Fresh off his re-election victory, Barack Obama—the “Pacific President”—became the first president to visit Myanmar and Cambodia when he traveled to the Southeast Asian countries in November.

The trip highlights the region’s importance to the United States and signals that Obama’s second term will significantly focus on Asian trade, security and governance issues.

Eight Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center scholars sat down to discuss reactions to the election in Asia, and possible directions for U.S.-Asia relations and foreign policy during the second Obama administration.

How do you think countries in Asia view the outcome of the U.S. presidential election?

Karl Eikenberry: Overall, I think the countries of Asia will view President Obama’s reelection as positive, including because of the likely continuity in American policy toward the region.

Thomas Fingar: Beijing is troubled by Obama’s policies toward Asia because it sees them as directed against China and detrimental to its interests. But it was more troubled by Romney’s rhetoric during the campaign and probably interprets the election outcome as portending more continuity than change in U.S. policy. On balance, Beijing would rather deal with a devil it knows than cope with the uncertainties of a new U.S. administration.

Gi-Wook Shin: There was some concern in South Korea that Mitt Romney would have reverted to the hardline North Korea policy of George W. Bush’s first term. It would have created a bit of tension between the United States and South Korea, so in that context many Koreans are relieved that Obama was re-elected.

David Straub: Interestingly, President Obama personally is overwhelmingly popular in South Korea, but opinion polls show that most South Koreans continue to have complex, even critical views of American foreign policy under him.

Is President Obama likely to make major changes to Asia policy in his second term?

Eikenberry: Some of the people in key positions in the second Obama administration will change, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, but President Obama will of course be in office for four more years. He has been in Asia and knows the players. He has a clear strategy, so overall I expect continuity in his administration’s Asia policy. 

Michael H. Armacost: Events are really what shape foreign policy, and developments can occur that are hard to predict.

Henry S. Rowen: We tend to assume there is a continuity or gradual evolution to events, but there are also discontinuities. Something could happen in North Korea, for example. Unexpected events do happen from time to time, and the question is to try to figure out what they might be.

How could U.S. China policy develop?

Fingar: If President Obama has a clear plan for his second term, its goals and priorities are not yet clear to the Chinese. They worry that he may continue, or ratchet up, efforts they see as designed to constrain China’s rise. That said, they know that steady relations with the United States are essential for their own continued economic success and will respond positively to U.S. efforts to reduce distrust and enhance strategic stability. They will be troubled, however, by likely—and overdue—U.S. pressure to secure enforcement of China’s intellectual property and other trade-related commitments, and by likely U.S. efforts to deepen trade relations with other countries.

How could the possible election of a more conservative Japanese government during the second term of the Obama administration affect U.S.-Japan relations?

Armacost: The Trans-Pacific Partnership is an issue where we both have potential constraints on the extent to which Japan can be included, and it is not certain whether that will change very much under a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration. Secondly, there is the longstanding Okinawa base issue. The LDP did not do anything about the base from 1996 onward, and that will probably also be the case if the LDP comes into power again. Finally, the United States will probably push Japan to take more of a stand on the ongoing Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with China.

After the failure of the United States’ Leap Day agreement with North Korea this year, and especially with the election of a new South Korean government next month, do you think that Obama’s second term could bring a renewed effort in diplomacy with North Korea?

Shin: It will be important to watch the outcome of the South Korean election. If the opposition party wins, they will move very quickly to engage with North Korea and the question then will be how the United States will respond.

Straub: In any event, the United States periodically reaches out to North Korea, to test it or just because time has passed. It may do so again after the election, particularly since there is a still fairly new leadership in North Korea, and also because there are elections or leadership changes in all the countries in the region. A number of the Six Party Talks member states, likely including South Korea, may also push harder for a resumption of those talks, which were never held during President Obama’s first term. But the Obama administration will be cautious because it was burned by North Korea’s breaking of their Leap Day agreement.

What direction might U.S. policy toward South Asia take?

