International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Gi-Wook Shin
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Last spring two North Korean defectors visited Stanford University from Seoul to share their experiences in the North. Hosted by Stanford's Korean Student Association, the event was held to increase awareness of North Korean human rights issues in the Stanford intellectual community. In fact, the Association hosts "North Korean Human Rights Night" every year. Stanford is not alone in this; many other leading American universities across the country, often also led by Korean American students, convene similar gatherings.

In the summer of 2012, Silicon Valley IT giant Google, a Stanford progeny and neighbor, hosted a conference on how technology can be used to disrupt illicit global networks, such as trafficking in human beings, human organs, and weapons. Ten North Korean defectors, ranging from former elite party members to forgotten orphans, flew in from Seoul to participate. They shared their extraordinary stories of survival amid excruciatingly painful quests for freedom.

Growing pressure on Pyongyang

These two stories are not isolated episodes. They reflect a recent trend of the international community paying dramatically more attention to North Korean human rights issues. Most notably, last month the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution to put North Korean human rights violations on the U.N. Security Council's agenda, despite objections from China and Russia. International pressure has been intensifying on Pyongyang since the release last year of a U.N. report documenting a network of political prisons in the North and atrocities that include murder, enslavement, torture, rape and forced abortions.

While concerns about North Korean human rights are longstanding at the U.N., this was the first time the U.N. Security Council ever debated the isolated country's human rights situation. In the past the international community focused primarily on curbing North Korea's nuclear programs. Now human rights in North Korea have become a matter rivaling the nuclear issue in seriousness and global attention. Its importance appears likely to continue to grow in the coming years.

That the human rights situation in North Korea is appalling was never a secret. Defectors have produced some searing accounts of life in the North Korean gulag. Why then did the international community largely ignore it until recently?

Partly this was a product of the priority given to security issues. But it also has to do with the closed nature of the regime and Cold War dynamics that made many people in the international community doubt that the situation could be as bad as some asserted. Pyongyang made it virtually impossible for foreign journalists to report out of the country, much less obtain video that could dramatize the situation of the ordinary people of North Korea for an international audience.

Moreover, some Western observers suspected that those focusing on North Korea's human rights situation were trying to demonize the regime for political and strategic purposes. Others, such as China and Russia, stayed away from supporting international criticism of North Korea's human rights situation, apparently for fear of opening up their own human rights situation to heightened international scrutiny. In any event, with few practical means to address the North Korean human rights situation, the international community paid little heed to the problem until the end of the cold war.

Unspeakable atrocities

Then, the great famine in North Korea in the mid-1990s led to many more North Koreans leaving their country and seeking temporary relief in China. More than ever they traveled on to the South and brought their life stories with them. One consequence has been an enormous increase in the amount of information available about circumstances inside North Korea, not least due to the flow of information into the country and the use of cell phones and other technology to get reports out. Along with changing international norms about human rights, this contributed to a dramatic growth during the past decade in the number of people, organizations and states throughout the world actively focusing on human rights in North Korea. In South Korea alone, there are many NGOs, often led by North Korean refugees, that work on North Korean human rights issues.

In a logical conclusion to these developments, a special United Nations Commission of Inquiry in February 2014 published a report detailing what it called "unspeakable atrocities" in North Korea. The head of the inquiry sent a letter to Kim Jong Un, warning, in effect, that Kim himself might be brought before the International Criminal Court. While the U.N. Security Council has not yet taken concrete action, the fact that it placed North Korea's human rights record on its agenda means that, theoretically at least, it can now at any point take the next step of referring these crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court.

How, then, should we deal with the human rights situation in North Korea? While it is not difficult to condemn the current condition on moral and ethical grounds, it is much more challenging to adequately address it in practical terms, especially when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reacts extremely negatively on such condemnation and uses it as a reason for not engaging on this issue.

For instance, the North Korean human rights situation remains one of the most divisive issues between conservatives and progressives in South Korea. South Korean conservatives advocate a very active program of publicizing and condemning North Korea's human rights situation. Many support steps such as taking the matter before the International Court of Justice with the aim of charging North Korea's leaders with crimes against humanity. Conservatives argue not only that this is the morally correct approach but also that it would put increased pressure on the regime to reform, if not contribute to its collapse.

