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Jared Genser is an attorney in the global government relations group of DLA Piper US LLP in Washington, D.C. and President of Freedom Now (www.freedom-now.org), a non-profit organization that works to free prisoners of conscience worldwide through legal, political, and public relations advocacy efforts. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and in Winter 2008 will be an Adjunct Professor Law at the University of Michigan Law School teaching a seminar entitled "The UN Security Council in the 21st Century: Operations, Impact, and Reform." Genser was a 2006-2007 Visiting Fellow with the National Endowment for Democracy. His human rights clients have included former Czech Republic President Vaclav Havel, former Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, and Nobel Peace Prize Laureates Aung San Suu Kyi, Desmond Tutu, and Elie Wiesel. Previously, Genser was a management consultant with McKinsey & Company, the global strategy consulting firm. He holds a B.S. from Cornell University, a Master in Public Policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University where he was an Alumni Public Service Fellow, and a J.D., cum laude from the University of Michigan Law School. He has published op-eds on human rights topics in such publications as the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal Asia, International Herald Tribune, The Nation (Bangkok), The Independent (UK), and The Star (Johannesburg), among others.

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Jared Genser Attorney Speaker DLA Piper US LLP, President, Freedom Now
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The Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) has concluded its third year of the Stanford Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development Program held July 30th-August 17th, 2007.

This year's summer fellows program brought 26 leaders from 22 different countries in transition to Stanford for the three-week program. The fellows combined theory with practice as they studied democracy, development, and the rule of law and the links and interactions among the three areas. Not only did the fellows participate in morning seminars with leading Stanford faculty, but they also attended talks by keynote speakers including Carl Gershman and Judge Pamela Rymer to name a few. Furthermore, this year's summer fellows engaged in group discussions and presentations on key issues of democracy, development, and rule of law within their countries and regions. Fellows brought their experiences and knowledge from a wide background of different professions to the discussions and presented their proposals for addressing real-world problems of democratic and economic development.

Throughout their three-week stay, fellows enjoyed the surrounding Bay Area attractions including San Francisco and Monterey, and had the opportunity to visit institutions such as Google, the San Francisco Chronicle, and KQED Radio. The program closed with a graduation dinner on August 17th, 2007 and fellows departed, eager to put to practice what they had gained from their three-week interaction with each other, with the Stanford faculty, and with visiting speakers.

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Conference in Honor of the 25th Anniversary of the Visiting Austrian Professorship at Stanford

Thursday, October 18

10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

Session I: Managing the Global Economy

Lead Presenter: Ronald McKinnon, Stanford University, "The Evolving World Dollar Standard"

Panel: David Brady, Stanford University; Gerhard Hafner, University of Vienna; Stefan Schleicher, University of Graz

1:30 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.

Session II: International Environmental Policy

Lead Presenter: John Weyant, Stanford University

Panel: Stefan Schleicher, University of Graz; Fritz Steinhausler, University of Salzburg

4:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.

Session III: European Security Policy

Lead Presenter: Hanspeter Neuhold, University of Vienna

Panel: Heinz Gaertner, Stanford University; David Holloway, Stanford University; Fritz Steinhausler, University of Salzburg

7:00 p.m

Dinner

Westin Hotel, El Camino Real, Palo Alto

Speaker: Gerhard Casper

Friday, October 19

8:30 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.

Session IV: Trade and Society

Lead Presenter: Tim Josling, Stanford University, "Biotech Regulations in the US and Europe: Consumer Protection or Consumer Protectionism"

Panel: John Barton, Stanford University

10:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.

Session V: Development of Democracy in Europe

Lead Presenter: Christophe Crombez, Stanford University, "Democracy in the European Union"

Panel: Coit Blacker, Stanford University; Roberto D'Alimonte, Stanford University

2:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.

Session VI: Roundtable on the Future of Transatlantic Relationship

Chair and Moderator: Bill Perry, Stanford University

Panel: Mike McFaul, Stanford University; Hanspeter Neuhold, University of Vienna; Gerhard Hafner, University of Vienna

4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.

