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Industries all over the world are grappling with new protocols and adaptations needed to safely reopen amongst changes the COVID-19 pandemic has wrought on the global economy. Nowhere have these changes been more apparent than in China, the original epicenter of the pandemic. Now, China is one of the countries leading the way in reopening its national economy.

To explore how business leaders and entrepreneurs in China responded to the lockdown and how they’re planning for the future, the China Program conducted a survey in coordination with the Stanford Center at Peking University and Stanford Business School alumni Christopher Thomas and Xue (Xander) Wu. Though taken from a small sample, the results are one of the best samples to date of how businesses in China are responding to the uncertain geopolitical environment the pandemic and current U.S.-China relations are creating.

High-tech firms and firms with a digital presence or the ability to quickly adapt to a digital environment have faired the best, as might be expected. Less expected are the indications that many of the business leaders surveyed are planning for some degree of 'decoupling' or economic separation from U.S.-based suppliers and markets. Both the pandemic and fluctuating U.S.-China relations have made access to global technologies uncertain and both factors are accelerating desires to create localized supply chains. While the long-term implications of these findings are still unknown, the survey provides a valuable snapshot of the current economic landscape within China. 

Read an excerpt from the article below, and find the full article at The Diplomat. A Chinese language version is available on Caixin.

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From, "After COVID-19: Rebooting Business in China"

China was the first country to experience the ravages of COVID-19, having lost 4,634 people to the pandemic with 83,565 confirmed cases to date. Draconian measures were used to bend the curve and essentially stop the spread of the disease, although reports indicate that recently new cases have emerged, including those stemming from a Beijing market. For the most part, however, China has loosened restrictions and re-opened large parts of its economy. Individuals scan government-mandated QR health codes with their smartphones, and daily life has been restored to some sense of normalcy with restaurants serving customers and retail shops open to shoppers.

In this pivotal and important time, with streams of foreign policy arguments and opinion pieces sharply analyzing current U.S.-China geopolitical tensions continuing to pour forth, we at the Stanford China Program wanted to take stock of how businesses and the overall economy are coping as China tries to reopen its businesses and reboot its economy. Toward this effort, we conducted a collaborative survey of 135 senior executives in China from May 13-26. The survey was designed to help us better comprehend the variation in how Chinese businesses are reopening as well as how Chinese business leaders are viewing their prospects for the future. The research findings, based on one of the largest surveys to date of senior executives in China, helped us explore the following types of questions: What kinds of businesses have done better and what kinds have done worse? What role has the government played in economic assistance and business reopening? And how do China’s business leaders view the deterioration in U.S.-China relations, the possibility of decoupling, and even future access to technology?


Read the full article at The Diplomat.

Watch the panel discussion on the survey led by Jean Oi, Christopher Thomas, and Xue (Xander) Wu with Alvin Shiqi Wang (王世琪), Xiang Wang (王翔), Simon Yang (杨士宁), and Zhiqiang (ZZ) Zhang (张志强).

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The survey reveals mixed progress in reopening different sectors of China's economy, but also shows that many business leaders in China are planning for some level of decoupling as access to global technology and supply chains remains uncertain.

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In a webinar dated June 8, 2020, American University in Cairo Scholar Amr Adly presented findings from his new book Cleft Capitalism: The Social Origins of Failed Market Making in Egypt (Stanford University Press, 2020). Egypt has undergone significant economic liberalization under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, USAID, and the European Commission. Yet after more than four decades of economic reform, the Egyptian economy still fails to meet popular expectations for inclusive growth, better standards of living, and high-quality employment. While many analysts point to cronyism and corruption, this study finds the root causes of this stagnation in the underlying social and political conditions of economic development. It offers a new explanation for why market-based development can fail to meet expectations: small businesses in Egypt are not growing into medium and larger businesses. The practical outcome of this missing middle syndrome is the continuous erosion of the economic and social privileges once enjoyed by the middle classes and unionized labor, without creating enough winners from market making. This in turn set the stage for alienation, discontent, and, finally, revolt. With this book, Adly uncovers both an institutional explanation for Egypt's failed market making, and sheds light on the key factors of arrested economic development across the Global South.


 

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The ravages of COVID-19 are now global. But the pandemic first struck in China, and the nation suffered a 6.8% decline in its first-quarter GDP. China is also the first country to move towards a recovery, however, rolling out government measures, re-opening businesses, and re-starting its economy. In this key moment, the Stanford China Program, in collaboration with alumni members of the Stanford Graduate School of Business, surveyed senior executives in China as their companies reboot their operations. In this two-part program, we first unveil potential trends and key takeaways from the survey. In the second half, we host a panel of prominent CxOs from China who give their insights and experiences rebooting their businesses. What are short-term challenges that companies in China currently face? What are some long-term implications of COVID-19 for their operational model, supply chain strategies, technology, and business digitization? What might they also mean, if any, for global trade relations and the future of globalization?