South Korean progressives, on the other hand, while acknowledging the seriousness of the situation, are adamant that focusing on it will not serve to improve the situation. Instead, they say, by making the regime feel even less secure, it would actually worsen the human rights situation in North Korea as well as hurt efforts to improve inter-Korean relations. Progressives therefore argue South Korea should instead focus for the time being on state-to-state dialogue while providing aid to the North. This would reassure Pyongyang, they say, and eventually contribute to its taking its own reform measures, including improving the human rights situation.

As a result of these very different views, the Republic of Korea has adopted significantly different policies depending on whether a progressive or a conservative leader occupies the Blue House. When progressives Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun were president, the ROK often abstained on votes in UN bodies addressing North Korea's human rights situation. In contrast, conservative governments voted in favor of international criticism of North Korea's human rights situation and sometimes took the lead in raising the issue.

A coordinated effort

Meanwhile, South Korea's National Assembly has for years been unable to pass a North Korean human rights bill at all. Progressives favor "human rights" legislation that deals primarily with providing humanitarian aid to the North, consistent with their perspective on the problem's roots, while conservatives have drafted a bill that focuses on human rights along the lines of the United States' North Korea Human Rights Act, first passed in 2004.

For its part, the U.S. itself became focused on human rights only about a generation ago. It was not until the administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-81) that the U.S. embraced an activist policy placing international human rights near the top of its foreign agenda. Before then, the U.S. fiercely criticized communist states, but mostly because of the nature of their regimes rather than their human rights practices per se.

Today democratic governments throughout the world routinely criticize aspects of the human rights situations even in friendly and allied countries, not just in those of adversaries. Actions on behalf of human rights that in earlier decades would have been deemed unacceptable "interference in domestic affairs" now enjoy international legitimacy and broad support. Concepts such as the "responsibility to protect (R2P)," which many Japanese have promoted, assert that national sovereignty is not absolute and that the international community must intervene to stop situations where the regime is unable to protect its people.

While concern is well-taken that a focus on the North Korean human rights situation would burden any engagement effort with Pyongyang and, moreover, would not improve the lives of the people of North Korea in the short- to mid-term, we cannot ignore the human rights situation. Any policy toward the North must take into account that the North Korean human rights issue has developed dramatically in recent years.

For South Korea, this requires a principled but nuanced approach. It has long been the primary center for research on North Korean human rights, with the Korea Institute for National Unification producing its annual White Paper since 1996, but it needs to establish a bipartisan body to develop programs to effectively address those areas most in need. It should also support all important and accurate criticism of North Korea's human rights situation at the United Nations and other international organizations.

However, South Korea may not take the lead in addressing North Korea's human rights abuses, while increasing the humanitarian provision of nutritional assistance and public health services in North Korea without linkage to the nuclear issue. Such an approach would deprive North Korea of the argument that South Korea is not actually concerned about human rights but is using the issue as a weapon against Pyongyang.

Like other aspects of North Korea policy, the human rights problem is extremely troubling yet enormously difficult to address effectively. The international community must share its wisdom and its resources to develop and implement principled, pragmatic, long-term approaches to the challenges that Pyongyang presents, especially the human rights situation. Leaders of the international community as a whole but above all South Korea's neighbors should support and participate in such a coordinated effort. This is in fact an area in which Japan and South Korea can easily cooperate more.

 

Shin recently coauthored the policy report, "Tailored Engagement: Toward an Effective and Sustainable Inter-Korean Relations Policy," released at a hearing of the Korean National Assembly's special committee on inter-Korean relations. This Nikkei Asian Review article was originally carried on Jan. 20 and reposted with permission.

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The United Nations Security Council met to discuss the situation in North Korea on Dec. 22, 2014.
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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has just won another landslide victory from snap election last December. After two years of governance, his cabinet is still popular and powerful. There are high chances for him to accomplish tax reform and win the LDP presidential election this fall. The current political situation is often reported as “Prime Minister’s Office’s dominance” or “Abe dominates.” This Abe cabinet is becoming a sharp contrast to past six cabinets, including his own first cabinet. All six cabinets were short tenured, serving just for around a year, and prime ministers’ leadership were weak. Before these six prime minister, however, Junichiro Koizumi commanded strong power and leadership, succeeding in a series of reforms. Why do we witness two totally different outcomes of Japanese prime ministers’ power in the last decade?