Eikenberry: Our presence in Afghanistan is going to remain an important part of our overall military posture in Central, South, and East Asia. Managing properly the transition to full Afghan responsibility for their internal security will remain very high on President Obama’s agenda. At the same time, it will be important to keep some U.S. counterterrorism capability in Afghanistan, with the permission of the Afghan government.  

The nature of our security dialogue with Pakistan will change in emphasis from one that since 9/11 has mostly been informed by international terrorism. If we continue to make progress against Al Qaida, I expect our conversation with Pakistan will place more emphasis on its nuclear weapons programs and deployments. This is a potentially destabilizing issue and a concern not only to India, but also to China.

There has been a steady appreciation in the current and future importance of India. It will continue to be key in terms of the administration’s broader Asia-Pacific policy, but with a clear understanding of the limits of defense engagement with India.

Will the rebalancing, or “pivot,” toward Asia continue to be a central theme in U.S. foreign policy in Obama’s second term?

Eikenberry: Last year, when President Obama announced the rebalancing to Asia, I think this was done in part to signal to the world that we were putting the decade of costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan behind us and looking forward—that the U.S. “was back.” I do not believe we will see any short-term major change in the deployment of military capabilities to the Asia-Pacific region, but the rebalancing could have profound consequences in the longer term. It will likely inform the prioritization of our future defense modernization and the development of military doctrine, which in turn drives procurement.

Donald K. Emmerson: Asia will continue to loom large on Washington's policy horizon. Although the pivot was originally all about security, the rebalance has since been "rebalanced" to encompass economic concerns. In July 2012 when Secretary Clinton went to Phnom Penh to attend the security-focused ASEAN Regional Forum, she brought along the largest delegation of American businesspeople ever to visit Southeast Asia. Their presence upgraded the profile of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Forum, which met the following day. The Obama administration has also taken the lead in promoting a Trans-Pacific Partnership to liberalize Asia-Pacific trade. 

President Obama's mid-November trip to Southeast Asia is further evidence of the pivot's continuation. In mid-November he will become the first U.S. president ever to have visited Myanmar and Cambodia. He will stop in Thailand as well. In Phnom Penh he will attend the U.S.-ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit. A key issue at these meetings will be the quarrels over sovereignty in the South China Sea between China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. To the extent that the United States appears to be intervening against Beijing in these disputes, the "pivot" will be interpreted as a move to check China.

Armacost: There is no doubt that the Asia rebalancing strategy will endure, but the components and the apportionment of resources may change. President Obama may have initially overplayed engagement with China, and now he is probably hedging too much. But it does not change the fact that there is a lot at stake in terms of our relationship with China and that we have to engage the government. So it is a question then of where to strike a balance between hedging and engagement. After the election, there is also the question now of what happens to U.S. trade policy, and whether the Trans-Pacific Partnership will include India, China, and Japan.

Daniel C. Sneider: If you look at the president’s broader message and the one he carried in the campaign, he is very focused on restructuring and moving toward a more innovation-centered U.S. economy to develop new sources of employment. In addition to being concerned about climate change, he is also seriously looking at alternative energy resources as a source of real growth in the U.S. economy and as a way to move away from foreign fossil fuel dependency. Focusing more on the Asia-Pacific region is also quite consistent with these goals.

The president, surrounded by his Cabinet members and senior national security and foreign policy advisors, appears grim as he declares: “This is certainly the greatest crisis I’ve ever faced as a president.”

He has ordered the deployment of U.S. forces into Syrian territory to protect civilians and establish safe zones. His Cabinet must now determine whether to order a pre-emptive strike against Syrian troops on word from the CIA that the Bashar al-Assad regime appears ready to use chemical and biological weapons stored in underground bunkers east of Damascus.

After a military briefing by the commander of CENTCOM, the president cautions those assembled at the classified briefing: “Remember, history will judge us, in part, by how thoroughly we discuss all the options today.”

With imagined top-secret memorandums from the CIA and the White House – as well as the real-deal Obama Nuclear Posture Review – some 20 Stanford undergraduate and law students dressed in suits and armed with laptops and position papers spend three hours debating the merits of an attack on Syrian forces.