Follow-up session on future Stanford/Austria research collaboration

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Chang's presentation seeks to understand the emergence and evolution of social movements during the 1970s in South Korea. During the authoritarian years when Korea was ruled by Park Chung-Hee, various social groups participated in the movement to restore democracy and ensure human rights. Their activism was instrumental to democratic changes that took place in the summer of 1987 and they continued to play an important role even after democratic transition. Utilizing the novel Stanford Korea Democracy Project Datasets, Chang traces the increasing diversification of South Korea's democracy movement in the 1970s.

Chang is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the department of sociology at Stanford University. Chang's paper "Differential Impact of Repression on Social Movements" won the Robert McNamara Paper competition from the Association for the Sociology of Religion and the Goldsmith Paper Award from the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation. He has published papers in Sociological Inquiry, Journal for Korean Studies, and Asian Perspective. Chang graduated from University of California, Santa Cruz where he double majored in psychology and religious studies. He received masters degrees in Sociology from both UCLA and Stanford University, and in Theological Studies from Harvard Divinity School.

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Paul Y. Chang Ph.D. candidate in sociology, Stanford University Speaker
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Rafiq Dossani
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Two countries with a common and ancient civilization, India and Pakistan, celebrated 60 years of independence from colonial rule this week. At the time of independence, both countries were in danger of collapsing from internal and external threats. This greatly influenced both countries' subsequent turn toward centralism - in India's case, statism, and in Pakistan's case, army rule.

For four decades, both statism and army rule seemed irreversible. This was despite failures across the board: In both countries, territory was lost and the economy stagnated. Resources were spent on developing nuclear weaponry and on dealing with the Kashmir insurgency, which was fostered by Pakistan and repressed by India. What was left was often wasted through corruption. By 1990, it was common for Pakistan to be labeled a failed state and India, perhaps more damningly, a failed democracy.

Pakistan's army and feudal landlords, who shared political power via an informal coalition throughout the first 40 years, deserve most of the blame for Pakistan's failures. They carved up the economy among themselves, and let the poor survive by growing food and providing simple services to the rich. India's greater failures hid these strategies from national or global attention. Pakistan even overtook India for a while until Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's nationalizations of the 1970s brought them on par again.

Pakistan, a day older than India, but with an even younger population, seems to have aged more poorly over the past two decades. As the Indian economy picks up speed on the back of the 1991 reforms, India is on its way to becoming a global player in services and acquiring as formidable a reputation as China for job creation. The IT sector alone creates three new jobs every minute of each working day. In the four statistics that really matter - literacy, life expectancy, infant mortality rates and the female-to-male ratio - only in the last does Pakistan perform better than India and that, too, marginally. In the others, it is substantially worse.

There is no single reason for Pakistan's poorer performance. It turned as reformist as India in the 1990s. This has benefited some parts of its economy. For instance, the country adds over 2.5 million new cell phone users each month, or 1 for every second of the day. Though below India's rate of 2.7 new cell phone users per second, it is a much better ratio to the population.

Religious fervor is often accused, but has not - in either the subcontinent's history or in Pakistan's shorter one - been a barrier to development. Despite incidents such as led to the recent siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad, theocratic parties have never received more than 15 percent of the popular vote - and that was three decades ago. Evidence within all the countries of South Asia provides proof of the proposition that the poor, regardless of faith or ethnicity, seek the means of development, particularly the acquisition of education. Muslims are no exception to this proposition. For instance, the first administrative district to reach 100 percent literacy in the subcontinent was the Muslim-majority district of Malappuram in the Indian state of Kerala.

Finally, one cannot simply blame performance on Pakistan not being a full democracy. The world abounds with more failed than successful democracies, while China provides the most stunning counterexample of a successful dictatorship. Pakistan's current state of governance - in which the military, the courts and parliament share power and the press is relatively free - has been achieved through decades of negotiation and may well be the best framework given its current stage of political maturity.

Yet, there is one difference that may be the real reason for Pakistan's backwardness, and it is now becoming evident - again, by comparison with India. It is linked to bad governance but does not always follow from the democratic tradition. The difference is, in a word, freedom. India provides a good example: The government used to decide how resources were spent, leaving citizens with few choices on careers, education and lifestyles - on participation in their nation's growth. Since the 1990s, the Indian state has worked hard to give its citizens more freedom. The result is an invigorated India.

