Governance

FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling. 

FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world. 

FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.

Authors
Daniel C. Sneider
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Commentary
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As President Bush continues his tour of Asia, Pantech Fellow and San Jose Mercury News columnist Daniel Sneider observes in YaleGlobal that growing regional cooperation threatens U.S. preeminence in East Asia.

On the surface, President Bush's week-long swing through Northeast Asia has been a strong contrast with his recent stormy (and, some say, stumbling) excursion into Latin America.

There was little sign of overt anti-Americanism. And no Asian leader will openly oppose American leadership in the flamboyant manner of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. Even prickly China swallowed President Bush's barbs about lack of democratic freedom in China, quietly acknowledging the two powers' differences. In contrast to the meeting of leaders from the Americas, the annual summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Korea will embrace the principles of free trade.

Beneath the polite appearance, however, there is no less a challenge to American leadership in Asia. While Washington fiddled, a powerful momentum has been building up in Asia toward the formation of an East Asian Free Trade Area or, more ambitiously, an East Asian Community, modeled on the European community. Led by China, the East Asian grouping pointedly excludes the United States.

The APEC agenda focuses on an initiative to counter the spread of avian flu and to offer a common push at the WTO meeting in Hong Kong next month to revive the Doha Round of global trade talks. The Bush administration has its own agenda for the APEC meeting: to reposition itself as a leader of economic growth and integration in the region. For this, APEC has the virtue of being a more open organization than those behind the disappointment at the American summit. Its 21 members span the Pacific Rim, bringing together nations from Chile and Mexico to Russia, China and Southeast Asia. But this attention to APEC may be a case of too little, too late. The momentum to give the amorphous APEC an ongoing institutional role, beyond its annual summit meetings, has slowed in recent years. Its pledges for mutual tariff reduction exist almost entirely on paper.

Until this year, the Bush administration barely addressed regional economic issues at APEC. It preferred to use the meetings to promote a post-9/11 security agenda of anti-terrorism. U.S. trade policy has focused more on reaching free trade agreements with a few selected "friends" in that war, such as Singapore and Australia.

Meanwhile a Chinese-sponsored move to hold an East Asian summit offers the most visible expression of a trend of declining American influence in Asia. That meeting will take place in Malaysia in mid-December. The gathering groups the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Pointedly not invited is the United States.

This meeting is an outgrowth of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process - an annual dialogue of ASEAN with China, South Korea and Japan that began in December 1997 in the midst of the Asian financial crisis. The APT has grown into an elaborate mechanism for cooperation in a range of areas from finance and agriculture to information technology. This reflects an underlying economic reality - the growth of regional and bilateral trade agreements and the rapid rise of intra-Asian trade.

Until fairly recently, foreign trade in East Asia was dominated by trans-Pacific trade with the United States. But the share of Asian exports headed to the U.S. has dropped dramatically, while those destined for other Asian nations has risen. In the two decades from 1981 to 2001, according to economist Edward Lincoln, the share of intra-regional exports has risen from 32 percent to 40 percent, and intra-regional imports from 32 percent to 50 percent.

Much of the growth of regional integration is being driven by China, which is generating enormous demand for imports of raw materials as well as for semi-finished goods that are assembled for export. China has not been hesitant to use this role to expand its influence in the region. It has embraced the APT as a road towards creation of an East Asian community. At the ASEAN summit last year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao declared that such a community was a "long-term strategic choice in the interests of China's development." China has also outmatched the U.S. in negotiating free trade agreements, both bilateral and regional. The most impressive is an FTA deal between China and ASEAN set to take effect in 2010. Beijing even dreams of an Asian currency, based on the Chinese yuan, to rival the dollar and the euro.

