Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/sQynE60SFTc

About this Event:

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Sophia Boyer

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: AK-47s, Tanks, and F-16s: Understanding Shifts in Pakistan's Conventional Military Strategy in the post-Cold war era

Abstract: The United States has navigated a complex relationship with Pakistan since the country’s inception in 1947. The behavior of the Pakistan Army has been a central factor in that relationship. This thesis analyzes when, how and why the Pakistan Army has shifted its conventional military strategy in the post-Cold war era. An investigation of the Pakistan Army’s capabilities, doctrines, rhetoric and force distribution suggests that Pakistan shifted its conventional military strategy four times since 1989: a ‘Post-Cold war Strategy’ from 1989-1994, a ‘Defense Minimal strategy’ from 1994-2001, a ‘Two-Front Commitment Strategy’ from 2001-2010, and a ‘Three-Front Commitment Strategy’ from 2010-2019. Based on existing literature and interviews, this thesis argues that external threats, specifically those emanating from India and the U.S., and bureaucratic politics driven by leadership changes have impacted shifts in Pakistan’s conventional military strategy substantially. These findings can inform a calibrated US South Asia policy comprising the management of conventional military balance in nuclear South Asia.

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Samantha Feuer

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: From the Shadows to the Front Page: State Use of Proxies for Cyber Operations.

Abstract: Why do some states delegate cyber operations to proxies while others rely on central commands? This thesis explores state use of cyber proxies in light of principal-agent problems. In particular, this work examines cyber proxies allegedly acting at the behest of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea by considering three variables: cost, skills and specialization, and plausible deniability. The use of case studies and process tracing analyses evaluate their explanatory power in the cyber realm. The data suggest that states may use cyber proxies to differing degrees and with differing motivations depending upon the type of mission or strategic aim, as well as their ability to pose credible threats to misbehaving proxies. Although cyber operations are comparatively “cheap” relative to physical missions - hence their appeal - some evidence suggests that using cyber proxies may provide additional cost savings compared to the use of their central commands for certain missions. States’ need for skills and specializations, not immediately attainable through central commands, may also lead them to use cyber proxies. Based on available evidence, it remains inconclusive whether states’ potential desire for plausible deniability influences their use of cyber proxies. During a period of global uncertainty in which our everyday lives have been forced online, critical infrastructure, the public sector and private industry are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks from adverse actors. As data in this field improves, this thesis hopes to serve as a framework for future researchers to test, with more certainty, the causal links between these explanations and the use of cyber proxies within these four states.

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Elena Crespo

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Blood and Treasure, but Mostly Blood: U.S. Electoral Accountability and the All-Volunteer Force

Abstract: In the wake of the American military’s transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF), scholars and military leaders alike cautioned that the Armed Forces defending the nation would come to disproportionately draw from the least advantaged and least politically powerful populations. Should that be the case, certain communities would pay higher costs of war while others would be relatively untouched, leaving the Executive free to command with little public accountability. This thesis adopts an experimental statistical counterfactual approach to examine the geographic casualty distribution across states during the Iraq War had there been a conscripted force. The data presented suggest that the conventional logic is partially correct: an all-volunteer force is not egalitarian. It disproportionately burdened certain states—predominantly in the South and Midwest—with higher casualty rates than would have a conscripted force. However, many of the states that shouldered the costs of war under an AVF also carry disproportionate political gravity as electoral swing states. These findings suggest that a President who chooses to use force is more likely to face electoral backlash for his or her decisions under an all-volunteer force than under a conscripted force. Ultimately, the thesis proposes that President George W. Bush may have increased the margin of his victory in the 2004 Presidential election and contributed to greater Republican victories in the 2006 Senate election had the Iraq War been fought with a conscripted force that more equally distributed casualties. This finding runs contrary to the popular contention that a conscripted force is inherently more democratic and will lead to better electoral accountability for use of force.

