In arguing that the United States has achieved nuclear primacy and thereby made mutual assured destruction obsolete, Lieber and Press rely on some questionable assumptions about the status of Russia's strategic forces.

To make their case that the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal "has sharply deteriorated," Lieber and Press quote statistics showing that Russia today has "39 percent fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer SSBNs [ballistic-missile-launching submarines] than the Soviet Union fielded during its last days." These numbers are generally correct, but a similarly one-sided examination of U.S. forces would have painted a similarly dire portrait; after all, the U.S. nuclear arsenal today has 66 percent fewer strategic bombers, 50 percent fewer ICBMs, and more than 50 percent fewer ballistic missile submarines than it possessed during the Cold War.

Lieber and Press claim that Russia's strategic bombers "rarely conduct training exercises," implying that Russia's military is neglecting strategic aviation. Yet Russia's strategic air forces participated in four major exercises in 2005 alone. Similarly, Lieber and Press refer to a number of failures during launches of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in 2004 to illustrate the decline of the Russian navy. But they do not mention the much larger number of successful launches or the Bulava SLBM development program, which has been quite successful so far.

It may be true, as Lieber and Press write, that "over 80 percent of Russia's silo-based ICBMs have exceeded their original service lives," but regular and successful tests of ICBMs that have been kept in silos for 25 years or longer suggest that this has not affected the missiles' reliability. Russia is decommissioning its ICBMs not because they are unreliable but because it does not need them. Lieber and Press claim that the development of the next-generation Russian ICBM, the Topol-M, has been "stymied by failed tests." But of 15 flight tests conducted to date, only one has failed -- a remarkable achievement for any missile-development program. It is true that the production rate of new Topol-Ms is low, but that may be because Russia has decided to concentrate on producing the mobile version of the missile, which it will begin deploying this year.

Lieber and Press are right to state that Russia may end up having as few as 150 land-based missiles by the end of the decade. But about half of those ICBMs would probably be road-mobile Topols and Topol-Ms, which, if operated properly, would have a good chance of surviving a first strike. Lieber and Press dismiss Russia's mobile missiles by saying that they "rarely patrol." In reality, very little is known about Russia's mobile-missile patrol rates, and although it is quite plausible that they are low, it is a stretch to assume that they are zero.

Lieber and Press describe Russia's early warning system as "a mess." In fact, although the system is past its prime, it has lost surprisingly little of its effectiveness. It may seem counterintuitive, but Russia would gain very little were its early warning system to be deployed to the fullest extent. Adding the capability to detect SLBM launches would not dramatically increase the time available to the Russian leadership for assessing attacks. The much-discussed "gaping hole" in the radar coverage east of Russia also should be put in context. Missiles launched from the Pacific could not cover the entire range of Russian targets that would need to be destroyed in a first strike. The scenario that Lieber and Press postulate, in which "Russian leaders probably would not know of the attack until the warheads detonated" because of flaws in their early warning system, is simply impossible.

The European Forum has taken a new name: The Forum on Contemporary Europe. This new name reflects the focus on contemporary issues facing Europe and its trans-Atlantic and global relations at the start of the twenty-first century. The change also reflects the directors' ambitious plans for growth in the near to mid-term future to meet scholarly and public dissemination needs for a program of research residencies, visionary teaching, and notable publications. The Forum's focus on Europe today spotlights timely issues and prominent figures in venues including:

Europe Now - Annual lecture by a prominent European public figure that addresses political, economic, security, and environmental issues facing the region and trans-Atlantic relations. This year's address will be delivered by the European Parliament's Greens/European Free Alliance Co-President, Daniel Cohn-Bendit.

European Integration/Payne Distinguished Lecture - Lecture by a prominent European public figure that addresses timely issues of integrating the expanding number of EU member states. This year's address will be delivered by best-selling author Ian McEwan.

Austrian and Central European Studies - The Forum will host an address on Austria's immediate past presidency of the European Council, delivered by the Honorable Eva Nowotny, Austrian Ambassador to the United States. The Ambassador's address will introduce the 2006-2007 interdisciplinary research and teaching program that brings a senior professor from an Austrian national competition to Stanford for a full-year Austrian chair position, and includes a multi-year conference meeting in Vienna and at Stanford. This year the program will also include a research symposium on the fiftieth anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

EU-US Trade Relations conference - Annual event addressing international trade issues, global markets, and the interface between developing and developed countries.

