Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/ZVHEqY1_3w8

 

Abstract: Before the CCP came to power, China lay broken. Today it is a force on the global stage, but its leaders remain haunted by the past. Sulmaan Khan will tell the story of the grand strategies pursued by China’s paramount leaders: the shrewd, dangerous Mao Zedong, who made the country whole and kept it so; the caustic, impatient Deng Xiaoping who dragged the country into the modern world; Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao who served as cautious custodians of Deng’s legacy; and Xi Jinping who combines assertiveness with insecurity. For all their considerable costs, China’s grand strategies have been largely successful. But whether or not they can meet the challenges of the twenty-first century remains to be seen.   

 

Speaker's Biography:

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Sulmaan Wasif Khan teaches international history and Chinese foreign relations at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, where he also directs the Water and Oceans Program at the Center for International Environment and Resource Policy. He is the author of Haunted by Chaos: China’s Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping (Harvard University Press: 2018), which was named a top book of 2018 by The American Interest, and Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China’s Cold War and the People of the Tibetan Borderlands (University of North Carolina Press: 2015). He has written for The Economist, Foreign Affairs, The American Interest, and YaleEnvironment360, among others, on topics ranging from Burmese Muslims to dolphin migration through the Bosphorus. He received his Ph.D. in History from Yale University in 2012.  

 

Sulmaan Khan Assistant Professor of International History and Chinese Foreign Relations Tufts University
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We are delighted to announce that APARC’s Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow David M. Lampton is the recipient of the 2019 John and Vivian Sabel Award for best article published in the Journal of Contemporary China (JCC), for his article “Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission: Policy Coordination and Political Power.”

Lampton’s article discusses the rationale for, and progress to date of, creating a National Security Commission in China. First announced in late 2013, the commission was part of Xi Jinping's drive to consolidate his personal power over the internal and external coercive and diplomatic arms of the governing structure. Lampton argues that it remains to be seen whether the institutional attempt to achieve coordination will improve, or further complicate, China's long-standing coordination problem.

The John and Vivian Sabel Award was launched in 2016 to celebrate publication of the 100th issue and the 25th anniversary of the JCC. Dr. Lampton’s article was published in Volume 24, Issue 95, 2015.

An award reception and dinner will be held at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver on April 30, 2019.

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Bureaucrats become powerful when they stage emotionally calibrated performances as “servants” before state principals, earn their trust, and carve out space for action through “whispering,” “propagating,” cultivating patrons, and building coalitions behind the scenes and on the sidelines of official interaction. These servant performances involve what sociologist Arlie Hochschild calls “emotional labor,” that is, the management of feelings when fulfilling the requirements of a job. Prof. Nair will develop a theory of emotional labor in international bureaucracies that explains why bureaucrats perform such work and how, if skilfully done, it can empower them. He will test the theory with an ethnography of the Secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Jakarta—a “hard” case that does not fit prevailing theorizations of bureaucratic power. Prof. Nair will also show how his theory can be applied to other, Euro-American bureaucracies.

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Deepak Nair researches the everyday practices and performances that produce international relations. His writings include ASEAN-related articles in journals such as International Political Sociology on topics that include golf, sociability, and diplomacy; on the practices of face-saving in diplomacy in the European Journal of International Relations; and on institutions, norms, and crisis in Asian Survey and Contemporary Southeast Asia. He earned his PhD and BA at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Delhi University, respectively.

Deepak Nair Assistant Professor of Political Science, National University of Singapore
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China is making a risky bet in the Middle East. By focusing on economic development and adhering to the principle of noninterference in internal affairs, Beijing believes it can deepen relations with countries that are otherwise nearly at war with one another—all the while avoiding any significant role in the political affairs of the region. This is likely to prove naive, particularly if U.S. allies begin to stand up for their interests.

In meetings I attended earlier this month in Beijing on China’s position in the Middle East, sponsored by the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, Chinese officials, academics, and business leaders expressed a common view that China can avoid political entanglement by promoting development from Tehran to Tel Aviv. China may soon find, however, that its purely transactional approach is unsustainable in this intractable region—placing its own investments at risk and opening new opportunities for the United States.

Over the past three years, China has charted an ambitious future in the Middle East by forging “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. This is the highest level of diplomatic relations China can provide, and Beijing believes these four countries anchor a neutral position that will prove more stable over the long term than that of the United States. China has also made massive investments in infrastructure throughout the region, including in Israel, where China is now the second-largest trading partner behind the United States.

