Abstract: In order to successfully battle organized crime, governments require a certain degree of citizens’ support. Governments are sometimes able to influence citizens’ opinions, but sometimes they are not. Under what circumstances do pro-government frames influence citizens’ opinions? Will individuals who are victims of crime be equally sensitive to frames than those who are not? We argue that crime victimization desensitizes citizens to pro-government frames. This further complicates governments’ fights against criminals, creating a vicious circle of insecurity, distrust, and frustrated policy interventions. To test our argument, we conducted a frame experiment embedded in a nationwide survey in Mexico. The empirical evidence supports our argument in most circumstances; yet desensitization is moderated by love media-exposure and identification with the president’s party.
Academics from American, European and Asian universities came together September 19th and 20th to present their research on the large-scale movements of people, and engage in a multidisciplinary exchange of ideas and perspectives. This installment of the Europe Center - University of Vienna bi-annual series of conferences and workshops was held on the Stanford campus and co-sponsored by The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Center for International Security and Cooperation.
CISAC Co-Director Amy Zegart and nine other national security and intelligence scholars were recently invited to the headquarters of the National Security Agency in Fort Meade, Md., for unprecedented talks with high-ranking officials. They discussed cybersecurity, the plummeting public trust in the agency, its relationship with Congress and how to rebuild the agency’s reputation and rethink its program operations.
The academics were first taken to the black granite wall carved with the names of 171 military and civilian cryptologists who have died in service. “I think they wanted us to know that this is an organization of people, not some robots trolling through your emails,” said Zegart, author of the book, “Spying Blind,” which examines why U.S. intelligence agencies failed to adapt to the terrorist threat before the 9/11 attacks.
The scholars were then taken to a windowless conference room for several hours of what Zegart called remarkably frank and free-ranging talks about the agency and its tactics.
The NSA is one of the world’s most secret intelligence gathering organizations. Its methods have come under intense scrutiny with a series of damaging leaks about its operations. Former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and national intelligence reporters have revealed tactics that have left many Americans cold and questioning the legality and necessity of the agency’s methods. From monitoring emails and phone calls, to secretly cracking encryption codes that protect personal email as well as financial and medical records and Internet chats – the revelations just keep coming. Civil liberty organizations and Internet privacy advocates here at Stanford are outraged, while some foreign governments are accusing Washington of Big Brother tactics run amok.
Zegart answers questions about those perceptions and her Sept. 23 briefing at NSA headquarters.
Are the accusations that the NSA is Big Brother squared fair?
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If you look at the reporting on the NSA so far, there is zero evidence of a widespread, deliberate and nefarious plan by the agency to violate the law and spy on American citizens. This is a policy debate, not a scandal. There’s no question in my mind that the NSA has interpreted its legal authority to the maximum extent of the law possible. They’ve taken what Congress has granted them and they have pushed to the edge – but that’s a very big difference from running amok.
How did this unprecedented meeting come about and why do you think the senior NSA officials – who asked not to be identified – called on social scientists?
In our group, the last time someone went to the NSA was in 1975, which tells you how rare it is for them to invite academics in. The was a sense at senior levels that they need to think more systematically and long-term about education, about being more open to academics coming in and doing research about the NSA and hearing what academics have to say. In part, thought-leaders at universities can play a role in transmitting some of the complexities in which the NSA operates – the tradeoffs the agency is confronting and the constrains under which they are operating.
The other academics invited to the NSA on Monday were William Inboden of the University of Texas, Austin; Michael Desch of Nortre Dame University; Jeffrey Engel and Joshua Rovner of Southern Methodist University; Thomas Mahnken of the U.S. Naval War College; Richard Betts of Columbia University; Benjamin Wittes of The Brookings Institution; Kori Schake of Stanford University; and Robert Chesney of the University of Texas, Austin.
One thing this meeting highlighted for me is that the NSA is not free to respond to the criticism it gets in the press. It’s intertwined with other organizations that have a say in how it responds: the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the FBI, the Justice Department and the White House. And they have never had to deal with the spotlight before. They gave me this statistic: Last summer, there were 167 legitimate questions from the press; in the summer of 2013 there were 1,900 media requests. That’s a tenfold increase. This is a whole new world for this agency. And to go against secrecy is just totally counter to their culture. This was a bold step for them to have us come in.
