Originally proposed by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955—but rejected by the Soviet Union—the Open Skies idea was revived by President George H. W. Bush in 1989 as a confidence-building measure to promote greater transparency regarding military installations, forces and activities. The Open Skies Treaty permits state parties to conduct unarmed observation flights over other state parties. It entered into force in 2002 and currently has thirty-four state parties—the United States, Canada, Russia, Kazakhstan and thirty other countries in Europe. All total, they have conducted more than fifteen hundred observation overflights.

For each state party or group of state parties, the treaty specifies an active quota, the number of observation overflights it may conduct per year, and a passive quota, the number of overflights it must accept. Observation aircraft can carry video and still cameras, infrared line scanners and synthetic aperture radars, though the capabilities of the equipment (e.g., resolution) are limited. When an Open Skies aircraft conducts an overflight, officials of the observed state party get to inspect the aircraft to ensure that it is carrying only permitted equipment and fly onboard.

Criticism of Open Skies

In October 2019, President Donald Trump reportedly signed a memorandum regarding his intention to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty. The following month, U.S. officials briefed NATO on U.S. concerns and warned that the United States would probably leave the treaty. Treaty critics seem to have three principal concerns.

First, critics note that Russia has violated the treaty. Moscow restricts the distance that observation flights can fly over the exclave of Kaliningrad and bars flights along the Russian border with the Georgian-breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The treaty limits flights near borders with non-state parties and the Russians argue that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are independent nations, a position few other countries recognize.

In response to the Russian violation, the United States has imposed roughly reciprocal limitations on Russian flights over U.S. territory, restricting, for example, overflights of Hawaii. Russia has violated the treaty, but Washington has responded proportionately within the treaty.

Second, opponents of the Open Skies Treaty argue that, over the past thirty years, commercial satellites have developed capabilities, such as camera resolution, similar to or better than the equipment carried on Open Skies aircraft. They assert that makes observation flights unnecessary and redundant.

Aircraft, however, are more flexible than satellites, which fly in fixed orbits. Moreover, aircraft can fly below cloud cover that can obscure photography taken from space.

Third, critics express concern that the Russians use observation flights to gather information on U.S. infrastructure as well as military facilities and activities. But how much of a threat is this? Critics seem to ignore the fact that, much like the United States, Russia operates imagery satellites whose capabilities are equal to or better than those permitted on Open Skies aircraft.

Advantages of Open Skies

U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty would mean forgoing a number of advantages. First, Open Skies imagery and other data can be used in ways that U.S. satellite imagery, which is highly classified, cannot. U.S. officials explained publicly only in November 2018 the basis for their 2014 assessment that Russia had violated the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty by testing a prohibited cruise missile. Satellite imagery almost certainly figured in that assessment, but that imagery remains closely held because the U.S. government wants to protect the capabilities of its satellites. Open Skies data, on the other hand, could readily be used to demonstrate a violation of an agreement or some threatening military activity.

Second, the United States conducts far more overflights of Russia and Belarus (the two are paired as a group of state parties) than vice-versa. According to the Department of State, during the first fifteen years of the treaty’s operation, the United States made 196 observation flights over Russia and Belarus while Russia/Belarus made just seventy-one flights over U.S. territory. Moreover, U.S. allies conducted five hundred other flights over Russia and Belarus.

Third, few countries possess the sophisticated space-based reconnaissance capabilities that the United States and Russia have. The treaty allows other states parties to conduct overflights and directly gather confidence-building data. U.S. allies value Open Skies; a number, including Germany, France and Britain, have urged Washington to remain within the treaty.

Fourth, Open Skies can provide a particularly useful tool in times or regions of crisis. Russian and Russian proxy forces have been in conflict with Ukrainian forces in the Donbas region since spring 2014. The United States has targeted observation flights—sometimes in cooperation with Ukraine—at Donbas and Russian territory bordering Donbas. These overflights not only gather data but send a signal of U.S. political support to Ukraine.

U.S. Withdrawal?

Should Trump unwisely decide to withdraw from the treaty, it could mean the treaty’s end. With Russia no longer having the possibility of flights over the United States, it might also withdraw. That would likely provide the death knell for the treaty; with just NATO members and a few neutral states remaining in the agreement, what would be the point? Alternatively, Moscow could choose to remain in the treaty, which would highlight the U.S. absence (and allow Russian overflights to continue over American military facilities and activities in Europe).

