FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.
FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.
Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.
Energy Developments and Geopolitics in the Caspian Region: Perspectives from Azerbaijan
Fariz Ismailzade, Azerbaijan, is director of the Advanced Foreign Service Program at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (ADA) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to joining ADA, Fariz worked for 10 years in the NGO sector of Azerbaijan, most recently as director of political programs at the International Republican Institute. Fariz has also conducted research at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. His research mainly focuses on the geopolitics of the Caucasus region and CIS affairs. Fariz is a regular correspondent for Eurasianet.org, Transitions on Line, Jamestown Daily Monitor and Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst and has written on the politics and economics of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus region for Institute for War and Peace Report, East-West Institute, Analysis of Current Events, Freedom House, CaucasUS Context, Azerbaijan International and Collage. Fariz has also presented at international conferences, including the Middle Eastern Studies Association, NATO Advanced Research Workshop in Kiev, Ukraine, and the Association for Studies of Nationalities in New York. Since 2006, he has been a recipient of the International Policy Fellowship Research Award. Fariz earned his BA in political science from Western University in Baku and holds a Masters in social and economic development from Washington University in St. Louis.
Elin Suleymanov, Azerbaijan, is Azerbaijan’s first Consul General to Los Angeles, California with personal rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Prior to that he served as Senior Counselor at the Foreign Relations Department, Office of the President in Baku, Azerbaijan and as Press Officer of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Washington, DC. Before joining diplomatic service, Mr. Suleymanov worked with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Azerbaijan and with the Open Media Research Institute in Prague, Czech Republic. A graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Medford, Massachusetts, Mr. Suleymanov also holds graduate degrees from the Political Geography department of the Moscow State University, Russia, and from the University of Toledo, Ohio. Mr. Suleymanov speaks Azerbaijani, English, Russian and Czech languages.
CO-SPONSORED BY CREEES
CISAC Conference Room
Real Drivers of Carbon Capture and Storage in China and Implications for Climate Policy
The capture and permanent storage of CO2 emissions from coal combustion is now widely viewed as imperative for stabilization of the global climate. Coal is the world’s fastest growing fossil fuel. This trend presents a forceful case for the development and wide dissemination of technologies that can decouple coal consumption from CO2 emissions—the leading candidate technology to do this is carbon capture and storage (CCS).
China simultaneously presents the most challenging and critical test for CCS deployment at scale. While China has begun an handful of marquee CCS demonstration projects, the stark reality to be explored in this paper is that China’s incentives for keeping on the forefront of CCS technology learning do not translate into incentives to massively deploy CCS in power plant applications as CO2 mitigation would have it. In fact, fundamental and interrelated Chinese interests—in energy security, economic growth and development, and macroeconomic stability—directly argue against large-scale implementation of CCS in China unless such an implementation can be almost entirely supported by outside funding. This paper considers how these core Chinese goals play out in the specific context of the country’s coal and power markets, and uses this analysis to draw conclusions about the path of CCS implementation in China’s energy sector.
Finally, the paper argues that effective climate change policy will require both the vigorous promotion and careful calculation of CCS’s role in Chinese power generation. As the world approaches the end of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 and crafts a new policy architecture for a global climate deal, international offset policy and potential US offset standards need to create methodologies that directly address CCS funding at scale. The more closely these policies are aligned with China’s own incentives and the unique context of its coal and power markets, the better chance they have of realizing the optimal role for CCS in global climate efforts.
Finesses and Game-Changers in Frontier Project Development: The Case of Carbon Capture and Storage
Project development is particularly challenging in “frontier” environments where alternative technologies, conflicting laws and agencies, and uncertain benefits or risks constrain the knowledge or decisions of participants. Carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) projects by means of geologic sequestration are pursued in such an environment. In these circumstances, entrepreneurs can seek to employ two distinct types of tools: the game-changer, being an improvement to the status quo for all those similarly situated, generally achieved through collective or governmental action; and the finesse, being an individualized pursuit of an extraordinary project that is minimally affected by a given legal, business or technological obstacle. These techniques are illustrated in the case of CCS as to ownership of property rights, carbon dioxide (“CO2”) transportation economics, liability for stored CO2 following the closure of injection wells, inter-agency and federal-state conflicts, competing technologies, and uncertain economic or legal incentives. The finesse and the game-changer should also be useful concepts for creative solutions in other applications.