Did the NSA officials talk about whether they had broken any laws?
They definitely wanted us to believe that what they are doing is lawful and effective. I believe the lawful part; I’m not so sure about the effective part. I think they haven’t looked hard enough about what effective means. Do they know it when they see it? And who’s to judge?
They were quick to point out that they’re under extensive oversight both by Congress and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court. The question is whether Americans are comfortable with the lines that have been drawn by their own government and if they’re comfortable with the lack of transparency. The NSA is really bad at letting us know what the gains are (from surveillance) and they’ve struggled with how to deal with the public reaction to the Snowden revelations.
This is an intelligence agency and they’re supposed to be stealing information from other governments; that’s what we pay them to do and other governments would use those capabilities in an instant if they had them. That has gotten lost in the debate. When I talk to my parents and friends, they think that the NSA is listening in on their phone calls. That’s just not true. They’re examining phone logs: who called whom and for how long. No one is listening to your conversation with grandma.
The fundamental problem is that the NSA is highly regulated – but nobody trusts the regulatory framework."
Did you discuss former NSA contractor Edward Snowden?
Extensively. It’s the biggest breach in the agency’s history. They’ve been in crisis mode since June. They’ve been putting our fires every day and the arsonist is still out there. NSA officials told us that they know 125 documents have been compromised; they believe Snowden probably has already passed to the press another 50,000 documents and that the entire tranche that he may have taken is bigger than that. But there’s a question about whether that tranche is accessible, that Snowden may have done things to make some of his data hard to read.
They said Snowden didn’t just download documents he himself had access to. He used social engineering, convincing someone else to give him access to additional information to breach security protocols. Meanwhile, Snowden had plenty of avenues for whistleblowing, including five inspectors-general and the members of the congressional intelligence committees, but he availed himself of none.
Have Snowden’s actions endangered national security or international relations?
The standard lines about “irreparable harm” are not convincing to many people because they are so vague, we’ve heard them so often, and the government classifies boatloads of information that shouldn’t be secret. But NSA officials got a little more specific. They said Snowden has hurt national security in three ways: The first is that he revealed government surveillance capabilities. Second, he’s revealed politically embarrassing things that are harming relations with our allies – and they believe there is more to come. (Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff postponed a state visit to Washington, for example, following the release of evidence that the U.S. spied on Brazilian politicians and business leaders.) They said Snowden has a pattern of releasing embarrassing information around big international meetings, such as the G20 summit. The third damaging impact is that Snowden has hurt the NSA’s ability to produce intelligence.
What are some of the challenges and solutions moving forward?
Intelligence is a political loser and so you see a lot of members of Congress who says they are shocked – shocked! – to find out what the NSA is doing when they had full opportunity to be briefed on these programs for a long time. So they’re making political hay out of NSA’s difficulties. Most members of Congress have zero incentive to actually learn anything about the complexities of intelligence because the voters don’t hear about it and they don’t reward them for it.
The near-term challenge is to stop Congress from doing something stupid, such as the wholesale cancelling of NSA programs and capabilities. The medium-term challenge is to figure out what sensible options there are to restoring the public trust and make the NSA more transparent and more targeted in its collection approach. When NSA chief Keith Alexander steps down, we are going to see all of these issues come to a head in a very public way with the confirmation of the next director.
The longer-term challenge is creating better mechanisms to assess whether NSA should do things just because it can technically – to weigh the wisdom and efficacy of programs, not just their legality. The NSA also needs a sustainable education campaign so that when things break in the news, legislators and constituents have an understanding of what this agency does and can put these revelations into perspective.
They definitely wanted us to believe that what they're doing is lawful and effective; I believe the lawful part, I'm just not so sure about the effective part."
What are the strengths of the NSA that the public doesn’t get to see?
The NSA is the organization that’s responsible for information assurance, like if you’re in government on a secure phone line. And most people don’t know the NSA wrote the codes to protect our nuclear arsenal from day one. So the NSA has two, often conflicting missions. One is signals intelligence, which is offense, and the other is the information assurance that is defense. In an era of cyber vulnerabilities, information assurance is huge. They feel like they were doing what they were authorized to do and serving the mission and that they are being characterized as evil for doing what they think is right.
