FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.
FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.
Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.
About the Event: In the last few years, a number of analysts have warned that we may be on the brink of a more proliferated world, as the security environment deteriorates, concerns about U.S. reliability as a protector are on the rise, hostility between the great powers grows, and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) seems to be under increasing stress. These fears were supercharged by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which appeared to demonstrate that nuclear weapons can facilitate conquest and that giving them up—as Ukraine did in the early 1990s—exposes states to terrible predation. How worried should we be about the nuclear club expanding in the coming decade? Drawing on lessons from nuclear history, I argue that while proliferation risks are growing, they are significantly more manageable than many analysts suggest. And while the odds of proliferation are increasing in both East Asia and the Middle East, we should be significantly more concerned about the latter.
About the Speaker: Nicholas L. Miller is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Miller’s research focuses primarily on the causes and consequences of nuclear weapons proliferation. His book, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy, was published by Cornell University Press in 2018. His work has also been published in a wide variety of scholarly journals, including the American Political Science Review, International Organization, and International Security, as well popular outlets like Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and War on the Rocks. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT.
All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.
About the Event: Nuclear deterrence assumes that state leaders are able to assess the costs, benefits, and consequences of any decision to use nuclear weapons. Similarly, U.S. nuclear policy presupposes that, in a crisis, the president will rationally assess how to respond to the threat of an incoming nuclear attack. Using a virtual reality simulation, we conducted an experiment and two controlled observations of decision making in a nuclear crisis. The results call into question the degree to which any U.S. president is likely to conform to the basic expectations of rational decision making when confronted with an incoming nuclear strike.
About the Speaker: Sharon K. Weiner is an Associate Professor in the School of International Service at American University as well as a Visiting Researcher for the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. Sharon's research, teaching, and policy engagement are at the intersection of organizational politics and U.S. national security. Her current work focuses on the theory, practice, and social construction of deterrence, the politics of U.S. nuclear weapon modernization programs, and larger issues of civil-military relations. Her most recent book, Managing the Military: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Civil-Military Relations (Columbia University Press, 2022) analyzes the power of the JCS chairman to help or hinder the president's ability to implement their defense policy preferences. She also collaborates with Moritz Kutt (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg) on The Nuclear Biscuit (thenuclearbiscuit.org), a virtual reality experience involving a nuclear crisis. The project analyses how people make high stakes national security decisions under conditions of uncertainty. She is currently on leave from American University and is a Senior Resident Fellow at the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.
People’s Republic of China in the Baltic States Edited by Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova and Kārlis Bukovskis, Riga, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2023, 154 pp., ISBN 978-9934-567-67-4
This collection of analytic essays describing political/security, economic, and people-to-people interactions between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) provides a welcome and useful elucidation of similarities and differences among the Baltic states. It also identifies (albeit without specifically doing so) the kinds of challenges facing all small and mid-sized countries in their dealings with much larger powers. Asymmetries of scale in the size of populations, firms, government bureaucracies, and other capacities make it difficult to identify and exploit opportunities, maintain multifaceted relationships, and manage the deluge and sometimes manipulative intent of initiatives from the larger partner. Small state governments must play a larger brokering and facilitating role than is true in bigger economies because sub-national actors have limited knowledge and capacity. This is certainly the case with respect to Baltic state interactions with China. Moreover, as these essays make clear, disparities in size and national objectives create vulnerabilities and dependencies that can be manipulated by the larger partner. A recurring leitmotif of the book is that China attempts to exploit dependencies for political reasons.
For the complete book review, read it online or download the text above.
About the Event:During the Second World War, U.S. and British military figures feared that Nazi Germany was pursuing a program to produce weapons that dispersed radiological material without a nuclear detonation. Although mistaken in their assessment, both countries in the postwar period launched their own radiological weapons (RW) programs, as did the Soviet Union. Death Dust explores the largely unknown history of the rise and demise of RW—sometimes portrayed as a “poor man’s nuclear weapon”—through a series of comparative case studies across the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Egypt, and Iraq. The authors draw on newly available archival material and interview data to illuminate the drivers of and impediments to radiological weapons innovation. They also examine how new, dire circumstances, such as the war in Ukraine, might encourage other states to pursue RW and analyze the impact of the spread of such weapons on nuclear deterrence and the nonproliferation regime. They conclude by offering practical steps to reduce the likelihood of a resurgence of interest in and pursuit of radiological weapons by state actors.
