Stanford University

Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

Mark Leonard: "The connectivity wars: European security and the weaponization of the internet, trade, migration and international institutions"

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Our world is built on links and connections. Roads, railways, supply chains, underwater cables, and social networks are thefoundation of our societies. It was the hope of the late 20th century that these interdependencies would further understanding anddecrease conflict. Like no other organisation, the European Union was based on this idea.
But now, what has brought us together is driving us apart. Instead of bringing us closer, these interdependences are turning sour, causing conflicts – and being used as weapons. The most important battleground of these conflicts will not be the air or ground but rather the interconnected infrastructure of the global economy: disrupting trade and investment, international law, the internet, transport links, and the movement of people. Welcome to the Connectivity Wars. 
 
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Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, the first pan-European think tank.  As well as writingand commenting frequently in the media on global affairs, Mark is author of two best-selling books. His first book, Why Europe will run the21st Century, was published in 2005 and translated into 19 languages. Mark’s second book, What does China think? was published in 2008and translated into 15 languages. He writes a syndicated column on global affairs for Reuters.com and is Chairman of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Geoeconomics. In 2016 he published an edited volume on Connectivity Wars and is working on a future book on the same topic.
Previously he worked as director of foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform and as director of the Foreign Policy Centre, a think tank he founded at the age of 24 under the patronage of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. In the 1990s Mark worked for the think tank Demos where his Britain™ report was credited with launching Cool Britannia. Mark has spent time in Washington, D.C. as a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and in Beijing as a visiting scholar at the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences.
Honoured as a “Young Global Leader” of the World Economic Forum, he spends a lot of time helping governments, companies, andinternational organisations make sense of the big geo-political trends of the twenty-first century. He is a regular speaker and prolific writerand commentator on global issues, the future of Europe, China's internal politics, and the practice of diplomacy and business in a networked world. His essays have  appeared in publications such as Foreign Affairs, The Financial Times, The New York Times, Le Monde, Süddeutsche Zeitung, El Pais, Gazeta Wyborcza, Foreign Policy, the New Statesman, The Daily Telegraph, The Economist, Time,and Newsweek.
 
 
Mark Leonard Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations
Lectures
European Security Initiative
European Security Initiative Lecture Series

Ivo Daalder: "America First: Donald Trump and the New World Order"

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Ivo Daalder

Ivo Daalder has been president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs since July 2013. Prior to joining the Council, Daalder served as the Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for more than four years. Daalder also served on the National Security Council staff as director for European Affairs from 1995-97.
 
Ambassador Daalder is a widely-published author. His most recent books include In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the National Security Advisers and the Presidents they Served—From JFK to George W. Bush (with I. M. Destler) and the award-winning America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (with James M. Lindsay). Other books include Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World (2007); Crescent of Crisis: US-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East (2006); and Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (2000). Daalder is a frequent contributor to the opinion pages of the world’s leading newspapers, and a regular commentator on international affairs on television and radio.
 
Before his appointment as ambassador to NATO by President Obama in 2009, Daalder was a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, specializing in American foreign policy, European security and transatlantic relations, and national security affairs. Prior to joining Brookings in 1998, he was an associate professor at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy and director of research at its Center for International and Security Studies.
 
Ambassador Daalder serves on the board of UI LABS, on the leadership board of the chancellor of the University of Illinois at Chicago, and on the Advisory Committee of the Secretary of State's Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society, for which he also cochairs the Global Cities Working Group.
 
Ambassador Daalder was educated at Oxford and Georgetown Universities, and received his PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is married to Elisa D. Harris, and they have two sons.

 

 
Ivo Daalder Former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
Lectures
European Security Initiative
European Security Initiative Lecture Series

Ideas for ASEAN going forward

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The Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a coalition of 10 Southeast Asian countries formed to promote regional development and security, will mark its 50th anniversary this year. While ASEAN’s longevity is a cause for celebration, it also calls for creative introspection regarding what it can and should do, according to Southeast Asia Program Director Donald K. Emmerson.

“There is a lot that ASEAN cannot do in its present form, under its present leaders, and in presently China-challenged conditions. Yet no one could objectively scan ASEAN’s first fifty years and conclude that the organization has remained the same – once a cow, always a cow.