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/yh5HVfzLgy0

About this Event:

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Antigone Xenopoulos

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Alliance or Vulnerable Reliance: U.S. Dependence on China for Critical Dual-Use Products

Abstract: Why has the United States become economically dependent on China for the supply of critical dual-use products—those which have both military and commercial applications? Examples of such dependence include pharmaceutical drugs, rare earth metals, printed circuit boards, and more. I propose three theoretical models as likely explaining this phenomenon: the formerly low prioritization of China as a security threat, uncoordinated economic and security policies, and interest group influence. Next, by systemizing evidence from plethora of sources such as trade data, industry assessments, and government speeches and reports, I show that the U.S.’ dual-use dependence on China is measurable, has increased with time, and manifests across industries and defense applications. I find that entities within the U.S. government long recognized the threat of dual-use dependence on China. Nevertheless, because China was not prioritized as a security threat or portrayed as a competitor, this dependence was not responded to; instead, it persisted. Finally, and surprisingly, I find that U.S. industry associations did not uniformly support offshoring to China; even industries which would be expected to take such a position acknowledged the national security imperative of maintaining robust domestic supply chains. Combined, these findings demonstrate that US government’s internal dynamics rather than private-sector factors better explain the U.S.’ dual-use dependence on China.

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Kelly Devens

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Assessing Russian Noncompliance in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

Abstract: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was a landmark bilateral arms control agreement created by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987. However, the United States formally withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, citing years of Russian violation of the Treaty with the development of its 9M729 missile system. This thesis explains the major underlying motivations behind Russian development of this ground-launched, intermediate-range missile, which was a violation of the INF. It utilizes a single case process tracing approach and presents two datasets: (1) a robust timeline of events detailing the development of the missile system, the mechanics of the violation, Russian public commentary on the Treaty, and the American response, and (2) a collection of interviews of high-level American officials heavily involved in the investigation of the violation and American and European academic subject experts. The thesis finds that 9M729 missile system was likely not developed for any one mission in particular. The Ministry of Defense and Russian military industry wanted the missile system to provide flexibility in response to an increasing number of military threats in several theaters, believed they could develop the missile with plausible deniability, and used factors such as U.S. missile defense systems, the expanding size of NATO, rising influence of China, weapons proliferation to unstable neighboring regions, and the opportunity to divide NATO as justification to receive program approval. Determining the rationale for developing a treaty-noncompliant weapons system presents opportunity to consider how existing and future arms control agreements are developed and considered.

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Jonah Martin Glick-Unterman

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: “All Options Are On The Table”: The Correlates of Compellence and Coalition Effects

Abstract: Why do some militarized threats compel an opponent state to change its policy or behavior while others do not? This thesis is the first study to comprehensively evaluate the major theories of compellence by considering individual signals. An original data set compiled by surveying 124,000 archival documents catalogues every major military mobilization and verbal threat by the U.S. President with compellent intent since strategic parity. The results contest theories regarding “cost-sinking” and “hand-tying” signals, reputation, and assurances. Moreover, they challenge the conventional “costly” signaling framework. Instead of a simple positive relationship between a signal’s cost and coercive utility, this thesis proposes a different dynamic: at some point, cost can diminish coercive value by conveying that concessions may not prevent later demands or the use of force. The effect of international support for intervention is instructive: although associated with a higher rate of some concessions, international backing has no bearing on whether a target fully capitulates. Case studies of compellence prior to the First Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War suggest that this phenomenon may be explained by the sequencing and expense of coalition building. Ultimately, policymakers should consider that effective signaling is rare and that demonstrating an unflinching commitment to the use of force can backfire.

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/vrUV4VtYZsE

About this Event:

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Ben Boston

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: America in East Africa: Security Partnerships, Aid Dependence, and Diplomatic Leverage

Abstract: Why is the United States able to shape the actions of friendly nations? In this thesis, I offer an answer by examining cases of military invasions by and domestic political liberalization effort of the Kenyan and Ugandan governments since the end of the Cold War. Drawing on academic, journalistic, and participant reporting of each case, including interviews with key American policymakers, I test three theoretical frameworks: balance of interests, dependence, and coercive diplomacy. Through these I attempt to explain American influence over the 1998 Ugandan and Rwandan invasion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 2011 Kenyan invasion of southern Somalia, the 1991 Kenyan reinstitution of multiparty politics, and the 2005 Ugandan abolition of presidential term limits and reinstitution of multiparty politics. The existing literature on these cases focuses on outcomes broadly, and on African states’ comparative ability to secure agency relative to the wishes of their donors. Taking the United States as my focus, in this comparative case study, I find consistent limits to America’s ability to shape the actions of Kenya and Uganda regarding their core interests; however, clear, sustained application of coercive diplomacy still altered outcomes — especially when it used the leverage offered by dependence. This thesis creates a model of American agency in maximizing leverage over aid-dependent states.