About the Speakers:
Sarah Bidgood is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in the MIT Security Studies Program. Prior to this, she served as Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California. Her work focuses on U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian arms control, risk reduction, and nonproliferation cooperation, as well as the nonproliferation regime more broadly. Her research and analysis have been published in journals such as International Security, the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, and The Nonproliferation Review, as well as outlets including Foreign Policy, Arms Control Today, War on the Rocks, and The National Interest. Sarah is a coauthor of the forthcoming book, Death Dust: The Rise, Decline, and Future of Radiological Weapons Programs, which will be published by Stanford University Press in December 2023. She is also the coeditor of Once and Future Partners: The United States, Russia, and Nuclear Non-proliferation (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018). Sarah received her BA in Russian from Wellesley College. She holds an MA in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and an MA with distinction in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies. She is a PhD candidate in Defense Studies at King’s College London, where her dissertation focuses on the relationship between Cold War nuclear crises and arms control.
Hanna Notteis the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and a senior associate (non-resident) with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Notte holds a doctorate and MPhil in international relations from Oxford University. Her expertise is on Russian foreign policy, the Middle East, and arms control and nonproliferation. Her writings have appeared in the Nonproliferation Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and War on the Rocks, among others.
William Potteris Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Founding Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at MIIS. He is the author, co-author, or editor of over 20 books. Dr. Potter has served on committees of the US National Academy of Sciences and is a past member of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. He has participated as a delegate at every NPT Review Conference and Preparatory Committee meeting since 1995. He is the recipient of the 2021 Therese Delpech Memorial Award.
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About the Event:The global energy transition will trigger more competition among great powers—the United States, China, and Russia. Global efforts to transition to low-carbon fuels to meet climate goals have prompted the realization that China is the Saudi Arabia of low-carbon energy manufacturing and exports. The only area of commercial low-carbon energy that China is not yet leading is nuclear reactor and fuel exports, an area in which Russia, the other U.S. adversary, continues to dominate despite its actions in Ukraine. While there has been increased global collaboration and coordination on low-carbon energy and emissions targets, major energy consumers, including the United States, are facing growing competition over resources, such as critical minerals needed for low-carbon technologies, and a race to manufacture and innovate new forms of low-carbon technologies. The United States is currently at a disadvantage, as it is dependent on imports for critical minerals, renewable technologies, and nuclear fuel. The energy transition has the potential to reorder energy suppliers and import dependencies, and countries leading the race to supply the transition will reap the economic and geopolitical benefits traditionally afforded to dominant fossil fuel suppliers. China’s new role as a dominate supplier of the energy transition bodes well for its broader foreign policy initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and Global Energy Interconnection. Hence, it’s important to examine the energy transition in the context of great power competition to better understand how the world’s changing energy landscape could potentially affect U.S. national, economic, and energy security absent prudent planning. You can find the publication here: https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR-Livermore-Paper-12-EnergyTransition-2023.0831.pdf.
About the Speaker: Asmeret Asghedom is the associate deputy director of the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Prior to joining CGSR, she worked at various positions in the U.S. federal government for over 10 years, focusing on global energy security issues. From June 2018 to January 2022, she was the director of the Energy Security Division in the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, managing the production, briefing, and coordination of energy and climate security intelligence products that were briefed to the U.S. president and cabinet officials. From January 2017 to May 2018, she was a production chief and an intelligence analyst in the Energy Security Division, writing finished intelligence products and briefing senior officials, including the secretary of energy, on global energy issues with the potential to impact U.S. national security. From June 2016 to December 2016, she was a policy advisor at the Treasury Department’s Office of International Affairs, focusing on economic policy in the Middle East and North Africa. From November 2011 to May 2016, she was an economist at the U.S. Energy Information Administration, forecasting the production, demand, and price of global crude oil, tracking major supply disruptions, and analyzing geopolitical events affecting global oil and natural gas markets. She holds a BA in political science from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), a BA in journalism and media studies from UNLV, and an MA in international economic development from American University in Washington DC.