In this presentation, Professor Takenaka gives an institutionalist explanation to this puzzle by examining the Japanese parliamentary system. To highlight its nature, he will make a brief comparison with the British system.

 

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Harukata Takenaka is a professor of political science at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo.  He specializes in comparative politics and international political economy, with a particular focus on Japanese political economy. His research interests include democracy in Japan, and Japan's political and economic stagnation since the 1990s. 

He received a B.A. from the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University.  He is the author of Failed Democratization in Prewar Japan: Breakdown of a Hybrid Regime, (Stanford University Press, 2014), and Sangiin to ha [What is House of Councillors], (Chuokoron Shinsha, 2010).

Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor, Central

 

Harukata Takenaka Professor, the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
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Last year was relatively quiet in inter-Korean relations, with no further North Korean military provocations against the South and no nuclear tests conducted. Then, on New Year’s Day this year, for the first time since he came to power on his father’s death, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un publicly expressed his willingness to hold an inter-Korean summit meeting “if the atmosphere and environment are ready." At the same time, he continued to emphasize the importance of his regime’s policies of “military first” and byeongjin, the simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and pursuit of economic growth. What are Kim’s real intentions? Can inter-Korean dialogue actually resume? Can the Six Party Talks to denuclearize the North be restarted after a six-year hiatus? Sook Kim, a former South Korean nuclear negotiator with North Korea, ambassador to the United Nations, and deputy director of the National Intelligence Service, will explore what the year 2015, the seventieth anniversary of Korea’s division, may hold for inter-Korean relations and the North Korean nuclear problem.

Philippines Conference Room

Encina Hall, 3rd floor

Stanford University

Sook Kim <i>2014–15 Pantech Fellow; former ROK Ambassador to United Nations</i>
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Tokyo-based reporter Jacob Schlesinger will receive award for his journalistic work and achievements spanning three decades

Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to announce Wall Street Journal reporter Jacob Schlesinger as the 2014 recipient of the Shorenstein Journalism Award.

Schlesinger has been selected for his excellence in reporting on Japan’s economy, trade and politics, over a more than three-decade career in journalism. A Japan watcher since the late 1980s, Schlesinger incisively covered the nation at its economic height, the ‘boom’ period, through its ‘bust,’ as the financial system collapsed in the 1990s, and now, into an era that has seen signs of economic revival.

Commenting on the selection of Schlesinger for the award, Professor Daniel Okimoto, one of the leading American experts on Japanese political economy and a former director of Shorenstein APARC, said:

 “Through the years, followers of Japan have had the benefit of being kept informed by a succession of first-rate journalists based in Tokyo, such as Bill Emmott (The Economist), author of “The Sun Also Sets,” and Gillian Tett (Financial Times), author of “Saving the Sun.” No foreign journalist has covered Japan longer, or understood its political economy more deeply, than Jacob M. Schlesinger (Wall Street Journal), author of “Shadow Shoguns.”

The Shorenstein Journalism Award, launched in 2002, is given to journalists who are outstanding in their reporting on Asia, and who have contributed significantly to Western understanding of the region. The award was originally designed to honor distinguished American journalists for their work on Asia, but since 2011, Shorenstein APARC re-envisioned the award to encompass Asian journalists who pave the way for press freedom, and have aided in the growth of mutual understanding between Asia and the United States. The award alternates between Western and Asian journalists.

The most recent award recipients were Aung Zaw, the founder of Burmese publication the Irrawaddy, and a pioneer of press freedom in that country, and Barbara Demick, the Los Angeles Times correspondent in Beijing and the author of ground-breaking studies of life in North Korea.

Schlesinger has covered Japan for the Wall Street Journal for nearly a decade. He is currently the Senior Asia Economics Correspondent and Central Banks Editor – Asia for the Journal, based in Tokyo. He came first to Japan as a reporter in the late 1980s, covering tech, trade and politics, and then reporting on Japan’s stock market crash and financial crisis, and the fallout that carried on through the mid-1990s, a period known as “the lost decade.”