China is not the first nation to try for such East Asian economic unity. Back in the days when Japan was riding high as an economic superpower, it too talked of leading an East Asian bloc, based on a yen currency zone. As late as 1997, in response to the Asian financial crisis, Japan proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund, a kind of alternate regional financial system. More recently, both South Korea and Japan offered their own visions of an East Asian community in 2001. And both countries tried to match China in the APT by offering to form free trade agreements with ASEAN.

Japan, however, was never as successful as China is likely to be. "It would seem that Japan is a natural counterweight to China, but Tokyo is generally perceived as reactive and incapable of outflanking Beijing," Brad Glosserman, director of research at the Pacific Forum of CSIS, wrote recently. "Its economic dynamism is no match for that of China."

The United States has never been friendly toward efforts to create an East Asian economic bloc, viewing them as chipping away at the global trading system and rivaling American leadership. But Asia is arguably only following in American footsteps -- witness the NAFTA deal with Canada and Mexico and the more recent trade pact with Central America.

Many American policymakers believe these developments are partly a product of the failure of the Bush administration to articulate - much less pursue - a strategy to engage East Asia.

"The United States has greater strategic interests in Asia now than it did in Europe before World War I or World War II,'' argued a recent report of the Grand Strategic Choices Working Group, co-chaired by John Hopkin's University's Francis Fukuyama and Princeton's G. John Ikenberry. "Thus," the report continued, "it is unfortunate that part of the problem, in East Asia in particular, is that America's relative lack of interest in tending to the region has caused some allies of the U.S. to doubt our resolve and question the value of resisting unfavorable developments alone."

The report echoes other policymakers in suggesting the U.S. form its own East Asian economic zone with Japan, South Korea and Australia."That's a non-starter,'' says Professor Vinod Aggarwal, director of Berkeley's APEC study center. "Nobody wants to be cut out of the China market."

Privately, Bush administration officials downplay the importance of the East Asian summit in December, pointing to the lack of any concrete agenda. The addition of India, Australia and New Zealand to the invitation list, along with Japan, should effectively counter any Chinese initiative, they believe.

But those countries also fear being left out of whatever may emerge from this process. They cannot afford to be left on the outside, looking in.

Ultimately, neither can the United States. The President's trip is a belated recognition of that fact. But to be more than a momentary gesture, the United States must give East Asia the consistent attention it deserves.

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Paul Stockton is the associate provost at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and is director of its Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Stockton is the editor of Homeland Security (forthcoming from Oxford University Press in 2005). His research has appeared in Political Science Quarterly, International Security and Strategic Survey. He is co-editor of Reconstituting America's Defense: America's New National Security Strategy (1992). Stockton has also published an Adelphi Paper and has contributed chapters to a number of books, including James Lindsay and Randall Ripley, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War (1997). Stockton received a BA summa cum laude from Dartmouth College in 1976 and a PhD in government from Harvard University in 1986. He served from 1986-1989 as legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Stockton was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship for 1989-1990 by CISAC. In August 1990, he joined the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School. From 1995 until 2000, he served as director of the NPS Center for Civil-Military Relations. From 2000-2001, he founded and served as the acting dean of the NPS School of International Graduate Studies. He was appointed associate provost in 2001.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Paul Stockton Associate Provost, Director, Center for Homeland Security Speaker Naval Postgraduate School
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In Thailand in 1997 reformers drafted a new constitution. They hoped to trigger dramatic improvements in the country's political system. Analysts, activists, and politicians alike blamed many of Thailand's problems on shortcomings of a party system seen as dangerously weak and fragmented. Accordingly, the new charter was designed to strengthen political parties while reducing their number. These constitutional changes profoundly affected Thai politics, but not always in the ways or for the reasons that reformers had in mind. Have the changes improved or worsened the quality of democracy in Thailand? In addressing this question, Professor Hicken will highlight the unintended consequences of constitutional reform and the nature of governance under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party.