China’s interests in the Middle East are both structural and strategic. Structurally, China needs the natural resources of the region, whereas the United States—now the world’s largest oil producer—does not. China is also seeking new markets to absorb its excess industrial capacity, and sees the Middle East poised for growth after decades of wars, woeful infrastructure, and popular discontent. Strategically, together with Russia, China is taking advantage of the uncertainty produced by ever-shifting U.S. policies, including zero-sum prescriptions for Iran and Syria that are unlikely to produce desired outcomes anytime soon. Regional governments in turn have welcomed China’s embrace, and its offer of investment without pressure to politically reform or respect human rights.

China’s President Xi Jinping previewed this more assertive Middle East strategy in a landmark address in Cairo three years ago. There, he declared that China does not seek a “sphere of influence” in the region—even while sinking nearly $100 billion in investments there through ports, roads, and rail projects. He alleged China rejects “proxy” contests—even while concluding a strategic partnership with Iran, the main sponsor of proxies in the region. And he warned against “all forms of discrimination and prejudice against any specific ethnic group and religion”—even while reportedly forcing 1 million Muslims into reeducation camps in China’s Xinjiang province.

Such contradictions can be maintained only so long as traditional U.S. allies in the region now welcoming Chinese investment allow them to be maintained. These U.S. allies do not shy from asserting their broader interests with Washington or expressing disagreement where policies diverge, and it is time they do the same with Beijing.

As the United States questions Chinese investment and intentions, particularly in the areas of technology and ports such as Israel’s Haifa, it can also challenge traditional allies as to whether they are granting China a free ride on what remains a largely U.S.-led security architecture. Such an arrangement should be as unacceptable to American partners in the region as it is to Washington. At the very least, these partners, together with Washington, can demand that Beijing utilize its emerging influence—particularly with Tehran and Damascus—to pursue measures that promote longer-term stability.

Read the rest at The Atlantic.

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Second Conference on "The Political Economy of Japan under the Abe Government"

March 1 - 2, 2019

Philippines Conference Room

Sponsored by: Japan Society for Promotion of Science, Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (Stanford University)

Organizers: Takeo Hoshi and Phillip Lipscy

 

 

Program

3/1/2019

8:45am   Breakfast

9:05am    Welcome Remark     Toru Tamiya (JSPS San Francisco Office)
                                                   Osamu Honda (Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership)

9:15am  "Abenomics and Japan's Entrepreneurship and Innovation: Is the Third Arrow Pointed in the Right Direction for Global Competition in the Silicon Valley Era?", Kenji Kushida (Stanford University)

Discussant:
Yong Suk Lee (Stanford University)

10:15am  Break

10:30am  "Abe’s Womanomics Policy: Did it have Effect on the closing of Gender Gap in Managers?", Nobuko Nagase (Ochanomizu University)

Discussant:
Curtis Milhaupt (Stanford University)

11:30am  Move to SIEPR Building for Lunch and Keynote Speech

11:45am  Lunch to conference participants

12:15pm  Lunch and Panel Discussion on Abenomics at SIEPR Building

Moderator: Takeo Hoshi
Panelists: Joshua Hausman
                   Takatoshi Ito
                  Nobuko Nagase
                  Steve Vogel

1:45pm   Panel ends and walk back to Encina Hall

2:00pm    "Abenomics, the Exchange Rate, and Markup Dynamics in Japanese Industries", Kyoji Fukao (Hitotsubashi University) and Shuichiro Nishioka (West Virginia University)

Discussant:
Yuhei Miyauchi (Stanford University and Boston University)

3:00pm  Break

3:30pm   "Abe's Reverse Course: How a Labor Shortage Transformed Labor Politics and Policy", Steven Vogel (University of California, Berkeley)

Discussant:
Kenji Kushida (Stanford University)


4:30pm   "The Crisis that Wasn’t: How Japan Has Avoided a Bond Market Panic", Mark T. Bamba and David E. Weinstein (Columbia University)

Discussant:
Johannes Wieland (University of California, San Diego)

5:30pm     Adjourn

 

3/2/2019

8:30am   Breakfast

9:00am   Welcome Remark
                 Moto Ono (Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership)

9:10am   "The Enduring Challenges of History Issues", Mary McCarthy (Drake Univesity)

Discussant:
Phillip Lipscy (Stanford University)

