Stanford University

Nuclear Energy

Understanding Three Decades of Lag in Indian Nuclear Decision-Making

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This talk reviews three decades of Indian nuclear decision-making. It argues that India’s slow pace of weaponization in the face of Pakistani nuclearization and Sino- Pakistani nuclear cooperation in the 1980s, the slack in building an institutional capacity to wield nuclear weapons after they came into existence in the 1990s, and the reluctant attempts at developing an operational arsenal even after formally claiming nuclear power status and almost going to war with a nuclear Pakistan in the last decade, constitute puzzling behavior. Existing proliferation models explain facets of Indian nuclear behavior. However, they don’t explain it in its totality. The different facets of Indian nuclear decision making in the last three decades can be collapsed into a single dependent variable: the lag in strategic decision-making. This talk operationalizes the concept of ‘lag’, critically reviews existing explanations of Indian nuclear behavior, and offers an alternative framework for understanding Indian nuclear decision-making.

Gaurav Kampani is a sixth year doctoral student at Cornell University's Department of Government. His major and minor fields are International Relations and Comparative Politics. Kampani's research interests cover international security and focus on the relationship between domestic institutions and strategic policy, military strategy, operations planning, and weapons development.

Kampani's dissertation project studies Indian civil-military institutions and nuclear weapons-related operational practices in the decade prior 1998 and the decade since.

Between 1998-2005, Kampani worked on South Asia-related nuclear and missile proliferation issues at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey CA.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Gaurav Kampani Nuclear Security Fellow Keynote Speaker CISAC
Paul Kapur Associate Professor, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School; Faculty Affiliate, CISAC Commentator
Seminars

Predicting Reliability (Or How I Learned to Start Worrying and Fear the Nuclear Industry)

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John Downer received his MA/MPhil in the History and Philosophy of Science from Cambridge University, his MA in Sociology from the University of Edinburgh, and his doctorate in Science and Technology Studies at Cornell University. His dissertation was on "The Burden of Proof: Regulating Ultra-High Reliability in Civil Aviation." Downer then worked at the London School of Economics' Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR), where he began re-working his dissertation for publication as a book titled "Black Box/Check Box: Assessing Critical Technologies" (forthcoming from MIT Press's Inside Technology series). Downer brings the sociology of knowledge to bear on discourses about technology policy and governance, taking insights from a close empirical study of technological knowledge-production-the US Federal Aviation Administration's assessment of new aircraft designs-and drawing out implications for broader questions about risk and governance in a world of pacemakers and nuclear power-stations. At CISAC, Downer is exploring the sociology and epistemology of failure and its implications for the governance of nuclear technologies.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

John Downer Postdoctoral Fellow, Zukerman Fellow Keynote Speaker CISAC
Charles Perrow (DISCUSSANT) Visiting Professor, CISAC; Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Yale University Commentator
Seminars

The Nuclear Crisis in Japan

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Daniel I. Okimoto

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Professor of Political Science, Emeritus
D_Okimoto_ALT_headshot.jpg PhD

A specialist on the political economy of Japan, Daniel Okimoto is a senior fellow emeritus of FSI, director emeritus of Shorenstein APARC, and a professor of political science emeritus at Stanford University. His fields of research include comparative political economy, Japanese politics, U.S.-Japan relations, high technology, economic interdependence in Asia, and international security.

During his 25-year tenure at Stanford, Okimoto served as a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy, the predecessor organization to Shorenstein APARC, within CISAC. He also taught at the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, the Stockholm School of Economics, and the Stanford Center in Berlin.

Okimoto co-founded Shorenstein APARC. He was the vice chairman of the Japan Committee of the National Research Council at the National Academy of Sciences, and of the Advisory Council of the Department of Politics at Princeton University. He received his BA in history from Princeton University, MA in East Asian studies from Harvard University, and PhD in political science from the University of Michigan.

He is the author of numerous books and articles, including Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology; co-editor, with Takashi Inoguchi, of The Political Economy of Japan: International Context; and co-author, with Thomas P. Rohlen, of A United States Policy for the Changing Realities of East Asia: Toward a New Consensus.

Director Emeritus, Shorenstein APARC
FSI Senior Fellow, Emeritus
Daniel I. Okimoto Director Emeritus of Shorenstein APARC, Senior Fellow Emeritus at FSI and Professor Emeritus, Political Science Speaker
Katherine D. Marvel Perry Fellow Speaker CISAC
Alan Hanson CISAC Visiting Scholar and Executive Vice President, Technologies and Used Fuel Management of AREVA NC Inc. Speaker
Seminars

Thomas Isaacs: The future of nuclear

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As Japan's troubles continue, CISAC's Thomas Isaacs discusses the future of the nuclear industry.

CISAC: My understanding is that Three Mile Island set back the industry because afterward there was no appetite for building new reactors.

Thomas Isaacs: It's not clear that it was Three Mile Island. It was certainly in that time frame. Others would say it was a combination of a reduction in the demand for electricity at that time and the emergence of alternative energy sources that were less expensive to get started. You saw less of an appetite not just because of the concern about Three Mile Island -- although that was probably a contributing factor -- but because it just no longer made sense to build new, huge, expensive power plants, particularly nuclear power plants.

CISAC:  Experts now say that what's going on in Japan is worse than Three Mile Island. If so, how might that affect the building of nuclear reactors in the future?

Isaacs: The effects are probably unknown and unknowable now. We'll need to have a much better idea of what actually transpires, and how it is handled by the Japanese. We'll also have to see what the consequences are and what the perceived consequences are, and the ability of the Japanese government and utilities to generate a sense of confidence, which is lacking right now. All of that will have an effect and it will be different for a variety of countries, but it's hard to speculate. My own assumption is that in countries where there is more of a national, organized effort to build nuclear, principally in places like China and India, you might not see as much effect as you might see in countries where nuclear has been much more of a controversial issue, and where the public has much more engagement in the decision-making process. In emerging countries that now have no or very few plants, you might see much more controversy. 

CISAC: What about regulation? Might there be more regulation, both here and in China, India, and elsewhere?

Isaacs: I think we don't know that yet either. You would hope that people would view this as a sobering event -- an opportunity to learn lessons for the future. As a result of Three Mile Island and then Chernobyl we have organizations like the World Association of Nuclear Operators, who come together from all over the world to share lessons learned. This will be an example of a place where you would hope they will take this very seriously -- I'm sure they will -- and they will ask very searching questions about whether our regulations or anybody's regulations are appropriate given what we've experienced. There's no question that the track record for U.S. reactors has been outstanding and getting better over the last 20 to 30 years. Should that lead to a sense of comfort? No. It should lead to a sense that we've always had an obligation to ask ourselves if we're doing everything that makes sense, and we can continue to learn from experience and improve.

CISAC: The issue of nuclear waste is important in this country and elsewhere. How might it fit into what we're seeing in Japan right now?

Isaacs: There is spent nuclear fuel, which is a waste form if it's not reprocessed. That's what would ultimately go into the repository, and that potentially is one of the problems that's causing the release of radioactivity at some of these plants. More broadly, you need to feel confident you know how to handle waste, both in the short term and in the very long term, because it is potentially hazardous for geologic time periods. Most people who work in that business believe that disposing of it in a geologic repository, in a stable geologic formation that has the right characteristics, is a very fine way to solve that problem, and pretty much every country that has decided to move toward nuclear waste disposal has chosen that approach. But from a societal point of view and a political point of view, it's a very tough problem. It's not just the science and technology problem.

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