新冠肺炎疫情现在已经演变成为了全球性的公共卫生事件。但是,疫情最早发生在中国,中国第一季度GDP下降了6.8%。而中国也是第一个走向经济复苏的国家,推出了一系列政府举措复工复产、重振经济。在这一关键时期,斯坦福大学中国项目与斯坦福大学商学院的校友合作,向中国企业高管调查了企业经营重振情况。上半场,我们首先将揭示调查的潜在趋势和主要调查结果。下半场,我们将邀请由中国首席官组成的专家组,提供有关重振企业经营的见解和经验。中国企业目前面临哪些短期挑战? 新冠肺炎疫情对其经营模式、供应链战略、技术和业务数字化有哪些长期影响?它们可能对全球贸易关系和全球化未来产生哪些影响?

Agenda (in Pacific Time)

5:00-5:30 PM   Survey Presentation: Key Takeaways
5:30-6:15 PM   China CxO Panel: Discussion
6:15-6:30 PM   Audience Q&A

(北京时间)

6月11日

早上 8: 00-8: 30   调查报告:主要调查结果

早上 8:30-9:15  中国首席官专家组:讨论

早上 9:15-9:45  观众问答

PANEL SPEAKERS

Portrait of Shiqi WangShiqi Wang has served as CEO and President of 21Vianet Group, Inc. since February 2018. Currently, Mr. Wang serves as Vice President of TUS Digital Group, a subsidiary of TUS Holdings, and serves on the board of directors of Beijing CIC Technology Co., Ltd. and Guangzhou Tuwei Technology Co., Ltd. . Mr. Wang has nearly 20 years of experience in the telecommunications industry, working at various renowned international companies, including 11 years with Ericsson, focusing primarily on strategy development and execution, corporate management, and equity investments. Mr. Wang received a bachelor's degree from Tsinghua University and an MBA from Peking University-Vlerick MBA Programme (BiMBA).

王世琪先生自2018年2月起担任世纪互联集团公司CEO兼总裁。在此之前,王世琪先生任启迪控股旗下启迪数字集团副总裁,他还在北京中航讯科技股份有限公司和广州图卫科技股份有限公司担任董事职务。王世琪先生在电信行业拥有近20年从业经验,曾在多家知名跨国公司任职,包括在爱立信公司工作11年,主要专注于公司战略规划与执行、产品管理和股权投资。王世琪先生拥有清华大学工学学士学位、邮电科学研究院工学硕士学位和北京大学Vlerick MBA项目MBA学位。

 

Portrait of Xiang WangXiang Wang is President and Acting CFO of Xiaomi Corporation, responsible for platform functions and for assisting the CEO with Group operations. Mr. Wang joined Xiaomi Corporation in July 2015 served as its Senior Vice President and President for International Business, responsible for global expansion, IP strategy, and strategic partner relationship management. Mr. Wang has more than 20 years of experience in the semiconductor and communications fields, with great vision and comprehensive understanding of next-generation wireless communications. He has played an integral role in shaping Xiaomi’s international business operations including with respect to its intellectual property compliance, management and strategy throughout the world. In 2016, Mr. Wang put together an international team of sales and marketing teams to expand into more markets outside of China. Within just 3 years, he led his teams into over 90 markets. As of Q3 2019, Xiaomi’s international revenue accounted for 48.7% of its total revenue. Today, Xiaomi is ranked among top 5 smartphone brands in over 40 markets. Mr. Wang previously served as the Senior Vice President of Qualcomm and President of Qualcomm Greater China, leading the company’s business and operations in Greater China. Prior to that role, he was Vice President of Qualcomm CDMA Technology, responsible for Qualcomm chipset business and customer service in China. Under his leadership, Qualcomm rapidly extended and strengthened its partnerships with increasing numbers of Chinese manufacturing customers. Before joining Qualcomm, Mr. Wang held key positions in sales and marketing at internationally leading companies, including Motorola and Lucent/Agere. Mr. Wang earned his BSEE from Beijing Polytechnic University.

王翔先生担任小米集团总裁兼代理首席财务官,他负责集团职能平台,协助首席执行官负责集团运营。王翔先生于20157月加入小米集团,任职高级副总裁、国际商务总裁,负责全球业务拓展、知识产权战略以及战略合作伙伴管理。王翔先生在半导体行业与通信领域有着20余年的工作经验,对下一代无线通信技术有卓越的洞见和透彻的理解。在塑造小米的国际商务运营,包括知识产权的合规性、管理和战略方面,他发挥着不可或缺的作用。2016年,王先生组建了一支包含销售与市场的国际团队,来拓展小米集团的海外业务。在三年内,他带领自己的团队将小米推广至超过90多个海外市场。到2019年第三季度为止,小米的海外业务收入占其集团总收入的48.7%。如今小米在40多个海外市场的智能手机品牌中占据着前5的位置。加入小米之前,王先生在高通集团任职高级副总裁以及大中华区总裁,领导高通集团在大中华地区的业务与运营。在此之前他担任高通CDMA科技副总裁,负责高通在中国的芯片组业务以及客户服务。在他的领导之下,高通得以与越来越多的中国制造业客户拓展并加强了合作关系。加入高通之前,王先生在一些顶尖跨国公司如摩托罗拉、朗讯科技/杰尔的销售与市场部门担任重要职位。王翔先生毕业于北京工业大学,拥有电机工程学士学位。