10:10am  Break

10:25am "Expansion of the Prime Minister's Power in the Japanese Parliamentary System", Harukata Takenaka (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)

Discussants:
Patricia Maclachlan (University of Texas)

11:25pm  "Abenomics: Est. in 2013, or 2007?", Takatoshi Ito (Columbia University)

                   Discussants:
                  Takeo Hoshi (Stanford University)

12:25pm  Lunch

1:30pm  "Abenomics, Monetary Policy, and Consumption", Joshua Hausman (University of Michigan), Takashi Unayama (Hitotsubashi University), and Johannes Wieland (University of California, San Diego)

Discussant:
Thuy Lan Nguyen (Santa Clara University)

2:30pm   "The Great Disconnect: The Decoupling of Wage and Price Inflation in Japan", Takeo Hoshi (Stanford University) and Anil Kashyap (University of Chicago)

Discussant:
Takashi Unayama (Hitotsubashi University)

3:30pm  Break

4:00pm   "Introduction", Takeo Hoshi (Stanford University) and Phillip Lipscy (Stanford University)

5:30pm  Adjourn

 

Conferences
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General Charles Brown, Commander, Pacific Air Forces, will discuss the strategic importance and complexity of the vast Indo-Pacific Region, and the increasing interstate competition for position and influence.  He will also address how U.S. national security priorities shape the development the Pacific Air Forces strategy and operational concepts.  Last, he will explain how his Command attempts to balance the requirements of U.S. joint forces and allied nations to produce combined airpower, and the importance of partner relationships in achieving comprehensive regional security.

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General Charles Brown
General Charles Q. Brown Jr. is the Commander, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF); Air Component Commander for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; and Executive Director, Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.  PACAF is responsible for Air Force activities spread over half the globe in a command that supports more than 46,000 Airmen serving principally in Japan, Korea, Hawaii, Alaska and Guam.

Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor, Central (C330)
616 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305

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This article originally appeared at Brookings.

 

Ukraine is halfway through a presidential election: The first round took place on March 31, and the run-off is coming up on April 21. At the annual Kyiv Security Forum and in other conversations in Kyiv last week, I had the opportunity to catch up on the latest developments in Ukraine, and came away with five key observations.

UKRAINE AGAIN SCORES A DEMOCRATIC ELECTION

Ukraine pulled off the March 31 election with no major hitch. Voting and ballot-counting proceeded smoothly. The Central Election Commission’s vote tallies corresponded with exit poll results and a non-governmental parallel count. The International Election Observer Mission (IEOM) released a preliminary assessment that noted some problems but termed the election competitive, reported that candidates campaigned freely, and said that the electorate had a broad choice.

The fact that Ukraine held a free, competitive presidential election should come as no surprise. The previous four presidential votes—the third round of the 2004 election (after the Supreme Court ordered a rerun of the run-off following the Orange Revolution), the general and run-off rounds of the 2010 election, and the 2014 election after the Maidan Revolution—all earned free, fair, and competitive assessments. Another indicator of a free and fair election: While he made it to the run-off, incumbent President Petro Poroshenko came in a distant second.

Sadly, Ukraine’s democratic experience remains a relative rarity in the post-Soviet space. Showing no sense of irony, Russian media cherry-picked criticisms from the IEOM’s assessment to disparage the overall election, yet that election contrasted markedly with the Russian presidential election in 2018. Indeed, in early March, few Ukrainians could say with certainty which two candidates would make it to the run-off; most Russians could have said with certainty who would win their 2018 presidential election as early as 2013.

BARRING A MIRACLE, IT WILL BE PRESIDENT ZELENSKY

TV comedian Volodymyr Zelensky won the first round, capturing 30.24 percent of the popular vote to Poroshenko’s 15.95 percent. Pre-election polls projected a Zelensky win (the question was who would face him in the run-off). His rise since announcing his candidacy in late December is striking. Six or eight months ago, pundits projected a run-off between Poroshenko and former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, who came in third.

Poroshenko received more bad news on April 11, with the release of the first polls regarding the run-off. One showed Zelensky ahead 51 percent to 21 percent, with an even bigger lead of 61 percent to 24 percent among those likely to vote. A second poll of those likely to vote gave Zelensky a yet wider margin: 71 percent to 24 percent. Those numbers pose a daunting challenge for the incumbent, who appears competitive only in western Ukraine.