Allen Hicken studies political institutions and policy making in developing countries, especially in Southeast Asia. Countries he has worked in include Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Cambodia. Writing-in-progress includes a book manuscript, "Building Party Systems: Elections, Parties, and Coordination in Developing Democracies." He has published in the American Journal of Political Science and Electorial Studies, among other places. At Michigan he is affiliated with the university's Center for Southeast Asian Studies and Center for Political Studies. He earned his Ph.D in political science and Pacific studies from the University of California - San Diego.

Daniel I. Okimoto Conference Room

Allen Hicken Assistant Professor of Political Science Speaker University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
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From August 2003 to May 2004, the Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office, under the leadership of Ahn Dai-Hee, then-chief of its Central Investigation Department, conducted a major investigation of the use of illegal funds in the 2002 presidential election.

This criminal investigation, Korea's largest, targeted illegal activities of leaders of the major political parties and major Korean conglomerates, which had funneled illegal funds to the political parties.

The independent and strictly evidence-based investigation resulted in the arrests and indictments of numerous political and business leaders, and revealed serious corruption in Korean politics and business (also referred to as "government-business collusion").

Mr Ahn's talk will include personal reflections on the investigation and discussion of its impact on political reforms in Korea, including how the investigation helped to significantly reduce corruption in Korea.

Ahn Dai- Hee is Chief Prosecutor of the Seoul High Prosecutors' office. He began his legal career as Army Judge Advocate after passing the national bar examination in 1975 and while still a student at Seoul National University. A prosecutor throughout his career, Mr Ahn's straightforward leadership of the Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office's investigation into illegal funds in the 2002 presidential election earned him national recognition. Mr Ahn's publications include Criminal Tax Law published by Bobmunsa in 2003.

Philippines Conference Room

Ahn Dai-Hee Chief Prosecutor Speaker Seoul Supreme Prosecutors' office
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The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University offers a three-course certificate program in International Security for professionals at national labs, international corporations, non-governmental organizations, members of the military and government, and others seeking a background in international treaties and global policy-making as context for their work.

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James S. Fishkin holds the Janet M. Peck Chair in International Communication at Stanford University where he is Professor of Communication and Professor of Political Science. He is also Director of Stanford's new Center for Deliberative Democracy.

Fishkin received his B.A. from Yale in 1970 and holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale as well as a second Ph.D. in Philosophy from Cambridge.

He is the author of a number of books including Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (1991), The Dialogue of Justice (1992 ), The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (1995). With Bruce Ackerman he is co-author most recently of Deliberation Day (Yale Press, 2004). He is best known for developing Deliberative Polling-a practice of public consultation that employs random samples of the citizenry to explore how opinions would change if they were more informed. Professor Fishkin and his collaborators have conducted Deliberative Polls in the US, Britain, Australia, Denmark, Bulgaria, China and other countries.

Fishkin has been a Visiting Fellow Commoner at Trinity College, Cambridge as well as a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, a Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington and a Guggenheim Fellow.

Encina Basement Conference Room

James Fishkin Janet M. Peck Chair in International Communication; Director, Center for Deliberative Democracy; Professor of Communication Speaker Stanford University
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How do you stop a terrorist?

You can work hard: Post men and equipment at every street corner, every port, every bay, every slip of beach, every straight stretch of asphalt long enough to land a plane.

You will spend billions, and your lines will be thin. All you've done is build the "impregnable" Atlantic Sea Wall--which the Allies punched through in hours on D-Day.

You've got to work smarter, not harder.

The opening line of the Oscar-winning movie A Beautiful Mind is "Mathematicians won the war." During World War II, the mathematics underlying cryptography played an important role in military planning.

Thereafter came a new kind of war. After the first frosts descended in the Soviet East, perhaps $2 billion were spent in the development of Game Theory.

Now again we face a new kind of war. And we need a new kind of mathematics to fight it.