First Drafts of Korea
Few regions rival the Korean Peninsula in strategic importance to U.S. foreign policy. For half a century, America has stationed tens of thousands of troops in South Korea to defend its ally from the threat of North Korean aggression. South Korea, in turn, is critical to the defense of Japan, another ally and the linchpin of American interests in East Asia. The rise of a nuclear-armed North has upped the ante.
Yet despite the stakes, the two Koreas have registered only episodically on the radar of the United States. The troubling gap between American perceptions of the peninsula and its strategic importance remained an unexplored phenomenon until now. First Drafts of Korea breaks new ground in examining how the American mass media shape U.S. perceptions of both Koreas and, as a result, influence U.S. foreign policy.
Beginning with a detailed analysis of American newspaper coverage of Korea between 1992 and 2003, the book features essays by Western journalists and senior U.S. officials with firsthand experience on the peninsula over the past two decades. These include frank accounts of the unique frustrations of covering Kim Jong-il's North Korea, undoubtedly the most closed and media-unfriendly nation on earth.
Addressing topics ranging from the democratization of South Korea in the 1980s to today's deteriorating nuclear crisis, the book's distinguished contributors offer unique insights into American media coverage of the peninsula and its impact on policymaking in Washington. What emerges is a complex, shifting portrait of two rival nations sharing one peninsula whose future remains inextricably linked to the global security interests of the United States.
Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.
The U.S. Media and Perceptions of the Last Cold War Frontier
Prescribing Cultures and Pharmaceutical Policy in the Asia-Pacific
Pharmaceutical policies are interlinked globally and at the same time deeply rooted in local culture. Prescribing Cultures examines how pharmaceuticals and their regulation play an important and often contentious role in the health systems of the Asia-Pacific.
The first section of this timely book analyzes pharmaceutical policy in China, Korea, Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, Australia, and India. The second section focuses on two cross-cutting themes: differences in "prescribing cultures" and physician dispensing; and the challenge of balancing access to drugs with incentives for innovation.
The book's contributors discuss important issues for U.S. policy. These include such hot-button topics as drug imports from Asia, regulation of global supply chains to assure drug safety and quality, new legislation to encourage development of drugs for neglected diseases, and the impact that decisions about pricing, regulation, and bilateral trade agreements have on access to medicines at home and abroad. In Prescribing Cultures, pharmaceutical policy reveals the economic trade-offs, political compromises, and historical trajectories that shape health systems.
Prescribing Cultures also illustrates how cultural legacies shape and are shaped by the forces of globalization, and thus will be of interest to students and scholars well beyond the confines of health policy.
Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.
Climate Change and the Energy Challenge: A Pragmatic Approach for India
India has been famous for arguing that it (and the rest of the developing world) should incur no expense in controlling emissions that cause climate change. The west caused the problem and it should clean it up. That argument is increasingly untenable — both in the fundamental arithmetic of climate change, which is a problem that is impossible to solve without developing country participation, and in the political reality that important western partners will increasingly demand more of India and other developing countries. India’s own public is also demanding more.
The Indian government has outlined a broad plan for what could be done, but the plan still lacks a strategy to inform which efforts offer the most leverage on warming emissions and which are most credible because they align with India’s own interests.
This paper offers a framework for that strategy. It suggests that a large number of options to control warming gases are in India’s own self-interest, and with three case studies it suggests that leverage on emissions could amount to several hundred million tonnes of CO2 annually over the next decade and an even larger quantity by 2030. (For comparison, the Kyoto Protocol has caused worldwide emission reductions of, at most, a couple hundred million tonnes of CO2 per year.) We suggest in addition to identifying self-interest — which is the key concept in the burgeoning literature on “co-benefits” of climate change policy — that it is also important to examine where India and outsiders (e.g., technology providers and donors) have leverage.
One reason that strategies offered to date have remained abstract and difficult to implement is that they are not rooted in a clear understanding of where the Government of India is able to deliver on its promises (and where Indian firms have access to the needed technology and practices). Many ideas are interesting in theory but do not align with the administrative and technological capabilities of the Indian context. As the rest of the world contemplates how to engage with India on the task of controlling emissions it must craft deals that reflect India’s interests, capabilities and leverage on emissions. These deals will not be simple to craft, but there are many precedents for such arrangements in other areas of international cooperation, such as in accession agreements to the WTO.