 

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Simon Yang is the CEO of Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd. (YMTC), who brings YMTC to a new height in 3D NAND industry. As an experienced executive in the semiconductor industry for over 30 years, Dr. Yang served as the CEO of XMC, COO/CTO of SMIC, and CTO/SVP of Chartered Semiconductor (Now GlobalFoundries), in charge of fab operation and technical R&D. Before that, he was in the Portland Technology Development sector of Intel for more than 10 years, in which he led a series of technical R&D projects. Dr. Yang obtained a Bachelor’s Degree from Shanghai University of Science & Technology, and a Master’s Degree and a Doctoral Degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

杨士宁博士现担任长江存储 CEO,带领长江存储在 3D NAND 闪存领域屡创佳绩。杨博士在半导体技术研发与运营管理方面拥有超过 30 年的丰富经验,并曾先后担任武汉新芯 CEO、中芯国际 COO/CTO 及特许半导体 (现“格芯”) 公司 CTO/SVP 等核心高层管理职位, 全面负责公司运营管理、技术研发等工作。早前,杨博士还在英特尔 波特兰的研发部门(PTD)工作 10 余年,专注于技术研发。杨博士荣获伦斯勒理工学院硕士和博士学位。迄今为止,杨博士 拥有 40 多项专利,发表过 30 余篇技术论文。

Portrait of Zhiqiang (ZZ) ZhangZhiqiang (ZZ) Zhang is President of ABB in China since October 2018. He has extensive management experience and a deep understanding of the Chinese market, developed during his career at several large global companies over the past three decades. He joined ABB from Sandvik where he was Asia- Pacific Regional Holding Officer and President of Sandvik China, and Member of Sandvik Group Executive Committee. Prior to that, he held leadership positions at several other companies, including Nokia Siemens Networks, where he was President of the Greater China Region, and Siemens VDO Automotive, China, where he was President and CEO. Mr. Zhang is Non-Executive Board member of Georg Fischer AG (Switzerland) and Daetwyler Holding AG (Switzerland). He holds a bachelor’s degree in electronic engineering from Beijing Jiaotong University, China, and a master’s degree in business administration from the Smith School of Business at Queen’s University in Canada.

张志强先生自 2018 10 月起担任 ABB 中国总裁。在此之前, 他在多家大型跨国企业工作三十余年,拥有丰富的管理经验,深 谙中国市场,曾任山特维克中国区总裁、山特维克集团执行管理 委员会成员、诺基亚西门子通信公司中国区总裁、西门子威迪欧 汽车电子中国区总裁兼首席执行官等职务。张志强先生还担任瑞士乔治费歇尔集团独立董事和瑞士德特威勒 控股公司独立董事。张志强先生拥有北京交通大学计算机专业学士学位和加拿大女王 大学商学院工商管理硕士学位。

SURVEY PRESENTERS

Jean C. OiJean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. She directs the China Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and is the Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. Professor Oi has published extensively on China’s reforms. Recent books include Zouping Revisited: Adaptive Governance in a Chinese County, coedited with Steven Goldstein (Stanford University Press, 2018), and Challenges in the Process of China’s Urbanization, coedited with Karen Eggleston and Yiming Wang (2017). Current research is on fiscal reform and local government debt, continuing SOE reforms, and the Belt and Road Initiative.

戴慕珍教授(Jean C. Oi)是美国斯坦福大学弗里曼•斯伯格国际研究所高级研究员以及政治学系中国政治学威廉•哈斯讲席教授。此外,她在沃尔特·肖恩斯坦亚太研究中心负责中国项目,也是北京大学斯坦福中心的李兆基冠名主任。她著有许多有关中国改革的文章。最近出版的书籍是与史蒂芬•戈尔茨坦合著的《重温邹平:中国县域的适应性治理》(斯坦福出版社,2018年),以及2017年与凯伦•艾格尔顿和王一鸣合著的《中国城市化进程中的挑战》。目前的研究是财政改革和地方政府债务,国企持续改革,以及“一带一路”倡议。

Photo of Christopher ThomasChristopher Thomas was most recently a partner with McKinsey & Company. He served as co-Managing Partner for the Firm’s Global Digital Strategy service line as well as its Global IoT service line; and as the leader of its Asia Semiconductor Practice. Prior to McKinsey, Mr. Thomas spent ten years at Intel. He was the General Manager of Intel China, with joint ownership for the region’s $5 billion-plus P&L. In this role, he grew revenues by more than 50% and oversaw China’s successful elevation from a sales unit to an independent regional P&L business reporting directly into headquarters. Mr. Thomas began his career as a private equity investor at The Blackstone Group in New York City. He is currently a Visiting Professor at Tsinghua University, China’s leading educational institution. He received an MBA from Stanford Business School, where he was an Arjay Miller scholar; a Master of Arts in Political Science from Stanford University; and a Bachelor of Science in Economics, summa cum laude, from the Wharton School.