Pakistan, meanwhile, has moved slowly on freedom. The state has withdrawn from the economy, but now grants favors selectively to the private sector, with the inevitable corollary of massive corruption and loss of freedom of action.

This suggests that Pakistan is only a crucial freedom step away from success. In reality, the immediate future does not look promising because the country's citizens do not have the political will to achieve real change. It is a sad commentary that Pakistan's choices for the next cycle of political rule look like bad ones: the continuation of the present system of quasi-military rule or its replacement with the destructive feudal forces that Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif represent. Surely, Pakistan's citizens deserve much better - something worth pondering as their nation celebrates turning 60.

Reprinted with permission by The San Jose Mercury News.

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Japan's ruling party suffered a historic defeat Sunday. For the first time since the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was formed in 1955, an opposition party has become the largest party in the upper house.

The powerful message delivered by Japanese voters has significant implications not only for Japan but also for the rest of the world, not least for its close ally, the United States.

The election result revives momentum in Japan toward creation of a viable two-party system, potentially ending the conservative postwar monopoly on power. Japanese voters expressed deep anxiety about the impact of economic change upon their treasured social order. They embraced the campaign of the Democratic Party (the main opposition) against growing income inequality and the failure of the state to take care of an aging population.

Equally important, the vote was a humiliating defeat for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's agenda of giving priority to revising Japan's antiwar Constitution and allowing its military to take on a global role in support of the US. Democratic Party leader Ichiro Ozawa effectively portrayed Mr. Abe as a man out of touch with the concerns of ordinary Japanese. But he also articulated an alternative vision of Japan's international role, calling for closer ties to its Asian neighbors and sending troops overseas only under the auspices of United Nations peacekeeping missions.

Since 9/11, Japan has been among the most loyal, if not unquestioning, of US allies. It sent troops to Iraq, provided logistical support to the war in Afghanistan, and outdid the US in putting pressure on North Korea. Most recently, Abe echoed the rhetoric of the Bush administration, calling for formation of a "values-based" alliance of democracies along with India and Australia, implicitly aimed at containing a rising China. The election results will certainly slow, if not reverse, this tight synchronization.

For the business community, the vote will raise concerns that needed economic policy actions such as fiscal reforms will get stalled in a gridlocked parliament. The vote reminds politicians that the economic recovery has left an awful lot of Japanese behind, with real wages falling, youth unemployment high, and the elderly drawing down their savings to survive. Abe's feel-good rhetoric and focus on security just angered those Japanese.

There remains strong support for gradual change. Most Japanese want the country to take on a more "normal" security role, but one that will stop far short of overdrawn fears of a remilitarized Japan. And many Japanese, particularly in the younger generation, back economic reform, though not at the expense of social stability.

The most intriguing question is the future of Japan's democracy. Abe is resisting calls for his resignation, attributing the vote to a series of scandals in his Cabinet and most of all to the revelation that the government's national pension system had lost the records of some 50 million people. The election result was bad luck, Abe claimed, not a repudiation of his administration's overall policies -- a view shared by Washington policymakers.

Exit polls do confirm that voters were strongly motivated by these issues. But they also express little faith in the personal leadership of Abe, who tried to cover up the pension debacle. He suffered from an unfavorable comparison to his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, one of Japan's most popular postwar leaders.

But the election suggests that Mr. Koizumi's personal charisma only temporarily reversed a longer trend of drift away from the ruling conservatives, particularly by unaffiliated swing voters in Japan's cities and suburbs. Mr. Ozawa, one of Japan's most brilliant politicians, managed to both regain those voters and steal away traditional conservative backers in rural areas among farmers and pensioners worried about their future.

Ozawa, whom I have known for more than two decades, is a man of uncommon political vision. He is a former LDP stalwart who has relentlessly pursued the goal of creating a clearly defined two-party system that can create real competition. He was the architect of a split in the LDP that briefly brought the opposition to power in the early 1990s.

Over dinner last fall, Ozawa laid out to me what seemed then like an incredibly audacious plan to regain power. First to win a series of local elections, leading up to a defeat of the LDP in the upper house election, forcing in turn the dissolution of the lower house and new elections. He clearly hopes to split the LDP again and pry away its coalition partner, the New Komeito Party, as part of his strategy of realignment.