In either case, political blame would fall on the United States. Given allied support for continuing the treaty, a U.S. withdrawal would be seen in Europe as one more instance where Washington ignored the views of its NATO partners.

Withdrawal would constitute yet another blow to arms control inflicted by the Trump administration. It left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding Iran. It refused to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (even though it seems to see no reason for nuclear testing). It eschewed political and military steps that would have increased pressure on Russia to return to compliance with the INF Treaty. It so far refuses Moscow’s offer to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expires in eleven months.

Trump over the past year has said that he wants to go big on arms control and negotiate an agreement with Russia and China covering all types of nuclear arms, but his administration has yet to offer a proposal or even an outline for doing so. A decision to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty would provide the latest evidence that he sees little point in arms control.

Steven Pifer is a William Perry Research Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. 

Originally for The National Interest

APARC’s Southeast Asia Program recently hosted the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Dan Kritenbrink, who joined faculty members from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and other Stanford experts for a roundtable discussion about U.S.-Vietnam relations and U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia.

Ambassador Kritenbrink outlined the priorities of the U.S. Mission Vietnam and commended the Vietnamese leadership on its cooperation on a range of issues that span economic development, nuclear nonproliferation, regional security, and people-to-people ties.

The year 2020 marks a quarter of a century since the United States and Vietnam established diplomatic relations. Vietnam is now the fastest-growing economy in Southeast Asia and has emerged as a U.S. partner in pushing back against Beijing's claims in the South China Sea. Yet there are limits to the partnership, as Vietnam is not a democracy and its communist government, having adopted a hedging strategy, is pursuing a multi-country foreign policy, including advancing defense ties with Russia. 

Roundtable discussion participants listening to Ambassador Kritenbrink..

The issues considered during the roundtable discussion with the Ambassador included some of the challenges and opportunities for Vietnam, which has more leverage to engage the region this year as it serves as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It certainly has a full agenda for its chairmanship amid geopolitical tensions in the region, the need to balance the U.S.-China friction, the spread of COVID-19, a slowdown in global trade, and the looming environmental and social impacts posed by the threats to the Mekong river.

Ambassador Kritenbrink began his posting in Vietnam in November 2017 and has served as an American diplomat since 1994. He has completed multiple assignments related to Asia, including the roles of senior advisor for North Korea policy at the Department of State; senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, where he worked on Vietnam and oversaw the negotiation of two Joint Statements regarding the U.S. Comprehensive Partnership with Vietnam; seven years in senior roles in the U.S. Embassy Beijing; and three prior diplomatic postings in Japan.

Shorenstein APARC is pleased to announce that Arzan Tarapore has been appointed a research scholar supporting the Center’s efforts to promote policy-relevant research, education, and public engagement on contemporary South Asia. In addition to conducting research and providing mentorship on South Asia security and geopolitical issues, Tarapore will organize public programming exploring the trends and challenges shaping the region. He will also cultivate cooperative relationships with stakeholders in the academic and policy communities in South Asia. His appointment is effective September 1, 2020.

Tarapore is currently a non-resident fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, as well as an adjunct professor with the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and an adjunct researcher at the RAND Corporation. His research focuses on security issues in South Asia and the rapidly evolving strategic landscape of the wider Indo-Pacific. Prior to his scholarly career, he served for thirteen years in the Australian Defence Department in various analytic, management, and liaison positions, including operational deployments and a diplomatic posting to the Australian Embassy in Washington, DC.

“We are delighted to have Arzan join APARC,” said Center Director Gi-Wook Shin. “APARC has more than a decade-long record of South Asia research and publishing activities as part of a previous initiative, which we are keen to revitalize. Arzan’s unique experience, combining scholarship with government service and diplomatic assignments, will be a tremendous asset to our community as we advance policy-relevant research and training on South Asia and U.S. strategy in the larger Indo-Pacific. We look forward to welcoming him to Stanford in September.”

Tarapore’s academic work has been published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Asia Policy, and Joint Force Quarterly, among others, and his policy commentary frequently appears on platforms such as the Hindu, the Indian Express, The National Interest, the Lowy Institute's Interpreter, the Brookings Institution’s Lawfare, and War on the Rocks.

"I am enormously excited to join Stanford's world-class community of scholars, and especially to be at the forefront of APARC's renewed focus on South Asia,” said Tarapore. “Our work will center on the opportunity – and the pressing need – to deepen our connections with the region, and to meaningfully inform debates on U.S. policy in the wider Indo-Pacific." 

