Nearly 18 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing restoration of Ukraine’s independence, the country has yet to make a clear, committed choice about its geopolitical future. Having established itself as a sovereign state in the 1990s, Ukraine’s foreign policy sought to balance its drive to build links to Europe and the United States with its need to maintain stable relations with Russia.

Many believed the 2004 Orange Revolution and Viktor Yushchenko’s subsequent election as president would lead to a concerted Ukrainian push to integrate fully into Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community. But political infighting within Kyiv and other problems have stymied the country’s efforts to take advantage of its new opportunities. The upcoming presidential election hopefully will result in an executive branch that can execute more coherent policies than has been the case in the past four years.

The United States and European countries that would like to see Ukraine more closely linked to the West will have to decide the best way to pursue engagement with Ukraine after Ukrainians choose their next president. It is possible, for example, that the new president will adopt a more modest pace to efforts to integrate into institutions such as NATO, while showing greater sensitivity to Russian concerns. In such a case, the United States and Ukraine’s supporters in Europe should maintain robust relations with Kyiv and press the country’s government to implement needed constitutional and economic reforms, while keeping doors open and working with Ukraine to integrate it into Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community at a pace that Kyiv will choose.

Nuclear-armed adversaries India and Pakistan have fought three wars since their creation as sovereign states in 1947. They went to the brink of a fourth in 2001 following an attack on the Indian parliament, which the Indian government blamed on the Pakistan-backed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist organizations. Despite some attempts at rapprochement in the intervening years, a new standoff between the two countries was precipitated when India accused Lashkar-e-Taiba of being behind the Mumbai attacks late last year.

The relentlessness of the confrontations between these two nations makes Inside Nuclear South Asia a must read for anyone wishing to gain a thorough understanding of the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia and the potential consequences of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent.

The book begins with an analysis of the factors that led to India's decision to cross the nuclear threshold in 1998, with Pakistan close behind: factors such as the broad political support for a nuclear weapons program within India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the intense rivalry between the two countries, the normative and prestige factors that influenced their behaviors, and ultimately the perceived threat to their respective national security.

The second half of the book analyzes the consequences of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent. These chapters show that the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia has increased the frequency and propensity of low-level violence, further destabilizing the region. Additionally, nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan have led to serious political changes that also challenge the ability of the two states to produce stable nuclear détente. Thus, this book provides both new insights into the domestic politics behind specific nuclear policy choices in South Asia, a critique of narrow realist views of nuclear proliferation, and the dangers of nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

After North Korea’s nuclear test on 9 October 2006, the fate of South Korea’s engagement policy with North Korea seemed to hang in the balance. To many, the nuclear test stood as a clear indictment of the Sunshine Policy and its successor, President Roh Moo-hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy. After years of investment and aid to the North under these policies, South Korea appeared to have received little in return. Conservative lawmakers charged that the nuclear test amounted to the “death penalty” for the Sunshine Policy, and former president Kim Young-sam proclaimed that the policy “should be thrown into a trash can.” Roh’s unification minister apologized to the National Assembly.

But others did not see the nuclear test as a verdict on South Korean engagement of the North. To more progressive forces, including the Roh administration, this is not a story of inter-Korean cause and effect; engagement represents a much larger inter- Korean effort, while the nuclear issue is rooted in problematic U.S.-DPRK relations. In their view, the nuclear test occurred because the Bush administration has taken a hard line with North Korea, creating an environment—featuring “regime change” rhetoric and the preemptive-strike doctrine—that spurred the North to pursue weapons considered the ultimate guarantee of security. The Sunshine Policy cannot be held to account for ruinous U.S.-DPRK relations, though such a circumstance can hinder inter-Korean engagement. While Roh offered a careful, politically calibrated suggestion to the public in the wake of the nuclear test, saying he “would like to suggest that we take time to figure out the causal relationship between the engagement policy and the nuclear test,” former president Kim Dae-jung pressed the progressive perspective in no uncertain terms, offering a direct, clamant answer: “North Korea has never said it would develop nuclear weapons because of South Korea’s Sunshine Policy. It said that it was developing nuclear weapons as a last resort to survive, because the United States was hard on the country.”

Ukraine and Ukrainians will be tested over the course of 2009. The global financial and economic crisis already has provoked a deep recession and falling living standards. Kyiv will need to make a real effort to strike a balance between integration into Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community and maintaining stable relations with Russia. Doing so will not be easy, as Russia regards Ukraine’s pro-Western policy as inimical to Russian interests, and Ukraine’s politics are subject to influence from Moscow. In particular, Ukraine must address its energy security situation, where it remains vulnerable to Russian pressure.

A new moral, ethical, and legal framework is needed for international human rights law. Never in human history has there been such an elaborate international system for human rights, yet from massive disasters, such as the Darfur genocide, to everyday tragedies, such as female genital mutilation, human rights abuses continue at an alarming rate. As the world population increases and global trade brings new wealth as well as new problems, international law can and should respond better to those who live in fear of violence, neglect, or harm.

Modern critiques global human rights fall into three categories: sovereignty, culture, and civil society. These are not new problems, but have long been debated as part of the legal philosophical tradition. Taking lessons from tradition and recasting them in contemporary light, Helen Stacy proposes new approaches to fill the gaps in current approaches: relational sovereignty, reciprocal adjudication, and regional human rights. She forcefully argues that law and courts must play a vital role in forging a better human rights vision in the future.

Higher growing season temperatures can have dramatic impacts on agricultural productivity, farm incomes, and food security. We used observational data and output from 23 global climate models to show a high probability (>90%) that growing season temperatures in the tropics and subtropics by the end of the 21st century will exceed the most extreme seasonal temperatures recorded from 1900 to 2006. In temperate regions, the hottest seasons on record will represent the future norm in many locations. We used historical examples to illustrate the magnitude of damage to food systems caused by extreme seasonal heat and show that these short-run events could become long-term trends without sufficient investments in adaptation.