Stanford University

Energy

This image is having trouble loading!FSI researchers examine the role of energy sources from regulatory, economic and societal angles. The Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) investigates how the production and consumption of energy affect human welfare and environmental quality. Professors assess natural gas and coal markets, as well as the smart energy grid and how to create effective climate policy in an imperfect world. This includes how state-owned enterprises – like oil companies – affect energy markets around the world. Regulatory barriers are examined for understanding obstacles to lowering carbon in energy services. Realistic cap and trade policies in California are studied, as is the creation of a giant coal market in China.

CISAC names Stanford biosecurity expert as next co-director

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Dr. David Relman investigates the secrets of the life sciences to help build a safer world.

The Stanford microbiologist and professor of infectious diseases has been named the next co-director of the university’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). An adviser to the federal government on emerging biological threats, Relman believes his new role at CISAC will strengthen its core mission of making the world a safer place.

“There is a strong link between microbiology, infectious diseases and international security,” Relman said. “It is increasingly clear that the destabilizing effects of human population growth and displacement, environmental degradation and climate change are all mediated in part through the emergence and spread of infectious diseases. In addition, rapidly evolving capabilities of individuals in the life sciences around the globe make it increasingly likely that this science will be used to cause harm.”

Relman, the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor at Stanford and chief of infectious diseases at the VA Palo Alto Healthcare System, has advised the U.S. government about pathogen diversity, biosecurity and the future of the life sciences landscape. He is a member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), chairs the Forum on Microbial Threats at the Institute of Medicine in Washington, D.C. and has participated in a number of studies for the National Academies of Science.

"David Relman is one of the nation’s top scientists exploring the mysteries of infectious disease, a thoughtful adviser to policymakers, and an extraordinary colleague,” said Tino Cuéllar, a Stanford Law School professor and the center’s co-director. “He will make tremendous contributions to CISAC's leadership as we expand our activities on public health and biosecurity while continuing our work on arms control and nuclear security."

Founded nearly three decades ago, CISAC’s mission is to produce cutting-edge research and spread knowledge to build a safer world. Now a part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), the center has a tradition of appointing co-directors – one from the social sciences and the other from the natural sciences – to advance the center’s interdisciplinary mission.

Relman will take up the post in January, when Siegfried Hecker’s term concludes after having served as co-director since 2007. Hecker, a nuclear scientist and director emeritus of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, is one of the world’s foremost experts on plutonium, nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. He will remain at CISAC and continue to teach in the department of Management Science and Engineering.

“It has been a personal pleasure to work with Sig,” said Cuéllar. “He has been an enormous asset to CISAC.  He will continue to be a visionary leader on nuclear security and arms control issues throughout the world.”

Relman joined Paul Keim, acting chair of the NSABB, to address a CISAC seminar in March about their work in advising the government on the potential dangers of laboratory-engineered H5N1 avian influenza.

The advisory board had been asked to review two manuscripts that described the deliberate modification of the H5N1 avian influenza virus so as to be transmissible for the first time from mammal to mammal via a respiratory route. This provoked a debate in the scientific community about the risks of such work and whether the details of these experiments should be published – details that would enable anyone skilled in the art of virology and molecular biology to recreate these highly virulent and transmissible viruses. Some argued that the research could end up in the wrong hands. The board eventually recommended in a split decision that this research should be published.

“Life scientists need to be involved in discussions about the oversight of risky science and the responsible conduct of science, so that the potential benefits can be realized while the risks are minimized,” Relman said.

Relman will continue to run his research lab at the Stanford University School of Medicine and the VA Hospital in Palo Alto, where his focus is on the beneficial communities of microbes in the human body. He is president-elect of the Infectious Diseases Society of America and a member of the Institute of Medicine at the National Academies of Science. He received his S.B. in biology from MIT in 1977 and an M.D. from Harvard Medical School in 1982. He completed his clinical training in internal medicine and infectious diseases at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston.

“The appointment of a life scientist who focuses on infectious diseases and biosecurity is an innovative step for our work in international security and cooperation,” said Gerhard Casper, president emeritus of Stanford University and director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Relman tells a story that illustrates his passion for scientific discovery. On a routine visit to his dentist about 15 years ago, he brought along his own test tube. He asked the dentist to give him some plaque that he had scraped off Relman’s teeth. He wanted to study his own bacteria.

“As a clinician, I can tell you my colleagues were not looking for new microbes to worry about,” Relman said. “Some of them believed there might well be some really weird new microbes in soil or in the ocean, but that the human microbial ecosystem was something that we understood quite well. Of course – that was wrong.”

Using DNA sequencing technology, he has since discovered hundreds of new bacteria in the human body.

