The toppling of Egypt's modern-day pharaoh through peaceful mass protests, aided by Facebook and Twitter, marks a watershed for Egypt and the entire Arab world. Contrary to widespread anxieties in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, it will also serve the long-term interests of the United States - and Israel.

Many analysts of Egypt have been warning for years that the status quo under Hosni Mubarak was not sustainable. A repressive and deeply corrupt dictatorship was sitting on top of a social volcano - an increasingly young, urbanized, digitally connected population seething over the lack of freedom, dignity and economic opportunity. A quarter of Egypt's working-age youth are unemployed and many more under-employed. Over the past two decades, average incomes in Egypt stagnated while they doubled or tripled elsewhere in the region.

Think of what could have happened. Many observers (including myself) worried that the growing alienation of young Egyptians might flow in anti-American, anti-Israeli and radical Islamist directions. The inevitable eruption could have turned violent, resulting in the kind of bloody suppression that gripped Algeria in the early 1990s, when 200,000 died. Or it might have been hijacked by radical Islamists who would ride the popular revolution to power, as in Iran in 1979.

So far, none of these have happened. The millions of Egyptians who have poured into the streets of Cairo and other cities have not been chanting "down with America," nor have their protests been about Israel (or the Palestinians). Rather, they want freedom, justice and accountability in Egypt. They have mobilized for democratic change with extraordinary discipline, imagination and moderation. In the face of killings, provocations, arrests and torture, they have adhered to nonviolence as a sacred principle.

In achieving the first condition for Egypt's liberation, the departure of the pharaoh, through peaceful grassroots mobilization, a huge chip has been lifted from their shoulders. Now Egyptians feel a new sense of pride, confidence and empowerment. And they are beginning to view the United States in a fresh and more hopeful light, not because of President Obama's Cairo Speech in 2009 but because of what he said and subtly did in the last two weeks (after several rhetorical blunders by some in his administration). As the mass protests grew, Obama aligned the United States more explicitly behind the goal of peaceful democratic change, warned the regime against the use of force, and urged Mubarak to step aside. The experience could mark a turning point not just for Egypt but for Barack Obama personally. He now has the chance to nurture democratic change in the Arab world through artful diplomacy and timely assistance, where George W. Bush failed with blunter rhetoric and means.

Israel as well should be reassured by developments so far. Egypt's new (and hopefully temporary) military junta has quickly reaffirmed the country's treaty obligations. Few protesters are calling for abrogation of Egypt's peace with Israel. Most protesters resent Israel's treatment of the Palestinians and want an independent Palestinian state, but mainly they want to transform their own country politically and economically. They know their aspirations for human dignity and economic opportunity can only be met with far-reaching internal reforms, and that the worn-out theme of anti-Zionism is a divergence from that. Israel and its friends should thus welcome democratic change in Egypt. The only way to guarantee a lasting Middle East peace is to root negotiated agreements in the same democratic legitimacy that undergirds the stability and resilience of Israel's political system. As Thomas Friedman recently observed, it is a better bet to make peace with 82 million people than with one man.

The challenge now is to ensure that Egypt's revolution produces a genuine pluralist democracy. This is far from assured.

Egypt's military rulers may well seek to sabotage the transition and restore the old order with a slightly more democratic façade. Or the Muslim Brotherhood (which rejects violent means but clings to Islamist political ends) could gain the upper hand in popular mobilization or elections. But the second scenario will be much more likely to follow, rather than prompt, the first. If a democratic transition unfolds seriously and peacefully through negotiations and reform, and if democratic institutions are well designed, the Muslim Brotherhood will be a significant but minority player.

For Egypt, Mubarak's fall is only the first step along a tortuous path. If its transition leads to democracy, it will produce a much more reliable partner for peace and progress in the Middle East. That is why other democracies in the world should support it in every way possible.

On February 8, the Program on Human Rights' at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law welcomed Madeleine Rees to speak as part of the Sanela Diana Jenkins Human Rights Series. A former UN High Commissioner on Human Rights in Bosnia, Rees now serves as the Secretary General of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) based in Geneva.