Schlesinger then worked for 13 years in the Journal’s bureau in Washington DC, covering politics and the U.S. economy. He was part of the Journal’s team that was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 2003 for the “What’s Wrong” series about the causes and consequences of the late-1990s financial bubble.

Schlesinger returned to Japan as the Japan editor/Tokyo bureau chief in 2009, overseeing the coverage of the historic transfer of power to the Democratic Party of Japan, and the triple disaster of the massive earthquake of March 2011 and the tsunami and Fukushima nuclear disaster that resulted. He has since closely followed the return to power of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, and its leader Shinzo Abe, and his administration’s economic stimulus policy, known as ‘Abenomics,’ as well as growing tensions within the region.

Schlesinger is the author of the book, “Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Postwar Political Machine,” widely recognized as one of the most important works on Japan’s politicians, parties and the dramatic changes in its political order. Published in 1997, the book was hailed by Foreign Affairs as “a fascinating and penetrating tale.” He wrote the book while a visiting fellow at Shorenstein APARC.

Schlesinger will receive the award at a special ceremony at Stanford’s Bechtel Conference Center on March 9. He will also lead a panel discussion earlier that day examining the coverage of Japan’s economy, from boom to bust and back again, with Susan Chira, a former Tokyo correspondent and now deputy executive editor of The New York Times and Professor Takeo Hoshi, a prominent economist and director of Stanford’s Japan Program.

Please click here for the full press release.

Contact: Lisa Griswold, communications coordinator at Shorenstein APARC, with any questions about the award or the March 9 events.

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Wall Street Journal's Jacob Schlesinger (at Left) interviews World Bank President Jim Yong Kim at the 2012 Tokyo Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
Wall Street Journal's Jacob Schlesinger (at Left) interviews World Bank President Jim Yong Kim at the 2012 Tokyo Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
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The Stanford Silicon Valley-New Japan Project
Public Forum Series with Networking
 

Speaker: Robert Cole (Bio)

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Tuesday, January 27, 2015
5:00 – 5:30 pm Networking
5:30pm - 7:00pm Lecture
Cypress Semiconductor Auditorium (CISX Auditorium)

Public Welcome • Light Refreshments

The Silicon Valley - New Japan Project

 


 

Cypress Semiconductor Auditorium (CISX Auditorium)
Paul G. Allen Building, Stanford University
330 Serra Mall, Stanford CA 94305
https://www.google.com/maps?q=CISX+Cypress+Semiconductor+Auditorium@37.4295793,-122.1748332

Robert Cole Professor Emeritus, Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley
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Abstract

In 2010-2011, the "Arab Spring" brought unexpected revolutions to many Middle Eastern and North African countries. Why did these seemingly invincible regimes fall, while China remained durably authoritarian? Many observers credited global media for the political transformations. While the hopes of Arab Spring democracy have proven to be fragile or short-lived, we can effectively explore the relationship between political communication and regime stability by turning our attention to Taiwan’s remarkable democratization, which remains under-appreciated by the international community.

This talk considers political communication in Taiwan from the martial law era to the heady days of democratic activism beginning in the late 1970s and lasting till the 1990s. Professor Esarey argues that the Chiang Ching-kuo administration’s diminishing capacity to control a small but influential opposition (dangwai) media, and even mainstream newspapers, gradually permitted reformers to reframe debates, reset the political agenda, and challenge state narratives and legitimacy claims. 

When viewed in comparative perspective, Taiwan’s successful democratization suggests that seeking regime change is impracticable, and even perilous, without considerable and sustainable media freedom as well as opportunities for the public to advocate, evaluate, and internalize alternative political views. A balance of “communication power” between state and societal actors facilitates a negotiated and peaceful transition from authoritarianism.

 

 

Bio

Professor Ashley Esarey received his PhD in Political Science from Columbia University and was awarded the An Wang Postdoctoral Fellowship by Harvard University. He has held academic appointments at Middlebury College, Whitman College, and the University of Alberta, where he is an instructor in the departments of East Asian Studies and Political Science and a research associate of the China Institute. Esarey has written on democratization and authoritarian resilience, digital media and politics, and information control and propaganda. His recent publications include My Fight for a New Taiwan: One Woman’s Journey from Prison to Power (with Lu Hsiu-lien) and The Internet in China: Cultural, Political, and Social Dimensions (with Randolph Kluver).