What were your biggest takeaways from this meeting?
I would say one of the things that I did walk away from the meeting hearing – and I think that perhaps this is the big policy question – is that the NSA orientation is to collect now, ask questions later. So the question is: Is that the right operating philosophy; are we comfortable as a democratic society with that collect-now-ask-later approach?
Prior work on colonialism has shown that colonial institutions can influence modern developments outcomes, but has not examined the distributional effect of colonialism within societies. This chapter examines how the strategic goals of the colonial state altered the distribution of wealth across Indian caste groups, and how these differences have persisted into the post-independence period. Colonial administrators were only likely to transfer formal or informal power to the precolonial elite if they were secure militarily. This theory is tested using an empirical strategy that uses European wars as an exogenous determinate of colonial military stress. In areas annexed at times of European war, precolonial elites have low levels of wealth today relative to other groups, while in areas annexed at times of peace in Europe precolonial elites retain a more substantial economic advantage. The results highlight the variable impact of colonialism within societies, the strategic nature of colonial policy choices, and the long term consequences of colonial conquest.
Speaker bio:
Alexander Lee's research focuses on the historical factors governing the success or failure of political institutions, particularly in South Asia and other areas of the developing world. His dissertation examined the ways in which colonialism changed the distribution of wealth in Indian society, and the ways in which these changes affected the development of caste identities. Additional research areas include the study of colonialism and European expansion in a cross- national perspective, and the causes of political violence, especially terrorism. His work has been published in World Politics and the Quarterly Journal of Political Science. Alex earned his PhD from Stanford in 2013. More information on his work can be found on his website: https://people.stanford.edu/amlee/
Encina Ground Floor Conference Room
Alexander Lee
Postdoctoral Fellow, 2013-14
Speaker
CDDRL
This seminar is part of the "Europe and the Global Economy" series.
How do political institutions shape the costs of responding to financial crises? Previous research contends that policy-makers in democracies choose policies less costly to taxpayers than politicians in autocracies. In this research note we re-evaluate Keefer's (2007) contribution to this body of research using an updated theoretical model as well as updated fiscal costs data, which is his dependent variable. We argue that political institutions shapes when politicians spend, rather than how much they spend, in response to financial crises. In the updated theoretical model we include the possibility that politicians can shift crisis response costs into the future by using policies that create contingent liabilities. Politicians facing removal pressures--such as elections--have incentives to create contingent, rather than immediately realized liabilities. Empirically we illustrate this dynamic by first updating Keefer (2007) using new data on the fiscal costs of financial crises. We further substantiate our argument with Eurostat's detailed yearly, cross-country comparable data from the late 2000s financial crisis to show that politicians in democracies tend to increase contingent liabilities, while also decreasing realized liabilities, before elections.
Mark Hallerberg is Professor of Public Management and Political Economy at the Hertie School of Governance and is Director of Hertie's Fiscal Governance Centre. He is also a non-resident fellow at Brussel's think tank Bruegel.
He is the author of one book, co-author of a second, and co-editor of a third. He has published over twenty-five articles and book chapters on fiscal governance, tax competition, and exchange rate choice.
Hallerberg has held professorships previously at Emory University, the University of Pittsburgh, and the Georgia Institute of Technology. He has done consulting work for the Dutch and German Ministries of Finance, Ernst and Young Poland, the European Central Bank, the German Development Corporation (GIZ), the Inter-American Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.
CISAC Conference Room
Mark Hallerberg
Professor of Public Management & Political Economy and Director of the Fiscal Governance Centre
Speaker
the Hertie School of Governance, Germany
*PLEASE NOTE: The room for this seminar has been changed to the Reuben Hills Conference Room, Encina Hall East, 2nd floor.
