The panelists began their election analysis with a discussion of the structural features of American democracy and then addressed the issues, strategies, and stakes central to November’s race.

Cain began his remarks by highlighting a longstanding and escalating concern about the American democratic structure: tension between electability and governance. Rather, that the negative partisanship necessary during the election process has proven incompatible with the bipartisan negotiations required to govern. This, coupled with campaign finance — which, among other things, has complicated the incentive and power structures of political parties — has fueled inefficiency and political frustration.

Jefferson argued that a persistent feature of American democracy is the influence of race on political outcomes. While various identities may shape Americans' political attitudes and behaviors, race, he contended, is unparalleled in its impact. As one example, Black Americans have long been "steadfast Democrats," while no Democratic Party nominee has received a majority of the white vote since 1964.

Referring to comparative politics scholarship, Jefferson noted that, in some ways, the Republican Party functions as an "ethnic party." He pointed out that Trump’s success in generating and consolidating his base is directly tied to white identity politics. Trump has relied on grievance politics to gain power, speaking to white, middle-class American voters who feel left behind and resentful of what they believe is a changing racial order. Positioning himself as their spokesman and defender, Trump attempts to reassure these voters that, if he returns to power, he will defend their place in America's racial hierarchy.

While Cain and Jefferson touched on American democracy’s organizing features, Canes-Wrone brought the conversation back to the current election cycle, highlighting prediction models and key issues. The polls, Canes-Wrone believes, are accurate, yet with such slim confidence intervals, the election is still too close to call.

Contrary to popular portrayal in the media, historical evidence suggests that bounces from the convention and vice presidential picks are rarely pivotal, if impactful at all. However, qualifies Canes-Wrone, this cycle is unprecedented, leaving an opportunity for a break in the trend.

Moving to discuss the issues, Canes-Wrone underscores that the candidates are following traditional political strategy — placing emphasis on the issues that favor them and de-emphasis on those that don’t. The Harris campaign has focused its efforts on abortion rights and threats to democracy, whereas Trump remains fixated on immigration and the economy. Unfortunately for Harris, post-COVID inflation and immigration remain the top issues, and her position is further complicated by the inability to heavily criticize her own administration.

To conclude their remarks, the panelists turned to the issue of gender: is the United States really ready to have a woman in the presidency? Canes-Wrone remarked that while survey data indicates that gender bias on the issue has diminished, it is not yet zero. In other political offices, women now win at equal rates to men, but with one caveat — far more expertise is required. There also appears to be far more sexism attached to executive offices, a reality Trump is likely to exploit. Perhaps luckily for Harris, there is one traditional argument the Republican nominee may have difficulty leveraging against her: it's not so easy to argue that a former prosecutor isn't tough on crime.

How can Venezuela move forward?

Going forward, Fuentes argues that the key to revitalizing the health of Venezuelan democracy is normalizing economic and political ties to global actors. From an international standpoint, measures such as international condemnation of Maduro’s falsification of election results, strategic and massive sanctions, extending a “golden bridge” to Maduro’s administration, vigilance regarding human rights violations, and providing humanitarian aid to Venezuela will be essential.

Despite the government-controlled election authority’s refusal to release detailed results from the election, Fuentes echoes a rousing call that Machado often shares with her followers that has fueled his fight for another day: “Believe in your people.”

Further Commentary

Fuentes also sat down for an interview with Francis Fukuyama, the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at FSI, to discuss why there is strong reason to believe this result was fraudulent. You can watch the interview below and read more in the Frankly Fukuyama column in Persuasion.

2022 Summer Fellow Jesús Armas, a Venezuelan activist and organizer of the María Corina Machado campaign in Caracas, also shared his reflections in this op-ed and with The Washington Post (here and here).

2: Sheinbaum’s landslide was a referendum on the legacy of the current President, Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO).

Given the massive Movement of National Regeneration (MORENA) electoral landslide, are we witnessing the beginnings of a MORENA-dominant era in Mexican politics?

