Elections
Authors
News Type
Q&As
Date
Paragraphs

China’s demographic landscape is rapidly changing, and the government has responded by launching ambitious social and health service reforms to meet the changing needs of the country’s 1.3 billion people. This week, officials approved a five-year plan to develop a comprehensive nationwide social security network.

Karen Eggleston, the Asia Health Policy Program (AHPP) director and a Stanford Health Policy fellow, discusses the success of China’s health care reforms—including its recently established universal health care system—and the long road still ahead.

Why is the overall health and wellbeing of China’s population important globally?

There are many reasons why the health of China’s citizens matters within a larger global context. On the most basic level, China represents almost 20 percent of humanity. But it is also a major player in the world economy and it depends on having a healthy workforce, especially now that its population is aging more. The government’s ability to meet the needs of its underserved citizens contributes to a more productive and stable China, and works towards closing the huge gaps we see in human wellbeing across the world.

China also potentially offers a model for other developing countries, such as India, that may want to figure out how to make universal health coverage work at a tenth of the income of most of the countries that have put it into place before.

What are some of the biggest changes in China’s health care system since 1949?

One of the most significant changes is that China has achieved very basic universal health insurance coverage in a relatively short period of time.  

Throughout the Mao period (1949–1978) there was a health care system linked to the centrally planned economy, which provided a basic level of coverage via government providers with a lot of regional variation. When economic reform came in 1980, large parts of the system—particularly financing for insurance—collapsed. The majority of China’s citizens were uninsured during the past few decades of very rapid social and economic development.

China’s overall population is changing quite dramatically, which means it has different health care needs, such as treating chronic disease and caring for an increasingly elderly population. The central government is trying to establish a system of accessible primary care—a concept that China’s barefoot doctors helped to pioneer but that fell into disarray—and health services that fit these new needs. 

How does China’s basic health care system work? Are there segments of the population still not receiving adequate coverage and care?

China has had a system where people can select their own doctors. Patients usually want to go to clinics attached to the highest-reputation hospitals, but of course, when you are not insured you almost always by default go to where you can afford the care. “It is difficult to see the doctor, and it is expensive” has been the lament of patients in China, so an explicit goal of the health care reforms has been to address this.

The term “universal coverage” has different definitions. China initially put in place a form of insurance that only covers 20 or 30 percent of medical costs for the previously uninsured population, especially in rural areas. Benefits have expanded, but remain limited. As with the previous system, disparities in coverage still exist across the population. China not only has a huge population with huge economic differences, but within that there is a large migrant worker population. It is a challenge to figure out how to cover these citizens and how to provide them with access to better care. The government is quite aware there are segments of the population not receiving equal coverage, and it continues to strive to resolve the issue.  

What are the greatest innovations in China’s health care system in recent years?

One of the most remarkable things China has achieved is really its new health insurance system. Even if the current coverage is not particularly generous it is nearly universal, and mechanisms are put in place each year to provide more generous coverage. China is also working on strengthening its primary care and population health services, infusing a huge sum of government money into these efforts. It is the only developing country of its per-capita income that has achieved such results so far.

Interestingly, a lot of people assume China achieved its universal coverage by mandate, while in fact the central government did so by subsidizing the cost for local governments and individuals. This reduces the burden, for example, on poorer rural governments and residents, and is one innovative way China is trying to eliminate the disparity in access to care.

Eggleston has recently published a working paper on China’s health care reforms since the Mao era on the AHPP website, as well as an article in the Milken Institute Review.

Gordon Liu, a Chinese government advisor on health care and the executive director of Peking University’s Health Economics and Management Institute, spoke at Stanford on May 29 on the future of China’s health care system.

Hero Image
ShanghaiHealthImperative LOGO
A disabled woman from Henan writes a poetic plea for money explaining the circumstances of her disability, her family's difficulties in paying for treatment, and their subsequent debt, Shanghai, August 2009.
Flickr/Santo Chino; http://bit.ly/IGKsL1
All News button
1
Paragraphs

تقدم  أول انتخابات بعد سقوط الأنظمة السلطوية فرصة مهمة للجهات الفاعلة على الصعيدين المحلي والدولي لتعزيز العمليات الانتقالية. تبحث هذه الورقة أفضل السبل لدعم الممارسات الديمقراطية في الانتخابات القادمة، بناء على الدروس التي قدمتها تجربتا مصر وتونس.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Policy Briefs
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
BDC-Stanford Project on Arab Transitions
Authors
-