Tarapore holds a PhD in war studies from King's College London, an MSc from the London School of Economics, and a BA (Hons) from the University of New South Wales. His research experience includes previous roles at the East-West Center in Washington and the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

Media Contact
Noa Ronkin
Associate Director for Communications and External Relations
Shorenstein APARC

A Q&A with Professor Stephen Stedman, who serves as the Secretary General of the Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age.

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At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, the Commission which includes FSI’s Nathaniel Persily, Alex Stamos, and Toomas Ilves, launched a new report, Protecting Electoral Integrity in the Digital Age. The report takes an in-depth look at the challenges faced by democracy today and makes a number of recommendations as to how best to tackle the threats posed by social media to free and fair elections. On Tuesday, February 25, professors Stedman and Persily will discuss the report’s findings and recommendations during a lunch seminar from 12-1:15 PM. To learn more and to RSVP, visit the event page.

Q: What are some of the major findings of the report? Are digital technologies a threat to democracy?

Steve Stedman: Our report suggests that social media and the Internet pose an acute threat to democracy, but probably not in the way that most people assume. Many people believe that the problem is a diffuse one based on excess disinformation and a decline in the ability of citizens to agree on facts. We too would like the quality of deliberation in our democracy to improve and we worry about how social media might degrade democratic debate, but if we are talking about existential threats to democracy the problem is that digital technologies can be weaponized to undermine the integrity of elections.

When we started our work, we were struck by how many pathologies of democracy are said to be caused by social media: political polarization; distrust in fellow citizens, government institutions and traditional media; the decline in political parties; democratic deliberation, and on and on. Social media is said to lessen the quality of democracy because it encourages echo chambers and filter bubbles where we only interact with those who share our political beliefs. Some platforms are said to encourage extremism through their algorithms.

What we found, instead, is a much more complex problem. Many of the pathologies that social media are said to create – for instance, polarization, distrust, and political sorting begin their trendlines before the invention of the Internet, let alone the smart phone. Some of the most prominent claims are unsupported by evidence, or are confounded by conflicting evidence. In fact, we say that some assertions simply cannot be judged without access to data held by the tech platforms.

Instead, we rely on the work of scholars like Yochai Benkler and Edda Humphries to argue that not all democracies are equally vulnerable to network propaganda and disinformation. It is precisely where you have high pre-existing affective polarization, low trust, and hyperpartisan media, that digital technologies can intensify and amplify polarization.

Elections and toxic polarization are a volatile mix. Weaponized disinformation and hate speech can wreak havoc on elections, even if they don’t alter the vote tallies. This is because democracies require a system of mutual security. In established democracies political candidates and followers take it for granted that if they lose an election, they will be free to organize and contest future elections. They are confident that the winners will not use their power to eliminate them or disenfranchise them. Winners have the expectation that they hold power temporarily, and accept that they cannot change the rules of competition to stay in power forever. In short, mutual security is a set of beliefs and norms that turn elections from being a one-shot game into a repeated game with a long shadow of the future.

In a situation already marred by toxic polarization, we fear that weaponized disinformation and hate speech can cause parties and followers to believe that the other side doesn’t believe in the rules of mutual security. The stakes become higher. Followers begin to believe that losing an election means losing forever. The temptation to cheat and use violence increases dramatically. 

Q: As far as political advertising, the report encourages platforms to provide more transparency about who is funding that advertising. But it also asks that platforms require candidates to make a pledge that they will avoid deceptive campaign practices when purchasing ads. It also goes as far as to recommend financial penalties for a platform if, for example, a bot spreading information is not labelled as such. Some platforms might argue that this puts an unfair onus on them. How might platforms be encouraged to participate in this effort?

SS: The platforms have a choice: they can contribute to toxic levels of political polarization and the degradation of democratic deliberation, or they can protect electoral integrity and democracy. There are a lot of employees of the platforms who are alarmed at the state of polarization in this country and don’t want their products to be conduits of weaponized disinformation and hate speech. You saw this in the letter signed by Facebook employees objecting to the decision by Mark Zuckerberg that Facebook would treat political advertising as largely exempt from their community standards. If ever there were a moment in this country that we should demand that our political parties and candidates live up to a higher ethical standard it is now. Instead Facebook decided to allow political candidates to pay to run ads even if the ads use disinformation, tell bald-faced lies, engage in hate speech, and use doctored video and audio. Their rationale is that this is all part of “the rough and tumble of politics.” In doing so, Facebook is in the contradictory position that it has hundreds of employees working to stop disinformation and hate speech in elections in Brazil and India, but is going to allow politicians and parties in the United States to buy ads that can use disinformation and hate speech.