Tesalia Rizzo: MORENA, the party of the current president, has been said to draw inspiration from the PRI, which governed during those 70 years. MORENA has effectively used social policy to gain favor among Mexicans. This election demonstrated that the strategy of using social policy to gain voter favor was successful not only at the presidential level but also at the state level, gaining more states and seats in Congress. This indicates that MORENA has built a stable party and a stable electorate, suggesting a potentially dominant era for the party.

Why do you think the margin of victory was so large?  

Tesalia Rizzo: It doesn't necessarily come as a huge surprise. López Obrador's approval ratings have been off the charts and very stable for a long time. This approval is largely driven by his social policies, which have been carefully crafted and effectively implemented. This election has shown that MORENA is now a political party with strong structures across the country. People are joining MORENA not only because they see it as a party that can win elections but also because they sense stability in its structure. If we think of parties as institutionalized social movements, perhaps MORENA has followed a similar path. 

3: Mexico has cemented its position as a consolidated electoral democracy, with strong procedural safeguards and a vibrant civil society embracing democratic values.

As an observer of democracies throughout the world, does Mexico fulfill the requirements of an electoral democracy?

Larry Diamond: I think people chose the leader they wanted in Mexico. It's easier to declare this democratic when it isn't close — it was decisive, a landslide. There's no sign that I know of significant fraud in the election. There's no sign that it wasn't cleanly and efficiently administered. And there's always a question of "compared to what?" If you look at the controversies around the U.S. election, for example, it may look better or less disputed, more efficient than some of the elections we held in U.S. states. Many people in the United States might wish for a system of national electoral authority that has the technical efficiency and ability to standardize across the country, as the National Electoral Institute (INE) has.

What about the political violence that occurred before the election? Would those challenges qualify Mexico as a liberal democracy?

Larry Diamond: I think there are many things to be noted about the state of Mexican democracy before election day. Some relate to the nature of the campaign, and some to the broader character of political and civic space in Mexico. Regarding the campaign, when you have a significant number of candidates assassinated — 40 to 50 people, which is shocking and deeply distressing — this isn't necessarily a ruling party killing its opponents but indicates a state that lacks the capacity to rein in criminal and narco-trafficking violence. This kind of climate degrades the electoral environment, though I wouldn't say it alone makes Mexico a non-democracy.

The sitting president of Mexico, AMLO, has been highly critical of the autonomous body for electoral administration, the INE. From a legal standpoint, what are the risks to the institutional architecture of electoral politics in the coming years?

Amrit Singh: I think it's important to recognize that INE has been one of the crown jewels of Mexico's democracy. It is widely regarded as one of the most independent and professional election commissions in the world. Whether it continues to be as highly regarded will depend on what Claudia Sheinbaum decides to do — whether she chooses to break from President López Obrador's authoritarian agenda or to open a new chapter in Mexico in favor of democracy and the rule of law.

You described the potential consequences of MORENA moving ahead with constitutional amendments that could affect the autonomy of the electoral agency. Do you think the new government has any incentive to pursue an agenda that would debilitate INE? If so, can we still speak about an electoral democracy in Mexico?

Amrit Singh: That remains to be seen. Claudia Sheinbaum has an opportunity to open a new chapter in Mexico's democracy. She has indicated, for example, that she is in favor of voting for judges, a proposal submitted by President López Obrador to Mexico's Congress back in February 2024. Whether she sticks to that position still remains to be seen. It is worrying that the constitutional reform proposals by President López Obrador may become a reality because MORENA and its allies now have a qualified majority in Congress. Over the last few years under President López Obrador's administration, we have seen systematic attacks on the independent institutions necessary for safeguarding democracy in Mexico. These attacks targeted INE, INAI (the freedom of information agency), and the federal judiciary. If such attacks continue under the new administration, there will be nothing left to speak of in terms of electoral democracy in Mexico. These institutions are essential for maintaining the checks and balances and the separation of powers necessary to uphold the rule of law and individual rights and freedoms.

4: Mexico is still lacking some of the civil protections of liberal democracy, the most apparent being insecurity and drug violence, which remain top unresolved issues.