Evolution of China's Coal Institutions, The
Coal is the major primary energy which fuels economic growth in China. The original Soviet-style institutions of the coal sector were adopted after the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949. But since the end of 1970s there have been major changes: a market system was introduced to the coal sector and the Major State Coalmines were transferred from central to local governments. This paper explains these market-oriented and decentralizing trends and explores their implications for the electric power sector, now the largest single consumer of coal.
The argument of this paper is that the market-oriented and decentralizing reforms in the coal sector were influenced by the changes in state energy investment priority as well as the relationship between the central and local governments in the context of broader reforms within China’s economy. However, these market-oriented and decentralizing reforms have not equally influenced the electric power sector. Since coal is the primary input into Chinese power generation, and power sector reform falls behind coal sector reform, the tension between the power and coal sectors is unavoidable and has raised concerns about electricity shortages.
Contexts of terror in Indonesia
Jim Castle is a friend of mine. I have known him since we were graduate students in Indonesia in the late 1960s. While I labored in academe he went on to found and grow CastleAsia into what is arguably the most highly regarded private-sector consultancy for informing and interfacing expatriate and domestic investors and managers in Indonesia. Friday mornings he hosts a breakfast gathering of business executives at his favorite hotel, the JW Marriott in the Kuningan district of Jakarta.
Or he did, until the morning of July 17, 2009. On that Friday, shortly before
8am, a man pulling a suitcase on wheels strolled into the Marriott's Lobby
Lounge, where Jim and his colleagues were meeting, and detonated the contents
of his luggage. We know that the bomber was at least outwardly calm from the surveillance videotape of his relaxed walk across the lobby to the restaurant.
He wore a business suit, presumably to deflect attention before he blew himself
up. Almost simultaneously, in the Airlangga restaurant at the Ritz Carlton
hotel across the street, a confederate destroyed himself, killing or wounding a
second set of victims. As of this writing, the toll stands at nine dead
(including the killers) and more than 50 injured.
On learning that Jim had been at the meeting in the Marriott, I became frantic
to find out if he were still alive. A mere 16 hours later, to my immense
relief, he answered my e-mail. He was out of hospital, having sustained what he
called "trivial injuries", including a temporary loss of hearing. Of the nearly
20 people at the roundtable meeting, however, four died and others were badly
hurt. Jim's number two at CastleAsia lost part of a leg.
The same Marriott had been bombed before, in 2003. That explosion killed 12
people. Eight of them were Indonesian citizens, who also made up the great
majority of the roughly 150 people wounded in that attack - and most of these
Indonesian victims were Muslims. This distribution undercut the claim of the
country's small jihadi fringe to be defending Islam's local adherents against
foreign infidels.
But if last Friday's killers hoped to gain the sympathy of Indonesians this
time around by attacking Jim and his expatriate colleagues and thereby lowering
the proportion of domestic casualties, they failed. Of the 37 victims whose
names and nationalities were known as of Monday, 60% were Indonesians, and that
figure was almost certain to rise as more bodies were identified. The selective
public acceptance of slaughter to which the targeting of infidel foreigners
might have catered is, of course, grotesquely inhumane.
Since Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was first elected president in 2004, Indonesia's
real gross domestic product has averaged around 6% annual growth. In 2008 only
four of East Asia's 19 economies achieved rates higher than Indonesia's 6.1%
(Vietnam, Mongolia, China and Macau). In the first quarter of 2009, measured
year-on-year, while the recession-hit economies of Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand all shrank, Indonesia's grew 4.4%. In the first half of 2009, the
Jakarta Stock Exchange soared.
The economy is hardly all roses. Poverty and corruption remain pervasive.
Unemployment and underemployment persist. The country's infrastructure badly
needs repair. And the economy's performance in attracting foreign direct
investment (FDI) has been sub-par: The US$2 billion in FDI that went to
Indonesia in 2008 was less than a third of the $7 billion inflow enjoyed by
Thailand's far smaller economy, notwithstanding Indonesia's far more stable
politics.
