In the early 1990s, Japanese reformers promised a political transformation: fewer pork-barrel projects, more accountability, and greater transparency. Have these promises been realized?

In the past twenty years, Japanese politics has undergone many dramatic changes. Electoral reform altered the relationship between politicians and voters, and Japan has steadily moved toward a two-party system.

Amid these shifts, it remains unclear where Japanese politics is heading, and whether the changes we observe now will stand the test of time. Each chapter in this wide-ranging volume addresses a key political development in Japan, notably voting behavior, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, gender gaps in political candidacies, and clientelistic versus ideological politics. Political Change in Japan likewise includes extensive discussion of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's dramatic career. In sum, the book's contributors assess not only the direction but also the probable permanence of political change in Japan.

Intended for scholars and students who study Japan, this timely volume provides valuable reading for comparative political scientists as well. With contributions from some of the most eminent scholars working on Japan today, Political Change in Japan seeks to answer the question: Was political reform in Japan a revolution or a flash in the pan?

BACKGROUND: Previous research has provided evidence that socioeconomic status has an impact on invasive treatments use after acute myocardial infarction. In this paper, we compare the socioeconomic inequality in the use of high-technology diagnosis and treatment after acute myocardial infarction between the US, Quebec and Belgium paying special attention to financial incentives and regulations as explanatory factors.

METHODS: We examined hospital-discharge abstracts for all patients older than 65 who were admitted to hospitals during the 1993-1998 period in the US, Quebec and Belgium with a primary diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction. Patients' income data were imputed from the median incomes of their residential area. For each country, we compared the risk-adjusted probability of undergoing each procedure between socioeconomic categories measured by the patient's area median income.

RESULTS: Our findings indicate that income-related inequality exists in the use of high-technology treatment and diagnosis techniques that is not justified by differences in patients' health characteristics. Those inequalities are largely explained, in the US and Quebec, by inequalities in distances to hospitals with on-site cardiac facilities. However, in both Belgium and the US, inequalities persist among patients admitted to hospitals with on-site cardiac facilities, rejecting the hospital location effect as the single explanation for inequalities. Meanwhile, inequality levels diverge across countries (higher in the US and in Belgium, extremely low in Quebec).

CONCLUSIONS: The findings support the hypothesis that income-related inequality in treatment for AMI exists and is likely to be affected by a country's system of health care.

Objective. To compare safety climate between diverse U.S. hospitals and Veterans Health Administration (VA) hospitals, and to explore the factors influencing climate in each setting.

Data Sources. Primary data from surveys of hospital personnel; secondary data from the American Hospital Association's 2004 Annual Survey of Hospitals.

Study Design. Cross-sectional study of 69 U.S. and 30 VA hospitals.

Data Collection. For each sample, hierarchical linear models used safety-climate scores as the dependent variable and respondent and facility characteristics as independent variables. Regression-based Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition examined differences in effects of model characteristics on safety climate between the U.S. and VA samples.

Principal Findings. The range in safety climate among U.S. and VA hospitals overlapped substantially. Characteristics of individuals influenced safety climate consistently across settings. Working in southern and urban facilities corresponded with worse safety climate among VA employees and better safety climate in the U.S. sample. Decomposition results predicted 1.4 percentage points better safety climate in U.S. than in VA hospitals: −0.77 attributable to sample-characteristic differences and 2.2 due to differential effects of sample characteristics.

Conclusions. Results suggest that safety climate is linked more to efforts of individual hospitals than to participation in a nationally integrated system or measured characteristics of workers and facilities.

Objective

To determine whether eligible extremely-low-birth-weight children (<1000g) were enrolled in the federally enacted, state-coordinated Early Intervention (EI) program intended to help children with developmental delay or disability regardless of parental income, and the factors associated with enrollment.

Methods

Retrospective analysis of 884 EI-eligible ELBW children born in South Carolina with birth weight 401 to 999g, gestation ≥24 weeks, and survival for the first 120 days of life. We created a linked data set with data from Early Intervention (1996–2001), Vital Records (1996–1998), death certificates, and Medicaid. Each child was followed from birth to 3 years old, the program eligibility period.

Results

A total of 54% of ELBW children were enrolled in EI at any time from birth to 36 months. Even among children ever enrolled in Medicaid (83% of all ELBW children), only 63% were enrolled in EI. Being born in a multiple gestational birth, having heavier birth weight (750 to 999g), and having ever enrolled in Medicaid were positively associated with EI enrollment. Among Medicaid patients for whom perinatal data were available, additional risk adjustment showed that EI enrollment was more likely with birth in level 3 hospitals, birth weight 750 to 999g, Neonatal Medical Index severity level V (most severe), and longer initial length of hospital stay.

Conclusions

Only about half of eligible ELBW children in South Carolina were enrolled—much lower than reported elsewhere. Efforts are needed to understand why eligible infants are not being enrolled and to develop strategies to remedy the situation.

The current focus of the health reform debate is rightfully beginning to shift to the need to transform the delivery system to contain the long run growth in costs. Although much of the debate still focuses on the role of a public plan, this ignores the need for fundamental change. None of the options on the table will transform the delivery system. If passed, the best the current proposals could do is to expand enrollment and perhaps contain federal costs, but on its own the public plan will be unable to make the delivery system more efficient.

To control health care costs, I propose a publicly chartered major risk pool, or MRP, that
will allow plans to pool risk, thereby eliminating the need for wasteful underwriting and
selective marketing costs. Participation in the MRP by both providers and insurers is
voluntary. It can be combined with any public option in an exchange implemented at the
federal or state level; it can even work without a public option. After a brief transition
period, the MRP requires no federal funds and will not be “on budget.” By allowing private plans to play a role in a transformed insurance and delivery system, the MRP can be politically attractive to a broader constituency than any of the current proposals.

The MRP addresses a key component of comprehensive health reform: restructuring the
delivery system. It is not a simple reinsurance pool that reimburses health plans for high costclaims. Instead, it creates a reformed payment system for both inpatient care and outpatient chronic care that will encourage efficiency and quality. The MRP will cover inpatient and similar short but expensive episodes, as well as chronic illness management. Its new payment approaches will achieve the efficiency goals promised by proposals for hospital medical staff-focused Accountable Care Organizations, but in an organizationally more plausible manner. Hospitals and physicians who focus on inpatient care and voluntarily form Care Delivery Teams will receive bundled episode-based payments, but the MRP will pay providers regardless of whether they belong to a Care Delivery Team, although at less attractive rates. Providers in these teams can use their bargaining power to charge the primary insurers more than the MRP pays. The MRP’s payments for monthly chronic illness management will give health plans and primary care physicians the incentives, flexibility, and information to more effectively compensate clinicians for the care they deliver and coordinate. By being publicly chartered, but independent of Congress, and by allowing options for all players, the MRP will be able to sidestep the ability of special interests to block change.