Abstract:

The Chinese bureaucracy presents a set of anomalies that need to be explained: In the presence of a strong central authority, why do we observe widespread collusive behaviors at the local level? Why are violations and problems uncovered in the inspection processes are left unaddressed? Why is performance evaluation conducted by the higher authorities is subsequently ignored by the local authorities? We develop a theoretical model on authority relationships in the Chinese bureaucracy by conceptualizing the allocation of control rights in goal setting, inspection and incentive provision among the principal, supervisor and agent. Variations in the allocation of control rights give rise to different modes of governance and entail distinct behavioral implications among the parties involved. The proposed model provides a unified framework and a set of analytical concepts to examine different governance structures, varying authority relationships, and behavioral patterns in the Chinese bureaucracy. We illustrate the proposed model in a case study of authority relationships and the ensuing behavioral patterns in the environmental protection arena over a 5-year policy cycle.

 

About the speaker:

Xueguang Zhou is the Kwoh-Ting Li Professor in Economic Development, a professor of sociology, and a Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies senior fellow. His main area of research is on institutional changes in contemporary Chinese society, focusing on Chinese organizations and management, social inequality, and state-society relationships. Zhou's research topics are related to the making of markets, village elections, and local government behaviors. His recent publications examine the role of bureaucracy in public goods provision in rural China (Modern China, 2011); interactions among peasants, markets, and capital (China Quarterly, 2011); access to financial resources in Chinese enterprises (Chinese Sociological Review, 2011, with Lulu Li); multiple logics in village elections (Social Sciences in China, 2010, with Ai Yun); and collusion among local governments in policy implementation (Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 2011, with Ai Yun and Lian Hong; and Modern China, 2010) .

Philippines Conference Room

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-6392 (650) 723-6530
0
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Kwoh-Ting Li Professor in Economic Development
Professor of Sociology
Graduate Seminar Professor at the Stanford Center at Peking University, June and July of 2014
Faculty Affiliate at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
Xueguang Zhou_0.jpg PhD

Xueguang Zhou is the Kwoh-Ting Li Professor in Economic Development, a professor of sociology, and a Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies senior fellow. His main area of research is on institutional changes in contemporary Chinese society, focusing on Chinese organizations and management, social inequality, and state-society relationships.

One of Zhou's current research projects is a study of the rise of the bureaucratic state in China. He works with students and colleagues to conduct participatory observations of government behaviors in the areas of environmental regulation enforcement, in policy implementation, in bureaucratic bargaining, and in incentive designs. He also studies patterns of career mobility and personnel flow among different government offices to understand intra-organizational relationships in the Chinese bureaucracy.

Another ongoing project is an ethnographic study of rural governance in China. Zhou adopts a microscopic approach to understand how peasants, village cadres, and local governments encounter and search for solutions to emerging problems and challenges in their everyday lives, and how institutions are created, reinforced, altered, and recombined in response to these problems. Research topics are related to the making of markets, village elections, and local government behaviors.

His recent publications examine the role of bureaucracy in public goods provision in rural China (Modern China, 2011); interactions among peasants, markets, and capital (China Quarterly, 2011); access to financial resources in Chinese enterprises (Chinese Sociological Review, 2011, with Lulu Li); multiple logics in village elections (Social Sciences in China, 2010, with Ai Yun); and collusion among local governments in policy implementation (Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 2011, with Ai Yun and Lian Hong; and Modern China, 2010).

Before joining Stanford in 2006, Zhou taught at Cornell University, Duke University, and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He is a guest professor at Peking University, Tsinghua University, and the People's University of China. Zhou received his Ph.D. in sociology from Stanford University in 1991.

CV
Date Label
Xueguang Zhou Kwoh-Ting Li Professor in Economic Development; Professor of Sociology; FSI Senior Fellow Speaker

Encina Hall, C148
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305

0
Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Director of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy
Research Affiliate at The Europe Center
Professor by Courtesy, Department of Political Science
yff-2021-14290_6500x4500_square.jpg

Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a faculty member of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He is also Director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, and a professor (by courtesy) of Political Science.

Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues in development and international politics. His 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His book In the Realm of the Last Man: A Memoir will be published in fall 2026.

Francis Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2001-2004. He is editor-in-chief of American Purpose, an online journal.