Europe's changing ethnography research and lecture theme - The Forum sponsors researchers and public figures on a wide range of contemporary issues, and is scheduling a series of speakers and research projects on this year's topic of the changing ethnographic make-up of the European community.

Through this growth, the Forum continues to be dedicated to innovative thinking about Europe in the new millennium. The expansion of the European Union deepens the challenges of democratic governance, economic growth, security, and cultural integration. The increasingly complex challenges facing Europe and its global relations - including labor migration, strains on welfare economies, local identities, globalized cultures, expansion and integration, and threats of terrorism, coupled with Europe's recent struggle to ratify a single constitution - underline the need for analysis informed by public figures with policy background. Established in 1997, the Forum conducts trans-Atlantic research and convenes public programs to offer creative and cooperative solutions. Distinct from many academic programs at U.S. research universities, the European Forum at FSI focuses on public programs and the wide-spread dissemination of its research findings. The Forum focuses study of Europe on research themes including FSI's priority emphasis on international political economy, security, global environment, and good governance.

The Forum on Contemporary Europe is pleased to announce the hire of Dr. Roland Hsu as Assistant Director. Dr. Hsu is responsible for the Forum's daily operations, and works closely with the Forum's Director, Professor Amir Eshel, and Program Assistant Nancy Easterbrook on strategic planning and research and public dissemination program designs. Dr. Hsu is also Lecturer in the Introduction to Humanities Program at Stanford University. Dr. Hsu has been brought on board to develop the Forum's ambitious plans to expand its programs, to identify and coordinate international research teams, and to support flexible, interdisciplinary projects that respond in practical terms to the dynamics of European studies.

Founded in 1997, the Forum at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) has created a program for new thinking about Europe in the new millennium. The increasingly complex challenges facing Europe and its global relations - including labor migration, strains on welfare economies, local identities, globalized cultures, expansion and integration, and threats of terrorism, coupled with Europe's recent struggle to ratify a single constitution, underline the need at this point to build on the Forum's success and utilize Dr. Hsu's faculty research and senior administrative experience to shape the growth of the Forum as a sustained and dynamic inter-disciplinary program.

The directors' plans for the Forum's growth include sustained research residencies, a visionary teaching program, and an influential publication series. The plans aim to make the program address the most pressing issues facing Europe and its trans-Atlantic and global relations at the start of the 21st century. Along with the affiliated research programs at FSI, the Forum will also play an important part in advancing the agenda of Stanford's International Initiative - the campus-wide effort, based in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, to bring together faculty, researchers and students to address the global challenges of peace and security, governance, and human well-being. The Forum's scholars will analyze models for answers to these challenges in case studies of Western and Eastern European, Scandinavian, and European Union histories and policy initiatives.

Before coming to Stanford Dr. Hsu was Assistant Professor of Modern European History at the University of Idaho, and Senior Associate Director of Undergraduate Advising and Research at Stanford, as well as Academic Advisor in the College of the University of Chicago. At Chicago Dr. Hsu earned his doctorate in Modern European History, and taught in the Humanities and also served as Assistant Director of the University Writing Programs. His research and teaching explore the relationship between politics, art, and memory. Dr. Hsu wrote his dissertation on modern European intellectual and cultural history at the University of Chicago. His most recent work on post-Revolutionary France reconsiders the use of the analytic category of memory in historical interpretation. The book manuscript in progress: Troubling Memory: Making Monuments, Tourists, and a Collective Past in Nineteenth-Century France engages scholarly literature on collective memory by reintroducing gender, work, and neighborhood network identities to differentiate the "collectivities" of collective memory.

The National Security Agency is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside a code. Secrets lie within. Located in Fort Meade, Md., it dwarfs the CIA. Its budget is black, unknown. And, most disturbing of all, it is the world's largest employer of mathematicians.

One of its secrets, recently revealed, is that it's monitoring millions of phone calls to learn just who was calling whom. (Technically, only telephone numbers are being recorded, but you don't have to be Q from James Bond to get a name from a number.) This information was being used to determine who might be a terrorist.

Legal or not, the spying program isn't worth violating our civil liberties for. The information one can glean will hardly help us win the war on terror.

With the NSA data, you can draw a picture with nodes or dots representing individuals, and lines between nodes if one person has called another. Mathematicians who work with pictures like this are called graph theorists. The field of social network analysis deals with trying to determine information about a group from such a graph, such as who the key players are or who the cell leaders might be.