“Our ability to predict the next important technical or conceptual advance in the life sciences is miserable, as is our ability to anticipate how these advances will be used,” Relman said. “But we can at least hope to engage the scientific community and the general public in discussions about our goals and our understanding of risks – and how best to mitigate them.”

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Climate change adaptation: Lessons from 2012

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David Lobell
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Originally appeared in The Chicago Council's Global Agricultural Development Initiative Global Food For Thought blog.

For all of the talk about the need to adapt to climate change, we still know fairly little about two basic questions: what works best, and how much can adaptation deliver? It‘s time to learn quickly.

Why don’t we know more? It would be easy to blame our ignorance on complacency. There is a tendency to marvel at the progress made in agriculture in the past 50 years, and assume it can handle anything. For example, the USDA declared in the early 1970s that new technologies meant “man has reduced variation in yields in both good and bad weather.” This optimism quietly faded after a series of bad harvests in the late 1970’s and 1980’s, including the big drought of 1988. People realized that a period of unusually benign weather, and not the technological gains themselves, had limited volatility during the middle of the 20th century.

It is also tempting to blame ignorance on inexperience. After all, many people continue to view climate change as something to deal with in the future. But the evidence is clear that climate has already been changing over the past 30 years in most agricultural areas, and farmers are doubtlessly trying to adapt. Up until now, the United States was an exception to that trend. But the 2012 drought has changed that, and projections indicate that years like this will be increasingly common in the coming decades.

With widespread evidence for climate change and its impacts, complacency and inexperience should give way to rigorous evaluations of what has happened. For example, why was US agriculture not better prepared for the 2012 drought? And did anything work well that can be scaled up?

A lot has changed in US agriculture since the 1988 drought, and many of the changes were textbook examples of what should help to reduce impacts of hot summers. Farmers now sow corn and soybeans more than a week earlier on average, and use longer maturing varieties than in 1988. Advances in cold tolerance along with spring warming trends allowed corn to expand in northern states where temperatures are cooler. For example, North and South Dakota increased corn area by more than 35% (nearly 2.5 million acres) just since 2009. Carbon dioxide levels, which improve crop water use efficiency, have increased by more than 10% since 1988. And farmers have begun to grow drought tolerant seeds that were unavailable in 1988.

Yet when the 2012 drought arrived, with fairly similar characteristics to 1988, impacts on crop yields were roughly the same. Corn yields are expected to be about 25% below trend, close to the 28% drop in 1988.

What can we learn from this experience? It is too early to say anything definitive, but two explanations seem plausible. First, it may be that some of the above changes were truly beneficial, but were counteracted by other changes making agriculture more, not less, sensitive to weather. For example, breeding progress in corn has generally been faster for good conditions than bad. As farmers become even better at eliminating yield losses from pests, nutrient stress, and other factors, the benefits of having favorable rainfall and temperature become that much greater, and the relative damages of not having them become that much worse.

A second possibility, of course, is that the adaptive changes in agriculture simply did not help much in dealing with adverse weather. For example, migrating corn northward may help, but the vast majority of corn production remains where it has been for decades, so the quantitative effect is small.

Hopefully researchers will quickly distinguish between these and other explanations, and the lessons can help guide efforts to further adapt. But any explanation will likely imply that there are limits to how much adaptation can reduce impacts of climate change. This fact does not diminish the urgency and importance of efforts to adapt to climate variability and change throughout the world. But it is a reminder that greenhouse gas mitigation is pivotal in any strategy to reduce impacts of climate change. Adaptation can only do so much.

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Cyber Security of Industrial Control Systems – What Does It Mean to National Security?

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Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are used throughout the industrial infrastructure and military applications. These systems are designed to be highly reliable and safe, but were not designed to be cyber secure. Moreover, many of these systems do not even have cyber logging or forensics. Consequently, these systems, which constitute the “soft underbelly” of the American economy and defense, can enable a “cyber Pearl Harbor” to occur without having the capability of even knowing the impacts were cyber-induced. Stuxnet and Aurora have demonstrated that cyber can be used as a weapon to damage or destroy engineering equipment and systems.

To date, there have been more than 225 actual control system cyber incidents worldwide affecting electric power, water, chemicals, pipelines, manufacturing, mass transit, and even aircraft. Most of the incidents have been unintentional. Selected unintentional incidents will be addressed at the ICS Cyber Security Conference (http://www.icscybersecurityconference.com/). However, there have been a number of targeted cyber attacks. The Stanford presentation will focus on Stuxnet and Aurora. It will address the lack of air-gaps, insecureable legacy ICSs, lack of cyber forensics, and cultural issues between IT and Operations that can enable these attacks to occur and evade detection.