Nevertheless, all things considered, the macro-economy in Yudhoyono's first
term did reasonably well. We may never know whether the killer at the Marriott
aimed to maximize economic harm. According to another expat consultant in
Jakarta, Kevin O'Rourke, the day's victims included 10 of the top 50 business
leaders in the city. "It could have been a coincidence," he said, or the
bombers could have "known just what they were doing".
Imputing rationality to savagery is tricky business. But the attackers probably
did hope to damage the Indonesian economy, notably foreign tourism and
investment. In that context, the American provenance and patronage of the two
hotels would have heightened their appeal as targets. Although the terrorists
may not have known these details, the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company is an
independently operated division of Marriott International, Inc, which owns the
JW Marriott brand, and both firms are headquartered on the outskirts of
Washington DC.
Second-round revenge against the Marriott may also have played a role -
assaulting a place that had rebuilt and recovered so quickly after being
attacked in 2003. Spiteful retribution may have influenced the decision to
re-attack the Kuta tourist area in Bali in 2005 after that neighborhood's
recovery from the bomb carnage of 2002. Arguable, too, is the notion that 9/11
in 2001 was meant to finish the job started with the first bombing of the Twin
Towers in 1993. And in all of these instances, the economy - Indonesian or
American - suffered the consequences.
Panic buttons are not being pushed, however. Indonesian stock analyst Haryajid
Ramelan's expectation seems plausible: that confidence in the economy will
return if those who plotted the blasts are soon found and punished, and if
investors can be convinced that these were "purely terrorist attacks" unrelated
to domestic politics.
Sympathy for terrorism in Indonesia is far too sparse for Friday's explosions
to destabilize the country. But they occurred merely nine days after
Yudhoyono's landslide re-election as president on July 8, with three months
still to go before the anticipated inauguration of his new administration on
October 20. That timing ensured that some would speculate that the killers
wanted to deprive the president of his second five-year term.
The president himself fed this speculation at his press conference on July 18,
the day after the attacks. He brandished photographs of unnamed shooters with
handguns using his picture for target practice. He reported the discovery of a
plan to seize the headquarters of the election commission and thereby prevent
his democratic victory from being announced. "There was a statement that there
would be a revolution if SBY wins," he said, referring to himself by his
initials.
"This is an intelligence report," he continued, "not rumors, nor gossip. Other
statements said they wished to turn Indonesia into [a country like] Iran. And
the last statement said that no matter what, SBY should not and would not be
inaugurated." Barring information to the contrary, one may assume that these
reports of threats were real, whether or not the threats themselves were. But
why share them with the public?
Perhaps the president was defending his decision not to inspect the bomb damage
in person - a gesture that would have shown sympathy for the victims while
reassuring the population. He had wanted to go, he said, "But the chief of
police and others suggested I should wait, since the area was not yet secure.
And danger could come at any time, especially with all of the threats I have
shown you. Physical threats."
Had Yudhoyono lost the election, or had he won it by only a thin and hotly
contested margin, his remarks might have been read as an effort to garner
sympathy and deflect attention from his unpopularity. The presidential
candidates who lost to his landslide, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Jusuf Kalla,
have indeed criticized how the July 8 polling was handled. And there were
shortcomings. But even without them, Yudhoyono would still have won. In this
context, speaking as he did from a position of personal popularity and
political strength, the net effect of his comments was probably to encourage
public support for stopping terrorism.
One may also note the calculated vagueness of his references to those - "they”
- who wished him and the country harm. Not once in his speech did he refer to
Jemaah Islamiyah, the network that is the culprit of choice for most analysts
of the twin hotel attacks. Had he directly fingered that violently jihadi
group, ambitious Islamist politicians such as Din Syamsuddin - head of
Muhammadiyah, the country's second-largest Muslim organization - would have
charged him with defaming Islam because Jemaah Islamiyah literally means "the
Islamic group" or "the Islamic community".
One may hope that Din's ability to turn his Islamist supporters against jihadi
terrorism and in favor of religious freedom and liberal democracy will someday
catch up to his energy in policing language. Yet Yudhoyono was right not to
mention Jemaah Islamiyah. Doing so would have complicated unnecessarily the
president's relations with Muslim politicians whose support he may need when it
comes to getting the legislature to turn his proposals into laws. Nor is it
even clear that Jemaah Islamiyah is still an entity coherent enough to have, in
fact, masterminded last Friday's attacks.