Recounting her experience in the Balkans, Rees described the failure of international organizations to properly consider the role of gender in their work. Specifically, she highlighted the UN and other organizations' inability to control rampant human trafficking in the Balkans. According to Rees, human trafficking continues to undermine women's sense of security and societal rehabilitation efforts. To remedy social insecurity in post-conflict areas, Rees suggested that international projects must comprehensively and collaboratively address the problems in these societies, especially the conditions that the most vulnerable women face.

In this same vein, Rees declared a need for greater collaboration among women's rights NGO's, human rights institutions, universities and activists. She discussed the need to break down the barriers that exist between these stakeholders. She also emphasized the role of universities like Stanford to disseminate information and conduct research that helps organizations like WILPF to succeed. Noting the daunting challenges ahead, Rees concluded by reaffirming her commitment to the fight for human rights, saying, "The good thing about being a naïve idealist is that we don't give up."

On February 1, James Cavallaro, Clinical Professor of Law at Harvard and Executive Director of Harvard Law School's Program on Human Rights, spoke at the fifth installment of the Sanela Diana Jenkins Speaker Series hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law's Program on Human Rights.

While much of Cavallaro's research has focused on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, his talk focused on his experience working on human rights issues in Brazil. Recounting stories from when he helped establish offices for Human Rights Watch in Brazil, Cavallaro raised the question of why human rights has not caught nearly as much traction in Brazil as in its South American neighbors.

To explain this "Brazilian exceptionalism" with regard to human rights, Cavallaro highlighted the persistently high crime rates that continue to plague Brazilian society. According to Cavallaro, Brazilian police are the worst human rights violators and have been known to torture suspects, employing apparatuses like the Parrot's Perch, and to use firearms and force indiscriminately. However, these violations of human rights agreements are tolerated in Brazil because the general population considers a hard stance on crime necessary to maintain order and to keep crime rates from rising to the levels seen during the early 1990s. Cavallaro noted that when people are forced to weigh their personal security against the rights' of others, people's self-interest almost always take precedence.

However, Cavallaro said that human rights in Brazil could be at a crossroads of sorts. He pointed out that how police forces handle security issues when Brazil hosts both the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic games could potentially mark the course for future human rights advancement or prolonged stagnancy in Brazil. He suggested that these events, during which Brazil's economic development and national pride will be on display, could serve to professionalize the police force and redefine the boundaries of appropriate action. Unfortunately, he said, the likelihood of such a shift in norms is unlikely to develop in the few years before these events.    

Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law in partnership with the Canadian Foreign Affairs and International Trade department are hosting a symposium, Addressing the Accountability Gap in Statebuilding: The Case of Afghanistan, on February 25, 2011. The distinguished Ashraf Ghani, former Afghan Minister of Finance and 2009 Presidential Candidate, will be delivering the keynote address. This event will bring together practitioners, experts, and diplomats from Afghanistan and beyond, to share experiences and explore options to improve the contemporary practice of state-building. This conference and keynote address is open to the public.

On February 8, Dr. Dan Chirot, Job and Gertrud Tamaki Professor of International Studies at the University of Washington, was the featured speaker at a special CDDRL seminar held on the unfolding crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. CDDRL hosted this event to bring attention to the instability and violence that has resulted in the aftermath of the November 2010 presidential elections, which left this West African country in  political stalemate and chaos after nearly a decade of civil war. Chirot's work has focused on social change and ethnic violence in Francophone West Africa, where he has spent considerable time researching and living in Cote d'Ivoire. Chirot spoke to a diverse audience, which included members of the Stanford community and a number of Ivorian nationals who brought a great deal of local context and perspective to the seminar discussion. The passion and interest that this topic generated, reminded CDDRL of the importance of providing a platform for global crises of democracy, governance, and development.

Providing a historical analysis of the region, Chirot described Cote d'Ivoire in its early years as the "greatest success story in post-independence Africa." An economic boom resulted from Cote d'Ivoire's competitive advantage in exporting their cash crop, cocoa, to French and other Western markets bringing rising GDP and prosperity levels. Chirot continued to describe the preferential economic relationship Cote d'Ivoire enjoyed with France, who considered this former colony a linchpin in its Africa strategy. Patronage networks began to form under the tutelage of Cote d'Ivoire's first president Felix Houphouet-Boigny and corruption among local elites was endemic. Chirot then described the upset that followed in the 1970's when globally competitive markets led to the deterioration of the trading position Cote d'Ivoire had traditionally held. Economic growth was curtailed and compounded with mounting  demographic pressures and land disputes, which surfaced multi-ethnic tensions in a country where over 60 dialects are spoken.

