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Former U.S. Sen. Mark Udall gained notoriety for his vocal opposition to National Security Agency surveillance programs in the wake of the Edward Snowden disclosures of June 2013.

Before losing his seat in the mid-term elections last year, the senior senator from Colorado had become one of the staunchest critics of the U.S. spy agency for conducting massive, warrantless data grabs on millions of Americans without their knowledge.

Even before the Snowden leaks, Udall had warned on the Senate floor in 2011 that the Patriot Act was being interpreted in a way to allow domestic surveillance activities that many members of Congress and the American public do not understand.

"Americans would be alarmed if they knew how this law is being carried out," he told fellow senators before he introduced amendments to the Patriot Act that would have secured tougher privacy mechanisms. The act was renewed without the amendments.

Udall – who served on the Senate's Intelligence and Armed Services committees – will be in conversation with Center for International Security and Cooperation Co-Director Amy Zegart Thursday, April 2, at 7:30 p.m. in CEMEX Auditorium as part of Stanford's Security Conundrum lecture series. The event is open to the public but an RSVP is required by 5 p.m. April 1.

The special series has brought together nationally prominent experts this academic year to explore the critical issues raised by the NSA's activities, including their impact on security, privacy and civil liberties. The series ends April 10 with a public conversation with Judge Reggie Barnett Walton, former presiding judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, known as the FISA court.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 empowered the FISA court to oversee government requests for surveillance of foreign intelligence agencies. During its existence, the court has granted more than 30,000 warrants; it has denied only 11.

Walton, in conversation with Stanford Law School Professor Jenny Martinez, will explain the role that the secretive institution attempts to play in maintaining the balance between civil liberties and national security.

"We're delighted to end the Security Conundrum series with a view from Congress and the courts," said Zegart, who is also a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. "Holding serious campus-wide conversations about issues of national importance is an essential part of the Stanford experience."

Zegart said CISAC and Hoover would conduct a similar series on international cybersecurity challenges in the coming academic year.

Udall, the third speaker in the series, also advocated for the declassification of the Senate Intelligence Committee's study on the CIA's enhanced interrogation program. The post-9/11 program allowed the government to ship suspected terrorists to secret overseas prisons and subject them to waterboarding and other torture techniques.

Gen. Michael Hayden, the former director of the NSA and CIA who has defended the government surveillance programs, kicked off the Security Conundrum series in October. In that talk, he said the metadata collection "is something we would never have done on Sept. 9 or Sept. 10. But it seemed reasonable after Sept. 11. No one is doing this out of prurient interests. No – it as a logical response to the needs of the moment."

The second speaker in the series, journalist Barton Gellman, gave a detailed account of his relationship with former NSA contractor Snowden and how he worked with him to reveal the details of the NSA's global and domestic surveillance programs.

One of the first Snowden revelations, Gellman said, was the top-secret PRISM surveillance program, in which the NSA tapped into the servers of nine large U.S. Internet companies, including Google, Microsoft, Yahoo and Facebook. Snowden said he believed the extent of mass data collection on American citizens was far greater than what the public knew.

The PRISM program allows the U.S. intelligence community to gain access from the tech companies to a wide range of digital information, including audio, video chats, photographs, emails and stored data, that enables analysts to track foreign targets. The program does not require individual warrants, but instead operates under the broad authorization of the FISA court.

"I asked him very bluntly, 'Why are you doing this?'" Gellman said of Snowden.

"He gave me very persuasive and consistent answers about his motives. Whatever you think of what he did or whether or not I should have published these stories, I would claim to you that all the evidence supports his claim that he had come across a dangerous accumulation of state power that the people needed to know about."

 
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On Tuesday March 3, 2015, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a hearing entitled, “Understanding the Cyber Threat and Implications for the 21st Century Economy.” This was the first in a series of hearings focused on cyberspace, the Internet, and the challenges and opportunities that they present. Cyberspace has become the backbone and engine of the 21st century economy, and recent high-profile information security breaches have raised awareness of the vulnerabilities and risks facing cyberspace. With this hearing series, the subcommittee seeks to expand the discussion surrounding these issues to examine the broader implications for businesses and consumers in today’s 21st century economy. This initial hearing will provide an overview of the issue, focusing on the history, evolution, and future of cybersecurity.

The witnesses included Herbert Lin, Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Richard Bejtlich, Chief Security Strategist, FireEye, Incorporated; and Gregory Shannon, Chief Scientist, CERT Program, the Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University. III.