克里斯托弗·托马斯(Christopher Thomas) 曾任麦肯锡公司的合伙人。他曾担任该公司全球数字战略服务线和全球物联网服务线的共同管理合伙人;以及亚洲半导体业务的领导者。在麦肯锡之前,托马斯先生在英特尔工作了十年。他曾是英特尔中国公司的总经理,共同负责该地区50多亿美元的营运收益业务。在这个职位上,他增加了50%以上的公司收入,并见证中国公司成功地从一个销售点提升为一个独立的地区运营收益业务,并直接向总部汇报。托马斯先生在纽约黑石集团开始了私人股本投资者的职业生涯。他是中国领先的教育机构清华大学的客座教授。他获得了斯坦福大学商学院的工商管理硕士学位,并成为阿杰·米勒学者;从斯坦福大学获得了政治学硕士学位;从沃顿商学院以优异成绩获得了经济学学士学位。

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Portrait of Xander Wu
Xander Wu oversees industry development and builds partnerships with the world’s top cloud computing companies for China Mobile International (USA). He helps clients expand their global footprint and advises companies on best practices for digital transformation. Mr. Wu has 13 years' experience in the global 4G and 5G industry, with a track record of achieving a number of the world’s first milestones in 5G and several de-facto standards for 4G and data networks. Mr. Wu graduated from Stanford Graduate School of Business, where he researched digital transformation and advised startups in the energy sector. He serves as a mentor at several incubators such as Plug and Play, helping startups find the right product/market fit and tailor go-to-market strategy.

负责中国移动国际有限公司(美国)的行业发展以及与世界顶级云计算公司建立合作关系。他帮助客户扩大其全球业务范畴,并就数字化转型的最佳实践为公司提供建议。先生在全球4G5G行业拥有13年的经验,在5G领域取得了许多世界上第一个里程碑式的成就,在4G和数据网络方面也取得了一些事实标准。先生毕业于斯坦福大学商学院,他研究了数字化转型,并为能源行业的初创企业提供咨询。他在一些孵化器企业如Plug and Play担任导师,帮助初创企业找到合适的产品及市场,并量身定制进入市场的策略 .

 

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Shiqi Wang (王世琪) CEO, President of 21 Vianet Group, Inc.
Xiang Wang (王翔) President of Xiaomi Corporation
President
CEO
Simon Yang (杨士宁) CEO of Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd. (YMTC)
Zhiqiang (ZZ) Zhang (张志强) President, ABB (China)
CEO
CEO CEO
Jean C. Oi Director of Shorenstein APARC China Program; William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Stanford University
Christopher Thomas Visiting Professor, Tsinghua University
CEO
CEO
Xander Wu (吴雪) China Mobile International (USA)
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In a webinar dated, May 27, 2020, Ohio University Historian Ziad Abu-Rish analyzed the trajectory of Lebanon's Uprising and the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the contemporary political scene. Abu-Rish examined the multiple crises manifesting in Lebanon today and their impact on the fate of the uprising that began in October 2019. While the currency, fiscal, and infrastructural crises were central to the making of Lebanon’s uprising, he argued, the novel strategic innovations that the protesters made were key to shaping its trajectory relative to past protests. More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has both exacerbated existing dynamics while also providing respite to the government and some of the traditional political parties. To watch the recording of the talk, please click below.


 

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Sponsored by the Stanford China Program and the Stanford Center at Peking University.

The ravages of COVID-19 are now global. But the pandemic first struck in China, and the nation suffered a 6.8% decline in its first-quarter GDP. China is also the first country to move towards a recovery, however, rolling out government measures, re-opening businesses, and re-starting its economy. In this key moment, the Stanford China Program, in collaboration with alumni members of the Stanford Graduate School of Business, surveyed senior executives in China as their companies reboot their operations. In this two-part program, we first unveil potential trends and key takeaways from the survey. In the second half, we host a panel of prominent CxOs from China who give their insights and experiences rebooting their businesses. What are short-term challenges that companies in China currently face? What are some long-term implications of COVID-19 for their operational model, supply chain strategies, technology, and business digitization? What might they also mean, if any, for global trade relations and the future of globalization?

Agenda (in Pacific Time)

5:00-5:30 PM   Survey Presentation: Key Takeaways
5:30-6:15 PM   China CxO Panel: Discussion
6:15-6:45 PM   Audience Q&A

Agenda (in China)

8:00-8:30 AM   Survey Presentation: Key Takeaways
8:30-9:15 AM   China CxO Panel: Discussion
9:15-9:45 AM   Audience Q&A

 

PANEL SPEAKERS

Portrait of Shiqi WangAlvin Shiqi Wang (王世琪) has served as CEO and President of 21Vianet Group, Inc. since February 2018. Currently, Mr. Wang serves as Vice President of TUS Digital Group, a subsidiary of TUS Holdings, and serves on the board of directors of Beijing CIC Technology Co., Ltd. and Guangzhou Tuwei Technology Co., Ltd. . Mr. Wang has nearly 20 years of experience in the telecommunications industry, working at various renowned international companies, including 11 years with Ericsson, focusing primarily on strategy development and execution, corporate management, and equity investments. Mr. Wang received a bachelor's degree from Tsinghua University and an MBA from Peking University-Vlerick MBA Programme (BiMBA).