 

Communication Power and Taiwan's Democratization
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Ashley Esarey Research Associate, China Institute University of Alberta
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Is Europe "elderly and haggard", and could France become "the crucible of  Europe" (Jan. 10, 2015 NYTimes op-ed)?

On the one hand, Europe is warned by the US about an Asian "pivot", and is perceived here as less relevant and effective. Significantly, certainly as a wake up call, Pope Francis recently compared Europe to  a "grandmother, no longer fertile and vibrant, increasingly a bystander in a world that has apparently become less and less Eurocentric”. France had been previously presented here as an eminent representative of an "Old Europe".

On the other hand,  the US has been constantly, during the last decade, advocating for a stronger Europe  and stressing a special French role in this endeavour. A few days ago, after the terrorist attacks in Paris, President Obama publicly stated that "France was the US oldest Ally". 

At a time when we have to face common challenges in the Middle East and in Africa, to adapt to new emerged actors and a more assertive Russia, to deal with direct threats including in the field of proliferation and the cyber space, to define a multipolar world and organize our economic relation (TTIP), what can be the EU contribution? What can also be a special intellectual and diplomatic French input to this global realignment?

Co-sponsored by The Europe Center, the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the France-Stanford Center.

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Ambassador Eric Lebédel of France

 

Ambassador Eric Lebédel is a French diplomat, former ambassador to the OSCE and to Finland, with a deep experience in Transatlantic relationship (twice as Minister's advisor;  in the French embassy in Washington DC) and in European affairs. He is also involved in crisis management (PMs office), international security (embassy in Moscow, consul general in Istanbul) and multilateral diplomacy ( NATO's Director for crisis management, OSCE). Presently working on Strategic Partnerships for the French MFA and interested in e.diplomacy, he also regularly lectures  at Sciences-po and ENA (Ecole Nationale d'Administration) on crisis management and Europe.

 

 

 

 

Ambassador Eric Lebédel French Diplomat Speaker
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CISAC Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies

INFORMATION SESSION 

for Stanford undergraduates interested in applying for the 2015-2016 academic year 

 

 Meet program faculty, current students, and alumni. 

Learn about the program. 

Eat pizza! 

 

CISAC’s Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies provides Stanford undergraduates with strong academic records and interest in international security topics from all undergraduate schools and majors the opportunity to earn Honors in International Security Studies by writing a rigorous, policy-relevant thesis. 

Students are admitted to the program on a competitive basis. 

For more information and/or to apply, please visit: http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/undergraduate_honors_program

Application deadline: February 27, 2015

Please direct questions to Shelby Speer, Honors Program Coordinator, sspeer@stanford.edu

 

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CISAC Honors 2014

 

CISAC Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies
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Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Encina Hall
616 Serra Street, C137
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-5368 (650) 723-3435
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Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Olivier Nomellini Professor Emeritus in International Studies at the School of Humanities and Sciences
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Coit Blacker is a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Olivier Nomellini Professor Emeritus in International Studies at the School of Humanities and Sciences, and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education. He served as director of FSI from 2003 to 2012. From 2005 to 2011, he was co-chair of the International Initiative of the Stanford Challenge, and from 2004 to 2007, served as a member of the Development Committee of the university's Board of Trustees.

During the first Clinton administration, Blacker served as special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and senior director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC). At the NSC, he oversaw the implementation of U.S. policy toward Russia and the New Independent States, while also serving as principal staff assistant to the president and the National Security Advisor on matters relating to the former Soviet Union.

Following his government service, Blacker returned to Stanford to resume his research and teaching. From 1998 to 2003, he also co-directed the Aspen Institute's U.S.-Russia Dialogue, which brought together prominent U.S. and Russian specialists on foreign and defense policy for discussion and review of critical issues in the bilateral relationship. He was a study group member of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission) throughout the commission's tenure.

In 2001, Blacker was the recipient of the Laurence and Naomi Carpenter Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching at Stanford.

Blacker holds an honorary doctorate from the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Far Eastern Studies for his work on U.S.-Russian relations. He is a graduate of Occidental College (A.B., Political Science) and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (M.A., M.A.L.D., and Ph.D).