The 1990s brought a period of successive upheaval and instability to Cote d'Ivoire after the death of President Houphouet-Boigny in 1993, resulting in a coup d'etat, and massive devaluation of the national currency. President Laurent Gbagbo head of the Ivorian Popular Front, was swept into office in 1999 as the country descended into a civil war that splintered it into  three sections that loosely followed ethnic and regional identity. With rebel groups governing the north and west of the country, and President Gbagbo residing in the southern commercial and political hubs, chaos and violence ensued as thousands were killed, displaced, and made victims to this disaster.

Chirot described the 2010 election as representing the promise of hope but only delivering more chaos and uncertainty to a country that was once the most stable in West Africa. He explained that opposition leader, Alassane Ouattara Alassane who hails from the north, was the internationally recognized victor in elections that were monitored by the Independent Electoral Commission. Gbagbo has refused to accept the results as Ouattara was overwhelmingly favored in the north and generally does not enjoy support from the southern power center of the country. Neither side is willing to make any concessions to the other and this deadlock and political stalemate has exacerbated the instability that has left Cote d'Ivoire in a state of crisis.

During the discussion period, there was some debate concerning the election results, the role of outside actors (namely the French), and the legitimacy of the reporting mechanisms. Amidst the controversy of the election results, Chirot made the claim that there is "an absence of leadership necessary to remedy this situation," and that some form of power sharing will be need to be negotiated if a peaceful resolution of the standoff is to be achieved.  Neither candidate has "clean hands" and there are clearly political and economic interests behind each man, who refuses to relinquish control over these patronage networks and influence as the country remains divided. Chirot reminded the audience that it is important to look beyond the perceived victor in this election and focus on how to bring stability and accountability back to Cote d'Ivoire after years of neglect.

Two decades after the fall of Soviet-bloc dictatorships, popular movements for democracy are erupting in the last regional bastion of authoritarianism: the Arab world.

So far, only Tunisia's dictator, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, has been toppled, while Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak - who has ruled that ancient land longer than many pharaohs - announced Tuesday that he will step down in September. But other Arab autocrats are bound to go. From Algeria to Syria to Jordan, people are fed up with stagnation and injustice, and are mobilizing for democratic change.

So, what happens when the autocrat is gone? Will the end of despotism give way to chaos - as happened when Mobutu Sese Seko was toppled in 1997 after more than 30 years in power in Zaire? Will the military or some civilian strongman fill the void with a new autocracy - as occurred after the overthrow of Arab monarchs in Egypt and Iraq in the 1950s, and as has been the norm in most of the world until recently? Or can some of the Arab nations produce real democracy - as we saw in most of Eastern Europe and about half the states of sub-Saharan Africa? Regime transitions are uncertain affairs. But since the mid-1970s, more than 60 countries have found their way to democracy. Some have done so in circumstances of rapid upheaval that offer lessons for reformers in Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries today.

Unite the democratic opposition.

When a dictatorship is on the ropes, one thing that can rescue it is a divided opposition. That is why autocrats so frequently foster those divisions, secretly funding a proliferation of opposition parties. Even extremely corrupt rulers may generate significant electoral support - not the thumping majorities they claim, but enough to steal an election - when the opposition is splintered.

In the Philippines in 1986, Nicaragua in 1990 and Ukraine in 2004, the opposition united around the candidacies of Corazon Aquino, Violeta Chamorro and Viktor Yushchenko, respectively. Broad fronts such as these - as well as the Concertacion movement that swept Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin to power in Chile in 1989 after the departure of Gen. Augusto Pinochet - often span deep personal and ideological differences. But the time for democratic forces to debate those matters is later, once the old order is defeated and democratic institutions have been established.