Poroshenko deserves credit for overseeing some impressive reforms, and he has had to cope with a low-intensity war with Russia. Reforms, however, slowed after 2016. Voters felt that Poroshenko had not done enough to fight corruption or challenge the outsized political and economic influence of the country’s oligarchs. He also suffered from an under-performing economy. The electorate wanted change.

It is difficult to see how Poroshenko can turn things around in the short time before Sunday’s run-off, though a few still believe he has a chance. They argue the electorate emotionally cast a protest vote but now must ask who really should lead the country: Poroshenko or a political neophyte.

The president’s campaign has gone negative, seeking to portray the run-off as a choice between Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin. That appears to be having little impact. On the evening of April 11, the president crashed a TV talk show on a pro-Zelensky network and had a brief, bitter telephone exchange with his rival. The episode carried a whiff of desperation. Poroshenko says he wants to debate Zelensky, but the two cannot agree on details. Zelensky did not show up at Poroshenko’s proposed debate on April 14, and the president says he will not turn up at Zelensky’s proposed venue on April 19.

WHO IS ZELENSKY?

Ukrainians and Western diplomats are trying to figure out what a Zelensky presidency would mean. One senior Ukrainian official’s comment—the comedian “is talented and smart, but how will he govern if he wins?”—reflects the views of many.

On television, Zelensky plays a common man thrust unexpectedly into the presidency, where he wages war against the ills that trouble Ukraine. The show is called Sluha Narodu (Servant of the People). During the campaign, Zelensky gave few interviews, held no campaign rallies, and did not lay out positions in any detail, instead letting his television persona define his image.

Zelensky has described in generalities a readiness to negotiate with Putin but with the goal of recovering all Russian-occupied territories; support for joining the European Union and NATO; and a desire to end corruption and fully liberalize the economy. His supporters—who include several noted reformers—describe a Russia-wary, pro-Western candidate who will put fighting corruption at the top of his agenda. Some suggest Zelensky would take a hard line with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its conditions. That could prove tricky. Ukraine needs financing, and no bank matches IMF rates.

Other Ukrainians hold a darker view of a Zelensky presidency. They express concern about his links to Ihor Kolomoisky, an oligarch who owns the network that broadcasts Sluha Narodu. Kolomoisky now resides in Israel after his bank, the largest in Ukraine, was taken over by Ukraine’s central bank following charges of financial improprieties. Critics question Zelensky’s lack of political experience, his ability to deal with Putin, and his commitment to a pro-Western course.

Zelensky reportedly this week will name key members of his team, including the foreign and defense ministers, chief of the general staff, head of the Security Service of Ukraine and procurator general. That could provide indications as to his planned direction.

A debate would provide Zelensky the venue to further define his prospective presidency and allow the country’s voters an opportunity to compare and contrast the positions of the run-off candidates. But a debate likely is not in the cards. Zelensky easily bested his opponents in the first round by avoiding specifics; why change a winning strategy now?

THE RUSSIANS—THE DOG THAT DIDN’T BARK?

Many expected the Russians, who used force to seize and illegally annex Crimea in 2014 and then fostered a simmering conflict in the eastern region of Donbas, to interfere in Ukraine’s election. They undoubtedly did—but with little apparent effect.

Ukrainian officials say Russian hackers had probed the Central Election Commission’s systems but without success. One noted that the Russians seemed more focused on general destabilization of the country rather than the election.

The Kremlin has made clear it wants Poroshenko to be a one-term president. Beyond that, however, Russian officials have taken care not to endorse a particular candidate, perhaps understanding that a “Russian favorite” tag would not prove helpful. Yuriy Boyko, head of the Opposition Bloc—the closest thing in Ukraine to a pro-Russian party—visited Moscow on the eve of the election and returned with a plan to obtain cheaper gas. That might have helped him in the eastern part of the country, from where most of his votes came. He did better than expected but still finished fourth.

The fact that part of Donbas remains occupied by Russian and Russian proxy forces severely hampers the election prospects for someone such as Boyko. The population there, which historically has favored close relations with Russia, could not vote. Nor could the population of Crimea, the only part of Ukraine in which ethnic Russians constitute a majority.

IT’S NOT OVER UNTIL IT’S OVER

Ukrainians will know their next president late on April 21, though the official vote may take a week to report. The winner will be inaugurated no later than 30 days after the Central Election Commission announces the official result. But another national ballot looms on October 27: the Rada (parliament) elections.