Scott Sagan, a political science professor and senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), plays Obama in the class co-taught by Allen Weiner, director of the Center on International Conflict and Negotiation at the Law School.

The Ethics and Law of War class presents law and political science students with some of the political, legal and moral consequences of war. For their final simulation, they must stay in character, grill one another as policymakers and world leaders might do behind closed doors – and then defend their final decisions.

“Instead of simply learning abstract just-war theory or international law doctrine, the simulations encourage students to apply what they've learned to real problems,” says Weiner, once a legal adviser at the State Department. “This provides for much deeper awareness of the subject matter and richer appreciation of the nuances and complexities.

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Scott Sagan as President Obama

Ethics & War

The class grew out of Stanford’s hugely successful, two-year War & Ethics lecture series, which concluded last month. Philosophers, writers, journalists, historians, social scientists, human rights activists and policy makers came together several times a month to grapple with the complex ethical equations of war. Co-sponsored by a dozen centers and departments across campus, the series drew big names and big crowds.

Vietnam War veterans and award winning authors Tobias Wolff – a Stanford English professor – and Tim O’Brien told a sold-out audience that writing about war was both therapeutic and heartbreaking. O’Brien was a Pulitzer Prize finalist for “The Things They Carried,” a harrowing string of stories about a platoon of American soldiers in Vietnam.

How do you write about war? “You do it sentence by sentence, line by line, character by character, even syllable by syllable,’ O’Brien told a mesmerized audience. “You dive into that wreck and try to salvage something.”

Journalist Sebastian Junger spoke at the screening of  “Restrepo,” his documentary about the Afghanistan War. Stanford students and faculty performed in George Packer’s play, “Betrayed,” which illuminated the U.S. abandonment of young Iraqi interpreters who risked their lives for Washington during the Iraq War. For the final event, Debra Satz, a philosophy professor and director of the McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society, Sagan, and Charles Dunlap, a retired Air Force general who now leads the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke University, debated the future ethical challenges of war.

Sagan, an expert in nuclear policy and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction who worked at the Pentagon and was a consultant to the Secretary of Defense, said the lecture series enriched his students by forcing them to pay attention and question the moral and legal underpinnings of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“I was stretched, intellectually, by this series,” he said. “It encouraged me to read and discuss both fiction and philosophy that raises the same ethical issues – from a very different perspective – that we analyze in political science.”

Back to class

Weiner, as stand-in for Vice President Joe Biden, tells those assembled they must consider that within 24 hours, 6,000 American troops will be in danger. The CIA has a “high degree of confidence” that Assad has ordered the removal of the chemical weapons from the underground bunkers and transport trucks have been spotted at the sights.

“As we head into an election cycle, the difficulties of the decision that we make today will be placed under even greater scrutiny,” Weiner says.

That decision will be to make one of these hard choices:

• The U.S. military withdraws its troops and avoids a military confrontation, but risks further civilian deaths and the condemnation of Arab Spring allies;
• Obama orders conventional airstrikes against Syrian troops, which could lead to thousands of inadvertent civilian casualties;
• Washington takes extraordinary measures and uses nuclear weapons to destroy the underground storage bunkers for its weapons of mass destruction. This last option likely would eliminate any chance of Syrian troops using chemical weapons, but it would open a Pandora’s box for the Nobel Peace Prize president who has pledged to work toward a nuclear-free world.

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U.S. Army Col. Viet Luong as CENTCOM Commander Gen. James Mattis

The students know Americans are weary of war after the WMD fiasco in Iraq and a decade-long war in Afghanistan, both of which have claimed countless lives and a trillion-plus in taxpayer dollars. Their decision – as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, among others – is weighted by the concern that Americans likely won’t re-elect a president who drags them into another costly warm, and by the fear that a successful president cannot let American troops be exposed to deadly chemical attacks.