Egypt is fortunate - it has an obvious alternative leader, Mohamed ElBaradei, whom disparate opposition elements seem to be rallying around. Whether the next presidential election is held on schedule in September or moved up, ElBaradei, or anyone like him leading a broad opposition front, will probably win a resounding victory over anyone connected to Mubarak's National Democratic Party.

Make sure the old order really is gone.

The exit of a long-ruling strongman, such as Ben Ali, does not necessarily mean the end of a regime. Fallen dictators often leave behind robust political and security machines. No autocrat in modern times met a more immediate fate than Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu, who was executed by a firing squad of his own soldiers in 1989 just three days after a popular revolution forced him to flee the capital. Yet his successor, Ion Iliescu, was a corrupt former communist who obstructed political reform. Most of the former Soviet states, such as Georgia and Kazakhstan, had similar experiences.

Countries are much more likely to get to democracy quickly if they identify and embrace political leaders who are untainted by the old order and are ready to roll it back.

But also come to an understanding with the old order.

Victorious democrats won't be able to completely excise the pillars of the authoritarian order. Instead, for their country to turn toward democracy, those pillars must be neutralized or co-opted. This old order may descend into violence when, as in Iraq, broad classes of elites are stigmatized and ousted from their positions. In a successful bargain, most old-regime elites retain their freedom, assets and often their jobs but accept the new rules of the democratic game.

Unless the military collapses in defeat, as it did in Greece in 1974 and in Argentina after the Falklands War, it must be persuaded to at least tolerate a new democratic order. In the short run, that means guaranteeing the military significant autonomy, as well as immunity from prosecution for its crimes. Over time, civilian democratic control of the military can be extended incrementally, as was done masterfully in Brazil in the 1980s and in Chile during the 1990s. But if the professional military feels threatened and demeaned from the start, the transition is in trouble.

The same principle applies to surviving elements of the state security apparatus, the bureaucracy and the ruling party. In South Africa, for example, old-regime elements received amnesty for their human rights abuses in exchange for fully disclosing what they had done. In this and other successful transitions, top officials were replaced, but most state bureaucrats kept their jobs.

Rewrite the rules.

A new democratic government needs a new constitution, but it can't be drawn up too hastily. Meanwhile, some key provisions can be altered expeditiously, either by legislation, interim executive fiat or national consensus.

In Spain, the path to democratization was opened by the Law for Political Reform, adopted by the parliament within a year of dictator Francisco Franco's death in 1975. Poland adopted a package of amendments in 1992, only after it had elected a new parliament and a new president, Lech Walesa; a new constitution followed in 1997. South Africa enacted an interim constitution to govern the country while it undertook an ambitious constitution-writing process with wide popular consultation - which is the ideal arrangement.

An urgent priority, though, is to rewrite the rules so that free and fair elections are possible. This must happen before democratic elections can be held in Egypt and Tunisia. In transitions toward democracy, there is a strong case for including as many political players as possible. This requires some form of proportional representation to ensure that emerging small parties can have a stake in the new order, while minimizing the organizational advantage of the former ruling party. In the 2005 elections in Iraq, proportional representation ensured a seat at the table for smaller minority and liberal parties that could never have won a plurality in individual districts.

Isolate the extremes.

That said, not everyone can or should be brought into the new democratic order. Prosecuting particularly venal members of a former ruling family, such as those tied to the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos, Indonesia's fallen strongman Suharto or now Tunisia's Ben Ali, can be part of a larger reconciliation strategy. But the circle of punishment must be drawn narrowly. It may even help the transition to drive a wedge between a few old-regime cronies and the bulk of the establishment, many of whom may harbor grievances against "the family."

A transitional government should aim for inclusion, and should test the democratic commitment of dubious players rather than inadvertently induce them to become violent opponents. However, groups that refuse to renounce violence as a means of obtaining power, or that reject the legitimacy of democracy, have no place in the new order. That provision was part of the wisdom of the postwar German constitution.

Transitions are full of opportunists, charlatans and erstwhile autocrats who enter the new political field with no commitment to democracy. Every democratic transition that has endured - from Spain and Portugal to Chile, South Africa and now hopefully Indonesia - has tread this path.

Fragile democracies become stable when people who once had no use for democracy embrace it as the only game in town.