“Whatever ASEAN does become, its alternative futures should be considered now, carefully and creatively, while there is still time to prefer one scenario over the others and to follow up with steps that make it more likely,” he writes in a paper featured in the February edition of TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia.

ASEAN, he says, needs to reexamine its goals and consider new means to achieve them, to brainstorm better ways of protecting its region from external control, and to reevaluate the nature and efficacy of the “ASEAN Way,” including its self-paralyzing commitment to unanimity as a precondition for collective action.

That commitment has already been breached for economic policy arrangements that allow a “two-speed ASEAN” to exist, where for less developed members, deadlines for economic reform are postponed, while for all other members, the deadlines remain unchanged. So, why not adapt that idea to regional security initiatives as well?

According to Emmerson, the Southeast Asia region is being threatened by China’s efforts to control land features in the South China Sea for the purposes of projecting coercive power. China uses the ASEAN Way’s requirement of consensus by promising economic support to specific ASEAN members in hopes of coopting them into vetoing any move by ASEAN to counter China’s campaign in the South China Sea.

Abetting China’s expansion, he says, are the rival claims to maritime sovereignty by some of ASEAN’s own members. Their failure to settle their own disagreements precludes the bargaining power that a unified ASEAN might bring to the table in talks with China.

Emmerson, who addressed these matters at Stanford in March, argues that a more innovative ASEAN will lead to a more secure region.

Regarding the South China Sea, for example, ASEAN could encourage an effort by its four claimant members to settle their own differences first by drafting an ASEAN agreement, signing it and presenting it to China to sign as well. Even if China refuses, at least ASEAN would have established a common position among the ASEAN countries most directly concerned.

In the paper, he discusses several ways of restructuring ASEAN. They include:

  • ASEAN minus X: A subset of ASEAN members would move ahead on economic or security arrangements with the understanding that the remaining subset would join later.
  • ASEAN Pacific Alliance: ASEAN would work with Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru to create a coalition that would strengthen ASEAN’s trans-Pacific ties.
  • East Asia Summit (EAS): ASEAN would try to elevate this annual gathering of leaders, including China and the United States, into a capstone venue for cooperation on regional security.

Emmerson also urges outside observers to generate innovative policy proposals related to ASEAN and present them for discussion informally or in Track II dialogue formats.

“It’s time for ASEAN watchers to generate ideas for the grouping to consider, including initiatives that could be pursued by one, two or more member countries,” he said in a later interview. “The creative involvement of scholars, journalists, businesspeople and other analysts inside member states could socialize such proposals in local policy circles to make them better known and more feasible.”

In line with this vision, Emmerson is co-organizing a trilateral workshop on ASEAN reform, regional security, infrastructure building and economic regionalism. Hosted by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and planned for this fall, it will evaluate proposals on these topics generated or compiled by Shorenstein APARC’s Southeast Asia Program and U.S.-Asia Security Initiative; the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore; and the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre in Canberra. Details about the conference will be posted in the coming months.

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Flags of member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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The Kremlin's Trojan Horses?: Russia and the European Far Right

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A wave of far-right populism is sweeping across Europe. Euroskeptic, nationalist, populist parties, once on the fringes of European politics, are poised to enter the mainstream. The rise of the far right is first and foremost a cultural backlash against the rapid economic and political integration of the E.U. over the last 25 years. But while far-right parties are nothing new in Europe, their explicit pro-Russian turn is. Far right parties are not simply puppets of the Kremlin, but they are undoubtedly allies. They act as agents of influence in Europe’s institutions by supporting pro-Russian views, praising Mr. Putin’s foreign policy in Ukraine and Syria, and advocating against EU policies that would hurt Russian interests, such as sanctions. Increasing electoral support for the far right populists is no doubt domestically driven, but by supporting Putin, far-right leaders conveniently play into the Kremlin’s geo-political agenda.