But even when you know everyone in the graph is a terrorist, graphs don't contain information about the order or hierarchy of the cell. Researchers look instead for graph features like centrality: They try to identify nodes that are connected to a lot of other nodes, like spokes around the hub of a bicycle wheel. Monterey Naval Postgraduate School researcher Ted Lewis, in his textbook "Critical Infrastructure Protection," defines a critical node to be such a central hub.

There are two problems. First, the central player might not be as important as the hub metaphor suggests. Jafar Adibi of the University of Southern California looked at e-mail traffic between Enron employees before Enron collapsed, and drew the graph. He found that if you naively analyzed the graph, you could mistakenly conclude that one of the central players was CEO Ken Lay's ... secretary. But that wasn't the person who ran the company into the ground.

Second, as the journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism reported in 2003, you can kill all the central players in a terrorist cell and still leave the cell with a complete chain of command -- still capable of carrying out a devastating attack.

Expert Kathleen Carley of Carnegie Mellon was able to correctly predict -- twice -- who would take over Hamas when its leaders were assassinated, and her analysis used detailed information about the individuals in the organization, not just what anonymous nodes were linked with what. The moral is that the graph theory approach is inadequate. For useful results, it's important to utilize the lattice theory approach, which takes into account order and hierarchy.

The other questionable aspect of the NSA spying program is that it seeks to work out who might be a terrorist based on their calling patterns. While I agree that anyone calling 1 (800) AL-QAEDA is probably a terrorist, guilt by association is not just bad law, it's bad mathematics, for three reasons.

The simplest reason is that we're all connected. Not in the Haight-Ashbury/Timothy Leary/late-period-Beatles kind of way, but in the sense of the Kevin Bacon game. Sociologist Stanley Milgram took individuals unknown to each other, separated by a continent, and asked one person to send a package to the other -- but only by sending the package to an individual he or she knew, who could then only send the package to someone he knew, and so on. While Milgram's interpretation of the results has since been questioned, the conclusion that emerged is that it took only six mailings, on average, for each package to reach its intended destination.

For example, President Bush is only three steps away from Osama bin Laden. And terrorist hermits like the Unabomber might be connected only to very few people. So much for guilt by association.

The second reason the NSA methodology is flawed is the concept "strength of weak ties," made famous by Stanford sociologist Mark Granovetter. Robert Spulak of the Joint Special Operations University puts it this way: You might not see your college roommate for 10 years, but if he were to call you up and ask to stay in your apartment, you'd let him. This is the principle under which sleeper cells operate: There is no communication for years. The links between nodes that the NSA is looking for simply might not exist for the real threats.

Formal concept analysis, a branch of lattice theory, helps rectify this situation. Individuals who share many of the same characteristics are grouped together as one node, and links between nodes in this picture, called a concept lattice, indicate that all the members of a certain subgroup, with certain attributes, must also have other attributes. For instance, you might group together people based on what cafés, bookstores and mosques they attend, and then find out that all the people who go to a certain cafe also attend the same mosque (but maybe not vice versa). While this tool has in fact been used by researchers at Los Alamos National Laboratory to sift through hundreds of terrorism-related reports, it's still dangerous to rely on the math.

The NSA data mining is flawed because, as Kennedy and Lincoln buffs know, two people can be a lot alike without being the same person. Even if there is only a 1 in 150 million chance that someone might share the profile of a terrorist suspect, it still means that, in a country the size of the United States, two people might share that profile. One is just minding his own business. The other is Cat Stevens.

This isn't to say mathematicians are useless. In September 2004 -- 10 months before the July 7 bombing of the London Underground -- mathematician Gordon Woo warned that London was a hotbed of jihadist radicalism. But Woo, who works for the Bay Area company Risk Management Solutions, didn't anticipate the bombings using math. He used his knowledge and experience of London, especially the Wood Green area. That's what law enforcement officials should be doing.

As for tracking terrorist financing, it may already be too late. The terrorism of the future, according to mathematician Stefan Schmidt of the Technical University in Dresden, Germany, may be the terrorism of the futures -- when bombs explode, the stock market drops. Schmidt wants to quantify the impact on the market of a terrorist incident. The only people who know when a bomb will explode are the terrorists. By playing the market, they may already have obtained as much money as they need -- in perfectly legitimate ways -- thus stifling Treasury Department efforts to cut off the source of their funding.

Math is just a tool. Used wisely, math can indeed help win the Battle of Britain (by breaking the German codes). But used unwisely -- as seems to be the case in the NSA telephone caper -- your approval rating might just hit an all-time low.