Lin's testimony begins at 21:00.

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In the past years, different forms of non-democratic rule have expanded, associated with revamped attempts at controlling the media. New mechanisms, including legislative, commercial and technological tools have been used to contain, co-opt and silence critical voices. At the same time, bottom-up pursuits of pushing the boundaries of the permissible and redefining the space for creative critical discourse have intensified, with outspoken journalists and netizens creating new platforms to bypass complex political restrictions. This panel presents a unique discussion on how this cat and mouse game works across non-democratic contexts: in Russia, China, and Turkey. These cases present different degrees of separation from democracy, with China being the furthest, categorized as a full authoritarian regime, Turkey being in between an illiberal democracy and competitive authoritarianism, and Russia positioned in the middle of China and Turkey. Beyond illuminating the specific dynamics of each case, the panel will engage in drawing the parallels and distinctions in control and resistance mechanisms across the three cases. It will further explore and reflect on the recent tendencies of cross-authoritarian diffusion of information management, illustrating how the three regimes and the critical journalists in them may be learning from one another and what that means for our understanding of media in non-democratic contexts. Watch Jaclyn Kerr's discussion of the Russian case.

 
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For seven decades, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has served as a discussion forum for urgent issues at the intersection of science, technology, and society. Born in the aftermath of World War II and a roiling debate over the control of the postwar atom, the Bulletin has been a sounding board for major nuclear-age debates, from atomic espionage to missile defense. Since the end of the Cold War, the magazine has featured an expanding array of challenges, including the threat posed by global climate change. The Bulletin’s contributors have expressed their public citizenship by helping to bring the political aspects of science into proper focus. They have stood up for the political freedom of science, and sought to harness scientific knowledge to responsible ends in the political arena. Such efforts are needed now, as they were in 1945. Read Benjamin Wilson's discussion here.

 

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Every week, the Islamic State (ISIS) makes further headlines with its ruthless behavior. Beheadings, mass executions, burnings and extreme acts of brutality are the methods of a terrorist campaign intended to cow opponents and rally potential fighters. At the same time, the group is fighting a guerilla war against Iraqi forces while engaging in more conventional infantry battles against Kurdish Peshmerga and Free Syrian Army cadres. The many tactics of ISIS raises the question: Which type of war are we fighting against?

CISAC's Joe Felter and his Empirical Studies of Conflict colleagues Eli Berman and Jacob Shapiro ask those questions in this National Interest article.

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We can't let partisan infighting destroy what could be a historic nuclear pact. America is the safest when its leaders work together to effectively meet national security and foreign policy challenges. Yet partisan infighting threatens to upend our nation’s best chance to stem the very real Iranian nuclear threat. Read William Perry's critique here.

 

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In a commentary on the long-term storage of SNF in the March 2015 issue of Nature Materials, Professor Rod Ewing writes that, "to design reliable and safe geological repositories it is critical to understand how the characteristics of spent nuclear fuel evolve with time, and how this affects the storage environment. Globally, about 10,000 metric tonnes of heavy metal (MTHM) are produced each year by nuclear power plants, and a cumulative inventory of approximately 300,000 MTHM is stored either in pools or dry casks at reactor sites around the world1. Most of this inventory is destined for long-term storage and eventual geologic disposal. Thus, the behaviour of UO2 in spent fuel as a waste form must be understood and evaluated under the extraordinary conditions of geologic disposal, which extends to hundreds of thousands of years. The behaviour of nuclear fuel under the conditions of long-term disposal in a geologic repository depend specifically on the chemical changes that have occurred to the fuel during service life in the reactor."

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To design reliable and safe geological repositories it is critical to understand how the characteristics of spent nuclear fuel evolve with time, and how this affects the storage environment. Rod Ewing discusses the issue in this Nature Materials essay.

 

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For 25 years now, a weak-state fixation has transfixed U.S. foreign policy, Amy Zegart writes in this Foreign Policy piece. But Washington's paranoia over weak and failing states is distracting it from the real national security threats looming on the horizon.

 

 

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As the fallout from the November 2014 cyber attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment continues, with Sony co-chairman Amy Pascal stepping down this month, it’s still not clear how the story will end, either for the Hollywood luminaries or U.S. national security. Herb Lin writes in this Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists piece that we can learn from the incident and start to formulate responses for the future attacks that will inevitably occur.

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