 

Portrait of Xiang WangXiang Wang (王翔) is President and Acting CFO of Xiaomi Corporation, responsible for platform functions and for assisting the CEO with Group operations. Mr. Wang joined Xiaomi Corporation in July 2015 served as its Senior Vice President and President for International Business, responsible for global expansion, IP strategy, and strategic partner relationship management. Mr. Wang has more than 20 years of experience in the semiconductor and communications fields, with great vision and comprehensive understanding of next-generation wireless communications. He has played an integral role in shaping Xiaomi’s international business operations including with respect to its intellectual property compliance, management and strategy throughout the world. In 2016, Mr. Wang put together an international team of sales and marketing teams to expand into more markets outside of China. Within just 3 years, he led his teams into over 90 markets. As of Q3 2019, Xiaomi’s international revenue accounted for 48.7% of its total revenue. Today, Xiaomi is ranked among top 5 smartphone brands in over 40 markets. Mr. Wang previously served as the Senior Vice President of Qualcomm and President of Qualcomm Greater China, leading the company’s business and operations in Greater China. Prior to that role, he was Vice President of Qualcomm CDMA Technology, responsible for Qualcomm chipset business and customer service in China. Under his leadership, Qualcomm rapidly extended and strengthened its partnerships with increasing numbers of Chinese manufacturing customers. Before joining Qualcomm, Mr. Wang held key positions in sales and marketing at internationally leading companies, including Motorola and Lucent/Agere. Mr. Wang earned his BSEE from Beijing Polytechnic University.

 

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Portrait of Simon Yang
Simon Yang (杨士宁) is the CEO of Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd. (YMTC), who brings YMTC to a new height in 3D NAND industry. As an experienced executive in the semiconductor industry for over 30 years, Dr. Yang served as the CEO of XMC, COO/CTO of SMIC, and CTO/SVP of Chartered Semiconductor (Now GlobalFoundries), in charge of fab operation and technical R&D. Before that, he was in the Portland Technology Development sector of Intel for more than 10 years, in which he led a series of technical R&D projects. Dr. Yang obtained a Bachelor’s Degree from Shanghai University of Science & Technology, and a Master’s Degree and a Doctoral Degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

 

Portrait of Zhiqiang (ZZ) ZhangZhiqiang (ZZ) Zhang (张志强) is President of ABB in China since October 2018. He has extensive management experience and a deep understanding of the Chinese market, developed during his career at several large global companies over the past three decades. He joined ABB from Sandvik where he was Asia- Pacific Regional Holding Officer and President of Sandvik China, and Member of Sandvik Group Executive Committee. Prior to that, he held leadership positions at several other companies, including Nokia Siemens Networks, where he was President of the Greater China Region, and Siemens VDO Automotive, China, where he was President and CEO. Mr. Zhang is Non-Executive Board member of Georg Fischer AG (Switzerland) and Daetwyler Holding AG (Switzerland). He holds a bachelor’s degree in electronic engineering from Beijing Jiaotong University, China, and a master’s degree in business administration from the Smith School of Business at Queen’s University in Canada.

 

 

SURVEY PRESENTERS

Jean C. OiJean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. She directs the China Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and is the Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. Professor Oi has published extensively on China’s reforms. Recent books include Zouping Revisited: Adaptive Governance in a Chinese County, coedited with Steven Goldstein (Stanford University Press, 2018), and Challenges in the Process of China’s Urbanization, coedited with Karen Eggleston and Yiming Wang (2017). Current research is on fiscal reform and local government debt, continuing SOE reforms, and the Belt and Road Initiative.

 

Photo of Christopher ThomasChristopher Thomas was most recently a partner with McKinsey & Company. He served as co-Managing Partner for the Firm’s Global Digital Strategy service line as well as its Global IoT service line; and as the leader of its Asia Semiconductor Practice. Prior to McKinsey, Mr. Thomas spent ten years at Intel. He was the General Manager of Intel China, with joint ownership for the region’s $5 billion-plus P&L. In this role, he grew revenues by more than 50% and oversaw China’s successful elevation from a sales unit to an independent regional P&L business reporting directly into headquarters. Mr. Thomas began his career as a private equity investor at The Blackstone Group in New York City. He is currently a Visiting Professor at Tsinghua University, China’s leading educational institution. He received an MBA from Stanford Business School, where he was an Arjay Miller scholar; a Master of Arts in Political Science from Stanford University; and a Bachelor of Science in Economics, summa cum laude, from the Wharton School.

