A major bill with bipartisan support in Congress would reward farmers for an unusual harvest. The Growing Climate Solutions Act(link is external) promises billions of dollars for climate-smart agriculture practices, such as planting cover crops to reduce erosion and sequester carbon. The bill highlights farming’s potential as a climate change solution, as well as the challenge of controlling the sector’s growing greenhouse gas emissions. Below, Stanford Earth scientists Inês Azevedo, David Lobell and Rob Jackson discuss the surprising amount of greenhouse gases emitted by farming, how farmland conservation programs can help reverse the trend and what the federal government can do to promote more climate-friendly agriculture, among other issues.

Azevedo is an associate professor in the Department of Energy Resources Engineering at Stanford’s School of Earth, Energy & Environmental Sciences (Stanford Earth). Her research examines the role of food systems in reaching de-carbonized economies. Lobell is the Gloria and Richard Kushel Director of the Center on Food Security and the Environment. He uses unique datasets to study rural areas; his research has shown how reduced soil tillage can increase yields while nurturing healthier soils and lowering production costs. Jackson is the Michelle and Kevin Douglas Provostial Professor of Energy and Environment in Stanford Earth. His work has shown that global emissions of nitrous oxide increased by 30 percent over the past four decades due mostly to large-scale farming with synthetic fertilizers and cattle ranching, and that well-managed soil’s ability to trap carbon dioxide is potentially much greater than previously estimated.

What might the average person be surprised to learn about greenhouse gas emissions from America’s agricultural lands?

Lobell: First, I think people are surprised that the food system actually uses a very small share of fossil fuels, even when you include all the fertilizer production. Second, people are surprised by how many things they think are good, like eating organic or local foods, have very little effect on emissions and can even be worse than conventional alternatives.

Jackson: Many people are aware that fossil fuel use drives most carbon dioxide emissions, but they might not know that more than half of methane and nitrous oxide emissions attributable to human activities come from agriculture.

Azevedo: I think the average person would be surprised to learn agriculture – including livestock, agricultural soils and agricultural production – accounts for about 10 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and, in contrast to some other sectors of the economy, they have increased over time.

Does the Growing Climate Solutions Act go far enough to mitigate and reduce emissions? How could it be stronger?

Lobell: I worry that there isn’t enough emphasis on the main greenhouse gases that agriculture contributes to – nitrous oxide and methane – where progress could probably be made a lot faster than for carbon dioxide. Soil carbon is like motherhood and apple pie – nobody is against it – but I wish that half the energy I see going into how to get more carbon into soil was going into how to reduce emissions of the other gases.

How can programs that reward farmers for certain conservation practices help? 

Jackson: The world’s soils contain far more carbon than the atmosphere, but agricultural activities such as plowing have released two hundred billion tons of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere from soils. Conservation programs can help us put some of that carbon back where it belongs, making our soils more fertile and better at retaining water.

Lobell: On one level, these programs can help start the process of making agriculture carbon neutral or even carbon negative. This is important if we want to meet aggressive climate goals. On another level, they can help build a broader political coalition devoted to solving climate change. This might be even more important for climate goals, especially given the disproportionate role of rural states in our federal government.

How should such programs be designed for maximum efficiency and cost-effectiveness?

Lobell: I’m concerned there is a lot of hype out there now on what specific practices can deliver, for example by companies trying to raise large funding rounds on the idea of selling carbon credits. I think it’s important that the programs have a strong system of verification and ability to adjust over time as we learn about what is truly effective.

Jackson: Rather than focusing primarily on carbon dioxide, agricultural incentives would be well served to reduce emissions of methane and nitrous oxide through practices such as better fertilizer and manure management. Methane’s warming potential is 30 times higher than carbon dioxide’s over a century, and nitrous oxide’s warming potential is nearly 300 times higher. Reducing them is a great bang for our climate buck.

From a global perspective, how important is agriculture’s role as a potential climate change solution, and how can policymakers better quantify and track it?

Azevedo: One of the recent things our recent research has shown is that although reducing emissions from fossil fuels is essential for meeting the Paris Agreement goals, other sources of emissions may also preclude its attainment. Specifically, even if all fossil fuel emissions were immediately halted, the achievement of the agreement’s 1.5 degree Celsius maximum temperature increase target would likely not be feasible if global food systems continue along their current trends.

