Adaptive Versus Non-adaptive EdTech: Evidence from a Large-Scale RCT in Rural China

Speaker: Yue Ma, Social Science Research Scholar, Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions

EdTech, which includes online education, computer assisted learning (CAL), and remote instruction, has expanded rapidly in the last decade. With the rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, the role of adaptive programs that can tailor learning experiences to individual users have received more attention than ever. Despite the popularity of these programs, however, rigorous, large-scale studies of their effectiveness do not exist. In this study, we examine whether the adaptive learning features of a CAL program are effective in improving student achievement in a developing setting. We analyze data from a field experiment of 8,647 students from 105 primary schools in rural China. Our empirical results show that neither adaptive nor non-adaptive CAL has an effect on student math scores. When we isolate the adaptive learning feature impact of CAL (versus non-adaptive CAL), we find null effects overall. Moreover, while non-adaptive CAL does have a small impact on the scores of mid-tercile students, adaptive CAL has no impact on the scores of students in any tercile. Interview findings suggest that outdated hardware, heavy teacher workloads, low student interest, and curriculum outpacing effects, among other factors, may explain the null effects of both adaptive and non-adaptive CAL. These results suggest that, in under-resourced contexts where these obstacles exist, both non-adaptive and adaptive Edtech may be ineffective learning tools, which has important implications for the continued, rapid expansion of EdTech throughout the world.

About the Workshops

The SCCEI Young Researcher Workshops are a bi-weekly series of presentations from scholars around campus who are working on issues related to China’s economy and institutions. The aim of the series is to bring together young scholars by providing a platform to present new research, get feedback, exchange ideas, and make connections. Each session features a single presenter who may present a new research plan, share results from preliminary data analyses, or do a trial run of a job talk or conference presentation. The Workshop Series is an opportunity to give and receive feedback on existing research, get to know other researchers around campus who are working on or in China, and be a testing ground for new ideas, data, and presentations.

Workshops are held every other Tuesday from 2 - 3 pm. Afternoon refreshments will be provided! 

Visit the Young Researcher Workshops webpage for more information on the content and format of the series and to learn how to sign up to present. 

Why do super-wealthy business owners in developing democracies engage in politics? Is corporate political activity fundamentally “defensive” or “offensive” in nature?

Using an original longitudinal dataset of 177 Ukrainian oligarchs, this paper investigates the reasons for (and the ramifications of) tycoons’ political activity. The analysis differentiates between political and economic vulnerabilities — as well as capabilities — of the oligarchs as antecedents for their political strategy. I also investigate how asset specificity of oligarchs’ portfolios, as well as their media ownership and foreign holdings, mitigate the results. Theoretical implications are drawn for our understanding of state-business relations in emerging democracies lacking the rule of law.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Stan Markus is an Associate Professor of International Business at the University of South Carolina and an Associate at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard. He received his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and his undergraduate degree from the University of Pennsylvania.

Professor Markus works on state-business relations and is broadly interested in the political economy of development. His projects explore property rights protection, oligarchs, corporate social responsibility, lobbying, corruption, state capacity, and institution building.

His book — Property, Predation, and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge University Press, 2015) — was awarded the Stein Rokkan Prize for Comparative Social Science Research. His research has also been published in the leading peer-reviewed journals in management (e.g. Academy of Management Review), political science (e.g. Comparative Political Studies), development studies (e.g. Studies in Comparative International Development), economic sociology (e.g. Socio-Economic Review), and general interest (e.g. Daedalus). It has also been recognized through many awards, including the Wilson Center Fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in D.C.; the Harvard Academy Fellowship from the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies; the Jean Monnet Fellowship from the European University Institute; the Academy of Management Best Paper Award; and the Best Article in Comparative Politics Award from APSA.

Markus's commentary has been featured in media outlets, including CNN, BBC, New York Times, Washington Post, Bloomberg, Forbes, Fortune, CNBC, NPR, Vox, and Voice of America, among others.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

In 1985, James A. Baker III's “Program for Sustained Growth” proposed a set of economic policy reforms, including inflation stabilization, trade liberalization, greater openness to foreign investment, and privatization, that he believed would lead to faster growth in countries then known as the Third World, but now categorized as emerging and developing economies (EMDEs).

A country-specific, time-series assessment of the reform process reveals three clear facts. First, in the 10-year-period after stabilizing high inflation, the average growth rate of real GDP in EMDEs is 2.6 percentage points higher than in the prior ten-year period. Second, the corresponding growth increase for trade liberalization episodes is 2.66 percentage points. Third, in the decade after opening their capital markets to foreign equity investment, the spread between EMDEs average cost of equity capital and that of the US declines by 240 basis points. The three central facts of reform provide empirical support for the Baker Hypothesis.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Peter Blair Henry is the Class of 1984 Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, a senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and dean emeritus of New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business. The youngest person ever named to the Stern Deanship, Henry has authored numerous peer-reviewed articles in the flagship journals of economics and finance, as well as a book on global economic policy, Turnaround: Third World Lessons for First World Growth (Basic Books).