The mock military briefing by Gen. James Mattis – played by visiting CISAC military fellow, U.S. Army Col. Viet Luong, himself a commander in Afghanistan – lays out the risks and probabilities of casualties under each scenario.

A student asks Luong which military option he would recommend.

The general prevaricates: “I’m a military guy; I tend to lean toward success and then I also consider civilian casualties. But I’m also very concerned about putting my soldiers at risk.”

Clinton, voiced by international policy student Micaela Hellman-Tincher, says she’s concerned about mission creep. “Consider the international implications of us entering into conflict,” she says.

The fake Samantha Power of the National Security Council, played by Ashley Rhoades, urges diplomatic measures and a stand-down from military conflict. “I’m not advocating in any way for inaction,” she says. “There are several diplomatic solutions. We ask that you give us 24 hours to be able to work on these diplomatic options and multilateral diplomacy.”

Such as what? Such as calling on Moscow to mediate or seeking a U.N. envoy.

The legal team from the law school lays out their arguments for why a preventive strike would be illegal under certain conventions; while a pre-emptive strike based on imminent and unavoidable threats of attack might be permissible.

Then Stanford law student Alex Weber – playing Avril Haines, legal advisor to the National Security Council – addresses the elephant in the room: the nuclear option.

“If you use a nuclear weapon, regardless of whether the Syrians use chemical weapons against our troops, you are, as Colin Powell said in the 1991 Gulf War, opening a Pandora’s Box, particularly because Syria has no nuclear weapon,” Weber says. “You are the nuclear nonproliferation president. There is a psychological button that you push that will prompt the media to take the ethical debate to new levels.”

In the end, consensus appears to be growing around an immediate preventive strike against the storage bunkers using conventional forces. The Cabinet knows this could lead to deaths on both sides, but allowing the Syrians to use chemical weapons could lead to even more.

“You can’t cut and run, Mr. President,” insists student Torry Castellano, playing White House Chief of Staff Jacob Lew.

Obama says he will take their advice under advisement and all rise as he leaves the war room.

More photos of the student simulation are available at CISAC's Facebook page.

Scarborough Shoal, a tiny rocky outcropping and lagoon off the west coast of the Philippines, sits at the center of the latest South China Sea tug-of-war. Protesters took to the streets in Manila on May 11 to criticize China’s support of fishermen who entered the disputed territory a month ago and sparked a yet unresolved naval standoff between the Philippines and China. On May 9, while ships from both sides maneuvered in the area, Manila's secretary of defense assured Filipinos that if Beijing attacked, Washington would come to the country’s defense.  

That expectation had been strengthened in Manila in November 2011 when the visiting American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, referred to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea.” Clinton’s slip of the tongue was not a major diplomatic incident. But some Flipinos saw it as a sign of U.S. support for their government's maritime claims.

Washington’s refusal to side with any of the claimant states had not changed. What had changed was the level of American concern. In the November 2011 issue of Foreign Policy Clinton had defended the idea of a “pivot” toward Asia, meaning a renewed U.S. focus on Asia after a decade of intense military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The term “pivot” has fallen out of favor in Washington, but the Obama administration’s heightened interest in Asia is real and ongoing, says Donald K. Emmerson, director of Stanford’s Southeast Asia Forum. He recently discussed the nuances of what he describes as an important but “lopsided pivot.”

How does the pivot fit into the larger global picture?

In the continuing debate as to whether the United States is in decline, the key question is: relative to what? Certainly, if we compare the situation now with the period immediately after World War II, the United States is less powerful relative to the power of other states. But 1945 ushered in a uniquely unipolar moment in American history. Americans had escaped the physical devastation wreaked on Europe and much of Asia. Germany and Japan lay in ruins. Twenty million Russians were dead. China’s long-running civil war would soon resume. Suddenly America had no credible competitors for global power.

Today? Conventional wisdom holds that Asia has become the center of gravity in the global economy. Yet even if we use purchasing power parity rather than exchange rates to measure the American share of world GDP, that share has only modestly decreased. Meanwhile, China’s remarkable rise may be leveling off. The evidence is less that the United States is in secular decline than that the world is changing in ways to which Americans need to adapt if they are to regain economic health. If the pivot facilitates that adaptation, it will have been a success.