Joseph Weiss is an industry expert on control systems and electronic security of control systems, with more than 35 years of experience in the energy industry. Mr. Weiss spent more than 14 years at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) where he led a variety of programs including the Nuclear Plant Instrumentation and Diagnostics Program, the Fossil Plant Instrumentation & Controls Program, the Y2K Embedded Systems Program and, the cyber security for digital control systems. As Technical Manager, Enterprise Infrastructure Security (EIS) Program, he provided technical and outreach leadership for the energy industry's critical infrastructure protection (CIP) program. He was responsible for developing many utility industry security primers and implementation guidelines. He was also the EPRI Exploratory Research lead on instrumentation, controls, and communications.

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Joseph Weiss Consultant Speaker Applied Control Solutions
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Global Health Impacts of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident

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This study quantifies worldwide health effects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on 11 March 2011. Effects are quantified with a 3-D global atmospheric model driven by emission estimates and evaluated against daily worldwide Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) measurements and observed deposition rates. Inhalation exposure, ground-level external exposure, and atmospheric external exposure pathways of radioactive iodine-131, cesium-137, and cesium-134 released from Fukushima are accounted for using a linear no-threshold (LNT) model of human exposure. Exposure due to ingestion of contaminated food and water is estimated by extrapolation. We estimate an additional 130 (15–1100) cancer-related mortalities and 180 (24–1800) cancer-related morbidities incorporating uncertainties associated with the exposure–dose and dose–response models used in the study. Sensitivities to emission rates, gas to particulate I-131 partitioning, and the mandatory evacuation radius around the plant may increase upper bound mortalities and morbidities to 1300 and 2500, respectively. Radiation exposure to workers at the plant is projected to result in 2 to 12 morbidities. An additional 600 mortalities have been reported due to mandatory evacuations. A hypothetical accident at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant in California, USA with identical emissions to Fukushima may cause 25% more mortalities than Fukushima despite California having one fourth the local population density, due to differing meteorological conditions.

Mark Z. Jacobson is Director of the Atmosphere/Energy Program and Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Stanford University. He is also a Senior Fellow of the Woods Institute for the Environment and Senior Fellow of the Precourt Institute for Energy. He received a B.S. in Civil Engineering with distinction, an A.B. in Economics with distinction, and an M.S. in Environmental Engineering from Stanford University, in 1988. He received an M.S. in Atmospheric Sciences in 1991 and a PhD in Atmospheric Sciences in 1994 from UCLA. He has been on the faculty at Stanford since 1994. His work relates to the development and application of numerical models to understand better the effects of energy systems and vehicles on climate and air pollution and the analysis of renewable energy resources. He has published two textbooks of two editions each and ~130 peer-reviewed scientific journal articles. He received the 2005 American Meteorological Society Henry G. Houghton Award for “significant contributions to modeling aerosol chemistry and to understanding the role of soot and other carbon particles on climate.” He has served on the Energy Efficiency and Renewables Advisory Committee to the U.S. Secretary of Energy.

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Mark Jacobson Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering Speaker Stanford University
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Taking Our Country Back: The Crafting of Networked Politics from Howard Dean to Barack Obama and the 2012 Elections

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Drawing on open-ended interviews with more than sixty political staffers, accounts of practitioners, and fieldwork, in this talk I present the previously untold history of the uptake of new media in Democratic electoral campaigning from 2000 to 2012. I follow a group of technically-skilled Internet staffers who came together on the Howard Dean campaign and created a series of innovations in campaign organization, tools, and practice. After the election, these individuals founded an array of consulting firms and training organizations and staffed a number of prominent Democratic campaigns. In the process, they carried their innovations across Democratic politics and contributed to a number of electoral victories, including Barack Obama's historic bid for the presidency, and currently occupy senior leadership positions in the president's re-election campaign. This history provides a lens for understanding the organizations, tools, and practices that are shaping the 2012 electoral cycle.  

In detailing this history, I analyze the role of innovation, infrastructure, and organization in electoral politics. I show how the technical and organizational innovations of the Dean and Obama campaigns were the product of the movement of staffers between fields, organizational structures that provided spaces for technical development, and incentives for experimentation. I reveal how Dean's former staffers created an infrastructure for Democratic new media campaigning after the 2004 elections that helped transfer knowledge, practice, and tools across electoral cycles and campaigns.  Finally, I detail how organizational contexts shaped the uptake of tools by the Obama campaign in 2008 and 2012, analyze the emergence of data systems and managerial practices that coordinate collective action, and show how digital cultural work mobilizes supporters and shapes the meaning of electoral participation.