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Eva Frankel

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Assessing the Threat of Bioterror from Lone Insiders in Biological Laboratories

Abstract: As the cost of DNA synthesis and sequencing drops and the life sciences advance, the literature suggests that synthesizing and weaponizing pathogens may have become within reach for non-state actors, creating a fundamental shift from a Cold War framework focused on the capabilities of state bioweapons programs to one focused on the threat posed by mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by terrorists. Lone insiders in biological laboratories, who have technical training and access to laboratory equipment, are considered a particular threat. Given the scholarship that suggests lone insiders in biological laboratories pose a significant security threat, why have there been no mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by lone insiders using pathogens? This thesis considers the capabilities of potential malicious actors in biological laboratories to weaponize pathogens, and their motivations to perpetrate mass-casualty attacks. Drawing on bibliometric data from synthetic virology papers, I argue that the historical threshold for capability required to weaponize pathogens is prohibitory to those who are not early adopters or innovators in the field of synthetic virology. Furthermore, I show that the malicious acts historically perpetrated by lone insiders are best characterized as biocrimes rather than bioterrorist acts, and transnational groups have not sought to recruit insiders in biological laboratories. By more fully understanding the threat of bioterrorism posed by lone insiders, policymakers and research institutions can work to ensure laboratory safety and security while promoting open science.

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China’s role in the COVID-19 outbreak has elicited a growing global backlash, including dueling Republican and Democratic campaign ads, alongside praise for China’s success in curbing the coronavirus and sending medical assistance overseas. How will the pandemic reshape China’s domestic and international standing, and what lies ahead for U.S.-China relations? Weiss will discuss the Chinese government’s pandemic response and what it reveals about the CCP’s domestic and international intentions.

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This event is part of the 2020 Winter/Spring Colloquia series, The PRC at 70: The Past, Present – and Future?, sponsored by APARC's China Program.

On May 20th please join us for Perspectives on Science Communication, Misinformation, and the COVID-19 Infodemic, featuring University of Washington scholars Kate Starbird, Jevin West and Ryan Calo, in conversation with Cyber Policy Center Director Kelly Born, as they discuss a new project exploring how scientific findings and science credentials are mobilized in the spread of misinformation.

Kate Starbird and Jevin West will present emerging research into how scientific findings and science credentials are mobilized within the spread of false and misleading information about COVID-19. Ryan Calo will explore proposals to address COVID-19 through information technology—the subject of a recent Senate Commerce hearing at which he testified—with particular attention to the ways contact tracing apps could prove a vector for misinformation and disinformation. 

May 20, 10am-11am (PST)
Join via Zoom 

Kate Starbird is an Associate Professor in the Department of Human Centered Design & Engineering (HCDE) and Director of the Emerging Capacities of Mass Participation (emCOMP) Laboratory. She is also adjunct faculty in the Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering and the Information School and a data science fellow at the eScience Institute. 

Kate's research is situated within human-computer interaction (HCI) and the emerging field of crisis informatics — the study of how information-communication technologies (ICTs) are used during crisis events. Her research examines how people use social media to seek, share, and make sense of information after natural disasters (such as earthquakes and hurricanes) and man-made disasters (such as acts of terrorism and mass shooting events). More recently, her work has shifted to focus on the spread of disinformation in this context. 

Ryan Calo is the Lane Powell and D. Wayne Gittinger Associate Professor at the University of Washington School of Law. In addition to co-founding the UW Center for an Informed Public, he is a faculty co-director (with Batya Friedman and Tadayoshi Kohno) of the UW Tech Policy Lab---a unique, interdisciplinary research unit that spans the School of Law, Information School, and Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science and Engineering where Calo also holds courtesy appointments. Calo is widely published in the area of law and emerging technology. 

Jevin West is an Associate Professor in the Information School at the University of Washington. He is the co-founder of the DataLab and the new Center for an Informed Public at UW. He holds an Adjunct Faculty position in the Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering and Data Science Fellow at the eScience Institute. His research and teaching focus on misinformation in and about science. He develops methods for mining the scientific literature in order to study the origins of disciplines, the social and economic biases that drive these disciplines, and the impact the current publication system has on the health of science. 

Kelly Born is the Executive Director of Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center. The center’s research and teaching focuses on the governance of digital technology at the intersection of security, geopolitics and democracy. Born collaborates with the center’s program leaders to pioneer new lines of research, policy-oriented curriculum, and outreach to key decision-makers globally. Prior to joining Stanford, Born helped to launch and lead The Madison Initiative at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, one of the largest philanthropic undertakings working to reduce polarization and improve U.S. democracy. There, she designed and implemented strategies focused on money in politics, electoral reform, civic engagement and digital disinformation. Kelly earned a master’s degree in international policy from Stanford University. 