Bjørn Høyland will present his joint work with Sara B. Hobolt and Simon Hix titled "Career Ambitions and Legislative Participation: The Moderating Effect of Electoral Institutions". In multi-level political systems politicians are faced with several possible career paths, as they can advance their careers at either the lower (state) or higher (federal) level. Career ambitions lead representatives to carefully adapt their behavior to maximize their chances of being re-elected and promoted to higher office at their preferred level of government. Høyland, Hobolt and Hix argue that the design of the electoral institutions influences how politicians respond to these incentives. Analyzing a unique dataset of both ‘stated’ and ‘realized’ career ambitions of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) they find that politicians seeking high political office in their home state reduce their legislative participation in the European Parliament, whereas politicians who seek to further their careers at the European level increase their legislative engagement. In addition, they find that this latter effect is strongest for politicians elected in party-centered electoral systems. This finding has implications for the literature on electoral institutions and legislative behavior.
This seminar is part of TEC's "European Governance" program seminar series.
Bjørn Høyland (PhD, London School of Economics, 2005) is Professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo, Norway. He is currently visiting Professor and Anna Lindh Fellow at the Europe Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford. The focus of his research is European Union politics and comparative legislative politics. Professor Høyland’s list of journal publications includes the American Political Science Review, Annual Review of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, and European Union Politics. His textbook (with Simon Hix) The Political System of the European Union (3rd ed) is the standard text for advanced courses on the European Union.
Encina Hall 616 Serra Street Stanford, CA 94305-6165
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bjorn.hoyland@stv.uio.no
Visiting Professor
Anna Lindh Fellow
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Bjørn Høyland (PhD, London School of Economics, 2005) is Professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo, Norway. He is currently visiting Professor and Anna Lindh Fellow at the Europe Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Division of International, Comparative and Area Studies, Stanford. The focus of his research is European Union politics and comparative legislative politics. Professor Høyland’s list of journal publications includes the American Political Science Review, Annual Review of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, and European Union Politics. His textbook (with Simon Hix) The Political System of the European Union (3rd ed) is the standard text for advanced courses on the European Union.
Bjørn Høyland was a visiting professor and Anna Lindh Fellow with The Europe Center in 2013-2014.
Bjørn Høyland
Professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo, Norway and Anna Lindh Fellow at
Speaker
The Europe Center
Efforts to bolster economic and private sector development in Palestine are central components to many current efforts to build peace and resolve the conflict. But what do we really know about the relationship between economic development and conflict resolution? What does research, and experience tell us about when economic interventions help reduce conflict, and when they fail? This distinguished panel will offer insights and lessons from Palestine -- with voices from the Palestinian business community, the US government, and academia.
The panel is co-sponsored by the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law.
This event is now full. We cannot accept any more RSVP's, but you can e-mail Zhila Emadi (zemadi@stanford.edu), if you would like to be placed on a waitlist.
About the Speaker:
General C. Robert Kehler is the commander of U.S. Strategic Command. He provides the President and Secretary of Defense with a broad range of strategic capabilities and options. He is responsible for the plans and operations for all U.S. forces conducting strategic nuclear and conventional deterrence and Department of Defense space and cyberspace operations.
General Kehler entered the Air Force in 1975 as a distinguished graduate of the Pennsylvania State University Air Force ROTC program. He has commanded at the squadron, group, wing and major command levels, and has a broad range of operational tours in ICBM, space launch, space control, space and missile warning operations.
General Kehler's staff assignments include tours with the Air Staff and Strategic Air Command headquarters. He was also assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force's Office of Legislative Liaison, where he was the point man on Capitol Hill for matters regarding the President's ICBM Modernization Program. As director of the National Security Space Office, General Kehler integrated the activities of a number of space organizations on behalf of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. He has also served as deputy director of operations, Air Force Space Command, and as deputy commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
CISAC Conference Room
General C. Robert "Bob" Kehler
Commander, United States Strategic Command
Speaker
John Villasenor, a CISAC affiliate and professor of electrical engineering and public policy at UCLA, writes in this IEEE SPECTRUM article with Mohammad Tehranipoor, that counterfeiters sell old components as new, threatening both military and commercial systems.
They explain that the global trade in recycled electronics parts is enormous and growing rapidly, driven by a confluence of cost pressures, increasingly complex supply chains, and the huge growth in the amount of electronic waste sent for disposal around the world. Recycled parts, relabeled and sold as new, threaten not only military systems but also commercial transportation systems, medical devices and systems, and the computers and networks that run today’s financial markets and communications systems.
