"In terms of geo-politics, the most difficult and most challenging part of the world in this era, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, is the broader Middle East," said Zalmay Khalilzad, in a 2010 Payne Distinguished Lecture, "The Struggle for the Broader Middle East: Where We Are and Where We Need to Go." A native of Afghanistan, Khalilzad served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and as a senior White House, Defense, and State Department Advisor.

Tracing the dynamic interplay of national, regional, and international forces, he set out five major issues likely to shape the future of the region:

1. The challenge of militant Islam, resulting from an ongoing crisis of civilization within a once powerful, innovative, and dynamic Islamic world.
2. Regional disputes, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border dispute, and ongoing Indian-Pakistani disputes.  Terming the Arab-Israeli conflict an important shaping factor, Khalilzad said that circumstances were not ready for a settlement.  "Israel wants a process without an outcome and the Palestinians want an outcome without a process," he said.
3. Rivalry for regional hegemony, including the rivalry between Shia and Sunni Islam and Iran's quest to obtain a nuclear weapon.  In the struggle over Iran's nuclear program, he said, is the potential for a wider regional conflict. Israel could attack Iran's facilities, destabilizing the region, and over the long term, a nuclear Iran would threaten Israel and provoke both state and sub-state proliferation.
4. Broader political and economic development and democratization efforts. The region's population is growing rapidly, but the educational system prepares the young poorly for the modern world and job prospects are limited, creating discontent and the danger of internal instability.
5. Extra regional factors, including U.S. policy. Setting a July 2011 timeline to withdraw troops from Afghanistan has had unintended consequences, he said, including increased corruption, as people seek to maximize access to resources now. In Iraq, institution building has been effective, the resource base is there for a power-sharing formula, and Iraq can do quite well. The pledge of U.S. troop withdrawals this summer, however, has led Iraqis to think "we are on our way out" and led them to look to regional actors for support, adding to polarization.

The region remains vitally important, he concluded, given the challenges emanating from it.  "A civilization crisis takes a long time to work itself out," he said, "and although the world is affected by it, we can influence it to a degree, but we have to do so without undermining the more moderate and secular forces for the good."

Thirteen fellows, including three first-time Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows, will be in residence at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) during the 2010-2011 academic year.

Fellows and their research topics include:

• Alexander Betts, a post-doc from Oxford University. "Global Migration Governance: Multiple and Contested Institutions."
• Edward Blandford, a post-doc from the University of California at Berkeley. "Scaling of Hierarchical Engineered Systems."
• David Blum, a Stanford pre-doctoral candidate. "Probabilistic Early Warning Systems for National Security Crises."
• John Downer, a post-doc from the London School of Economics. "Administering Aircraft: The Security Implications of Technological Ecosystems." Zukerman Fellow.
• Matthias Englert, post-doc, CISAC. "Managing the Proliferations Risks of Gas Centrifuges-Analysis in View of Possible Solutions."
• Katherine D. Marvel, post-doc, CISAC. "Understanding the Regional Consequences of Global Climate Change" and "Game Changers for Nuclear Energy."
• Aila Matanock, a Stanford pre-doctoral candidate. "Reformed or Reconfigured? Explaining why Militant Groups Participate in Elections."
• Brenna M. Powell, pre-doc from Harvard. "Normalizing Security after Conflict: Jobs for the Boys and Justice for the Hoods."
• Jan M. Stupl, post-doc, CISAC. "Controlling the Spread of Ballistic Missiles."
• Michael Sulmeyer, D.Phil candidate, Oxford University; law student, Stanford Law School; teaching assistant for CISAC Honors Program. "Weapons under Fire: Terminating Major Weapons Contracts for the U.S. Military."

Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows and their research areas include:

• Anne Harrington de Santana, a post-doc from the University of Chicago. "The Fetishism of Force: Nuclear Weapons as a Currency of Power."
• Gaurav Kampani, a Cornell pre-doctoral candidate. "The Weaponization Paradox: Why some Emerging Nuclear Weapons Powers Delay Building Operational Forces."
• Riqiang Wu, a pre-doc from Tsinghua University in China. "How to Establish and Maintain an Asymmetric Deterrence: China-U.S. Strategic Relations."

The United States belongs to various organizations and networks that encompass countries on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. The East Asia Summit (EAS) is not among them. Should the US try to join? This working paper by Donald K. Emmerson answers that question with a qualified yes: Despite formidable difficulties affecting President Obama's schedule of foreign travel, his administration should try to "ease" the US into the Summit, initially as a guest of the host country.

How does a corrupt government stop corruption? What if that government is democratic, and must cultivate the support of political parties that are themselves corrupt? Is fostering reform in such a political economy the equivalent of trying to make snow in hell?

These questions may be overstated, but the dilemmas they convey are all too real. Witness the storm of concern triggered by the recent resignation of the highest-profile reformist in Indonesia, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, from her linchpin job as minister of finance in a country that was ranked the most corrupt and the most democratic in Southeast Asia in 2009.