 

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Xander Wu (吴雪) oversees industry development and builds partnerships with the world’s top cloud computing companies for China Mobile International (USA). He helps clients expand their global footprint and advises companies on best practices for digital transformation. Mr. Wu has 13 years' experience in the global 4G and 5G industry, with a track record of achieving a number of the world’s first milestones in 5G and several de-facto standards for 4G and data networks. Mr. Wu graduated from Stanford Graduate School of Business, where he researched digital transformation and advised startups in the energy sector. He serves as a mentor at several incubators such as Plug and Play, helping startups find the right product/market fit and tailor go-to-market strategy.

 

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Alvin Shiqi Wang (王世琪) <br>CEO, President of 21Vianet Group, Inc.<br><br>
Xiang Wang (王翔) <br>President of Xiaomi Corporation<br><br>
Simon Yang (杨士宁) <br>CEO of Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd. (YMTC)<br><br>
Zhiqiang (ZZ) Zhang (张志强) <br>President, ABB (China)<br><br>
Jean C. Oi <br>Director of Shorenstein APARC China Program; William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Stanford University<br><br>
Christopher Thomas <br>Visiting Professor, Tsinghua University<br><br>
Xander Wu (吴雪) <br>China Mobile International (USA)<br><br>
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A number of formerly regulated multiproduct industries have a transitional or permanent residual regulatory mandate to protect consumers from "excessive" prices. The legislation that deregulated most rail rates contains a statutory mandate for the regulator to protect shippers from "excessive" prices. Fulfilling this mandate has been challenging because of the cost and administrative burden to shippers in obtaining regulatory relief. Moreover, as argued by Wilson and Wolak (2016), the existing rate relief mechanism is based on a cost concept that does not reflect the actual incremental cost of a shipment and it does not adequately address the question of what constitutes an "excessive" rate for a multiproduct firm with significant common costs. This paper analyzes a benchmark price approach to identifying "excessive" prices in multiproduct industries subject to residual price regulation. Our empirical analyses demonstrate how the mechanism can be used to fulfill the statutory mandate to protect shippers from "excessive" prices at substantially lower cost, with less administrative burden, and without significant adverse consequences for the long-term financial viability of the railroads.

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Japan's startup ecosystem has matured dramatically over the past decade, with greater societal legitimacy, business success, and government support than most observers would have expected 20 years ago. Despite the challenging times ahead with the global pandemic, Japan's startup ecosystem is still poised to inject flexibility and innovation in a system often criticized as too rigid. This panel brings together scholars who have studied and participated in the ecosystem, and one of the key government officials pushing policy supporting the startup ecosystem. 

PANELISTS

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Masahiro Kotosaka, Associate Professor, Keio University
 
Masahiro Kotosaka is an Associate Professor at Keio University and advisor to several global start-up companies. Before moving to Keio, he was a faculty at Ritsumeikan, a junior faculty at University of Oxford, and was a consultant at McKinsey & Company (Frankfurt/Tokyo). As a practitioner, he worked for sixteen client organizations across nine industries and nine countries, and spent four years running three profitable IT/Retail businesses before joining McKinsey. He graduated from University of Oxford with D.Phil. (PhD) in Management Studies and MSc in Management Research with Distinction.

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Yoshiaki Ishii, Director of Science, Technology and Innovation, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan

Since getting his start at the government's Small and Middle Enterprise Agency, Dr. Yoshiaki Ishii has shaped his career almost exclusively around supporting young companies and enhancing innovation. Now, he is the director of the Cabinet Office and responsible for determining how to execute the government's mission of supporting deep tech start-ups and creating an innovation ecosystem. Previously, he served as director of the New Business Policy Office, Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau, METI. He has demonstrated expertise in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME), and Venture Business Policy, Industrial Organisation, and Innovation Policy. Dr. Ishii earned his PhD from Waseda University, in 2012, after completing an MBA at Aoyama Gakuin, in 2000.

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Kenji Kushida, Research Scholar, Shorenstein APARC Japan Program (Moderator)
 
Kenji E. Kushida is a Japan Program Research Scholar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and an affiliated researcher at the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy. Kushida’s research interests are in the fields of comparative politics, political economy, and information technology. He has four streams of academic research and publication: political economy issues surrounding information technology such as Cloud Computing; institutional and governance structures of Japan’s Fukushima nuclear disaster; political strategies of foreign multinational corporations in Japan; and Japan’s political economic transformation since the 1990s. Kushida has written two general audience books in Japanese, entitled Biculturalism and the Japanese: Beyond English Linguistic Capabilities (Chuko Shinsho, 2006) and International Schools, an Introduction (Fusosha, 2008). Kushida holds a PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. He received his MA in East Asian studies and BAs in economics and East Asian studies, all from Stanford University.