How is it possible for the incumbent party, MORENA, to be reelected despite the security conditions and maintenance of high levels of violence?

Beatriz Magaloni: The main issue in Mexico is the violence surrounding elections, not necessarily from political parties or the incumbent attacking opposition candidates, but from organized crime. These were the most violent elections we've had, with at least 30 candidates for municipal presidencies and other positions killed and more than 200 attacked. This is deeply concerning because it means that organized crime, not just voters, is influencing election outcomes. How do we explain AMLO's victory? Because, although it is Claudia's victory, it is essentially a referendum on AMLO’s performance. He is an incredibly intelligent politician who has been able to amass electoral support through various mechanisms, including delivering entitlements and public services to poor and middle-class voters.

Xóchitl Gálvez ran a campaign highlighting the violence and harshly criticizing AMLO’s "hugs, not bullets" slogan. Claudia has said she will increase the size of the National Guard. How do you think this will work out in a liberal democracy, having an even larger military presence in Mexico?

Beatriz Magaloni: Xóchitl didn't win for two main reasons. One, she was embraced by political parties like the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which have been discredited for their own roles in perpetuating violence. President Calderón started the war on drugs, and during President Peña Nieto’s administration, we saw events like the disappearance of the Ayotzinapa students, which increased corruption and impunity. This association with discredited parties hurt her campaign. Secondly, she was competing against an incumbent who was very popular. People don’t really know who Claudia is, and we are eager to learn what she brings to politics at this critical juncture, with high levels of violence and immigration issues.

5: Popular welfare programs glue together the MORENA coalition, but these might not be enough to reduce poverty and improve well-being.

What do you expect will happen with poverty alleviation and the provision of basic public services like health and education?  

Alberto Díaz-Cayeros: The government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) always claimed to prioritize the poor. "Primero los pobres" ("first the poor") was the slogan in his campaign, and Claudia Sheinbaum repeated it yesterday in her victory speech. It is paradoxical that a government claiming to support the poor removed the most crucial and effective poverty reduction program Mexico has had in two decades. Claudia Sheinbaum is not obligated to follow AMLO's exact policies. I expect she will likely listen to experts and policy advice from those working on poverty relief globally and in Mexico. Hopefully, she will incorporate elements of conditional cash transfer programs that have successfully alleviated poverty worldwide.

Claudia Sheinbaum's proposals and the legacy of her predecessor, AMLO, suggest that she aims to build on the foundation laid by Mexico's fourth transformation. What do you expect her social policies to look like? Will she move Mexico closer to a universal welfare state?

Alberto Díaz-Cayeros: The current government has aimed to create programs that move Mexico towards a universal welfare state. AMLO's significant poverty reduction achievement was raising the minimum wage, which benefited moderately poor families but not the extremely poor. But the removal of the conditional cash transfer program and Seguro Popular led to a loss of access to public health for a significant portion of the population. Moving towards universalization will require substantial funding and a focus on labor market reforms.

6: This election matters to Americans and the world for the sake of global economic growth, hemispheric security, and multicultural diversity in the U.S.

Why does the Mexican election matter to the U.S.?

Tino Cuéllar: Mexico has become a particularly massive trading partner of the United States, the largest trading partner now that trade with China has declined due to trade tensions. Additionally, the law enforcement and rule of law interests of the United States and Mexico often converge. So, the well-being of the United States, its relationship to the larger world, and issues many Americans care deeply about — security, migration, and economic prosperity — are all interconnected with Mexico.

Compared to U.S. elections, how vibrant is Mexican democracy?

Tino Cuéllar: In both countries, democratic processes have withstood attacks and efforts to undermine institutions. However, the success of democracy depends not only on formal legal arrangements — such as electoral institutes, courts, and prosecutors — but also on norms, traditions, and habits of behavior. An important distinction in discussions about Mexican democracy is the risk of violence that candidates face. In the U.S., running for office generally does not expose one to great risk due to law enforcement and norms. In Mexico, improving democracy further will involve securing the well-being of candidates, even if their agendas might upset people who might target or threaten them. In principle, there are many common interests that Mexico and the United States share. They both have an interest in keeping borders secure, making economies vibrant, and allowing the peoples of both countries to share in a more prosperous hemispheric economy, which is good for both countries and the world.