The Democratic Party has yet to demonstrate its own ability to rule, but it would be unwise to underestimate Ozawa. And it would be foolish to dismiss the desire for change delivered by Japanese voters on Sunday.

Reprinted with permission by the Christian Science Monitor.

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Do international factors, including democracy promotion policies of Western actors, play a significant role in encouraging or discouraging transitions to democracy? If so, when and how do external incentives, financial and technical aid, socialization techniques, diplomacy or demonstration effects influence domestic decision-makers to attempt to transition to democracy? What combination of domestic conditions and external factors are most likely to lead to the weakening of non-democratic regimes and their replacement with democratic governments?

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While the debate to "surge" or "withdraw" troops continues, Larry Diamond, Coordinator of the Democracy Program at CDDRL, along with Carlos Pascual, writes on the need for a diplomatic strategy to achieve a sustainable peace in Iraq. Diamond asserts that U.S. troops should aim to provide security needed to create an environment to negotiate a peace agreement to end the war and warns that if the parties in Iraq cannot reach a political settlment to reduce the violence and achieve peace, then military force must be redeployed to contain the regional spillover from the conflict.
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Professor Winkler portrays the 'German Question" through the lens of history in the past 150 years. He examines a variety of key issues that have arisen throughout German history and acknowledges that this 'German Question' period has come to an end. Professor Winkler also looks to Germany's future in Europe.

Synopsis

To Prof. Winkler, the reunification of Germany in 1990 resolved the ‘German Question.’ However, he argues that it has been a question not just since World War I but since the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. Prof. Winkler believes that this event was not simply a struggle for territory but also involved striving for unity and freedom. These two key values, which Prof. Winkler emphasizes throughout his lecture, can be characterized by a constitutional nation-state. Prof. Winkler explains that although the 1848 Revolution was a failure, it was a step forward in that Germany realized that Austria was not going to be part of this nation-state when it would be created. Prof. Winkler cites that in creating the Prussian nation-state in 1871, Bismarck took care of the unity aspect. However, “parliamentization,” as he Prof. Winkler puts it, only occurred in 1918. He argues that this democratization of post-World War I Germany helped Hitler’s rise to power and then collapsed once Hitler started taking control of the government.

However, Prof. Winkler explains that Hitler’s fall initiated a learning process for the German people that was even more severe than after 1918, but this time not all had the chance to turn to democracy. Although many Germans longed to be reunited with their compatriots, a new mission for European integration of West Germany arose in as early as the late 1940s. Prof. Winkler explains it was an intellectual movement, primarily advanced by Catholic conservatives, which gradually shifted more to the middle and left. By 1986, this movement had shifted thoroughly left, at a time where many Germans had come to feel that the separation of East and West Germany was necessary, pointing to Auschwitz to support their point.

Prof. Winkler argues that once the Berlin Wall fell, the post-national identity that West Germany had created still remained. This created issues with many desiring European integration before German reunification. However, Prof. Winkler explains this notionwas argued down by notables such as Willy Brandt, who felt the guilt of World War II could not fade through indefinite division. Prof. Winkler argues that once Germany was reunified, although post-war guilt still remained, it had finally achieved unity and freedom, thus resolving the ‘German Question.’ Prof. Winkler finishes by revealing his belief in the uniqueness of German history in that while it belonged to the West, it had continually rejected the democratic enlightenment. Prof. Winkler emphasizes his belief that it is time for Germany to understand its history in order to know where ti stands now and how it can contribute to Europe. He argues that the way Germany confronts its history will be “crucial” to Europe as well.

About the speaker

Heinrich August Winkler studied history, philosophy, and public law in Tubingen, Heidelberg, and Munster. He was associate professor at the Freie Universitat in Berlin in 1970-72 and then professor of modern history in Freiburg until 1991. He has been at the Humboldt-Universitat in Berlin since 1992, and has been a visiting scholar in Princeton, at the Wilson Center in Washington, at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Berlin, and at the Historisches Kolleg in Munich. He is the author of numerous works including "Germany: The Long Road West," for which he won the Friedrich Schiedel Prize for Literature in 2002.

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Heinrich August Winkler Speaker
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