase in military assistance funding came in 1984, and it was also the result of Congressional action. This time, Congressman Wilson’s lobbying secured an additional $50 million for the assistance program, bringing total annual support up to approximately $130 million. Beyond merely increasing the CIA’s budget to help the mujahideen, Congress also insisted on making the support publicly known. In April 1984, a report released by the Senate Foreign Relations committee expressed support for “a Congressional resolution publicly mandating moral and material support for the mujahideen,” calling the move “a useful, even if far from decisive, antidote to Soviet policy.” (Scott 1996, 53) In October 1984, the Senate passed the resolution 97-3, and the House passed its counterpart with unanimous consent. The resolution, which had 75 cosponsors, was in large part a version of Senator Tsongas’ 1982 bill that had unanimous bipartisan support and pushed the Reagan administration to do more, despite never being passed.

After initial prodding by Congress and pro-rebel advocacy groups, intelligence that indicated the Soviets believed they could not win led to the adoption of a more ambitious arming effort by the Reagan administration. Total aid would peak in 1987, a year after the U.S. first supplied the famed Stinger anti-aircraft missile. (Scott 1996, 61-62) The concerted bipartisan effort by Congress at the early stages of the war should not be understated: The legislative branch played a crucial role in deciding U.S. foreign policy. Even at the time, Congress’ role did not go unnoticed; A 1984 article in the New York Times noted, “By all accounts, Congress has been responsible for most of the increases in covert aid.”

Figure 1: Graph on U.S. Aid to the Mujahideen, 1980-1987. Coordinates X: Year and Y: USD Millions. U.S. aid was matched by Saudi Arabia throughout the war. Other countries, individuals, and organizations contributed smaller amounts as well.

Image description: dark gray line graph with x-axis labeled "Year" from 1980-1987 and y-axis labelled "Millions USD $" from 0-700. A curved blue line runs from 1980 to 1987 with data points (1980, 30), (1981, 50), (1982, 50), (1983, 80), (1984, 120), (1985, 250), (1986, 470), (1987, 630).

Case Study 2 – Congressional Aid to Kyiv During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Congressional assistance for Ukraine over the past decade is an example of legislative influence on the direction and success of U.S. foreign policy. Bipartisan Congressional aid to Ukraine first began during Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014. Between 2014 and 2022, the U.S. provided $2.8 billion in military assistance to Kyiv. From Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 to the present, the U.S. has provided over $44 billion in security assistance. Initially, large bipartisan majorities approved multiple tranches of aid in conjunction with the Biden administration as part of standalone bills. Votes were more partisan when Ukraine aid was folded into larger legislation that included partisan funding priorities. Since the passage of the first few tranches of assistance, the number of Republicans in both the Senate and the House who have voted against further aid has expanded substantially. This trend has impacted Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and caused reputational harm to the United States.

Figure 2: Table with two columns: "Date" and "Aid to Ukraine Voting Record"; and five rows: March 2022, May 2022, September 2022, December 2022, and April 2024. 

Voting breakdowns for the five tranches of U.S. assistance that have passed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. Republican support has declined across both houses of Congress, changing the direction and pace of U.S. foreign policy.

In February 2024, the Senate passed a bill to provide $60 billion in military assistance to Ukraine by a 70-29 vote. However, House speaker Mike Johnson avoided bringing the legislation to the floor for several months before and after Senate passage. Analysts attributed Johnson’s unwillingness to advance the legislation to the threat by far-right Representatives to remove Johnson if he supported providing Ukraine with more assistance. Congressional inactivity thus impacted U.S. foreign policy, indicating that domestic politics inevitably shape decisions on the world stage. Were U.S. political decisions merely a “black box,” they would not be marked by the peaks and valleys in aid provisions that stem from domestic political dynamics.

Critics may say that by providing large amounts of aid to both Afghan rebels and Ukraine, Congress has acted quite similarly in terms of U.S. great power relations with the USSR and Russia, respectively. By the numbers, the U.S. has provided substantially more military assistance to Ukraine. Yet while this is true in terms of the total financial cost of the military provisions, it does not take into account that the value of the aid is not commensurate with the need of the partner the U.S. is trying to support. Ukraine is defending its territory against attacks from land, air, and sea. In contrast to the assistance provided to the mujahideen, which consisted largely of small arms for insurgent attacks, Ukraine requires advanced hardware for a modern army waging trench battles as part of a war of attrition. The Congressional response was sufficient to support the Afghan rebels and has thus far been insufficient to support Kyiv.

Conclusion

The two case studies reviewed here – Congressional actions related to the Soviet war in Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – have shown how and when Congress has exerted consequential influence on U.S. foreign policy. In the former case it spurred the White House to greater action and ultimately forced the USSR to withdraw its troops, while in the latter, it has stalled the executive branch’s assistance efforts. The two examples provide evidence for the view that Congress is not a monolith that acts identically over time. The legislative branch is a microcosm of the entire political system. Elections, domestic developments, trends in public opinion, party leadership, and other factors change how Congress behaves.

While it is true that the latest aid bill ultimately passed with a robust majority, it is also apparent that support for the funding is not nearly as robust as aid for the mujahideen was in the 1980s. In recent years, domestic politics have lessened the strategic predictability of U.S. foreign policy. As Ukraine’s military stocks dwindled, discussions about launching a discharge petition – a bureaucratic maneuver that would call a vote on the legislation without requiring Speaker Johnson’s approval – continued for months. Ultimately, it took a political agreement between Speaker Johnson and Congressional Democrats to ensure his position to secure the aid package. Nonetheless, a point of concurrency with Congressional behavior in the 1980s is the ability and willingness of individuals to effect or stall change. Whereas Representative Charlie Wilson used his position on the House Appropriations Committee to circumvent other House committees and boost assistance to the rebels, Representative Johnson used his position as Speaker of the House to prevent an aid bill from being put up for a vote.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent those of any previous or current employers, the editorial body of SIPR, the Freeman Spogli Institute, or Stanford University.