Do you interpret the pivot to the Asia-Pacific as more hype or reality?

The pivot is definitely a reality, but the reality is partly about symbolism and atmospherics. The pivot conveys reassurance, particularly to Southeast Asia, that the United States cares about the Asia-Pacific region and that it is willing to cooperate more than before with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Part of that is simply “showing up”—a willingness to attend ASEAN regional meetings. Another part of the pivot, however, involves raising the American security profile in the region, which has so far strengthened ASEAN’s diplomatic hand in dealing with China’s sweeping claim to the South China Sea.

How has the pivot been received and interpreted in Asia?

Generally speaking, the pivot has been welcomed in Southeast Asia, despite worries that if it becomes an effort to contain China, a Sino-American cold war could result. The specific responses of Southeast Asian governments have differed, however, on a spectrum from passive acquiescence to active support.

In Japan, the rotation of prime ministers in and out of office has understandably focused that country’s politics more on domestic concerns, and the still not fully resolved disposition of U.S. forces on Okinawa has drawn energy from the bilateral relationship.

As a “middle power,” South Korea has been supportive of multilateral frameworks and solutions. Seoul is pleased to see a renewed American interest in working with Asians in multilateral settings such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit.

China’s response has varied between cool and hostile. The foreign ministry has treated the pivot with some equanimity compared with the hostility of those in the People’s Liberation Army who view increased American involvement in Asia as a threat to Chinese aims and claims, especially regarding the South China Sea. China’s foreign policy is the outcome of contestation between various groups inside the country that do not necessarily see eye to eye on how best to handle the United States.

What do you see as the main implications, repercussions, and complications of the pivot?

The pivot, as Hillary Clinton advertised it in her Foreign Policy article, signals a shift in U.S. priorities away from Iraq and Afghanistan. For a time following the 9/11 attacks on America in 2001, the United States tended either to neglect Southeast Asia or to treat it as a second front in the “war on terror.” Economically, the pivot implies an acknowledgment that if America is to prosper in this century it will have to pay closer attention to Asia as an engine of global economic growth. Diplomatically, the pivot implies that with regard to Asian states, Washington cannot merely manage its relations bilaterally as the hub where their spokes meet, but must cultivate multilateral diplomacy as well. Militarily, the pivot implies that even while the American global force posture is drawn down in some parts of the world, it needs to be upgraded in Asia in response to Asian and American concerns over the terms on which China’s rise will take place.

A major constructive repercussion of the pivot has been the evolution of China’s own diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Previously China had disavowed multilateral diplomacy with Southeast Asians over claims to the South China Sea—a bilateralist strategy that in Southeast Asian eyes resembled an effort to “divide and rule.” America’s willingness to reach out to ASEAN and take part in ASEAN events has helped diplomats in any one Southeast Asian country to resist having to face China alone. Multilateral discussions, involving China and meant to prepare the way toward an eventual Code of Conduct, are now underway.

But as we saw recently during Hillary Clinton’s visit to the Philippines, it is important for Washington to maintain its independence and impartiality while facilitating peace in the region.

Complications? Yes, there is a danger that Washington could be dragged into supporting, or appearing to support, the claims of one of the Southeast Asian parties to the dispute. The Obama administration is aware of this risk, however, and I strongly doubt that an American official will again refer to the “West Philippine Sea.” 

A more serious complication in the longer run may arise from the pivot’s emphasis to date on Asian-Pacific security, and its relative lack of attention to creating and cultivating American economic opportunities in Asia.

China’s economic footprint in Asia is large and growing. It has moved up to become the main trading partner of many countries that used to trade proportionally more with the United States. An unbalanced relationship in which China saves and lends what Americans borrow and spend is unhealthy for both countries, and it cannot last. The pivot should forestall an invidious division of labor whereby Washington through the Seventh Fleet subsidizes the regional peace that enables Asians to prosper doing business with China. A higher priority needs to be placed on promoting American trade and investment in Asia, including China.