Dr. Fukuyama holds honorary doctorates from Connecticut College, Doane College, Doshisha University (Japan), Kansai University (Japan), Aarhus University (Denmark), the Pardee Rand Graduate School, and Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland). He is a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rand Corporation, the Board of Trustees of Freedom House, and the Board of the Volcker Alliance. He is a fellow of the National Academy for Public Administration, a member of the American Political Science Association, and of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is married to Laura Holmgren and has three children.

(October 2025)

CV
Date Label
Francis Fukuyama Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow Moderator Stanford University
Seminars
Authors
Roland Hsu
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs
Across France and the French overseas domains and territories, voters are going to the polls, and their level of dissatisfaction is surpassed only by the height of what is at stake for France, Europe, and US international policy.

The Europe Center invites the Stanford and area community to join us Friday, May 4th, for a roundtable discussion on the upcoming French elections.    (Sign-up here [link]).  Three analysts from different fields of expertise – Arthur Goldhammer, Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, and Jimia Boutouba – will discuss the election and its wider context.  The Europe Center is timing this public event  for the eve of round 2, with much to analyze from round 1, and policy options to consider for the impending winner.

Round 1 (April 22) results:

  • François Hollande: 28.6%
  • Nicolas Sarkozy 27.2%
  • Marine Le Pen 17.9%
  • Jean-Luc Melenchon 11.1%
  • François Bayrou 9.1%
  • Five other candidates 6.1%

Speculation during the two-week interim period between round 1 and 2 will focus on the leader of the far-right Front National – Marine Le Pen, who took her party to its highest vote tally in modern memory.  How will the two remaining candidates vie for these voters who were apparently preoccupied with a perceived threat from immigration, cultural dilution, and security?  Especially in the wake of the recent tragic violence in Toulouse, candidate Sarkozy courted such far-right voters, but candidate Hollande vociferously chastised the tactic as capitalizing on the tragedy.

Available opinion surveys note widespread disenchantment with incumbent President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has put his personal stamp on Euro-zone rescue and recovery and alliance with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, but who has failed to deliver such reform, stability, or growth in France.  President Sarkozy has also raised the profile of France and its international policy on the Afghan international peace-keeping force, as well as the Arab Spring and most recently international effort to enforce a cease fire in Syria.

French voters also express disappointment with Socialist candidate François Hollande, frequently labeling him and his party as vaguely center-right and having abandoned a clear commitment to the party’s traditional platform of equality and social justice.
Interest – and survey support – grew in the run-up to the first round of voting for the candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who brings a background as a teacher and self-identified Trotskyite, to lead the party Front de Gauche – a loose coalition of ex-Communists, environmental left, and the rough equivalent of U.S. “99%” movement.  

What did not happen this year was to have an “alternative” candidates from what are seen as the edges of ideological spectrum can win enough votes to edge out Sarkozy or Hollande and survive to the second round – as happened in 2002 when Jean-Marie Le Pen (father of Marine) out-placed the Socialist Lionel Jospin, to make it to the second round, and effectively compel center-left Socialists to hand the election to Jacques Chirac.
***************


The French presidential election is organized to accommodate two rounds.  The first round took place Sunday, April 22.  Because no candidate won more than fifty percent of the vote, there will be a run-off election of the top two candidates, on Sunday, May 6.
Basic facts of the structure of the French Presidential election are at:
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20120420/API/1204200768?p=1&tc=pg

Latest blog entry by Arthur Goldhammer: http://artgoldhammer.blogspot.com/

Opinion poll results from the leading agency Ipsos Public Affairs are updated frequently at: http://www.ipsos.fr/presidentielle-2012/index.php

All News button
1
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Senior Fellow Martha Crenshaw recently addressed a FBI counterintelligence committee about her Stanford project to map militant organizations. Her research identifies patterns in the evolution of militant organizations in specific conflict theatres while studying the causes and consequences of their growth.

Hero Image
Crenshaw honorsgrad logo
Crenshaw speaks at the 2010 CISAC Honors Graduation. Professor Crenshaw was a co-instructor for the year-long course.
Rod Searcey
All News button
1
Authors
Landry Signé
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

On March 22, a military coup abruptly ended two decades of uninterrupted democracy in Mali, the well-reputed West African country and key counter-terrorism partner of the United States. The coup leader Army Captain Amadou Sanogo and his mutinous troops suspended the 1992 democratic constitution, took over the presidential palace, the state television and several institutions, arrested members of the government, and promised a more efficient fight against Tuareg rebels. Interruption of the Malian democracy by a belligerent military faction is a serious threat to stability, peace, and human rights given the domestic context.