Blacker's association with Stanford began in 1977, when he was awarded a post-doctoral fellowship by the Arms Control and Disarmament Program, the precursor to the Center for International Security and Cooperation at FSI.

Faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Faculty member at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
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Coit Blacker Senior Fellow at FSI, Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies at the School of Humanities and Sciences Speaker Stanford University
Martha Crenshaw Senior Fellow at FSI and CISAC, Professor of political science by courtesy Speaker Stanford University
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Sony Pictures Entertainment was set to release a satirical comedy, “The Interview,” in late 2014, but a cyberattack hit the organization that leaked corporate information, leading the company to initially pull the film and opening up a string of theories over who was behind the attack and how to respond.

Speculation began to mount as a clearer picture of the unprecedented hacking, both comprehensive and large in size, began to emerge. The breach is thought to be retribution for Sony’s production of the film, which carries a plot to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

Then, a threat was directed at movie theaters and moviegoers planning to screen and see “The Interview.” The message warned those against involvement ahead of the film’s Dec. 25 opening, indicating a “bitter fate” and alluding to the 9/11 attacks in the United States.

An unknown group, The Guardians of Peace “GOP,” claimed responsibility for the cyberattack. Media and those familiar with North Korea began to point blame on the country, which had already publicly condemned the film last June and has a history of cybercrime. Responding to accusations, top North Korean leadership rejected any involvement in the attack.

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The White House responded as Sony canceled the film’s New York premiere and said it would discontinue distribution. Following his year-end press conference, President Barack Obama condemned the hacking, citing the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s conclusion that North Korea was behind the attack. The President said the United States would respond “proportionally,” and on Jan. 2, signed an Executive Order that put into action a series of sanctions imposed by the Department of the Treasury.

David Straub, a Korea expert at Stanford University, answered questions about the Sony hacking and its policy implications for the United States and North-South Korean relations. Straub is the associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He formerly served as the State Department’s Korean affairs director.

What do we know about the Sony hacking? Who’s responsible?

Based on many types of evidence, including confidential information, U.S. government officials appear to be quite confident that North Korea did in fact conduct this operation. There’s still some disagreement in the media and among tech experts over who is responsible. They’ve cited a number of reasons but the main one is that the FBI’s official statement attributing the attack to North Korea provided evidence that they believe is far from conclusive. I myself am not a technical expert, but based upon my following North Korea for many years – the attack strikes me as being very likely to have been a North Korean operation. The FBI statement noted that the Sony attack is similar to an attack that the North Koreans conducted against South Korean banks and media outlets in March 2013. In that attack, many South Korean banks had their hard drives completely wiped clean. It was a hugely destructive attack and very similar to what happened to Sony.

Does North Korea’s response to the Sony hack coincide with past behavior?

In addition to the 2013 South Korean bank cyberattack, the North Koreans apparently sank a South Korean naval vessel in 2010, killing 46 sailors. In both instances, the North Koreans denied that they did it, expressed outrage over being accused, demanded that the South Koreans produce proof, said that they could prove that they didn’t do it, and then requested that the South Koreans conduct a joint investigation. These same demands are being made in response to the U.S. blaming Pyongyang for the Sony cyberattack. It couldn’t be more similar. More generally, the North Korean regime is very calculating. They know they can’t win an outright military confrontation with South Korea, much less the United States, so what they do is try to find a weak link and go after it in a way in which they have plausible deniability – a situation where it’s very difficult for the attacked party to prove who did it.

Describe North Korea’s hacking capabilities.

North Korea is a very secretive country, so it’s hard to be completely certain of their cyber capabilities. However, according to many accounts, the North Korean government has established professional hacking schools and units over the years, resulting in hundreds if not thousands of trained hackers. North Korea has engaged in a number of attacks in the past, the most prominent one was the attack on South Korean banks in March 2013. But also, a few years ago, North Korea conducted less sophisticated attacks on major U.S. government websites.

Why would they conduct an attack?