A recording of this event can be found here (YouTube recording)

National AI Strategies and Human Rights: New Urgency in the Era of COVID-19, takes place Wednesday, May 6th, at 10am PST with Eileen Donahoe, the Executive Director of the Global Digital Policy Incubator (GDPi) at Stanford's Cyber Policy Center and Megan Metzger, Associate Director for Research, also at GDPi. Joining them will be Mark Latonero, Senior Researcher at Data & Society, Richard Wingfield, from Global Partners Digital, and Gallit Dobner, Director of the Centre for International Digital Policy at Global Affairs Canada. The session will be moderated by Kelly Born, Executive Director of the Cyber Policy Center.   

The seminar will focus on the recently published report, National Artificial Intelligence Strategies and Human Rights: A Review, produced by the Global Digital Policy Incubator at Stanford and Global Partners Digital - and will also provide an opportunity to look at how the COVID-19 crisis is impacting human rights and digital technology work more generally.   

We will also be jointly hosting a webinar with the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies on May 8th at 1pm PST, with experts from around the center and institute discussing emerging research on Covid-19, and the implications to future cyber policies, as well as the upcoming elections. More information on the May 8th event, can be found here.   

May 6, 10am-11am (PST)  
Join via Zoom

 
Eileen Donahoe is the Executive Director of the Global Digital Policy Incubator (GDPI) at Stanford University, FSI/Cyber Policy Center. GDPI is a global multi-stakeholder collaboration hub for development of policies that reinforce human rights and democratic values in digitized society. Areas of current research: AI & human rights; combatting digital disinformation; governance of digital platforms. She served in the Obama administration as the first US Ambassador to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, at a time of significant institutional reform and innovation. After leaving government, she joined Human Rights Watch as Director of Global Affairs where she represented the organization worldwide on human rights foreign policy, with special emphasis on digital rights, cybersecurity and internet governance. Earlier in her career, she was a technology litigator at Fenwick & West in Silicon Valley. Eileen serves on the National Endowment for Democracy Board of Directors; the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity; the World Economic Forum Future Council on the Digital Economy; University of Essex Advisory Board on Human Rights, Big Data and Technology; NDI Designing for Democracy Advisory Board; Freedom Online Coalition Advisory Network; and Dartmouth College Board of Trustees. Degrees: BA, Dartmouth; J.D., Stanford Law School; MA East Asian Studies, Stanford; M.T.S., Harvard; and Ph.D., Ethics & Social Theory, GTU Cooperative Program with UC Berkeley. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

   
Megan Metzger is a Research Scholar and Associate Director for Research at the Global Digital Policy Incubator (GDPi) Program. Megan’s research is focused on how changes in technology change how individuals and states use and have access to information, and how this affects protest and other forms of political behavior. Her dissertation was focused primarily on the role of social media during the EuroMaidan protests in Ukraine. She has also worked on projects about the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, and has ongoing projects exploring Russian state strategies of information online. In addition to her academic background, Megan has spent a number of years studying and working in the post-communist world. Her scholarly work has been published in The Journal of Comparative Economics and Slavic Review. Her analysis has also been published in the Monkey Cage Blog at The Washington Post, The Huffington Post and Al Jazeera English.

 
Mark Latonero is a Senior Researcher at Data & Society focused on AI and human rights and a Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. Previously he was a research director and research professor at USC where he led the Technology and Human Trafficking Initiative. He has also served as innovation consultant for the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Dr. Latonero works on the social and policy implications of emerging technology and examines the benefits, risks, and harms of digital technologies, particularly in human rights and humanitarian contexts. He has published a number of reports on the impact of data-centric and automated technologies in forced migration, refugee identity, and crisis response.  

 
Richard Wingfield provides legal and policy expertise across Global Partners Digital's portfolio of programs. As Head of Legal, he provides legal and policy advice internally at GPD and to its partner organizations on human rights as they relate to the internet and digital policy, and develops legal analyses, policy briefings and other resources for stakeholders. Before joining GPD, Richard led on policy development and advocacy at the Equal Rights Trust, an international human rights organization working to combat discrimination and inequality. He has also undertaken research for the Bar Human Rights Committee and Commonwealth Lawyers Association, the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights and provided support during the preparatory work for the Yogyakarta Principles.  
 