 

 

Alina Polyakova, PhD, is the Director of Research for Europe and Eurasia at the Atlantic Council. She is the author of  the book, The Dark Side of European Integration (2015), which examines the rise of far-right populism in Europe. Dr. Polyakova is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a frequent media commentator on developments in Ukraine, Russia, and Europe. Her writings have appeared in major publications such as The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The American Interest, Newsweek, and academic journals. Concurrently, Dr. Polyakova is a Swiss National Science Foundation Senior Research Fellow and coinvestigator on a multi-year project examining the rise of far-right political parties in the European Union. She has been a fellow at the Eurasia Foundation, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Fulbright Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), and a Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer at the University of Bern. Dr. Polyakova has taught courses on European politics, foreign policy, and Russia at the University of California, Berkeley and the University of Bern, Switzerland. She holds a PhD and MA in Sociology from the University of California, Berkeley, and a BA in Economics and Sociology with highest honors from Emory University.

 

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Alina Polyakova
Lectures
European Security Initiative
European Security Initiative Lecture Series

Research Presentations (session 4 of 5) - Nakaya, Zhang and Zhang

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The format of this presentation is each of the three speakers will have approximately 15 minutes to present their research.  This will be followed by a short period of 5-10 minutes for any questions or comments from the audience.

 

In this session of the Corporate Affiliates Research Presentations, the following will be presented:

 

Daisuke Nakaya, Japan Air Self Defense Force, "Japan's Future Direction of Its Defense Program and the Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Alliance In Order to Deter Conflict" 

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Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. security treaty in 1960, Japan and the U.S. have built a robust alliance based on common value and interests and Japan has maintained its peace and security, centered on the Security Arrangement with the United States. On the other hand, security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region are becoming more serious. There has been a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies, over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests. In his research, Nakaya focuses on Japan’s ability to effectively deter conflict in this situation and shares insights on the future of Japan’s Defense Program and its effort to strength the Japan-U.S. alliance.

 

Shaofeng Zhang, PetroChina, "Risk Analysis on Project Finance for the Cross-border Infrastructure"

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Large infrastructures have huge influence on economic increase, social development and cultural development. With the increase of global integration, more and more cross-border large infrastructures have been developed, are under construction or planning to be constructed to enhance the regional corporations.

Project finance is the most frequently used way to finance large infrastructures, especially cross-border infrastructures, and risk is connected with every part. Risk analysis helps all parties involved to clarify the principles of risk allocation – allowing a reasonable amount of control on the whole. Therefore, these large cross-border infrastructures can be financed, constructed and operated smoothly to achieve their economic, social and cultural goals. In his research, Zhang shares how to analyze risks linked to the projects on the whole, the relationship between those risks, and how those risks can be best allocated to relevant parties and appropriately managed.

 

Xuan Zhang, Beijing Shanghe Shiji Investment Company,  "Future Education in China"

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Improvement science is a disciplined approach to educational innovation that supports teachers, leaders, and researchers in collaborating to solve specific problems of practice. It brings discipline and methods to different logics of innovation by integrating the following – problem analysis, user of research, development of solutions, measurement of processes and outcomes, and rapid refinement through plan-do-study-act cycles. For teachers, school leaders and system leaders, improvement science moves educational innovation out of the realm of “fad” and into the realm of research-based, evidence-driven continuous improvement with the goal of increasing the effectiveness and educational practice. Improvement science is explicitly designed to accelerate learning-by-doing and is a more user-centered and problem-centered approach to the future of education. Zhang will share a case study of how improvement science influences the future education innovation. In his presentation, Zhang focuses on networked improvement communities (NICs) which has been demonstrated to be the most benefitcial approach in improvement science.

 

Japan Air Self Defense Force
PetroChina
Beijing Shanghe Shiji Investment Company
Seminars

Private Foreign Policy

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Abstract: Microsoft President Brad Smith recently analogized Microsoft to a “Digital Switzerland.” This moniker captures the role that U.S. technology companies have increasingly taken on with respect to cybersecurity and privacy: they are acting like states and running their own foreign policies, and they are setting themselves as neutrals with respect to existing national authorities, including the United States. U.S. tech companies are not the first super-empowered private companies, but they have numerous features that set them apart from prior private powers like the Dutch East India Company or more recent examples like ExxonMobil. This article first provides an account of how the relationship between U.S. tech companies and governments has evolved over time. By breaking down the “Digital Switzerland” idea, the article then explores the extent to which and how the companies differ from the powerful private interests of earlier eras, and it concludes by analyzing the implications of the companies’ role for governance and for individuals going forward.