All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.
U.S.-China relations have deteriorated to a level unforeseen since the early 1960s. China’s rapid military modernization, maritime posturing, and diplomatic withdrawals signal a persistent security-focused approach from Beijing. What is to be done in an era of great power competition, where policies promoting careful coexistence and reduction of tensions are deprioritized?
In a new article for The Washington Quarterly titled “China’s America Policy: Back to the Future,” co-authors Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC fellow, and David M. Lampton, a senior research fellow at the Johns Hopkins—SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and a former Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at FSI, explain the current tensions through a comprehensive analysis of the historical drivers of Chinese policy. The article enhances the understanding of Chinese grand strategy and proposes a series of policy prescriptions to help reduce the dangerous externalities of the diplomatic feud between Beijing and Washington.
March 2024 update: Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton joined Kaiser Kuo, host of the Sinica Podcast, to discuss their Washington Quarterly article. Listen:
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) sponsored the talk entitled "China's America Policy: Origins and Implications" by Dr. Tom Fingar on February 15, 2024. Watch:
Unhelpful Caricatures of China
Fingar and Lampton begin the article by acknowledging that U.S. policy is an important driver of Chinese behavior. They argue that U.S. policy has often been based on inaccurate and oft-counterproductive characterizations of China.
The authors challenge reductivist portrayals of Chinese strategy as purely ideological are misleading, asserting that “describing the PRC as an autocracy means interpreting its behavior as part of an ideological crusade to preserve the regime and thwart U.S. ambitions” and that “Beijing’s Communist Party leaders, like leaders in all countries, seek to preserve their political system, but that is not their only objective.”
Fingar and Lampton also dispute the prevailing view in Washington of China as an “unstoppable juggernaut determined — and/or destined — to displace the United States and remake the international system,” emphasizing instead that current PRC behavior is better understood as the product of perceived weakness and fragility.
To manage the current impasse, the authors suggest that Washington must avoid exacerbating the situation and must shape Chinese perceptions in a way that might facilitate a transition to a more cooperative coexistence.
The True Drivers of China’s Strategy
The authors purport that, over the centuries, China’s policy options have coalesced into one of two comprehensive approaches: one that prioritizes national and regime security, and another prioritizing economic and social development.
The first approach assumes a hostile international environment and promotes “economic autarky, tighter domestic social control, ideological conformity, a leader-in-charge approach to governance, and deep suspicion of foreigners.” The second “emphasizes the gains to be made through interdependence and openness, places less emphasis on ideology, and instead underscores the importance of experts, pragmatism, initiative and innovation.”
These two drivers, in the authors’ view, neatly explain the last century of Chinese grand strategy and frame the current administration’s emphasis on security and coercive Wolf Warrior Diplomacy.
Theories of Encirclement
The authors add that, both historically and currently, an important category of factors shaping Chinese policy is assumed subversion, that is, “persistent attitudes […] centered on suspicion and fear of outsiders (foreign countries and groups) and social forces swirling in China itself [...] Almost any action that could be negative for China is perceived as taken to weaken the regime.”
Chinese commentators often cite U.S. foreign policy activities — including Secretary of State Clinton’s statements about maritime claims at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, the Obama Administration’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia,” NATO’s and other security groupings’ involvement in Asia, and alleged U.S. efforts to foment regime change through “peaceful evolution” — as a rationale for Beijing’s increased assertiveness.
However, Fingar and Lampton see these as excuses and contributing factors to decisions primarily motivated by concerns about a perceived growing danger of domestic instability that would impede economic growth and erode regime legitimacy.
What can be done?