The majority coalition that emerges after the new Rada is seated will select the prime minister. Zelensky, if he becomes president, will need to build his political party—named, not coincidentally, Sluha Narodu—to secure a large bloc in the Rada. That matters, as executive power in Ukraine is bifurcated, with the prime minister choosing most of the cabinet. Other parties could see defections from their ranks if Sluha Narodu builds steam, but speculation has already begun about the kind of opposition might emerge.

Some see a possibility that Zelensky might try to force snap elections in order to translate a big win on April 21 into a quick Rada win for Sluha Narodu. However, that does not appear legally possible. The Rada cannot be dismissed within six months of the end of its term. That clock starts ticking in late May, and procedural rules would not allow a newly inaugurated president time to call an early election before the six-month period began.

Politics in Ukraine have never been easy or straightforward, and they have at several points taken radical turns. The country may be entering one such period now. How Zelensky—assuming he wins on Sunday—takes on presidential responsibilities and manages the complex politics that follow will matter greatly for Ukraine’s ability to continue its reform path, deepen integration with Europe, secure peace, and regain occupied territories…all despite Russian efforts to return it to Moscow’s orbit.

 

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EMERGING ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIA

A Special Seminar Series


RSVP required by Wednesday, April 17, 2019

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ABSTRACT: Why does success in combat sometimes fail to produce a stable and durable peace settlement? In the 1965 war, India successfully repelled a Pakistani invasion of the disputed territory of Kashmir, captured new territory, and launched a massive counter-offensive – but it did not improve the long-term security of Kashmir or deter future Pakistani aggression. This presentation offers an explanation that shows how war can help to establish deterrence between enduring rivals. I argue combat success is important, but must be paired with costly signals of resolve. In 1965, India achieved combat success but failed to deliver such signals of resolve: it did not permanently retain the Kashmiri territory it captured, and it deliberately limited the strategic threat posed by its counter-offensive. As a result, India defended against invasion without establishing post-war deterrence. India’s current military strategy continues to favor ineffective and potentially destabilizing concepts of deterrence. This carries implications not only for regional security, but also U.S. strategy, which increasingly depends on India to maintain a favorable and stable regional balance of power.
 
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Arzan Tarapore
PROFILE:
Arzan Tarapore is a nonresident fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, an adjunct defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, and from Fall 2019, an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University. His research lies at the intersection of South Asian politics and military strategy. His current book project explains the concept of strategic effectiveness, drawing on in-depth historical case studies of India’s war-fighting experience since 1965. Prior to his scholarly career, Arzan served for 13 years in the Australian Defence Department, which included operational deployments and a diplomatic posting to Washington, DC. He holds a PhD in war studies from King’s College London.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philippines Conference RoomEncina Hall, 3rd Floor, Central616 Serra Street, Stanford, CA 94305
Arzan Tarapore Nonresident fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research
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Ketian Zhang
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On March 31, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that two Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) J-11 jets crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait. This violated the long-held tacit agreement between China and Taiwan that neither side should cross the median line.

Taiwan deemed this “an intentional, reckless & provocative action,” which triggered “a 10-minute standoff” in the air. As Asia security expert Bonnie S. Glaser notes that, if intentional, this would be the first PLAAF crossing of the median line in about 20 years. In this case, it’s likely that Taiwan, not the South China Sea, prompted Beijing’s actions.

An unresolved issue from the Chinese civil war, Taiwan has always been a “core interest” to party leaders in Beijing. Here are some key takeaways from my research on China-Taiwan relations…

Read the full article in The Washington Post.


To hear more from Ketian, don't miss her recently posted video Q&A. In addition, be sure to RSVP for her April 16 seminar "Killing the Chicken to Scare the Monkey: Explaining Coercion by China in the South China Sea."

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The marines of China navy participate in the annual military training on January 3, 2018 in Zhanjiang,
ZHANJIANG, CHINA - JANUARY 03: The marines of China navy participate in the annual military training on January 3, 2018 in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province of China.
Pu Haiyang/VCG via Getty Images
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We sat down with our 2018-19 Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow in Contemporary Asia Ketian Zhang to discuss China's use of coercion in foreign policy; her research on  South China Sea disputes; her forthcoming articles; and the fellowship experience in general. To hear more from Ketian, RSVP for her April 16 seminar "Killing the Chicken to Scare the Monkey: Explaining Coercion by China in the South China Sea."

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Ketian Zhang participating in Q&A Thom Holme, APARC
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