The Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) is Pakistan's best reputed and only private management school. Operating within the environment of a government run university system, LUMS has used innovative strategies in marketing, research and consulting to reach its globally renowned status. Wasim Azhar, Dean of LUMS, will present a case study on its strategies. Dr. Wasim Azhar has taught at Wake Forest University, Swarthmore College, Kean University and the University of Pennsylvania in the USA. He has also worked as Marketing Analyst for Exxon Corporation in the USA. He is a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), American Marketing Association, American Production Inventory Control Society (APICS), American Mathematical Association and MENSA. His research interests include issues in business policy, marketing strategy, and negotiation dynamics. Dr. Azhar received his Ph.D. and MSc from the University of Pennsylvania, MBA from Wake Forest University, and MSc from University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore.

Japan represents a quintessential "network society" -- permeated by dense webs of formal and informal relationships across all areas of daily life, from the political to the economic. Yet as industrial activity continues to languish along many indicators in the 1990s, what was once considered a source of competitive strength is now viewed as an underlying weakness. Critics of "crony capitalism" in Japan (and the rest of Asia) charge that mutual backscratching has replaced the kind of hard-nosed business decisions needed to make economically efficient decisions about how to allocate capital, weed out poorly performing companies, and shift resources into more productive uses. Based on the forthcoming volume, "The Organization of Japanese Business Networks" (Cambridge University Press), this presentation evaluates these criticisms theoretically and empirically. It also considers efforts now underway in Japan in the area of keiretsu reform. Michael L. Gerlach received his Ph.D. in organizational behavior from Yale University and is currently associate professor at UC Berkeley's business school. His research is focused on cross-national studies of business organizations; entry strategies in foreign markets; strategic alliances, joint ventures, and new organizational forms; interfirm relationships and corporate strategies in Japanese business; business and public policies concerning international competitiveness; the comparative analysis of the institutions of modern market economies as they reflect social and cultural contexts.

For three decades following its establishment in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) played an important role in managing regional conflicts and nurturing a sense of regional identity in Southeast Asia. Toward the end of the 1990s, however, transnational environmental and economic crises dealt heavy blows to the credibility of the Association. These crises exacerbated tensions and burdens that had already arisen inside ASEAN in the wake of its expansion to include all ten Southeast Asian countries and its involvement in building larger multilateral institutions for the Asia Pacific. Are ASEAN's best years behind it? Or will it recover, perhaps even exceed, its former ability to sustain regional security and strengthen regional identity in Southeast Asia? Why, or why not? Amitav Acharya is an internationally recognized authority on regionalism in Southeast Asia. His latest books are The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia (Oxford, 2000) and Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (Routledge, 2000). He is on research leave at Harvard for the current academic year as a fellow of the Asia Center and the John F. Kennedy School of Government.

David W. Brady is a political scientist whose work encompasses American politics and legislative bodies, international political trends, and comparative politics. Brady holds the Bowen H. and Janice Arthur McCoy endowed chair at the Graduate School of Business and is a professor of political science in Stanford University's School of Humanities and Sciences. A dedicated and popular teacher, Professor Brady is a past recipient of Stanford's Phi Beta Kappa Distinguished Teacher Award, presented for his work with undergraduates, and of the Robert K. Jaedicke Silver Apple Award, presented by the Stanford Business School Alumni Association for his participation in alumni activities.

Brady recently served as an associate dean for academic affairs at the Business School and continues to serve as director of the School's programs in executive education. He is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and senior fellow by courtesy at the Institute for International Studies, both on campus. David is also co-director of the University's Social Science History Institute and associate director of the University's Public Policy Program. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and member of the advisory council for the Kansai Silicon Valley Venture Forum.

His publications include Change and Continuity in House Elections (eds. with J. Cogan), Stanford University Press (2000), Revolving Gridlock, Westview Press (1998); "Congress in the Era of the Permanent Campaign," Brookings Review, forthcoming 2000; "The Roots of Careerism in the U.S. House of Representatives," Legislative Studies Quarterly, (1999); "The SNTV and the Politics of Electoral Systems in Korea," in Electoral Systems in Asia (University of Michigan Press (1999); "Out of Step, Out of Office: Legislative Voting Behavior and House Election Outcomes," in Change and Continuity in House Elections, Stanford University Press (1999).

Internet use in China has recently grown at a tremendous pace, and today there are more than 17 million users. In this talk, Harwit examines government control over the physical data pipelines and network content. He explores the management and revenue flows from the information highway, and political efforts to regulate the content that appears on Chinese computer screens. He also analyzes the post-WTO role foreign companies may have in the network's future development. He concludes that, though the telecommunications bureaucracy is keen to extract monetary profit from the Internet, political drive for control over content is muted by schizophrenic government policy, user self-censorship and, in the short run, user demographics. Eric Harwit is an Associate Professor of Asian Studies at the University of Hawaii, and a visiting scholar at Stanford's Asia / Pacific Research Center for the 2000-2001 academic year. A 1984 graduate of Cornell University, he received a diploma from the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing in 1990, and his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California at Berkeley in 1992. Professor Harwit is the author of China's Automobile Industry (M.E. Sharpe, 1995), and several other articles on industrial and economic development in Asia. He is currently writing a book about the politics of telecommunication in China, and has a Fulbright research grant to conduct a study of telecommunications in rural China in mid-2001.