In the final section of the article, the authors reflect on the poor state of U.S.-China ties, arguing that “relations will spiral unless domestic factors persuade Beijing to reprioritize growth and development.” Indeed, Xi Jinping’s return to the security-minded policy package signifies a departure from the cooperative approach prevalent in the latter half of the 20th century. The authors emphasize that an escape from the current downward trajectory in U.S.-China bilateral relations “will not occur without joint efforts and a change in the domestic politics of both societies.”
For this to happen, Beijing must first perceive less hostile intent from Washington. According to the authors, this will be no easy feat. Despite common expressions of intent to improve relations and to put a “floor” under the relationship voiced at ministerial-level meetings and recent meetings between Biden and Xi, little has improved in real terms. “Even limited and tangible efforts to pick low-hanging fruit such as mutual reduction of tariffs, restoration of academic exchanges, and reopening closed consulates remain dormant or ineffective.”
For Fingar and Lampton, Washington needs an approach that does not depend on prior or simultaneous moves by Beijing. The authors provide three concrete areas that may help bolster U.S.-China ties. The first is to avoid behaviors that push “PRC hot buttons” and trigger predictable reactions that stymie meaningful dialogue. The U.S. must continue to conduct necessary and appropriate military exercises in international waters and airspace and should call out dangerous or unprofessional actions by the PLA Navy or Air Force.
To this end, the U.S. should also avoid making statements and take actions that make it difficult for Beijing to respond positively, as “many third country observers are spring-loaded to criticize US inaction to reduce tensions [...] Conversely, PRC initiatives should be treated seriously, examined carefully, and addressed appropriately.”
The second area of improvement is to avoid declaring preconditions for discussions or taking actions that may not be in U.S. interests. Such preconditions rarely, if ever, have eased or accelerated desirable outcomes, and imposing conditions further complicates the resolution of issues and indicates to third countries that the United States is solely responsible for tensions.
To start the process, the authors suggest that “both sides ought to pick some low-hanging policy fruit like reopening consulates in Houston and Chengdu and increasing mutual media access [...] Both sides should see the benefit of having more than 350 American students studying in China.”
The third and most complicated issue is Taiwan. “Taiwan-related issues are the elephant in the room that cannot be ignored, but there is nothing to be gained by abandoning the policy of strategic ambiguity or further muddying the US position,” write Fingar and Lampton.
The authors suggest that the correct response to speculation on this issue should be “restatement of the USG position that the use of force in the Taiwan Strait is unacceptable, that there will be absolutely no support for Taiwan independence unless Taipei and Beijing peacefully reach agreement, and that relations between the people of Taiwan and the United States will remain unofficial [...] Washington needs to stop nibbling around the edges of the One China Policy.”
Only when progress is made on these three areas will perceived threats to Beijing begin to diminish. In the meantime, the current U.S. and Chinese framework of great power competition that “justifies efforts to hobble the other, is harmful to both countries and impedes international efforts to address global challenges.”
The authors deploy the “first law of holes” as a good place to start: “When you are in a hole as we are now in the relationship with China, stop digging. Making things worse is a poor way to seek improvement.” A reduction in tensions will not be easy, but tangible and modest measures to avoid hostility and work toward bounded competition and even cooperation on transnational challenge areas like pandemic disease and climate change mitigation should remain a possibility.
2024 Shorenstein Journalism Award Open to Nomination Entries
Sponsored by Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the annual award recognizes outstanding journalists and journalism organizations for excellence in covering the Asia-Pacific region. News editors, publishers, scholars, and organizations focused on Asia research and analysis are invited to submit nominations for the 2024 award through February 15.
U.S.-China meeting at the Filoli estate prior to APEC 2023 in San Francisco. Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons
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A new article for The Washington Quarterly, co-authored by Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton, investigates the drivers of Chinese policy behavior, assesses the role of U.S. policy in shaping it, and suggests steps to reduce the heightened tensions between the two superpowers.
In this article, authors Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton discuss US policies to manage relations with China, and argue that they cannot succeed if they are based on a distorted understanding of PRC politics.
The authors provide critiques of the flawed characterizations of PRC politics and policymaking that often prevail in Washington, then offer their own explanation of what has driven the shift in PRC behavior. Concluding with recommendations for policy and approach, the authors thereby suggest realistic and modest measures to avoid unmitigated hostility and pave the way toward a future guided by the search for coexistence, bounded competition, and productive cooperation.