Since 2001, tremendous amounts of information have been gathered regarding terrorist cells and individuals potentially planning future attacks. There is now a pressing need to develop new mathematical and computational techniques to assist in the analysis of this information, both to quantify future threats and to quantify the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations and strategies. Concepts and techniques from mathematics--specifically, from Lattice Theory and Reflexive Theory--have already been applied to counterterrorism and homeland security problems. The following is a partial list of such problems.

1. Strategies for disrupting terrorist cells

2. Data analysis of terrorist activity

3. Border penetration and security

4. Terrorist cell formation

Jonathan Farley is a CISAC science fellow and a professor in the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science at the University of the West Indies, Jamaica. His work focuses on applying lattice theory and other branches of mathematics to problems in counterterrorism and homeland security.

In 2001-2002 he was one of four Americans to win a Fulbright Distinguished Scholar Award to the United Kingdom. In the calendar years 2003 and 2004 he taught as a professor in the Department of Applied Mathematics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 2004 he received the Harvard Foundation's Distinguished Scientist of the Year Award, a medal presented on behalf of the president of Harvard University for "outstanding achievements and contributions in the field of mathematics." The City of Cambridge, Mass., declared March 19, 2004, to be "Dr. Jonathan David Farley Day."

He obtained his doctorate in mathematics from Oxford University in 1995, after winning Oxford's highest mathematics awards, the Senior Mathematical Prize and Johnson University Prize, in 1994. He graduated summa cum laude from Harvard University in 1991 with the second highest average in his graduating class.

Farley's work includes the solution of a problem posed by universal algebraist George Gratzer that remained unsolved for 34 years, and the solution (published in 2005) of a problem posed in 1981 by MIT mathematics professor Richard Stanley.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Jonathan Farley Speaker
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Barbara Olshansky is Director Counsel of the Global Justice Initiative and Deputy Legal Director of the Center for Constitutional Rights. Barbara's current docket at the Center for Constitutional Rights includes class action lawsuits concerning international human rights; immigrants' rights; race discrimination in employment, education, the environment, and public health; and prisoners' rights. Barbara recently co-authored two books: the most recent, entitled America's Disappeared, discusses the plight of America's "war on terror" detainees; and the second, entitled Against War With Iraq, analyzes the international law ramifications of the U.S. decision to pursue a military campaign in Iraq.

Barbara has also written two other books: Democracy Detained, discussing America's secret practices used in the "war on terror," and Secret Trials and Executions, assessing the military commissions scheduled for Guantánamo detainees. Stanford Law School recently named her 2005 Public Interest Lawyer of the Year.

Stanford Law School, Room 190

Barbara Olshansky Director Counsel of the Global Justice Initiative and Deputy Legal Director of the Center for Constitutional Rights. Speaker
Lectures
Authors
George Krompacky
News Type
News
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On October 18, 2005, SPRIE presented the next seminar in its 2005-2006 series on "Greater China and the Globalization of R&D" with speaker Dr. Doug Fuller, current SPRIE Fellow. Dr. Fuller, speaking on "From California Dreaming to Silicon Success: The Rise of China's Semiconductor Industry," presented both industry-wide data and case studies of individual firms to explain how the politics of finance in China shape which Chinese chip firms become fast learners able to compete in world markets and which ones remain technological laggards.

Over the last several decades, there has been a strenuous debate about policies for economic development between the Washington Consensus promoted by the major international financial institutions and the revisionist political economists . Followers of the former view advocate free and unfettered markets buttressed by institutions to protect property rights. The revisionists argue that development involves social and political processes not adequately captured by the narrow prescriptive focus of the Washington Consensus.

In confronting globalization, there is also a new split among the revisionists themselves. Whereas the Washington Consensus welcomes globalization as a boon to developing countries through expanding the scope of market forces, the revisionists divide over the prospects for developing countries under globalization. The optimists, such as Ernst and Saxenian, see transnational networks as providing opportunities for developing countries to continue to learn the skills and competencies necessary to further their progress. The pessimists of the revisionist camp, such as Stiglitz and Strange, see globalization eroding the capabilities of the state or state-societal alliances necessary for development.