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Yoshiaki Ishii, Government of Japan
Masahiro Kotosaka, Keio University
Kenji Kushida, Stanford University
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Data-intensive technologies such as AI may reshape the modern world. We propose that two features of data interact to shape innovation in data-intensive economies: first, states are key collectors and repositories of data; second, data is a non-rival input in innovation. We document the importance of state-collected data for innovation using comprehensive data on Chinese facial recognition AI firms and government contracts. Firms produce more commercial software and patents, particularly data-intensive ones, after receiving government public security contracts. Moreover, effects are largest when contracts provide more data. We then build a directed technical change model to study the state's role in three applications: autocracies demanding AI for surveillance purposes, data-driven industrial policy, and data regulation due to privacy concerns. When the degree of non-rivalry is as strong as our empirical evidence suggests, the state's collection and processing of data can shape the direction of innovation and growth of data-intensive economies.

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David Yang’s research focuses on political economy, behavioral and experimental economics, economic history, and cultural economics. In particular, David studies the forces of stability and forces of changes in authoritarian regimes, drawing lessons from historical and contemporary China. David received a B.A. in Statistics and B.S. in Business Administration from University of California at Berkeley, and PhD in Economics from Stanford. David is currently a Prize Fellow in Economics, History, and Politics at Harvard and a Postdoctoral Fellow at J-PAL at MIT. He also joined Harvard’s Economics Department as an Assistant Professor as of 2020.

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David Yang Prize Fellow in Economics, History, and Politics; Department of Economics, Harvard University
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The Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU), the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), and the APARC China Program jointly hosted a workshop on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in early March. The workshop, held on March 2 and 3, welcomed researchers from around the world with expertise in the Initiative. Unfortunately, because of the rapidly developing health emergency related to the coronavirus, participants from not only China, but also Japan, were prevented from attending. As described by Professor Jean Oi, founding director of SCPKU and the China Program, and Professor Francis Fukuyama, director of CDDRL and the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, who co-chaired the workshop, the meeting aimed to provide a global perspective on the BRI, consolidate knowledge on this opaque topic, and determine the best method and resources for future research.  

The workshop began with presentations from several of the invited guests. Dr. Atif Ansar from the University of Oxford’s Saïd Business School kicked off the first day by describing not only the tremendous opportunity that the BRI presents to developing economies, but also the serious pitfalls that often accompany colossal infrastructure projects. Pointing out the poor returns on investment of mega infrastructure projects, Ansar examined the frequest cost and schedule overruns, random disasters, and environmental degradation that outweigh the minimal benefits that they generally yield. China’s own track record from domestic infrastructure projects does little to mitigate fear of these risks, Ansar claimed. In response, he urged professional management of BRI investments, institutional reforms, and intensified deployment of technology in BRI projects. Dr. Ansar was followed by Dr. Xue Gong of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Dr. Gong’s analysis centered on the extent to which China’s geopolitical motivations influenced its outward foreign direct investments (OFDI). Although her research was still in the early stages, her empirical analysis of China’s OFDI inflows into fifty BRI recipient countries from 2007-2018 nevertheless revealed that geopolitical factors often outweigh economic factors when it comes to China’s OFDI destinations.

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Amit Bhandari of Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations presents his research at the Belt and Road Workshop.
Participants then heard presentations from Amit Bhandari of Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations and Professor Cheng-Chwee Kuik of the National University of Malaysia. Mr. Bhandari’s talk focused on Chinese investments in India’s six neighboring countries, which tend to center more on energy rather than connectivity projects. He first found that the investments are generally not economical for the host countries because they come with high costs and high interest rates. Secondly, he argued that these projects often lacked a clear economic rationale, appearing instead to embed a geopolitical logic not always friendly to India. Professor Kuik, by contrast, provided a counterexample in his analysis of BRI projects in Southeast Asia. He described how, in Southeast Asia, host countries’ reception of the BRI has varied substantially; and how various stakeholders, including states, sub-states and other entities, have used their leverage to shape outcomes more or less favorable to themselves. Kuik’s analysis injected complexity into the often black-and-white characterizations of the BRI. He highlighted the multidimensional dynamics that play out among local and state-level players in pursuit of their goals, and in the process of BRI implementation.

Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt and Scholar-in-Residence Jeffrey Ball, both at Stanford Law School, followed with individual presentations on the role of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the BRI and the emissions impact of the BRI on climate change, respectively. Professor Milhaupt  characterized Chinese SOEs as both geopolitical and commercial actors, simultaneously charged with implementing Party policies and attaining corporate profits. Chinese SOEs are major undertakers of significant overseas BRI projects, acting not only as builders but also as investors, partners, and operators. This situation, Milhaupt asserted, carries significant risks for SOEs because these megaprojects often provide dismal returns, have high default rates, and can trigger political backlash in their localities. Milhaupt highlighted the importance of gathering firm-level data on businesses actually engaged in BRI projects to better infer geostrategic, financial, or other motivations. Jeffrey Ball turned the discussion to carbon emissions from BRI projects and presented preliminary findings from his four-country case studies. He concluded that, on aggregate, the emissions impact of the BRI is still “more brown than green.” Twenty-eight percent of global carbon emissions may be accounted for by BRI projects, Ball asserted, underscoring the importance of the BRI to the future of global climate change.

