On October 6, 2021, the APARC China Program hosted the panel program, "Engaging China: Fifty Years of Sino-American Relations." In honor of her recently released book of the same title, Director of the Grassroots China Initiative Anne Thurston was joined by contributors Mary Bullock, President Emerita of Agnes Scott College; Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow; and David M. Lampton, Professor Emeritus at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Thomas Fingar also moderated the panel.

Recent years have seen the U.S.-China relationship rapidly deteriorate. Engaging China brings together leading China specialists—ranging from academics to NGO leaders to former government officials—to analyze the past, present, and future of U.S.-China relations.

During their panel, Bullock, Fingar, Lampton, and Thurston reflected upon the complex and multifaceted nature of American engagement with China since the waning days of Mao’s rule. What initially motivated U.S.’ rapprochement with China? Until recent years, what logic and processes have underpinned the U.S. foreign policy posture towards China? What were the gains and the missteps made during five decades of America’s engagement policy toward China? What is the significance of our rapidly deteriorating bilateral relations today? Watch now: 

For more information about Engaging China or to purchase a copy, please click here.

My summer internship experience at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) was remote due to the pandemic. It was nonetheless a memorable experience as I got to explore cybersecurity issues around Southeast Asia. ASPI is a think-tank under the umbrella of the Asia Society family, which aims to explain the diversity of Asia to the United States and the complexity of the United States to Asia. It heightens understanding between the two regions and tackles major policy challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific in security, prosperity, and sustainability by providing solution-oriented recommendations and ideas for such challenges.

At Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), I delved into policies and developments around the data privacy issue in Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Singapore. I learned how these countries bring up policies and collaborate bilaterally, regionally, and globally to tackle problems around cybersecurity. My summer internship experience also enriched my knowledge and understanding of the world.

Working at ASPI

The internship started in June 2021, around the end of the spring quarter, and continued through the end of summer. There were a total of four interns in the Washington D.C. office. I mainly worked with a small team of three - Elina, my supervisor, Chris, my co-intern, and I - which focused on cybersecurity issues.

My supervisor, Elina Noor, an inspiring expert in cyberspace, especially in the Southeast Asia region, led the team with great insights and leadership. Along with my co-intern, Chris, we spent the entire three months working on a project that studies Ethical Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Data for Inclusive Development in Southeast Asia. The project itself is expected to continue for a year, and we were in the early stages of the project. 

As a security research intern, I collected data and assisted the research. Additionally, I focused on building-up fundamental understanding of the project - determining the stages of development each country is in, how they respond to the global trend and issues, and what criteria need to be included in analyzing the different characteristics of each country, considering both the local context and the global trend. In the next nine months, the project will survey countries’ positions on these issues, assess the importance and impact of the topic, and highlight the significance of engaging in international developments. I am excited for the final product to come forth, a collaborative work of all people involved in this project.

Other responsibilities also came along the way. I had the opportunity to find the correlation between the South China Sea dispute and cyber incidents between the countries claiming sovereignty over the region. These incidents are ambiguous to identify, and the attribution is not always clear. It was also challenging to make a data set from scratch as it was a whole new experience. However, I managed to conclude that cyber incidents spiked around the time of the major disputes around the South China Sea. No secret that the Global Economy class taught by Professor Aturupane from Fall 2020-21 helped me make sense of the data set and read graphs!

The interns in the New York and Washington D.C. office took turns doing daily press scans, following up with news from the Northeast to the Middle East. It was amazing to learn how Asia, as one big continent, held such a diverse set of news and events occurring each day. I also accumulated lists of people in congress, embassies, and the government to share the op-eds from ASPI. Most of these administrative works were done as a team effort, and I met a larger ASPI family through the experience.

Ending My Internship

Working at ASPI was a rewarding way to spend my summer. I owe special thanks to Elina and Chris, who were incredibly supportive and made me feel like I was making a significant contribution to the institution. I was also rewarded with knowledge and insights into new topics in Asia and its relations with the world, mainly focusing on the U.S. It provided great insight into the developments of cybersecurity issues and data privacy around Southeast Asian countries. It was a fantastic opportunity to apply what I learned at Stanford to real-world policy problems. I thoroughly enjoyed my internship this summer and feel ready to embark on new challenges that will come forth in my career path.