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

It’s almost impossible to sue a foreign government in U.S. courts. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the court-created “act of state” doctrine, and other common-law immunities shield foreign officials and governments from most lawsuits. For instance, courts have dismissed claims against China, Cuba, Venezuela, and Russia over allegations of torture, detentions, and election interference. Yet foreign governments have unfettered access to U.S. courts as plaintiffs. And foreign dictatorships—including Russia, China, Turkey, and Venezuela—have leveraged this access to harass political dissidents, critics, and even newspapers in the United States. These doctrines create an asymmetry at the heart of this Article: foreign dictators and their proxies can access our courts as plaintiffs to harass their opponents, but their regimes are, in turn, immune from lawsuits here.

This seminar will expose that asymmetry and argue that U.S. courts and Congress should make it harder for foreign dictators to abuse our legal system. This seminar offers three novel contributions. First, this seminar provides the first systematic assessment of foreign dictatorships in U.S. courts. While much of the literature is siloed by area of substantive law—focusing on contexts like human rights or property expropriations—this seminar treats dictators as a transsubstantive category of litigants, worthy of special analysis. Second, this seminar exposes how foreign dictators are increasingly taking advantage of U.S. courts and comity doctrines, especially as plaintiffs. In a misguided effort to promote harmonious foreign relations, courts have provided foreign dictators an array of protections and privileges, which dicta- tors are eagerly exploiting. Finally, this seminar demonstrates that there is no historical, constitutional, or statutory obligation on U.S. courts to give foreign dictators these legal protections and unfettered access to our courts. Because of that, I offer four concrete proposals to both stymie dictators’ access to U.S. courts as plaintiffs—through a proposed foreign sovereign anti-SLAPP statute—and weaken the protections that dictators enjoy as defendants. Simply stated, U.S. courts should not be instruments of foreign authoritarian oppression.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Diego A. Zambrano’s primary research and teaching interests lie in the areas of civil procedure, transnational litigation, and judicial federalism. His work explores the civil litigation landscape: the institutions, norms, and incentives that influence litigant and judicial behavior. Professor Zambrano also has an interest in comparative constitutional law and legal developments related to Venezuela. He currently leads an innovative Stanford Policy Lab tracking “Global Judicial Reforms” and has served as an advisor to pro-democracy political parties in Venezuela. In 2021, Professor Zambrano received the Barbara Allen Babcock Award for Excellence in Teaching.

Professor Zambrano’s scholarship has appeared or is forthcoming at the Columbia Law Review, University of Chicago Law Review, Michigan Law Review, Northwestern University Law Review, Stanford Law Review, and Virginia Law Review, among other journals, and has been honored by the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) and the National Civil Justice Institute. Professor Zambrano will be a co-author of the leading casebook Civil Procedure: A Modern Approach (8th ed. 2024) (with Marcus, Pfander, and Redish). In addition, Professor Zambrano serves as the current chair of the Federal Courts Section of the AALS. He also writes about legal issues for broader public audiences, with his contributions appearing in the Wall Street Journal, BBC News, and Lawfare.

After graduating with honors from Harvard Law School in 2013, Professor Zambrano spent three years as an associate at Cleary Gottlieb in New York, focusing on transnational litigation and arbitration. Before joining Stanford Law School in 2018, Professor Zambrano was a Bigelow Teaching Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

The US infrastructure investment industry is undergoing a period of rapid change today, which presents public sponsors, federal agencies, and industry leaders with a unique set of challenges and opportunities.

The US Infrastructure Investment Forum aims to share information, identify challenges and policy reforms, and foster collaboration to deliver on the potential of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL).

Forum topics will include the impact of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, federal permitting regulations, and key challenges to US infrastructure development.

This half-day forum is open to the public and will be of particular interest to federal, state, and local transportation officials along with infrastructure investment industry executives and academic or nonprofit organization representatives.

AGENDA

1:30 – 1:45 pm — ​Welcome Remarks

1:45 – 2:15 pm​ — The Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council and Delivering on the Promise of the IIJA

• Christine Harada, Executive Director, Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council

2:15 – 2:45 pm​ — Strategies for Overcoming Vetocracy in Infrastructure Development

• Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; Director, Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy

2:45 – 3:45 pm​ — American Project Permitting and Development: Challenges and Opportunities

• Moderator: Michael Bennon, Stanford CDDRL
• Alex Herrgott, The Permitting Institute
• Steve DeWitt, ACS Infrastructure Development
• Liz Klebaner, Nossaman LLP

The forum is hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and organized in collaboration with the Build America Center (BAC), the Build America Bureau (BAB), the National Governors Association (NGA), and the Global Infrastructure Investors Association (GIIA).