About the Event: New digital technologies are profoundly changing human thought, including in the interpretation and application of international law. In this seminar, I employ both critical and behavioural approaches to international law to reflect on the technological revolution in international law, developing a cognitive-behavioural critique of contemporary law of armed conflict. Through an interdisciplinary and empirical exploration, I demonstrate that despite their differences – methodologically, theoretically, and ideologically – both critical and cognitive-behavioural approaches to international law share a commitment to complexity: a reading of knowledge production as a situated exercise, affected by geography, positioning, and motivations.
About the Speaker: Shiri Krebs is a Professor of Law at Deakin University and Law and Policy Co-Lead at the Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre (CSCRC). In 2023-2024 she is a Visiting Professor at Stanford University and a Senior Humboldt Fellow at Hamburg University. She is an affiliate scholar at Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and serves as the elected Chair of the international Lieber Society on the Law of Armed Conflict. Her current funded projects include an ARC DECRA Fellowship studying the regulation of predictive technologies for preventive counterterrorism, at the intersection of law, science, and technology.
Prof Krebs’ research on international fact-finding, biases in counterterrorism decision-making, and human-machine interaction in drone warfare, has influenced decision-making processes through invitations to brief high-level decision-makers, including at the United Nations (CTED, Office of the Secretary-General), the United States Department of Defence, and the Australian Defence Force. Her recent research awards include the ‘Researcher of the Year’ Award (Australian Women in Law Awards, 2022), the David Caron Prize (American Society of International Law, 2021), the Australian Legal Research Awards (finalist, Article/Chapter (ECR), 2022), and the Vice-Chancellor’s Researcher Award for Career Excellence (Deakin, 2022).
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About the Event:How does possession of nuclear weapons affect decisionmaker psychology? Extensive research documents the causes of proliferation, but we know far less about the psychological consequences of this proliferation. Drawing on advances in psychological research on power, this paper expects that possession of nuclear weapons increases support for preventive war. In contrast to conventional security and prestige arguments, the feeling of power activates a curious combination of fear and overconfidence -- the hallmark features of preventive war thinking. The paper examines this expectation through internal documents in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. The findings shed new light on the effects of nuclear weapons on foreign policy in general, as well as the sources of preventive war thinking in particular.
About the Speaker: Caleb Pomeroy is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He researches the psychology of power in international relations, notably the effects of relative state power on human thought and behavior. His work is published or forthcoming at International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Peace Research, and Security Studies, among other outlets. He holds a PhD in International Relations from The Ohio State University, an MSc in Contemporary Chinese Studies from the University of Oxford, an MSc in Security Studies from University College London, and a BA in Economics from Boston College.
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About the Event:Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is not a local or regional conflict; it is the prerequisite of the global confrontation between democratic and authoritarian regimes. We don’t know when and how the war will end, but it is abundantly clear that victory over authoritarian regimes like Russia, Iran and China is impossible without Ukraine aboard.
We have all believed in the power of international law and the rule of law until it has been shattered by repeated violations perpetrated by the Russian Federation. Democratic values and principles should be protected with power. And the power is not making declarations but making tanks, drones and missiles. Democracy has to be backed up with power to be able to resist those who are trying to destroy it.
About the Speaker: Oleksii Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament, a member of the Ukrainian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and Vice President of the PACE Committee on Migration, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. In Parliament, he is a member of the ‘European Solidarity group’, and head of the caucuses ‘For Democratic Belarus’, and ‘For Free Caucasus’. MP Goncharenko is a founder of Ukraine’s largest network of educational-cultural centres, the Goncharenko Centers, which have become volunteer hubs since February 2022.
MP Goncharenko has been fighting against Russian propaganda and publishes widely in international media to bring the truth to the world about Ukraine. He is included in the sanctioned persons lists of the Russian Federation. MP Goncharenko is a guest speaker at Yale University, Princeton University, Dartmouth College, and the University of Pennsylvania.
All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.
FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