Sri Mulyani waged unremitting war on graft. Under her stewardship of the finance ministry, more than 150 of its personnel were dishonorably discharged. Nearly 2,000 more were otherwise punished for infractions. She led a vigorous campaign against tax cheats. Among them were rich and influential people who had grown accustomed to absconding with funds they owed the government.

Euromoney named her ‘finance minister of the year’ in 2006—a post she had only taken up the year before. In 2008 and again in 2009 Forbes magazine admiringly listed her among ‘the 100 most powerful women in the world.’ Correspondingly, on the heels of her resignation on 5 May 2010, Indonesian stocks and rupiahs fell.

Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was directly elected to that office in 2004 and, for a second five-year term, in 2009. As president he has opposed corruption and championed reform. Fatefully, however, in 2004 he chose a wealthy businessman, Aburizal Bakrie, to join his government as coordinating minister for the economy.

In 2006 in East Java, a Bakrie-controlled company using an unprotected drill while probing for gas may have triggered a mud volcano that would swallow more than a dozen villages and render more than 15,000 people homeless. In 2010 the volcano continued to spew an estimated 100,000 tons of mud daily onto the surface. Bakrie’s reputation for probity was not enhanced when, reportedly against Mulyani’s advice, he insisted on denying responsibility for the disaster. Instead he blamed an undersea earthquake that had struck off the south coast of Java, some 250 kilometers away, two days before the mud erupted. Opinions remain divided as to what caused what.

An unambiguously man-made crisis in 2008, the global financial meltdown, shrank the Jakarta stock market, Bakrie’s holdings included. Trading on the exchange was temporarily suspended. Bakrie urged his fellow cabinet member Mulyani to extend the suspension. She refused. He was furious. Her relations with him worsened further when she slapped travel bans on certain Bakrie company executives accused of tax evasion.

In 2009 Bakrie became chair of the Golkar Party. Toward the end of that year he led a fierce campaign in the Indonesian legislature against both Mulyani and another nonpartisan technocrat, Indonesian vice-president Boediono, for malfeasance related to the government’s decision in 2008 to rescue an ailing financial institution, Bank Century. The bailout may have prevented a spiral of withdrawals, and thus helped Indonesia weather the global crisis, but the effort cost far more than expected, and some of the infusions apparently benefited key depositors more than the bank itself.

Legitimate financial questions were soon superseded, however, by a thoroughly political effort on the part of politicians and their supporters opposed to Mulyani and her reforms to oust not only her but the vice-president as well. Mulyani’s and Boediono’s opponents included, in addition to Bakrie, others whose circumstancial links to corruption she had uncovered.

An anti-Mulyani case in point is the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS). Despite priding itself on upholding Islamic ethics and opposing corruption, the PKS rejected allegations that one of its legislators, Muhammad Misbakhun, could have been implicated in a fictitious Bank Century letter of credit for US $22.5 million. When, at the end of April 2010, Misbakhun was arrested and detained on a warrant signed by the national police official in charge of economic and tax crimes, PKS leaders accused the police of having an ulterior motive. The party had by then, in effect, joined the anti-Mulyani chorus.

Subjected to intense and prolonged criticism by these politicians in the glare of the media, Mulyani had ample reason to quit the spotlight, resign, and leave Indonesia. (On 1 June 2010 she will become a managing director of the World Bank in Washington DC.) But her long record of nonpartisan tenacity in the struggle against corruption makes it hard to believe that she simply lost her will to fight. For the time being it is impossible to rule out that she was sacrificed for the sake of a restoration of political comity between SBY and his opponents.

The irony is that Golkar and the PKS had joined with SBY’s Democrat Party to form a ruling coalition, to which they continue to belong. SBY had built that coalition with the expectation that its members, having joined the government, would support it, including its campaign against corruption.

That inclusive or ‘rainbow’ strategy was a triple failure. First, cabinet posts that might have been held by competent and ethical nonpartisans motivated by a desire for public service were allocated instead to partisans whose skills and motives, shall we say, varied. Governance suffered. Second, coalition-party leaders who were given ministerial posts in return for ensuring broad legislative backing for the government in the legislature either would not or could not deliver that support. Cooptation failed. Third, some ruling-team politicians, who might have at least stood back from the fray, instead jumped in, seemingly hoping to blunt the government’s efforts to diminish corruption and improve governance while protecting themselves and furthering their own careers. Discipline frayed.

Mulyani has resigned. Has Bakrie won?

In a recent conversation, an off-the-record analyst anticipated ‘more stability, which, in Indonesia, correlates inversely with reform.’ He could be wrong. But it may not be coincidental that on 6 May 2010, one day after Mulyani announced her resignation, SBY met with ruling-coalition leaders. Or that the meeting launched a Coalition Parties Forum whose daily activities will be led by none other than the chair of the Golkar Party, Aburizal Bakrie. Or that Bakrie reported that SBY had agreed that the Forum would not try to bind the coalition to a common position. Or that, again according to Bakrie, whereas previously the coalition parties were only asked to help safeguard the government’s policies, henceforth they would be asked to help determine them as well. Much will depend on Mulyani’s replacement as minister of finance, and on whether he or she is told to stop rocking the boat.