Lobell: I think accelerating public research in this area will be critical, particularly for ways to accurately measure carbon accumulation or emissions reductions on individual farms. If this had been a well-funded area, we might be in a much better position in terms of leveraging all of the private sector enthusiasm for it. Since food is a traded commodity, it will also be important to monitor global land-use change and the extent to which our domestic policies might be having unintended consequences elsewhere.

Editor’s note: In late September, the National Interest organized a symposium on nuclear policy, nonproliferation, and arms control under the Biden administration. A variety of scholars were asked the following question: “Should Joe Biden seize the opportunity of his administration’s Nuclear Posture Review to redefine the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security planning? How should U.S. policy change to address the proliferation threats that the United States is facing?” The following article is one of their responses:

President Joe Biden should use the opportunity of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the United States’ security policy and support a forward-looking arms control approach while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. He will have to make his views known if he wants the process to produce bold options for his consideration.

First, the NPR is the ideal place to consider the planned strategic modernization program. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the program’s cost over the next ten years at $634 billion.  Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent requires that certain programs proceed, including command and control updates, the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, the B-21 bomber, and the B61-12 bomb. However, some programs should be reconsidered. For example, while the United States should maintain a triad that includes an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) leg, the NPR should assess whether it is necessary to deploy four hundred ICBMs. It should also take an unbiased look at whether some portion of the Minuteman III force could be life-extended, allowing the Defense Department to push out to the future the question of building an expensive new ICBM. 

Pursuing all of these strategic programs would entail significant opportunity costs as less money would be available for conventional forces such as Virginia-class attack submarines, conventionally-armed missiles, and fighter aircraft. That matters. The most likely path to a nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia or the United States and China is a conventional conflict that escalates into a nuclear conflict. American conventional military power that can deter conventional conflict with peer competitors in the first place will also greatly reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict.  

Second, the NPR will provide the basis for Washington’s approach in possible negotiations with Russia regarding further reductions and limitations on nuclear arms. American officials have said that the Biden administration would seek a limit covering all American and Russian nuclear arms. The NPR should set a level for American negotiators. How about 2,500 total nuclear warheads, with a sub-limit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads? That would require significant cuts by the United States and Russia but would still leave both with many more nuclear weapons than any other country. Such a reduction would position Washington and Moscow to effectively press China to moderate its nuclear plans. 

Moscow will likely not agree to any nuclear reduction, let alone a limit of 2,500, unless Washington addresses issues such as missile defense. With this in mind, decisions in the NPR should account for decisions regarding other non-nuclear weapon programs, and vice versa. 

Third, Biden has endorsed moving to a declaratory policy in which the sole purpose of the United States’ nuclear weapons would be to deter a nuclear attack on the United States or an ally or partner and, if necessary, retaliate for such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow now appear to believe the other is lowering the threshold for nuclear use. That should leave no one comfortable. Adopting a sole-purpose policy would signal a different approach from the United States. 

Critics of a sole-purpose policy argue that the ambiguity in America’s current declaratory policy means that the implicit threat of the first use of nuclear weapons can help deter a conventional attack. That is a serious point, but it is almost impossible to conceive of circumstances in which an American president would authorize first use, particularly against a nuclear-armed adversary that could strike back with its own nuclear arms. Moreover, given the effort that China and Russia are devoting to developing their conventional forces, Beijing and Moscow certainly seem to believe in the possibility of great power conventional conflict, regardless of the United States’ nuclear deterrent. 

The adoption of a sole-purpose policy will require consultation with allies who depend on the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent. Those consultations may prove difficult, but there are offsets (for example, American boots on the ground) that could replace a dubious threat of first use. 

Right-sizing the United States’ nuclear forces (in part to free up funds for conventional forces), shaping a proposal for significant reductions with Russia, and adopting a sole purpose policy offer outcomes that a forward-looking NPR could advance. The review should offer these as options for the president’s consideration. He can then decide how bold he wishes to be. 

Steven Pifer is a William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Originally for The National Interest