Peering into the future, one may reasonably conclude that the bombings'
repercussions will neither annul Yudhoyono's landslide victory nor derail the
inauguration of his next administration. Nor will they do more than temporary
damage to the Indonesian economy. As for the personal aspect of what happened
Friday, while mourning the dead, I am grateful that Jim and others, foreign and
Indonesian, are still alive.
Donald K Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Forum at Stanford University.
He is a co-author of Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political
Islam (Stanford University Press, November 2009) and Hard Choices:
Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford/ISEAS, 2008).
Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved.
Where Are They Now? Ony Jamhari
Ony Avrianto Jamhari taught the Indonesian language at Stanford in 2005-06 as a
Foreign Language Teaching Assistant (FLTA) under Fulbright sponsorship. He was
active on campus in other ways as well, including organizing an Indonesian film festival.
SEAF Director Don Emmerson enjoyed working with him on research projects in
Indonesia. In 2009 Ony began teaching Indonesian language and culture at Woosong
University, Daejeon, South Korea. He can be reached at ony_jamhari@yahoo.com.
In July 2009 he looked back on his time at Stanford and brought SEAF up to date on his
activities and interests since then:
“My time as an FLTA at Stanford was a blessing, an honor, and an incredible experience
for me. Not only did I gain academic experience; my time at Stanford opened doors to
my future career. In addition to teaching Indonesian, I was able to learn about the
American system of higher education. This knowledge encouraged me to strive toward
the ultimate goal of my life: to become an agent for change in the educational world.
“In 2006 I left Stanford to return to Indonesia. I continued teaching Indonesian (bahasa
Indonesia) in Jakarta. Thanks to contacts with colleagues and friends, I was able to teach
the Indonesian language to many foreigners working and living in the capital city of
Indonesia. Sudirman Street (Jalan Sudirman)—Jakarta’s main thoroughfare and business
area, became in effect my office, as I moved from one building to another from early
morning to late evening teaching Indonesian. I was also often asked by the Fulbright
committee in Jakarta to serve as a resource person helping to orient and train their new
grantees—Indonesians preparing to go to the US as FLTAs and Americans who had
come to teach English to Indonesia.
“My desire to focus and develop my personal skills in education also motivated me to
work at the Indonesian International Education Foundation (IIEF) as a program officer
for an International Fellowships Program (IFP) sponsored by the Ford Foundation. This
program provided opportunities for advanced study to individuals who would go on to
use their education to become leaders in their respective fields. My experience with IFP
broadened my knowledge and my network of colleagues and contacts, as I worked with
twenty-two international partners of the program in cities around the world.
“In February 2009 I moved to South Korea to my present position teaching bahasa
Indonesia at Woosong University in Daejeon here in South Korea. So far not many
students have signed up to take Indonesian. Many Korean students prefer to take either
Japanese or Chinese, in addition to English, which is required. It is a big challenge for
me to promote the study of Indonesian. Fortunately, some professors and staff have been
very helpful in disseminating information about the availability of Indonesian classes. I
expect there will be more students interested in learning the language next semester.
“Besides teaching, I am also working for Prof. Lee Sung Joon, the Director of the Asia
Research Center at Woosong, to conduct research on Indonesian education. On 6-10 July
2009 I attended two conferences in Vietnam. Prof Lee and I presented a paper entitled
‘Higher Education as a Trade Service in Indonesia’ at one conference organized by the
Korea Research Academy of Distribution and Management and the Korea Logistics
Research Associations, Inc. At the other event, hosted by the Korean Education
Development Institute, I was a discussant of ‘Mid to Long Term Education Cooperation
Development in Indonesia,' a research paper presented by Prof. Lee Sung Joon.
“I am hoping and expecting that my contribution in education will be useful for others, as
well as for my beloved country, Indonesia.
“Looking forward, there are two things that I want to do in the near future: to work
toward a Ph.D in the field of education, and to write my first novel, entitled ‘International
Jomblo,’ about an individual who looks for better things in his life.”