If Mulyani’s remarkable legacy is indeed erased, illiberal circles in Singapore may think, ‘We thought so. Democracy does thwart reform.’ But my own judgment in hindsight will be less sweeping.

Indonesia’s Democrat Party is still basically an extension of the appealing personality of SBY. Over the six years since he was first elected president, more time, energy, and resources could have been invested in deepening the roots and popularity of the party itself. Had those assets been so spent, the Democrats might have been able, in the legislative elections of 2009, to enlarge their contingent of lawmakers enough to be able to rule, not by the dubious grace of Sri Mulyani’s antagonists, but in SBY’s and his party’s own right—subject to democracy’s checks and balances, yes, but freed of the need to cobble together a coalitional rainbow of colors that clash.

Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Forum at Stanford University and is also the editor of Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia. (Stanford/ISEAS, 2008/9)

A heartening number of analysts helpfully commented on an earlier draft of this essay.  While protecting their privacy by not naming them, I am grateful to them.  Complementing my focus here on the politics of Sri Mulyani’s exit is the economic context ably reviewed by Arianto A. Patunru and Christian von Luebke in their ‘Survey of Recent Developments’ in the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 46: 1 (2010, 7-31.)

As part of the Forum on Contemporary Europe's program on History, Memory, and Reconciliation, José Zalaquett, a Chilean lawyer and legal scholar known for his work defending human rights in Chile during the regime of General Pinochet, delivered a lecture and discussion on "Post-Conflict International Human Rights: Bright Spots, Shadows, Dilemmas" on April 22, 2010.

The Stanford Daily - April 23, 2010

By Caity Monroe

“The important thing is not to let your heart grow cold while keeping your head cool.”

It was with this assertion that Helen Stacy, a senior lecturer in law, introduced José Zalaquett, Chilean lawyer, legal scholar and human rights defender, at his lecture on Thursday evening.

The quote, spoken by Zalaquett in a previous interview, was an apt way to acquaint the audience with a man who, despite being exiled for 10 years and having encountered thousands of stories of oppression and mass atrocity, demonstrated a mastery of balancing idealism and realism — all while maintaining an evident sense of morality and empathy.
“I do believe that law and ethics correlate a lot,” he said. “They are in my view like overlapping circles…and that area of overlap may be more or less considerable.”
Most of Zalaquett’s lecture focused on transitional justice and the various options for repairing and reconstructing a nation in the aftermath of mass atrocity. Zalaquett is renowned for his work defending human rights in his home country during General Augusto Pinochet’s oppressive regime. Having served on Chile’s National Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Zalaquett has first-hand experience with the importance of acknowledging atrocities and revealing the truth — however grim it may be.

“The idea that these atrocities may be left in the dark is repugnant to basic moral principles,” he said.

Stanford history Prof. James Campbell and political science Prof. Terry Karl provided commentary on Zalaquett’s lecture. Both sided with him on the importance of truth and recognition post-atrocity. However, all three also agreed that there are certain restrictions on truth’s ability to prevail and on the capacity of post-conflict societies to both uncover and subsequently handle such knowledge.

“One of the things that alarms me is that the more normal truth commissions become and the more normal some qualified amnesty provisions become…the more difficult it becomes to bring persecution to perpetrators of mass atrocity,” Campbell said, highlighting, as all three speakers did at some point during the event, one of the commonly-cited problems of such situations.

Dealing with complex issues of ethnic cleansing, mass atrocity and genocide is difficult and it appears that the general consensus on the matter is that there is no ideal solution.
Zalaquett depicted the transitional justice dilemma as necessary and promising, yet did so in a realistic framework.

“It’s a human endeavor, and human endeavors fail more than they succeed. Which is all the more reason to try over and over again,” he said.

This acknowledgment of some of the political and logistical restrictions that limit post-atrocity negotiations was one thing that students most appreciated about the lecture.
“This guy is amazing…He is one of the first people who acknowledged the idea that you have political constraints in post-conflict scenarios, and you have to deal with it,” said Cristina Brandao, a student SPILS fellow in the law school’s masters program. “This is, in my opinion, what makes him so important… somebody has to say this.”

Another part of the talk that appealed to many in attendance was the way in which Zalaquett spoke of acknowledgement. He emphasized that there is knowledge, and there is acknowledgement. In her comments after Zalaquett’s presentation, Karl added that such acknowledgement is particularly difficult for big powers like the United States that have been complicit in many different human rights violations.

“I really liked his distinction between acknowledgment and knowledge,” said Lila Kalaf ‘10. “We know that our government does some pretty messed up things all the time, but we don’t acknowledge it. And the step between knowledge and acknowledgment is so huge for Americans…it probably causes a lot of upheaval because once you acknowledge something, it usually starts to require action.”