The North Koreans appear to have both the capability and the motivation to attack Sony. The nation’s entire political system rests on a cult of personality – now a cult of family, actually – that began with the founder of the regime, Kim Il-sung, and extends to his grandson today, leader Kim Jong-un, who has been in power since Dec. 2011. It’s the only thing holding the political system together at this point. The cult of personality is so strong that any direct criticism of the top leader is something that North Koreans will compete among each other to reject. From this standpoint, it seems very likely that they would feel they had to prevent the showing of a movie that features an assassination of Kim Jong-un. And, the hackers had plenty of time to prepare for and implement the attack because everyone knew well ahead of when the movie would be released.

The United States placed new financial sanctions on North Korea. What impact will the sanctions have?

President Obama made it clear that the U.S. government would respond at a time, in a place, and in a manner of its own choosing. Not all measures taken would be made public. So far, the first publically announced measure was the President’s Executive Order on Jan. 2 imposing additional sanctions on a number of North Korean agencies and officials. This in itself is unlikely to have major consequences because most of those entities were already sanctioned. But, the Executive Order states that the sanctions are being implemented not only because of the cyberattack against Sony, but more generally because of North Korea’s actions and policies, including its serious human rights abuses. So in a sense, the North Koreans got the United States to expand its reasons for sanctioning them.

 

President Obama addresses the Sony hacking, saying the United States will "respond proportionally," at his year-end press briefing on Dec. 19.

President Obama addresses the Sony hacking at his year-end press briefing on Dec. 19. Photo credit: WhiteHouse.gov

 

What other steps will the United States likely take?

President Obama left open the possibility that North Korea might be returned to the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list, from which the nation was removed in 2008. I think it was a mistake to remove North Korea from that list in the first place. It was done to promote progress on the nuclear talks, which eventually failed, and ignored a number of terroristic actions that North Korea has committed in recent years. Another possibility, which is being pushed by Republicans in Congress, is to increase financial sanctions that mirror the type that were successfully implemented in Iran.

How will the U.S. response influence cybersecurity policy going forward?

The attack on Sony is a huge wakeup call to American businesses, and even to the U.S. government. It’s the first attack of this size on a company located in the United States. It got tremendous profile in the media and the President has been personally engaged in responding. Nearly everyone has heard about it, so U.S. companies are now going to be focused much more on cybersecurity because it has exposed some potential vulnerabilities – a “if North Korea can do it, presumably others can too” mentality. Moreover, if an attack can be executed on a film company, it could also be done to other businesses and even to elements of U.S. critical infrastructure.

How do you view North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s possible offer to meet with South Korean leadership this year?

Kim Jong-un said that he was open to the possibility of a summit with South Korea in his annual New Year’s address, although he made no specific proposal. He made clear that the summit would be conditional on actions to be taken in advance by South Korea. Among these, Kim demanded ending U.S.-South Korean military exercises and halting the flow of propaganda-filled balloons sent over the border into the North by non-governmental activist groups in the South. Moreover, North Korea has a history of expanding its conditions later, without any warning. So, I think one has to be skeptical. The signal is unfortunately less likely to be a sincere effort toward real, sustained dialogue, and more likely to be a North Korean propaganda effort devised to confuse, divert and divide international public opinion. That said, South Korea has acted entirely appropriately in welcoming the signal and reiterating its own offer of high-level talks. Let’s hope for the best.

David Straub also participated in an interview with Public Radio International on Jan. 1 about the prospect for North-South talks, the audio can be accessed on the PRI website.

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"The Interview," a Sony Pictures film starring actors Seth Rogen and James Franco about a fictional plot to assasinate North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, releases in theaters.
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Prime Minister Shinzo Abe dissolved Japan’s lower house of parliament in November, and held an early election on December 14. The vote kept the status quo – the ruling Liberal Democratic Party retained its majority in the Diet, winning two-thirds of the seats.

In a Dispatch Japan Q&A, Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, discusses the election results and weighs the outcomes for the Abe administration.

“For Abe, this election was all about power, and retaining power.

“With this victory, Abe should have staved off any serious challengers, barring external events that dramatically change the perception of his government.”

Sneider said the question remains what Abe will choose to do with his ‘somewhat rebuilt’ political clout.

The full article is available on the Dispatch Japan blog, and in Toyo Keizai, a Tokyo-based economics/politics publication, in Japanese and English.

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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
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