Since the coup, the conflict with the Tuareg rebels has continued to worsen. The two main Tuareg groups — the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Islamist Ansar Dine — have gained ground and seized new territories in the north of the country, pushing for sharia law. If a domestic solution is not found quickly, African regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders - either diplomatically or coercively  - to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too lateAfrican regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders — either diplomatically or coercively — to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too late.

The Coup in Mali: Who is Behind it and Why?

Plotters deposed the widely respected and democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Touré, a little over a month before the scheduled presidential election on April 29. Coup leader Captain Sanogo justified the unconstitutional seizure of power under the guise of national security, accusing President Touré of inefficiently fighting the decades-old Tuareg rebellion, and not providing enough resources to the army.

However, given the electoral timing, reasons advanced by Captain Sanogo to justify the coup are illogical. President Touré was not a candidate in the 2012 presidential election, and had just over a month left in his second and last term in office. As a visionary leader, he respected the unique Malian societal and political culture, improved governance, and put the country on a path to sustainable economic growth. Therefore, it is not surprising that Freedom House has continued over the past two decades to classify Mali as a democratic regime — whether electoral or liberal — despite several challenges such as; weak public institutions and central government, poverty, aid dependency, the Tuareg separatist rebellion, and labor or social unrests. The coup leader’s argument is further weakened because the democratic Malian government was offering public space to potentially unsatisfied military personnel to negotiate within the constitutional framework, along with the option to openly discuss issues of concern with presidential candidates.

The Coup is Reinvigorating Fear of a Repressive Military Regime 

The coup is reinvigorating fear of the resurgence of repressive rule that reigned for decades after successive military coups. Such repressive rule must be prevented. In 1968, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré ousted the civilian government, eight years after Mali gained its independence from France. Because he was resistant to democratic changes, Traoré was ousted in 1991 by Amadou Toumani Touré in the face of widespread civil unrest and demands for greater political rights and democratic reforms.

In 1991, the Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP) was formed by various groups representing civil society and under the supervision of Amadou Toumani Touré. The Committee organized successful political liberalization, which included; a national conference, a constitutional referendum, a founding election won by President Alpha Oumar Konaré (1992-2002), and consequently a democratic transition in 1992. Many hope that twenty years of democratic developments are not eradicated by this coup. Captain Sanogo still has the window of opportunity to respect the Malian values and people, and end his rule, as requested by the people.

The Devastating Consequences of the Coup in Mali and Africa

The coup has significant implications on the political developments in Mali, West Africa and the African continent. It weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy.The coup weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy. In addition, it worsened the situation in the north of the country, with rebel militias controlling more towns than before the coup. The coup has consequently increased the risk of disproportionate use of force, potentially leading to more violent and deadly conflicts threatening minority groups in Mali, with negative consequences for the entire West African region.

 The coup also gives reasons — not necessarily valid — to citizens and pessimistic observers to despair about the prospect of democracy in West Africa. The spirit of democracy has recently been challenged in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. If most plotters manage to stay in power, Africa may face a resurgence of military coup plots, reviving the violent nightmare of the two last decades of the twentieth century.

 Malian and International Reactions to the Coup

Malian domestic leadership and the international community have all taken serious steps towards returning the country to civilian rule and restoring the democratic system. Malian political and civil society leaders have clearly shown deep opposition to the rupture of the constitutional order, and they have requested return to the rule of law. They are peacefully demonstrating to avoid violence and to preserve national unity. On March 28, the ousted President Touré called for a consensual solution and told French Radio station RFI "what is important is democracy, institutions, and Mali." In the same vein, the international community has strongly condemned the coup, applied some diplomatic sanctions, and requested a return to an elected civilian government.

The U.N. Secretary General has called for immediate restoration of constitutional rule, and the U.N. Security Council echoed a similar sentiment by calling for "the restoration of constitutional order and the holding of elections as previously scheduled." The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reiterated its policy of “zero tolerance” for unconstitutional seizures of power, organized high-level meetings with heads of state to persuade the junta to step-down, readied its stand-by forces, and placed an economic embargo on Mali.