The day concluded with presentations by  Michael Bennon, Managing Director at the Stanford Global Projects Center, and Professor David M. Lampton, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Bennon first presented findings from two empirical case studies of BRI projects and then went on to describe how the BRI is now practically the “only game in town” for infrastructure funding for developing countries. Lengthy environmental review processes at Western multilateral banks have turned the World Bank, for example, from a lending bank into a “knowledge bank,” he argued. He also highlighted that, in general, economic returns on BRI projects for China are very poor, even though recipient countries may accrue macroeconomic benefits from these projects. Finally, Professor Lampton turned the discussion back to Southeast Asia, where China is currently undertaking massive cross-border high-speed rail projects through eight ASEAN countries. He described how each host country had varying capacity to negotiate against its giant neighbor, and how the sequential implementation of these cross-border rail projects also had varying impacts on the negotiating positions of these host countries. BRI played out differently in each country, in other words, eliciting different reactions, push-backs and negotiated terms.

The second day of the workshop was dedicated to working toward a collaborative approach to future BRI research. The group discussed the key gaps in the existing research, including how to know what China’s true intentions are, how to measure those intentions, who the main players and their interests in both China and the host countries are, and even what the BRI is, exactly. Some cautioned that high-profile projects may not be representative of the whole. Participants brainstormed about existing and future sources of data, and stressed the importance of diversifying studies and seeking empirical evidence.

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Participants in the Belt and Road Initiative Workshop at Stanford University, March 2-3, 2020.
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President Xi Jinping’s tenure has been marked by growing state influence over all spheres of governance in China, including a marked tightening of control over the economy.

Curtis Milhaupt, the William F. Baxter-Visa International Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, addressed the hardening of Party controls over Chinese corporate governance. His lecture to the China Program on February 6 was based on research conducted by Milhaupt in collaboration with Yu-Hsin Lin of City University of Hong Kong, and examined the expanding role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) within both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately-owned enterprises (POEs). The influence of the CCP within these enterprises, Milhaupt says, is not as straightforward as it might seem.

Milhaupt posits that the level of control exercised by the CCP on SOEs is lower than one might generally expect. At the same time, the CCP exercises a surprisingly higher level of control over POEs than we would typically assume. To draw these conclusions, Milhaupt uses a set of ten model provisions deemed to be dangjian, or “party-building,” measures that were developed and released by the Central Committee of the CCP. From data compiled between 2015 and 2018 from the charters of publicly-listed companies, Milhaupt shows that 10% of SOEs chose not to adopt any of the provisions distributed by the Central Committee. Meanwhile, 6% of POEs had at least a low level of adoption, despite the fact that the provisions were not directed at them. The reason for such variation, according to Milhaupt, can be explained by the characteristics of the provisions, the SOEs, and the POEs.

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Milhaupt breaks the measures into three distinct groups: personnel-related, decision-making, and symbolic. Nearly every corporation that amended its charter adopted the symbolic provisions. As the name suggests, these generally did not require any substantial or meaningful change on the enterprises’ parts. There was a steep drop-off, however, in the level of adoption for the other two types. Only 58% of SOEs who amended their charters adopted the more intrusive, decision-making provisions. Similarly, only 52% of such SOEs adopted the personnel-related provisions. The numbers were even lower for POEs, with only 25% of POEs who amended their charters adopting the decision-making provisions, and only 16% adopting the personnel-related provisions.

Which enterprises adopted which provisions was highly correlated to those enterprises’ characteristics. SOEs were far more likely to amend their charters if they had direct state shareholding, but less likely to amend if they had large non-state shareholders, were further down in the state-ownership chain, or were cross-listed on international stock exchanges. POEs followed a similar structure, with enterprises being more likely to adopt provisions the more politically connected they were or the more direct state shareholding they had.

It remains unclear how the government can actually enforce the dangjian policy, and how these policies will affect the enterprises that adopt it. Despite the official rhetoric behind the dangjian policy, with claims that greater loyalty to the Party will lead to more economic success, Milhaupt expresses doubts:

“What’s [the danajian policy] going to mean for firm performance? Certainly, from a . . . straightforward economics or corporate governance perspective, one would not be optimistic that infiltrating corporations with political influence is going to do good things for firm performance.”

Milhaupt also has concerns about how the strategy will impact international investment, noting the already high levels of suspicion surrounding Chinese motivations: “This [emphasis on loyalty to the Party] would certainly seem to add fuel to the fire, and heighten concerns or suspicions with respect to Chinese outbound economic activity.” As SOEs and POEs continue to navigate both domestic and international markets with their amended charters, the future feasibility of the CCP’s reassertions over the economy is far from certain.

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Pedestrians walk past a Madrid branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), one of the largest state-owned enterprises in China.
Pedestrians walk past a Madrid branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), one of the largest state-owned enterprises in China.
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