Few will dispute that the essence of our times can be conveyed by two simple words: " Global" and "Change". Economies, technologies, information, media, culture, and indeed security issues have been vastly internationalized and transformed in the incredibly short period of the half century following World War II . The world is being consumed by the forces of change driven by the engines of technology and geoeconomics. Economic change and technological development, like wars or sports, are usually not beneficial to all. Progress only benefits those groups of nations that are able to take advantage of newer methods of science, just as they damage those that are less prepared technologically, culturally, and politically to respond to change. Only societies free of rigid doctrinal orthodoxy and possessing attributes such as the freedoms to inquire, dispute, and experiment; a belief in the possibilities of improvement; a concern for the practical rather than the abstract; and rationalism that defies mandarin codes, religious dogmas, and traditional folklore, are likely to prosper in the new millennium. In any case, we must look with caution into the future. History teaches us that the only thing we can be certain of is that we will be surprised; our vision may well turn out to be distorted and myopic, our best guesses will often be wrong and we are likely to be disappointed in our expectations. We can only be certain of continuing conflict on a technology-driven planet with concurrent dwindling resources and increasing population.

Since gaining its independence in 1965, the Republic of Singapore has attracted a level of scholarly and journalistic interest disproportionate to its tiny size. Singapore has defied categorization. Time and again it has seemed to swim against the tide of intellectual and ideological fashion. It practiced a market economy and free trade before these became the rage. It maintained one-party dominance long after pluralistic democracy became the global norm that it is today. Singapore's "uniquely anomalous status as the world's richest nondemocracy" (Larry Diamond) makes it a puzzling exception to the rule that economically advanced countries practice political pluralism. Most recently, financial and political turbulence elsewhere in East Asia have highlighted the extraordinary stability of the Singapore system. Has the ruling People's Action Party found the answer to successful governance in a global economy? Are the city-state's leaders forcibly postponing the inevitableÑperhaps even imminentÑonset of political liberalization? Or is there another way of resolving the "Singapore puzzle"? Chee Soon Juan joined the opposition Singapore Democratic Party in 1992. Three months later he was dismissed from his position as a lecturer at the National University of Singapore. His writings include To Be Free: Stories from Asia's Struggle against Oppression (1998) and Dare to Change: An Alternative Vision for Singapore (1994). Cherian George is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Communication at Stanford University. From 1990 to 1999 he worked as a journalist for Singapore's leading English-language newspaper, The Straits Times. He is a founding member of The Roundtable, a nonpartisan discussion group in Singapore.

In 1975Ð76 the fall of Saigon was followed by national reunification and the establishment of the Socialist Republic. Access to the Mekong Delta was widely expected to facilitate rapid neo-Stalinist industrialization and the appearance of a powerful military threat to capitalist SEA. But this did not happen. By 1981 partial reforms had permitted all state enterprises to operate in markets and some degree of agricultural decollectivisation. In the second half of the 1980s there was a clear de-Stalinization of everyday life. And by 1989Ð90 a recognizable market economy had emerged. Since then the Vietnamese Communist Party has, with some success, negotiated a major opening-up of the country to foreign contacts. Vietnam has joined ASEAN, and has seen the emergence of land, labor, and capital markets, and the confused processes by which classes form. Fundamental economic and political change has therefore occurred. Growth has been rather fast and the use of state violence minimal. Politically, for the still-Leninist VCP, the shift from Plan to Market has been a great success. What is the political economy basis for this? Despite emergent capitalist classes and a market economy, the political economy of "post-transition" Vietnam is heavily marked by its recent history, and remains very different from other ASEAN members. Notwithstanding revolutionary change, dualities common to both the traditional and modern political economies have offered great potential for political restructuring. In this sense "development doctrines" are perhaps less exotic and more indigenous than elsewhere in SEA. This facilitates relatively harmonious political adaptation and is the key to understanding change. For example, wide rural land access, with a collective tinge in the most densely populated areas, has a strong and pervasive effect upon the macro political economy. "Voice and exit" are enhanced. Thus we see rather high levels of migration, and risk bearing be farmers. Rural GDP has grown fast through the 1990s. Also, real wages in urban areas tend to be higher and the labor regime less brittle. What are the political implications of such a land regime? At the end of the day, one reason for the lack of extensive state violence against the population seems to be that the party/state has sufficient sources of support and power for tense economic issues in the rural areas to be fought out without property rights needing violence to enforce them. These issues are fought out locally (within cooperatives and communes) and in macro contexts (access to world markets). But in the rural areas the state does not, apparently, need to support particular economic interests for its survival. One reason for this is that the "land issue" has been addressed through the adaptation of socialist models, so that large-scale land property is not (yet?) a major issue. Dominant groups in the rural areas do not depend upon land access for their incomes. Adam Fforde is a development economist. He holds an Oxford MA (Engineering Science and Economics), a London MSc (Economics) and a Cambridge PhD (Economics). He studied Vietnamese in Hanoi during 1978/79 and was a visiting scholar at the National Economics University (Hanoi) in 1985Ð86. He lived in Vietnam from 1987 to 1992 while working as an advisor to the Swedish aid program, and in Australia from 1992 to 1999, where he was a visiting fellow at the ANU and Chairman of Aduki Pty Ltd (Consultants). He is now senior fellow at the SEA Studies Programme, National University of Singapore. He has published on topics including the economic development of north Vietnam prior to 1975, agricultural cooperatives, and the transition from plan to market. He is currently working on class formation and the emergence of factor markets in the 1990s, industrial reform since the early 1960s, and Vietnamese development doctrine.