CISAC Co-director Siegfried Hecker has called on colleagues and friends to congratulate his co-director, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar on being named to an endowed professorship at Stanford Law School. Cuéllar is now the Stanley Morrison Professor of Law, named for the late Stanford constitutional law professor. Hecker issued the following statement:

"A member of the Stanford faculty since 2001, Tino became my co-director at CISAC in September 2011. He is also a faculty affiliate of CDDRL and a senior fellow at FSI. The endowed professorship is a tribute to his extensive work in both the law and international security and cooperation. Tino has done much to take CISAC forward as a center that focuses not only on nuclear nonproliferation, arms control and counterterrorism, but one that also tackles cyber and biosecurity, as well as migration and transnational flows.

"His teaching and research focus on administrative law, executive power and how organizations implement critical regulatory, public safety, migration and international security responsibilities in a changing world.

"Tino has a new book coming out next month: “Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies” (Stanford University Press). The book explores the history and impact of the Roosevelt-era Federal Security Agency (today the Department of Health and Human Services) and the Department of Homeland Security established after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

"Tino has served in the Obama and Clinton administrations, most recently as Special Assistant to the President for Justice and Regulatory Policy in 2009-2010. In July 2010, President Obama appointed Tino to the Council of the Administrative Conference of the United States, an independent agency charged with recommending improvements to federal regulatory programs.

"The Stanley Morrison professorship was established in 1996 by Joan and Henry Wheeler to honor Morrison, who was a beloved professor at Stanford Law School for three decades, specializing in criminal, constitutional, tax and international law."

Myanmar has made tremendous strides in its political and economic reform efforts since Thein Sein assumed the presidency in March 2011. But how stable is the country today, and how much has democracy taken root?

Donald K. Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum, recently discussed Myanmar’s path to democracy within the context of the country’s history, the current unrest in Rakhine State, and looking ahead to 2014 when Myanmar chairs the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and prepares for its next presidential election.

How committed is Myanmar’s current leadership to democratization?

We should understand that rather than a transformation to a true liberal democracy we are seeing political and economic reform, and also that there is a lot going on below the surface of the government that we cannot see.

President Thein Sein does appear genuinely committed to reform. During a meeting in August 2011, he and Aung San Suu Kyi worked out the plan in which she would run for election. That plan was critical for the reforms that have happened since, even if Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy have no real legislative power.

At the end of the day, Myanmar’s critical institution is still the Tatmadaw, the military. The constitution grants the military a quarter of the seats in parliament and the right to nominate the most important of the country’s two vice presidents. In July, when the first vice president, long known as a hard-liner, stepped down due to “health reasons,” the president replaced him with an ostensibly more moderate vice admiral. In making this transfer, Thein Sein may have wanted to ensure a smooth continuation of the reforms.

Although public figures in Myanmar are politically diverse, nearly everyone now claims to be a “reformer" (considered good) as opposed to a “spoiler." This even applies to individuals from more conservative military backgrounds who may have taken part in past repression. If the country’s stability comes under serious threat, such men could revert to harder-line views.

Ultimately, apart from the balance of forces between reformers and spoilers inside the military, national stability is and will remain a key requisite to further liberalization and the consolidation of democracy.

How stable is Myanmar at present?

It depends on where you are. If you are in Naypyidaw, the capital, or in Yangon, caught up in the influx of investors, fortune-seekers, and diplomats, things probably look pretty good—opportunistic and venal, but dynamic and potentially beneficial. However, if you are in the restive north or in clash-ridden Rakhine State, which borders Bangladesh, then things probably look really bad.

Myanmar's many ethnic minorities tend to live on the periphery of the country. These border areas have been marked by endemic unrest and violence for a very long time. The latest flare-up in Rakhine is particularly unfortunate because it implicates a group that is identified both by ethnicity and by religion: the Rohingya. They are Muslims, and they have long been subject to discrimination at the hands of the Burman-Buddhist majority. According to some estimates, as many as 200,000 Rohingya have fled across the border to escape the latest violence. The government in majority-Muslim Bangladesh, unwilling to alienate Nyapyidaw by appearing to harbor the refugees, has begun to push some of them back into Myanmar.

Assuming that Bangladesh does not champion the Rohingyas’ cause, the violence in Rakhine State is unlikely to disrupt Myanmar’s stability on a national scale. But it will reinforce the “need” of spoilers in the Tatmadaw to enlarge the military’s presence and its budget to prevent the clashes from getting further out of hand. And that could strengthen the nationalist legitimacy of the military and its rationale for retaining a political role.

How could reform change Myanmar, and what are some potential challenges to that process?

The urgent priority for Thein Sein is performance. It is vital that he be able to point to the positive results of reform. In aid, investment, and trade, Western countries, China, India, and other outside powers can facilitate meaningful economic growth, or be seen as abetting cronyism and corruption. If the reforms foster a high-performing economy in which incomes start to go up and a middle class begins to form, one can be more optimistic about the future. But if official repression of the Rohyingya intensifies, if other ethnic-minority grievances are reignited, if fighting spreads, and the Tatmadaw regains its former clout, disillusioned Westerners will be less willing to work with a regime they no longer trust.

As we move toward 2015, the stakes for reform are rising. Myanmar is scheduled to hold elections in that year. Thein Sein will be 75 years old, and so will Aung San Suu Kyi. He has said that he will not run, although he could change his mind. She is constitutionally barred from running, and her party is not currently strong enough to push through an amendment. What if neither one is available to run? Who will continue the process of reform, if it is still under way?