Gallit Dobner is Director of the Centre for International Digital Policy at Global Affairs Canada, with responsibility for the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to counter foreign threats to democracy as well as broader issues at the intersection of foreign policy and technology. She formerly served as Political Counsellor in The Hague, where she was responsible for bilateral relations and the international courts and tribunals (2015-19), and in Algiers (2010-12). Gallit has also served as Deputy Director at Global Affairs Canada for various international security files, including Counter Terrorism, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. Prior to this, Gallit was a Middle East analyst at Canada’s Privy Council Office. Gallit has a Masters in Political Science from McGill University and Sciences PO. 

 
Kelly Born is the Executive Director of Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center. The center’s research and teaching focuses on the governance of digital technology at the intersection of security, geopolitics and democracy. Born collaborates with the center’s program leaders to pioneer new lines of research, policy-oriented curriculum, and outreach to key decision-makers globally. Prior to joining Stanford, Born helped to launch and lead The Madison Initiative at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, one of the largest philanthropic undertakings working to reduce polarization and improve U.S. democracy. There, she designed and implemented strategies focused on money in politics, electoral reform, civic engagement and digital disinformation. Kelly earned a master’s degree in international policy from Stanford University. 

The Stanford Cyber Policy Center continues its online Zoom series: Digital Technology and Democracy, Security & Geopolitics in an Age of Coronavirus. These webinars will take place every other Wednesday at 10am PST. 

The next event, Improving Journalistic Coverage in the Digital Age: From Covid-19 to the 2020 Elections, will take place Wednesday, April 22, at 10am PST with Andrew Grotto, from the Cyber Policy Center's Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance, Janine Zacharia, from Stanford's Department of Communication and Joan Donovan, from Harvard University’s Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government, in conversation with Kelly Born, Executive Director of the Cyber Policy Center. 

Grotto and Zacharia will be discussing their recent report How to Report Responsibly on Hacks and Disinformation. Recognizing that reporters are targeted adversaries of foreign and domestic actors, especially during an election year, the report provides recommendations and actionable guidance, including a playbook and a repeatable, enterprise-wide process for implementation. Donovan will discuss health misinformation, COVID-19, and how this relates to disinformation around the 2020 elections, the US census and beyond. 

Join us on April 22nd for the next talk in this enlightening series. You can also watch our April 8th seminar, Digital Disinformation and Health: From Vaccines to the Coronavirus.  

April 22, 10am-11am (PST) 
Join via Zoom link 
 
Janine Zacharia is the Carlos Kelly McClatchy Lecturer in Stanford’s Department of Communication. In addition to teaching journalism courses at Stanford, she researches and writes on the intersection between technology and national security, media trends and foreign policy. Earlier in her career, she reported extensively on the Middle East and U.S. foreign policy including stints as Jerusalem Bureau Chief for the Washington Post, State Department Correspondent for Bloomberg News, Washington Bureau Chief for the Jerusalem Post, and Jerusalem Correspondent for Reuters. 


 
Andrew Grotto is director of the Program on Geopolitics, Technology and Governance and William J. Perry International Security Fellow at Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center and teaches the gateway course for graduate students specializing in cyber policy in Stanford’s Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program. He is also a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He served as Senior Director for Cyber Policy on the National Security Council in both the Obama and the Trump White House. 

Dr. Joan Donovan is Director of the Technology and Social Change (TaSC) Research Project at the Shorenstein Center. Dr. Donovan leads the field in examining internet and technology studies, online extremism, media manipulation, and disinformation campaigns. Dr. Donovan's research and teaching interests are focused on media manipulation, effects of disinformation campaigns, and adversarial media movements. This fall, she will be teaching a graduate-level course on Media Manipulation and Disinformation Campaigns (DPI-622) with a focus on how social movements, political parties, governments, corporations, and other networked groups engage in active efforts to shape media narratives and disrupt social institutions.

 
Kelly Born is the Executive Director of Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center, where she collaborates with the center’s program leaders to pioneer new lines of research, policy-oriented curriculum, policy workshops and executive education. Prior to joining Stanford, she helped to launch and lead The Madison Initiative at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, one of the largest philanthropic undertakings working to reduce polarization and improve U.S. democracy. There, she designed and implemented strategies focused on money in politics, electoral reform, civic engagement and digital disinformation. Kelly earned a master’s degree in international policy from Stanford University.