I conclude by discussing the relationship between technological change and democratic practice, showing how from Howard Dean to Barack Obama, new media have provided campaigns with new ways to find and engage supporters, to run their internal operations, and to translate the energy and enthusiasm generated by candidates and political opportunities into the staple resources of American electioneering.  While these tools have facilitated a resurgence in political activity among the electorate, this participation has come in long institutionalized domains: fundraising, volunteer canvassing, and voter mobilization.  Meanwhile, participation is premised on sophisticated forms of data profiling, targeted persuasive communications, and computational managerial practices that coordinate collective action.  As such, I argue that the uptake of new media in electoral campaigning is a hybrid form of organizing politics that combines both management and empowerment. 

Daniel Kreiss is Assistant Professor in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Kreiss's research explores the impact of technological change on the public sphere and political practice. In Taking Our Country Back: The Crafting of Networked Politics from Howard Dean to Barack Obama (Oxford University Press, 2012), Kreiss presents the history of new media and Democratic Party political campaigning over the last decade. Kreiss is an affiliated fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School and received a Ph.D. in Communication from Stanford University. Kreiss's work has appeared in New Media and Society, Critical Studies in Media Communication, The Journal of Information Technology and Politics, and The International Journal of Communication, in addition to other academic journals.

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Daniel Kreiss Assistant Professor in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication Speaker University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Liberation Technology Seminar Series

Geophysical limits to global wind power

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There is enough power in Earth’s winds to be a primary source of near-zero-emission electric power as the global economy continues to grow through the twenty-first century. Historically, wind turbines are placed on Earth’s surface, but high-altitude winds are usually steadier and faster than near-surface winds, resulting in higher average power densities1. Here, we use a climate model to estimate the amount of power that can be extracted from both surface and high-altitude winds, considering only geophysical limits. We find wind turbines placed on Earth’s surface could extract kinetic energy at a rate of at least 400 TW, whereas high-altitude wind power could extract more than 1,800 TW. At these high rates of extraction, there are pronounced climatic consequences. However, we find that at the level of present global primary power demand (~ 18 TW; ref. 2), uniformly distributed wind turbines are unlikely to substantially affect the Earth’s climate. It is likely that wind power growth will be limited by economic or environmental factors, not global geophysical limits.

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Thirteen Days -- and Fifty Years Later: What Have We Learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis?

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Fifty years ago, the Soviet Union and the United States stood on the brink of nuclear war. For thirteen days in October 1962, people around the world held their breath and hoped for a peaceful resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis. This distinguished panel will discuss and debate the crisis from the perspectives of Moscow and Washington, and consider what history has taught us since those thirteen days in 1962.

 

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David Holloway

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E214
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 723-1737 (650) 723-0089
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Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies
Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History
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David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. He was co-director of CISAC from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into seven languages, most recently into Chinese. The Chinese translation is due to be published later in 2018. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals.

Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986 -- first as a professor of political science and later (in 1996) as a professor of history as well -- Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Lancaster (1967-1970) and the University of Edinburgh (1970-1986). Born in Dublin, Ireland, he received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his PhD in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University.

Faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Affiliated faculty at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Affiliated faculty at The Europe Center
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David Holloway CISAC, History, and Political Science, Stanford Speaker

Scott D. Sagan

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E202
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-2715 (650) 723-0089
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The Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
The Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education  
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of Daedalus: Ethics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Scott D. Sagan CISAC and Political Science, Stanford Speaker
Strobe Talbott President, Brookings Institution Speaker
Joe Cirincione President, Ploughshares Fund Moderator
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Drell Lecture

The Yaqui Valley Revisited: A case study on agricultural sustainability in Mexico

The Yaqui Valley is the birthplace of the Green Revolution and one of the most intensive agricultural regions of the world, using irrigation, fertilizers, and other technologies to produce some of the highest yields of wheat anywhere. It also faces resource limitations, threats to human health, and rapidly changing economic conditions. In short, the Yaqui Valley represents the challenge of modern agriculture: how to maintain livelihoods and increase food production while protecting the environment.

Networks of Fear: The Dynamics of Extortion in Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency

We study the dynamics and logic of extortion in Mexico’s drug war. Mexican drug trafficking organizations have diversified into a host of other illicit activities, protection rackets, oil and fuel theft, kidnapping, human smuggling, prostitution, money laundering, weapons trafficking, auto theft and domestic drug sales. The project seeks to measure, through the use of list-experiments, patterns of extortion by both criminal organization and the police, and the extent to which drug cartels coopt civil society and become embedded in the social fabric.

Japan’s culture: Culprit of the nuclear accident?

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In this article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Toshihiro Higuchi, historian and 2011-2012 CISAC fellow, explains how the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear incident, contrary to the opinions of Japan's parliament, is not "uniquely Japanese."  

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