This opinion piece originally appeared in Nikkei Asia

Addressing a joint session of the U.S. Congress two weeks ago, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida cracked a joke about how he has rarely received such a warm welcome from the Diet back in Tokyo.

Indeed, while many observers saw his trip to the U.S. as a great success, back in Japan, Kishida is facing tough problems.

His biggest headache right now is the ongoing scandal around the funding of factions of his ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Kishida's achievements in foreign affairs, such as the successful hosting of the Group of Seven summit in his hometown of Hiroshima last year, and his trip beforehand to Kyiv to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, have often been more than offset by domestic setbacks.

These have included the exposure of close links between LDP politicians and the controversial Unification Church, Kishida's unpopular decision to hold a state funeral for assassinated former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and the chaotic rollout of a new national identity card.

As a result of such troubles, Kishida's public approval rating is hovering at a historic low. With voters going to the polls this weekend to elect new Diet members to fill three vacant seats, the LDP is not even fielding its own candidate in two of the races, and appears to be struggling in the third district although it is usually a party stronghold.

The factional funding scandal could have a lasting impact on Japanese politics. Factions have been central to governance and the distribution of key posts within the LDP since its founding in 1955.

The LDP's factions are relatively unique in that they command members' near-total commitment in respect to parliamentary votes and other key decisions, which are provided in exchange for the factional organization's financial support for operations and campaigning.

Fundraising parties have been an embedded element of the LDP's factional system. These worked in a straightforward manner: The more party tickets politicians could sell, the more money that would come in to their faction.

Individual top ticket sellers would also be rewarded with greater influence by their faction. Large factions, like the one previously headed by Abe, benefitted from selling a large number of party tickets.

This practice was largely legal, as long as the money raised was reported in accordance with the country's extensive election laws. In the current scandal, the problem was that some factions significantly underreported ticket sales.

Such moves, likely with the approval of faction leaders, allowed the factions and their members to evade limits on accepting contributions from individual donors and escape restrictions on how the funds could be used. Abe's faction and a faction headed by former party Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai are considered to have been the most egregious violators, and their current leaders have been punished accordingly by Kishida.

Kishida has made a couple of bold moves in his handling of the scandal, particularly his decision to voluntarily testify to the upper house's political ethics committee when most other LDP officials resisted appearing, and his move to dissolve his own party faction in response to criticisms about underreporting of its fundraising.

Other factions were then, in effect, forced to follow suit, to the extent that only one of the party's six factions has held back from announcing its dissolution. This could thus be the end of LDP factional politics as we have known it, a development that could transform Japanese politics in a more policy-oriented direction.

As the head of the only faction left standing, former Prime Minister Taro Aso has become even more powerful. He now is not only a critical partner behind Kishida's current administration but also a potential kingmaker for the next government.

Another party figure commanding great influence these days is Yoshihide Suga, whose 2020-2021 prime ministership is being favorably revaluated. He began pushing against party factions long before the current scandal erupted and has been proven correct about their negative effects. As more LDP members become factionless, many are looking to Suga for direction.

Third, considering the severe punishment meted out to some faction leaders, it is noticeable that Nikai and Koichi Hagiuda have been left relatively unscathed.

Nikai shrewdly preempted the announcement of punishments by declaring that he would retire from politics. Hagiuda notably received the lightest punishment among the five top leaders of the Abe faction, likely reflecting Kishida's calculations that he might need his support ahead of September's LDP presidential vote.

The upshot of all this is that factional politics have been transformed but voting blocs will still be important. Kishida's flattening of the LDP party organization could give him more direct influence over many of the party's legislators. The weakening of the factions also means that individual politicians will be able to vote on legislation based on their own judgment rather than the preferences of their faction leader, which could potentially improve the policymaking process.

Yet media reports suggest the factions are moving quite slowly to actually dissolve themselves and dismantle their infrastructure. Only time will tell whether factional politics have been made a thing of the past or whether they will resurface in the LDP in a different form.