About the Speaker: Kristen Eichensehr is an Assistant Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law. She writes and teaches about foreign relations, separation of powers, cybersecurity, and national security law. Before joining the UCLA faculty, Eichensehr clerked for Chief Judge Merrick B. Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and for Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Sonia Sotomayor of the Supreme Court of the United States. Eichensehr also served as Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State and practiced at Covington & Burling LLP. Eichensehr received her J.D. from Yale Law School, where she served as executive editor of the Yale Law Journal. Eichensehr is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a former visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, and an affiliate scholar at the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School. She is a frequent contributor to and member of the editorial board of the national security blog, Just Security.

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

Kristen Eichensehr Assistant Professor UCLA School of Law
Seminars

Reputation in the Anti-Abuse Regime

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Abstract: Recently, Twitter, Netflix, Spotify, Airbnb, Reddit, Etsy, SoundCloud, and The New York Times were knocked out by a botnet driven by the Mirai malware. Mirai is a contemporary case of a more general phenomenon: the illegitimate appropriation of online resources for prestige, economic, and/or political gain. Historically participants in the anti-abuse regime have used reputation indicators to characterize subsets of this illegitimate activity as abuse: any traffic---spam, malware communications, DDOS traffic---that is not explicitly consensual, is abusive. Participants in this regime use decentralized, transnational monitoring to aggregate and vet credible reputation indicators, then redistribute these indicators to participants enforcing anti-abuse norms. This work explains how these reputation indicators have functioned over the course of their evolution within this regime, from products of supposedly “vigilante blacklists” into credible mechanisms based on graduated sanction as a remediative signaling mechanism rather than a punitive sanction. Returning to Mirai, this work concludes by evaluating the potential for this regime to tackle contemporary IoT security challenges. In particular, can the anti-abuse regime discipline a market projected to grow from $900M in 2015 to $3.7B in 2020, or will it need help from conventional authorities?

About the Speaker: Jesse is the 2016-2017 Cybersecurity Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and holds a PhD in Technology, Management, and Policy from MIT.  Jesse focuses on understanding the institutions and political economy of Internet operations vis a vis conventional modes of domestic and inter-state governance mechanisms. This work includes studies on infrastructure resource management and policy, infrastructure security, credible knowledge assessment, and operational epistemic communities’ role informing public policy. Jesse’s dissertation evaluates the common resource management institutions that sustain the integrity and security of the Internet’s numbers and routing system. The dissertation documents how the roles of these institutions, comprising diverse transnational operator communities, managing the complex of physical and information resources supporting the integrity of global Internet connectivity. Concluding analyses narrow the focus from operational authority to the character of political authority in these communities, rooted in the family of consensus processes used to adapt resource policy and institutions apace with Internet growth and development.  Jesse is currently working on a number of papers from his dissertation: reputation and security in the numbers and routing system, contrasting consensus as a decision-making process with conventional mechanisms for credible knowledge assessment, and the challenges in comity between substantive-purposive authority in operational institutions with governments’ conventional, formal-legalistic modes of authority. Ongoing work is developing a theory of epistemic constructivism and case work on developing joint capabilities between operational security regimes and law enforcement/national security actors.

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

Cybersecurity Postdoctoral Fellow CISAC
Seminars

Jason Healey

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Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs
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Jason Healey is a Senior Research Scholar and adjunct faculty at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs specializing in cyber conflict, competition and cooperation. Prior to this, he was the founding director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative of the Atlantic Council where he remains a Senior Fellow.  He is the author of dozens of published articles and the editor of the first history of conflict in cyberspace, A Fierce Domain: Cyber Conflict, 1986 to 2012.  A frequent speaker on these issues, he is rated as a “top-rated” speaker for the RSA Conference and won the inaugural “Best of Briefing Award” at Black Hat.

During his time in the White House, he was a director for cyber policy and helped advise the President and coordinate US efforts to secure US cyberspace and critical infrastructure.  He created the first cyber incident response team for Goldman Sachs and later oversaw the bank’s crisis management and business continuity in Hong Kong.  He has been vice chairman of the FS-ISAC (the information sharing and security organization for the finance sector) and started his career as a US Air Force intelligence officer with jobs at the Pentagon and National Security Agency.  Jason was a founding member (plankowner) of the first cyber command in the world, the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense, in 1998, where he was one of the early pioneers of cyber threat intelligence.