The Obama administration is hoping to persuade more Asian economies to join an arrangement called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), but the bar that it sets is high. The TPP’s strict protections for the environment, labor, and intellectual property rights and its comprehensive cuts in both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have raised its quality but lowered its appeal, especially to the region’s larger economies. Meanwhile, anticipated cuts in American budgets for defense will only intensify the need to refocus the pivot on economic as well as military access to Asia.

Related Resources

Foreign Policy: “America’s Pacific Century”
November 2011 article by Hillary Clinton introducing the concept of the "Asia pivot."

Stanford Daily: "Obama pivots policy toward Asia"
Summary of Donald K. Emmerson's May 1, 2012 talk.

LinkAsia: "Treat Scarborough Shoal Incident as a 'Wake Up Call'"

Thomas Fingar, who has observed developments in U.S.-China relations since "ping-pong diplomacy" in the early 1970s, spoke with China-based Leaders Magazine about the significance of—and hype surrounding—the Obama administration's "Asia pivot." The following is an edited version of the interview transcript.

President Obama recently announced a new military strategy, in which he stated that budget cuts will not weaken the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific. How do you interpret this?

The Asia-Pacific is the most economically dynamic region in the world, and it has the largest military forces and the most nuclear powers. U.S. interest has always been there. Our interest, our stake, and our involvement as a Pacific power is very great.

President Obama has been talking about our overall budget deficit and the need to reduce spending, including on defense. Some savings have already come from ending the war in Iraq and winding down the war in Afghanistan, which then increases the relative percentage of the military budget for East Asia. In the process of balancing its budget, the United States is not going to do anything to destabilize the region.

Is this just the policy of the Obama administration, or is it a longer-term strategic shift that could lead to a cold war?

I would distinguish between the rhetoric of "pivoting" toward Asia and the fact that the United States never left Asia. The George W. Bush administration did not send representatives to a number of ASEAN meetings and that troubled people in the region. But U.S. economic and political involvement and military deployments in the region, as well as the alliance structure, have not changed for decades.

American engagement has been important to the threat of nuclear weapons and to the freedom of the seas in the Asia-Pacific. Our allies and China can be confident that this policy is not aimed against anybody—it is not a cold war.

Some experts say that relations between Washington and Beijing are actually doing much better than the media portrays. Do you agree with this perspective?

I do agree with it. I have been involved in U.S.-China relations since "ping-pong diplomacy" in 1972, and we still have ups and downs and swings in our relationship, but the pattern is clear and the magnitude of the swing is much smaller than it used to be. In recent years, we have bumped up against one another in more places around the world, on more issues, because we are both global players. Most issues are handled pretty smoothly, however, and in a pretty routine fashion. The strength of the bilateral relationship—the depth of the interdependence—keeps growing.

From your experience, will there be a big impact on bilateral relations when the new Chinese leadership takes office later this year?

I think it used to be the case that personalities mattered a great deal, but it does not make so much of a difference now in both countries. I do not expect China’s policies and objectives to change, or its perceptions of the United States. In addition, if we elect a new presidential administration, I also do not expect a change in American perceptions of the opportunities and challenges China poses.

Which issue in U.S.-China relations most concerns you?

Mutual suspicion concerns me the most. Some people in China believe the United States will attempt to stop China’s rise or to contain it at some point. In the United States, the things we do not understand about China's intentions and aspirations lead to a similar kind of “worst case” thinking. I think the two countries need to do more to talk directly to one another about their concerns, and to find new approaches. For example, China does not like the bilateral alliance structure the United States has in Northeast Asia. The United States is quite prepared to acknowledge it is an arrangement that was developed for a different time and conditions. What kind of a new collective security arrangement can we have in the region that then? We are a long way from figuring it out, but we need to start talking about it together. 

Original article

"American experts discuss the significance and outcomes of the 'Asia pivot'"
(in Chinese)