This interview was first published by the Stanford News Service.

When President Joe Biden meets with his Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinping next week, they will both want to show the world that the two countries have common and compatible objectives and that cooperation is possible, says Stanford scholar Thomas Fingar.

While there are real differences between the two countries, global threats exist that require joint effort to address, such as nuclear proliferation and the danger of new arms races, said Fingar in an interview with Stanford News Service.

In anticipation of the upcoming summit scheduled for Monday, Fingar discusses what to expect when the two leaders meet and what goals Biden will want to work towards as it fits with his larger objectives for the U.S.

Fingar is a Shorenstein fellow at The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), which is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is leading a multi-year study, China and the World, that seeks to better understand China’s global engagement.

Fingar returned to Stanford in 2009 after having served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94) and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held several positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Where does diplomacy between the U.S. and China now stand?

Friction between Beijing and Washington did not put an end to diplomatic exchanges, but having markedly different approaches has inhibited the two sides. Simply stated, the United States has sought to work on specific global and bilateral problems to achieve priority objectives such as limiting greenhouse gases and reducing the dangers of unconstrained nuclear, space and cyber competition. China has maintained that “building trust” and improvement of the overall bilateral relationship are prerequisites for progress on specific issues. Developments in the run-up to the summit, such as the joint climate statement in Glasgow, suggest that Beijing has relaxed its preconditions.

How does the summit symbolize a diplomatic reset?

Both symbolically and substantively, the summit will empower lower-level officials in both countries to work on issues within their purview. This is more significant in China, where clear signals from the top are necessary for subordinates to engage, but it will also help to mitigate paralysis on the U.S. side resulting from competing visions of how best to address China-related issues.

What issues will be top of mind for Biden and Xi?

Both will want to diminish exaggerated characterizations of bilateral friction as evidence that we have entered a new Cold War and may be on the verge of conflict, and that cooperation on any issue is impossible. We have very real disagreements, but we also have many common or compatible objectives. Helping domestic and external audiences to understand that things are not nearly as dire as many observers contend will be a priority objective. Beyond that, I think clarifying matters of greatest concern to the other side and establishing mechanisms to address them will be on the agenda.

What areas can they agree on and where can they make progress?

They are likely to find it easier to agree on issues requiring joint effort than on the best way to address issues like nuclear proliferation (Iran and North Korea), new weapons systems and the danger of new arms races (hypersonic glide vehicles, cyber and kinetic threats to nuclear surveillance and command and control systems) and transition to cleaner energy sources.

What areas will spark disagreement and will these issues come up?

I suspect that both leaders will feel compelled to raise all of the high salience concerns in their countries. For Biden, that list includes Xinjiang, Hong Kong, PRC [People’s Republic of China] actions near Taiwan and the rollback of opportunities for Americans in China. Xi will raise U.S. military operations around China’s periphery, arms sales and relations with Taiwan, restrictions on visas for Chinese citizens and Chinese investment in the U.S., among other issues.

What would signal that the meeting was productive?

The fact that it has occurred will be significant because it will open the door to other, hopefully, less contentious exchanges across a broad spectrum of issues. Easing of travel restrictions should be easy to achieve but of more than symbolic importance. I doubt that the meeting is designed to solve any of the difficult issues in our relationship.

What do you think about Biden’s approach to China?

I agree with the President’s focus on his largely domestic “Build Back Better” agenda. Spending the time, effort and political capital necessary to secure approval of measures to address infrastructure, energy, education, childcare, internet access and a host of social justice, pandemic and voter protection issues are, in my opinion, more important than trying to improve relations with China for the sake of improving the relationship. Where working with China is necessary and/or perceived to be possible for achieving other domestic and foreign policy goals, he should do so. I think the fact that this summit is taking place is a sign that he is attempting to do that, but I judge that he is unwilling to jeopardize his ability to achieve higher priority objectives by making concessions to Beijing merely to create the appearance of a better relationship.