He is on the Defense Science Board task force on cyber deterrence and is a frequent speaker at the main hacker and security conferences, including Black Hat, RSA, and DEF CON, for which he is also on the review board.  He is president of the Cyber Conflict Studies Association, and has been adjunct faculty at NSA’s National Cryptologic School, Georgetown University and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. 

State shaming often ineffective

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When a state is “shamed” by outsiders for perceived injustices, it often proves counterproductive, resulting in worse behavior and civil rights violations, a Stanford researcher has found.

Rochelle Terman, a political scientist and postdoctoral fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), recently spoke about how countries criticized by outsiders on issues like human rights typically respond -- and it's contrary to conventional wisdom. Terman has published findings, “The Relational Politics of Shame: Evidence from the Universal Periodic Review,” on this topic in the Review of International Organizations. She discussed her research in the interview below:

What does your research show about state "shaming"?

Shaming is a ubiquitous strategy to promote international human rights. A key contention in the literature on international norms is that transnational advocacy networks can pressure states into adopting international norms by shaming them – condemning violations and urging reform. The idea is that shaming undermines a state’s legitimacy, which then incentivizes elites into complying with international norms.

In contrast, my work shows that shaming can be counterproductive, encouraging leaders in the target state to persist or “double down” on violations. That is because shaming is seen as illegitimate foreign intervention that threatens a state’s sovereignty and independence.  When viewed in this light, leaders are rewarded for standing up to such pressure and defending the nation against perceived domination. Meanwhile, leaders who “give in” have their political legitimacy undermined at home. The result is that violations tend to persist or even exacerbate.

When and where does it work better to directly confront a country’s leadership about such injustices?

At least two factors moderate the effects of international shaming. The first is the degree to which the norm being promoted is shared between the “shamer” and the target. For instance, the West may shame Uganda or Nigeria for violating LGBT rights. But if Uganda and Nigeria do not accept the “LGBT rights” norm, and refuse to accept that homophobia constitutes bad behavior, then shaming will fail. In this case, it is more likely that shaming will be viewed as illegitimate meddling by foreign powers, and will be met with indignation and defiance.

Second, shaming is quintessentially a relational process. Insofar as it is successful, shaming persuades actors to voluntary change their behavior in order to maintain valued social relationships. In the absence of such relationship, shaming will fail. This is especially so when pressure emanates from a current or historical geopolitical adversary. In this later scenario, not only will shaming fail to work, it will likely provoke defensive hostility and defiance, having a counterproductive effect.

Combing these insights, we can say that shaming is most likely to work under two conditions: when the target is a strong ally, and the norm is shared.

What are some well-known cases where "shaming" backfired?

The main example I use in my forthcoming paper is on the infamous “anti-homosexuality bill” in Uganda. When Uganda introduced the legislation in 2009 (which in some versions applied capital punishment to offenders) it provoked harsh condemnation among its foreign allies, especially in the West. Western donor countries even suspended aid in attempt to push Yoweri Musaveni’s government to abandon the bill. According to conventional accounts, the onslaught of foreign shaming, coupled with the threat of aid cuts and other material sanctions, should have worked best in the Uganda case.

And yet what we saw was the opposite. The wave of international attention provoked an outraged and defiant reaction among the Ugandan population, turning the bill into a symbol of national sovereignty and self-determination in the face of abusive Western bullying. This reaction energized Ugandan elites to champion the bill in order to reap the political rewards at home. Indeed, the bill was the first to pass unanimously in the Ugandan legislature since the end of military rule in 1999. Museveni – who by all accounts preferred a more moderate solution to the crisis – was backed into a corner.

A Foreign Policy story quoted Ugandan journalist Andrew Mwenda as saying, “the mere fact that Obama threatened Museveni publicly is the very reason he chose to go ahead and sign the bill.” And Museveni did so in a particularly defiant fashion, “with the full witness of the international media to demonstrate Uganda’s independence in the face of Western pressure and provocation.”