September's party leadership vote will give us a great indication of where things are going. Will Kishida be rewarded for rolling the dice on faction dissolution, or will it bite him in the back as Aso, Suga, and others summon the support to topple the prime minister?

In any case, a major transformation is taking place within the LDP, Japan's dominant party since its founding. The results could have a lasting impact on the country's politics.

The April 10 parliamentary elections in South Korea resulted in a landslide victory for the liberal opposition, dealing a resounding setback to President Yoon Suk Yeol and his ruling conservative People Power Party. While the liberal Democratic Party fell short of achieving a super majority, the outcome reflects pervasive public discontent with Yoon's administration amid economic challenges and political controversies, placing Yoon in a difficult position for the remainder of his three-year term.

“In a sense, this was a rematch between President Yoon and Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung, whom Yoon defeated in the 2022 presidential race by a razor-thin margin, and Lee won in a big way,” explains Stanford sociologist and APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin. “Now the Democratic Party really became Lee’s party.”

Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and the director of the Korea Program at APARC, joined the Korea Society for a livestreamed election analysis session. Watch it here:

The election outcomes reflect the increased political division and polarization gripping South Korea, which is poised to be a major issue for Korean politics in the coming years, Shin notes. Shin has written extensively about the roles of illiberalism, populism, and polarization in the decline of Korean democracy and their implications for Korean society and politics.

“I have said before that Korea is facing a crisis in democracy. Now I can say that Korea is also facing a crisis in political leadership,” he tells Korea Society Policy Program Officer Chelsie Alexandre.

In this session, Shin explores in detail what the election results mean for Korea’s political, economic, and social policy, its alliance with the United States, and its relations with regional states.

Shin has also contributed to election analysis in national and international media.

Reboot of Adversarial Politics

South Korean voters’ verdict on the Yoon government’s performance reflects deep disappointment and even resentment about some of his policies and leadership styles, Shin shares with Bloomberg News. As the opposition holds a large majority in the National Assembly, Yoon appears destined to complete his remaining three years in office as a lame duck, unable to push for any major policy initiatives, domestic or foreign. We should expect a reboot of adversarial politics in South Korea as the opposition looks to obstruct Yoon’s legislative agenda, Shin predicts. 

Voter turnout for the parliamentary elections reached 67 percent, marking the highest turnout for general elections in 32 years. Liberals expressed discontent with the government by sending a strong message through voting, while the ruling conservative party tried to mobilize its supporters to minimize losses. Ultimately "there were no major policy debates between the ruling and main opposition parties," says Shin in an interview with Singaporean public broadcast service CNA.

Shin anticipates the Democratic Party will likely contest Yoon's stance toward Tokyo and Washington. Speaking with French international news agency AFP, Shin explains the potential return of former U.S. President Donald Trump, who held high-profile but unsuccessful summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his presidency, could add to the tension. If Trump were to reengage with North Korea, then the Yoon government would have to decide whether to shift from its hardline policies against the North or risk friction between Washington and Seoul, Shin says.

The election outcomes could also hinder the Yoon government’s momentum for improving ties with Japan, especially since Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, too, is facing low domestic approval ratings, Shin tells The Korea Herald. "It is unfortunate for the Korea-Japan relationship that both leaders are politically struggling."

Despite facing legal issues, controversial opposition leader Lee Jae-myung remains a leading contender for the presidency when Yoon's term ends in 2027, echoing the situation with former U.S. President Donald Trump, he tells AFP.

Gender and Generational Gaps

The parliamentary election has also brought to relief the tremendous underrepresentation of women and young people in Korean politics. Only 20% of parliamentary seats are held by women, and over 85% of elected members are over the age of 50. The older establishment and the conservative People Power Party have failed to connect with South Korea's young people, Shin says. While the country is a global cultural force and excelling in semiconductor exports, South Korea’s younger people are facing intense competition in education, limited job prospects, and soaring housing prices. “The lack of understanding of the challenges the youth face is contributing to the country's rising generational conflict,” Shin explains via AFP.