If 2015 bears watching, so does 2014. For the length the latter year, Myanmar will chair the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The authorities in Naypyidaw will host all of ASEAN's major meetings in 2014. Some of these gatherings will involve the United States and other countries at ministerial and head-of-state levels. In 2015 ASEAN will inaugurate a first-ever, Southeast Asia-wide ASEAN Community encompassing economic, political-security, and socio-cultural cooperation. In 2014 Myanmar will oversee the Community’s final preparation. If in the meantime an intra-military coup occurs and the winner cracks down, the leaders of democratic countries will think twice before agreeing to lend legitimacy to such a regime by attending its events.

Despite these uncertainties, there is a real chance that reforms will take root. Myanmar is not likely to become a fully stable and liberal democracy, at least not soon, but it could, with skill, help, and luck, become a “good enough” democracy of sorts.

As the U.S. presidential election swiftly approaches, many wonder what policy approach the next president - be it Barack Obama or Mitt Romney - will take with regard to China. Thomas Fingar, FSI’s Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow, considers how the outcome of the election could impact U.S.-China relations, and how the United States could focus its priorities in Asia.

Q. How does China see a Mitt Romney presidency?

Fingar: Conventional wisdom about China has long held that Beijing prefers Republicans to Democrats, primarily because Republicans are thought to be more interested in trade and less concerned about human rights. I'm not sure that particular characterization of Beijing's views was ever correct, but to the extent that it was, it is of decreasing importance and almost entirely absent now. The Chinese have been anxious about Governor Romney’s positions on China during the campaign, seeing his statements as excessive or unjustifiably critical and indicative of a determination to contain or constrain China's economic rise.

Beijing has expressed concern that Romney intends to act in ways that threaten China's continued rapid economic growth and undermine the communist-led regime. Such concerns were likely alleviated during the final debate when Romney said he views China as a potential partner, not an adversary. However, the Chinese will likely assume that Romney's call for more defense spending is aimed at containing China, since the United States’ only other declared security threat is Iran.

Q. Romney says he would label China a currency manipulator on “day one” of his presidency. Do presidents have the power to do such a thing? Could this trigger a trade war?

Fingar: Presidents can certainly announce rhetorical positions, but it is highly unlikely that such a declaration would lead to actions that could trigger a trade war. It could launch a political and bureaucratic process in which advocates with competing objectives and strategies would seek to fashion policy adjustments in order to achieve them. It would not, however, lead automatically to actions that would damage a relationship in which Americans, as well as the Chinese, have an enormously important stake.

Q. What positive or problematic developments could impact U.S.-China relations if Obama wins a second term?

Fingar: I anticipate many issues and problems, but no crises. The foundation for the relationship – interdependence and mutual benefit – is strong and growing stronger. That said, what happens in China will be important to the United States and command presidential attention. If China's economy continues to slow, it will slow recovery of the U.S. economy, both directly and by reducing Chinese purchases and sales to and from third countries that use earnings from sales to China to purchase goods and services from the United States. Continued deferral of resolving territorial disputes in the Sea of Japan and South China Sea will exacerbate perceptions that the United States should serve as a counterbalance to China, complicating U.S.-China relations. Another issue sure to be on the table is Chinese failure to honor World Trade Organization and intellectual property rights commitments.

Q. Obama’s rhetoric on China has become increasingly aggressive. Do you anticipate a tougher stand toward China if he is re-elected?

Fingar: Nothing that President Obama has said during the campaign suggests to me that he would make significant changes to U.S. policy toward China if he were re-elected. It would be a mistake to read too much into the number of times China is mentioned relative to other countries, as “China” is often used as a proxy for all foreign economic competition and the effects of globalization. Beijing should not take this personally; this is part of the price of becoming the world’s second-largest economy and having the biggest trade deficit with the United States. Far more important than such rhetoric are Obama’s and Romney’s references to seeking a partnership with China and the need for China to “play by the rules” with respect to WTO commitments, intellectual property rights and the treatment of foreign firms operating in China. I am confident Obama has no desire to make China into an enemy and no intention to contain or constrain China’s “rise.”

Q. Some doubt the Pentagon has the resources to deter Iran while pivoting to Asia. Which is more urgent for the new administration?

Fingar: The United States continues to have enormous military capabilities. Moreover, it counts as allies and partners most other major nations and military powers. Iran knows that, but threats to use military force are not likely to persuade Tehran to abandon the potential to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, such threats would likely bolster the arguments of people who claim Iran needs nuclear weapons to deter stronger and hostile adversaries.  Diplomacy, backed by international sanctions, and enlightened Iranian self-interest offer a far better path to deterring Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Q. Do you expect the so-called Asia pivot to continue under the foreign policy team of the incoming president?

Fingar: East Asia is the most dynamic region in the world and the United States has many important interests and ties there. We are a Pacific power and a Pacific player and must remain heavily engaged in the region. The “pivot” toward Asia is a misnomer because it implies that we left and are now returning. We never left and never will. The “rebalancing” toward Asia is intended to reduce uncertainty about American intentions and to help prolong the period of peace and stability that has been critical to the achievement of prosperity and interdependence in the region. I hope the new administration, whoever wins, will redouble efforts to build a new, inclusive security arrangement for the region.