The African Union immediately suspended the membership of Mali until constitutional rule is restored, and the U.S. paused military aid to Mali and urged rebels to end fighting. France has suspended its official cooperation with Mali, but maintained humanitarian aid and is pushing the U.N. Security Council to explore avenues to support ECOWAS in their efforts to restore order. Canada, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and the World Bank have all suspended their aid. These diplomatic actions, especially from ECOWAS, have pressured the junta to announce (formally but not yet effectively) the restoration of the 1992 constitution on April 1, a few days after unconstitutionally promulgating a new one. Further actions should be made in a timely manner to pressure the junta to step-down, to ensure that power is transferred back to civilian rule and constitutional order restored.

Restoring democracy and peace in Mali — diplomatically or coercively — is imperative. It will send a strong warning to those who try to undermine democratic efforts that unconstitutional appropriation of power and threats to peace and security will not be tolerated. Citizens will also be shown that they are supported in their battle for democracy and peace.  

Hero Image
GRIN Logo
All News button
1
-

Timed between the election's first and second rounds, this discussion brings together noted scholars and authors with unique and deep insight into contemporary French political culture.

Co-sponsored by the Europe Center and the French Culture Workshop


A brief write-up of this discussion titled "French vote a rejection of Sarkozy, panelists say" can be found in the May 7, 2012 edition of the Stanford Daily.


Event Summary:

Arthur Goldhammer opens the panel by arguing that the first round of the French presidential elections, not the second, are "the real story." For the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic, divisions between left and right were less pronounced than between the top two tiers of candidates (Hollande/Sarkozy, and Melénchon/Le Pen) especially regarding their attitudes toward European integration, globalization, and the Euro. Goldhammer points out that given France's role as a top global investor as well as a leading destination for foreign investment, the anti-globalization stance of the second tier candidates is unrealistic, although it enjoyed broad support at the polls. Sarkozy responded to this show of support by attacking the Shengen agreement and other aspects of the EU in a bid to win votes, while Hollande kept a low profile on the same issues. If Hollande wins, Goldhammer predicts, he will be tested by the markets and the global financial industry. He also points out that the Socialist and UNP parties are both internally divided on important issues.  If Sarkozy loses and decides to leave politics, Goldhammer predicts a power struggle for leadership of the party.

Laurent Cohen-Tanugi predicts that if Hollande wins, the outcome will be a statement against Sarkozy more than one in favor of Hollande. He echoes Arthur Goldhammer's concern about a strong market reaction to a victory by Hollande, who has positioned himself as pro-growth and has sanctioned Sarkozy for his strict austerity measures. Cohen-Tanugi adds that Hollande's focus is on domestic politics, and that he lacks significant international experience. Whoever wins, he cautions, France is in for difficult times.

Jimia Boutouba describes the rise of the extreme right – which has invoked nostalgia for a pre-globalization era - leading up to the elections. This rise has been dominated by Marine Le Pen and the Front National, which vows to defend the "French way of life" and (like Sarkozy as the election neared) has made anti-immigration rhetoric a key component of its platform. Le Pen, however, has attracted many first time, rural, and female voters, and has been successful in setting the tone and the agenda of national politics. Boutouba sees several problems with this trend toward defining the nation by what it opposes (Islam, globalization, international finance, etc), and warns it can be very disruptive to the political system, pointing to the recent fall of the Dutch government. More significantly, the anti-immigrant tone of the discourse discourages second and third generation descendants of immigrants from voting or participating in the political process.

A question and answer session following the roundtable addressed such questions as: Have both Hollande and Sarkozy radicalized their rhetoric and proposals to win support from far right and far left voters? Will the taxes and government spending (which is already very high in France, at 57%) promised by some politicians choke private sector growth? Which candidate will be most attractive to this new generation of French college graduates? What are the main differences between the three potential leaders currently jockeying for control of Sarkozy's party? To what extent would a Hollande presidency be beholden to Communists, Greens, and other extreme left parties? How will a Hollande presidency affect France's involvement with NATO, and relations with the United States? What are the prospects for the future of the Euro?

 



CISAC Conference Room

Arthur Goldhammer Translator, writer, and Senior Affiliate at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University; member of the editorial boards at "French Politics, Culture, and Society", and "La Revue Tocqueville/The Tocqueville Review" Speaker
Laurent Cohen-Tanugi Visiting Lecturer at the Stanford Law School, international lawyer, policy adviser and public intellectual Speaker
Jimia Boutouba Assistant Professor of Modern Languages and Literatures Speaker Santa Clara University
Panel Discussions
-
     Vast resources are devoted to predicting human behavior in domains such as economics, popular culture, and national security, but the quality of such predictions is usually poor. It is tempting to conclude that this inability to make good predictions is a consequence of some fundamental lack of predictability on the part of humans. However, our recent work offers evidence that the failure of standard prediction methods does not indicate an absence of human predictability but instead reflects: 1.) misunderstandings regarding which features of human dynamics actually possess predictive power, and 2.) the fact that, until recently, it has not been possible to measure these predictive features in real world settings.
 