Our recommendation gives Facebook an option that allows political advertisement in a way that need not enflame polarization and destroy mutual security among candidates and followers: 1.) Require that candidates, groups or parties who want to pay for political advertising on Facebook sign a pledge of ethical digital practices; 2.) Then use the standards to determine if an ad meets the pledge or not. If an ad uses deep fakes, if an ad grotesquely distorts the facts, if an ad out and out lies about what an opponent said or did, then Facebook would not accept the ad. Facebook can either help us raise our electoral politics out of the sewer or it can ensure that our politics drowns in it.

It’s worth pointing out that the platforms are only one actor in a many-sided problem. Weaponized disinformation is actively spread by unscrupulous politicians and parties; it is used by foreign countries to undermine electoral integrity; and it is often spread and amplified by irresponsible partisan traditional media. Fox News, for example, ran the crazy conspiracy story about Hilary Clinton running a pedophile ring out of a pizza parlor in DC. Individuals around the president, including the son of the first National Security Adviser tweeted the story. 

Q: While many of the recommendations focus on the role of platforms and governments, the report also proposes that public authorities promote digital and media literacy in schools as well as public interest programming for the general population. What might that look like? And how would that type of literacy help protect democracy? 

SS: Our report recommends digital literacy programs as a means to help build democratic resilience against weaponized disinformation. Having said that however, the details matter tremendously. Sam Wineburg at Stanford, who we cite, has extremely insightful ideas for how to teach citizens to evaluate the information they see on the Internet, but even he puts forward warnings: if done poorly digital literacy could simply increase citizen distrust of all media, good and bad; digital literacy in a highly polarized context begs the question of who will decide what is good and bad media. We say in passing that in addition to digital literacy we need to train citizens to understand biased assimilation of information. Digital literacy trains citizens to understand who is behind a piece of information and who benefits from it. But we also need to teach citizens to stand back and ask, “why am I predisposed to want to believe this piece of information?”

Q: Obviously access to data is critical for researchers and commissioners to do their work, analysis and reporting. One of the recommendations asks that public authorities compel major internet platforms to share meaningful data with academic institutions. Why is it so important for platforms and academia to share information?

SS: Some of the most important claims about the effects of social media can’t be evaluated without access to the data. One example we cite in the report is the controversy about whether YouTube’s algorithms radicalize individuals and send them down a rabbit hole of racist, nationalist content. This is a common claim and has appeared on the front pages of the New York Times. The research supporting the claim, however, is extremely thin, and other research disputes it. What we say is that we can’t adjudicate this argument unless YouTube were to share its data, so that researchers can see what the algorithm is doing. There are similar debates concerning the effects of Facebook. One of our commissioners, Nate Persily, has been at the forefront of working with Facebook to provide certified researchers with privacy protected data – Social Science One. Progress has been so slow that the researchers have lost patience. We hope that governments can step in and compel the platforms to share the data.

Q: This is one of the first reports to look at this problem in the Global South. Is the problem more or less critical there?

SS: Kofi Annan was very concerned that the debate about digital technologies and democracy was far too focused on Europe and the United States. Before Cambridge Analytica’s involvement in the United States and Brexit elections of 2016, its predecessor company had manipulated elections in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. There is now a transnational industry in election manipulation.

What we found does not bode well for democracies in the rest of the world. The factors that make democracies vulnerable to network propaganda and weaponized disinformation are often present in the Global South: pre-existing polarization, low trust, and hyperpartisan traditional media. Many of these democracies already have a repertoire of electoral violence. 

On the other hand, we did find innovative partnerships in Indonesia and Mexico where Election Management Bodies, civil society organizations, and traditional media cooperated to fight disinformation during elections, often with success. An important recommendation of the report is that greater attention and resources are needed for such efforts to protect electoral integrity in the Global South. 

About the Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age

 As one of his last major initiatives, in 2018 Kofi Annan convened the Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age. The Commission includes members from civil society and government, the technology sector, academia and media; across the year 2019 they examined and reviewed the opportunities and challenges for electoral integrity created by technological innovations. Assisted by a small secretariat at Stanford University and the Kofi Annan Foundation, the Commission has undertaken extensive consultations and issue recommendations as to how new technologies, social media platforms and communication tools can be harnessed to engage, empower and educate voters, and to strengthen the integrity of elections. Visit  the Kofi Annan Foundation and the Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age for more on their work.