Uganda anti-homosexuality law was finally quashed by its constitutional court, which ruled the act invalid because it was not passed with the required quorum. By dismissing the law on procedural grounds, Museveni – widely thought to have control over the court – was able to kill the legislation “without appearing to cave in to foreign pressure.” But by that time, defiance had already transformed Uganda’s normative order, entrenching homophobia into its national identity.

Does this 'doubling down' effect vary in domestic or international contexts?

Probably. States with a significant populist contingent, for instance, are especially hostile to international pressure, especially when it emanates from a historical adversary, like a former colonial power. Ironically, democracies may also be more susceptible to defiance, because elites are more beholden to their constituents, and thus are less able to “give in” to foreign pressure without undermining their own political power. 

The international context matters a great deal as well. States are more likely to resist certain norms if they have allies who feel the same way. For instance, we see significant polarization around LGBT rights at the international level, with most states in Africa and the Muslim world voting against resolutions that push LGBT rights forward. South Africa – originally a pioneer for LGBT rights – has changed its position following criticism from its regional neighbors. 

Does elite reaction drive this response to state "shaming?"

To be quite honest, this is a question I’m still exploring and I don’t have a very clear answer. My hunch at the moment is no. The “defiant” reaction occurs mainly at the level of public audiences, which then incentives elites to violate norms for political gain.  These audiences can be at either the domestic or international level. For instance, if domestic constituents are indignant by foreign shaming, elites are incentivized to “double down,” or at least remain silent, lest they undermine their own political legitimacy.

That said, elites can also strategize and manipulate these expected public reactions for their own political purposes. For instance, if Vladimir Putin knows that the Russian public will grow indignant following Western shaming, he might strategically promote a law that he knows will provoke such a reaction in order to benefit from the ensuing conflict. This is what likely occurred with Russia’s “anti-gay propaganda” law, which (unsurprisingly) provoked harsh condemnation from the West and probably bolstered Putin’s domestic popularity.

Any other important points to highlight?

One important point I’d like to highlight is the long-term effects of defiance. In an effort to resist international pressure, states take action that, in the long term, work to internalize oppositional norms in their national identity. In this way, shaming actually produces deviance, not the other way around.

Follow CISAC at @StanfordCISAC and  www.facebook.com/StanfordCISAC

MEDIA CONTACTS:

Rochelle Terman, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 721-1378, rterman@stanford.edu,

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

 
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Protestors march to the United Nations building during International Human Rights Day in 2012 in New York City. Activists then called for immediate action by the UN and world governments to pressure China to loosen its control over Tibet -- a form of "state shaming," as examined by CISAC fellow Rochelle Terman in her research.
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End of the U.S.-led Postwar Order? Allies' Reactions to Trump Diplomacy

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Expected dramatic shifts of foreign policy by leading democracies, including the U.S. and U.K., would shake a future of liberal international order, which has underpinned the stability even after the end of the Cold War. Since Mr. Donald Trump was elected as the 45th President of the U.S., abovementioned discourse is heard everywhere in Europe and Asia today.

It is not clear, if American leadership and military presence would in fact retreat, how American allies behave and whether they can work together to sustain the order. Among others, Japan has been the exceptionally strong believer of such postwar American leadership. It is doubtful that all American allies and friends share same views, having their own historical context with the U.S. and own ideas on order and principles. Hence, naturally they shall differ in losing the confidence on the durability of American leadership.

A new order will be shaped by many factors, but American allies’ perspectives should not be overlooked. Hegemon’s own reluctance for ruling is surely significant. So is other great power’s revisionism, making use of such strategic opportunities. However, American allies has the potential to shape the fate of the order: if they succeed in acting collectively, it shall underpin the global governance for a while, and ensue the order transformation process in rather slow and peaceful pace. 

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If they fail, it shall not only accelerate the U.S. retrenchment, but invite an emergence of divisive and competitive order. Sahashi shares the findings from the international study project which he leads, and argues the difficulty for US allies to unite themselves and the potential order transformation in the long term.

Ryo Sahashi is Associate Professor of International Politics and Director, Faculty of Law, Kanagawa University, Yokohama, and is leading the newly-launched international joint study “Worldviews on the United States.” From 2014-2015, he served as Visiting Associate Professor, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University.

 

Ryo Sahashi Associate Professor, Kanagawa University
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