     This talk introduces some of the science behind this basic observation and demonstrates its utility through three case studies. We begin by considering social groups in which individuals are influ- enced by the behavior of others; in these situations, social influence is known to decrease the ex ante predictability of the ensuing social dynamics. We show that, interestingly, these same social forces can increase the extent to which the outcome of a social process can be predicted in its very early stages. This finding is then leveraged to design prediction methods which outperform existing techniques for predicting social group dynamics.
 
     The second case study involves analysis of the predictability of adversary behavior in the coevo- lutionary “arms races” that exist between attackers and defenders in many domains, including cyber security, counterterrorism, fraud prevention, and various markets. Our analysis reveals that conventional wisdom regarding these coevolving systems is incomplete, and provides insights which enable the development of proactive cyber defense methods that are much more effective than standard techniques. Finally, we consider the task of predicting human behavior at the level of individuals. In particular, we show that a given individual’s mobility patterns can be predicted with surprising accuracy, and conversely that knowledge of even a small portion of a person’s travel patterns permits reliable identification of that individual. 

About the speaker: Rich Colbaugh received his Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from The Pennsylvania State University in 1986. He presently holds a joint appointment with the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, where he is Chief Scientist of ICASA and a Professor in both the Mechanical Engineering and Management Departments, and Sandia National Laboratories, where he is a member of the Analytics and Cryptography Department. His research activities have focused on the modeling, analysis, and control of dynamical systems of importance in nature and society. Much of this work involves the study of very large, complex networks, including those of relevance to national security, socioeconomic systems, advanced technology, and biology.
 
Dr. Colbaugh spent 2001-2006 with the U.S. Intelligence Community in Washington DC advising senior leadership on counterterrorism and counterproliferation programs. Since 2007 he has concentrated his research and development efforts on social media analytics, attracting support for this program from agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, and the National Science Foundation.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Rich Colbaugh Sandia National Laboratory; Chief Scientist, Institute for Complex and Adaptive Systems, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology Speaker
Seminars
-

About the topic: What could queueing theory, the science of customer flows and delays in service systems, possibly offer towards understanding and countering terrorism? In terror queue models, newly hatched terror plots correspond to newly arriving customers, the number of ongoing terror plots corresponds to the queue of customers waiting to receive service, undercover agents or informants correspond to service providers, customer service is initiated when a terror plot is detected, and service is completed when the plot is interdicted. Not all plots are interdicted; successful terror attacks correspond to customers who abandon the queue without receiving service! Building upon these ideas, we will focus our attention upon a simple observation: other things being equal, the number of ongoing terror plots increases with the duration of time from plot initiation until execution or interdiction (whichever comes first), yet no estimate of the probability distribution governing terror plot duration has appeared in the open literature. Starting with a review of US terrorism-related indictments, lower and upper bounds for the initiation date of 30 distinct Jihadi plots were identified in addition to the date of arrest or an attempted/actual terror act. Accounting for the censoring and truncation effects inherent with these data; the estimated mean duration equals 9 months, while 95% of all plots are estimated to fall between 1 and 25 months. These estimates suggest that in the United States, on average approximately three ongoing Jihadi terror plots have been active at any point in time since 9/11/2001.

About the Speaker: Edward H. Kaplan is the William N. and Marie A. Beach Professor of Management Sciences, Professor of Public Health, and Professor of Engineering at Yale University’s School of Management who is currently on sabbatical as Distinguished Visiting Professor at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business. The author of more than 125 research articles, Kaplan received both the Lanchester Prize and the Edelman Award, two top honors in the operations research field, among many other awards. An elected member of the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine of the US National Academies, Kaplan’s current research focuses on the application of operations research to problems in counterterrorism and homeland security. 

CISAC Conference Room

Edward H. Kaplan Professor of Management Sciences, Professor of Public Health, and Professor of Engineering, Yale; Distinguished Visiting Professor, Graduate School of Business, Stanford Speaker
Seminars
Subscribe to Elections