Using the case of technological upgrading (one aspect of economic development) in China's information technology (IT) industry, I demonstrate that opportunities for development exist under globalization. These paths to development are not simply the result of picking the right international networks to join nor are they due to the continued efficacy of state action. They also do not arise from well-developed market institutions within China. China's development success in spite of low levels of state industrial policymaking capacity and very incomplete market institutions tells us that other developing countries similarly unequipped can develop even in this globalized world.

In China's IT industry, two local institutional variables, firm operational strategies and state-firm relations, have interacted with the technology flows present in global networks to create opportunities for certain types of firms to upgrade. A firm's operational strategy (OS) determines its motivation to upgrade in China as opposed to doing so elsewhere. The relationship of firms to the state determines their sources of finance i.e. whether or not they can access functioning financial institutions.

The relationship of firms to the state determines their sources of finance and these sources of finance in turn impact their ability to upgrade. Sources of finance that provide credit with hard budget constraints give firms incentives to upgrade. Firms have hard budget constraints when they do not receive free help in covering their own financial obligations. With hard budget constraints forcing firms to meet their financial obligations, firms have to remain competitive to survive. For technology firms, a critical part of their competitiveness is their technology so they have every incentive to improve their technologies to keep pace with competitors. Finance that provides credit with soft budget constraints deprives firms of the incentives and even the capabilities to upgrade. Firms have soft budget constraints when they do not have to pay for some or all of their financial obligations themselves. These firms can rationally expect to survive even if not competitive because others are willing to bail them out. A third possibility is no source of finance. Firms without financing will not be able to invest in technological development.

 

There are four types of firms in China: the favored domestic firms, the neglected domestic firms, the hybrid foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and the regular FIEs. Financing and motivation have varied across firm categories. Due to different state-firm relations, FIEs rely on foreign finance and domestic firms do not. Hybrid FIEs differ from regular FIEs because the hybrids have a China-based operational strategy. This operational strategy (OS) is a mix of interests and ideational factors that causes these firms to perceive China either as the vital center of their operations (the China-based OS) or as just another location among many (the non-China-based OS). Thus, variation in firm-state relations (finance) and operational strategy (motivation) determine the variation in technological upgrading.

This thesis finds that the two types of FIEs are more likely to contribute to upgrading in China than the two types of domestic firms. Among the FIEs, the hybrid FIEs are more likely to contribute than the regular FIEs though the discrepancy is not as large as it is between the FIEs and domestic firms.

The hybrids are the most successful upgraders because they have both disciplined finance (i.e. credit with relatively hard budget constraints) from foreign financial institutions and the motivation to upgrade in China due to their China-based OS. The unsuccessful domestic upgraders lack finance (neglected domestic firms) or financial discipline (the favored domestic firms) due to their particular relationships to the state. The regular FIEs have the capabilities to upgrade due to their financial discipline and access to transnational technology networks, but undertake less upgrading in China than the hybrids because they lack the China-based operational strategy.

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Lt. Gen. Bruce A. Wright is Commander, U.S. Forces Japan, and Commander, 5th Air Force, Yokota Air Base, Japan. In these two command positions he is the senior U.S. military representative in Japan and commander of U.S. Air Force units in Japan respectively.

The general received his commission upon graduation from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1973 and served as an instructor pilot early in his career. He has held command at all levels -- fighter squadron, group, wing and major command. Prior to assuming his current position, he was Vice Commander, Air Combat Command, with headquarters at Langley Air Force Base, Va., and Air Component Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Northern Command. A command pilot, General Wright has more than 3,200 flying hours, principally in fighter aircraft, including 65 F-16 combat missions flown during operations Desert Storm, Provide Comfort and Deny Flight.

Philippines Conference Room

Lieutenant General Bruce A. Wright Commander, U.S. Forces in Japan Speaker
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