International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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This paper examines UK national (security and nuclear) interests in relation to Trident and the recent putative shift in conceptions of UK national interests from a discourse of ‘security’ to one of ‘resilience’. We discuss the rise of resilience in the discourse of UK national interests and reflect upon its possible articulations with the concept and goal of security, in order to make sense of what a shift from security to resilience would entail. We then assess the practices of UK nuclear weapons policy, and Trident in particular, in relation to the requirements with which a resilient nuclear weapons policy would need to comply. We conclude that the perceived requirements of deterrence as a communicative practice in large part explain missed opportunities to acknowledge the risk of a nuclear accident and the possibility of a consistent shift towards resilience as a national priority. Purchase the book here.

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British Foreign Policy and the National Interest
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"North Korean Human Rights: A Long Journey with Little Progress" examines human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) and the approaches that the European Union has taken to address the situation. In this paper, Mike Cowin provides perspective on EU-DPRK engagement; the two sides officially established diplomatic relations in May 2001. The EU and its members have continued to raise the human rights issue during bilateral meetings. But, North Korea says it will continue to refuse dialogue if the EU continues to sponsor resolutions against North Korea at the UN Human Rights Commission/Council. The EU has rejected this as a precondition. "The EU has had no incentive or justifiable reason to take the initiative to break out of this chicken-and-egg dilemma...The DPRK has also maintained its position. The gap between the two sides has therefore widened," he writes. Cowin suggests the EU could take additional steps to restart EU-DPRK engagement.

Mike Cowin is the 2014-15 Pantech Fellow in the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Before coming to Stanford, he served as the deputy head of mission at the British Embassy in Pyongyang, North Korea. He has also served in the British embassies in Seoul from 2003 to 2007, and in Tokyo from 1992 to 1997.

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Mike Cowin
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Increasingly in scholarly descriptions of state responses to power ascendancy, the classic distinction between “balancing” and “bandwagoning” has been superseded by the less dichotomous term “hedging” as a name for what is really going on. Few, however, have tried to clarify what distinguishes hedging from other strategies, what causes weaker states to hedge, and why they hedge in different ways.

Prof. Kuik will focus on Southeast Asian states’ responses to China.  Hedging occurs, he will argue, when one country pursues contradictory policies toward two or more competing powers in order to prepare a fallback position should circumstances change.  Hedging is likely when two conditions are present:  when threats are neither immediate nor straightforward, and when sources of vital support are uncertain.  At the domestic level, hedging is often the most viable approach because its contradictory attributes allow ruling elites to optimize multiple policy tradeoffs and thereby to enhance their legitimacy at home.  The hedging behaviors of ruling elites are a function of their respective strategies of legitimation.  

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Cheng-Chwee Kuik is a co-convener of the East Asia and International Relations Forum at the National University of Malaysia and an associate member of the Institute of China Studies at the University of Malaya.  From September 2013 until July 2014, he was a postdoctoral research associate in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University.  His writings in English and Chinese have appeared in The Asan Forum (2014), Asian Security (2013), the Chinese Journal of International Politics (2013), Asian Politics and Policy (2012), Contemporary Southeast Asia (2008 & 2005), Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (2004), and various edited books.  His essay “The Essence of Hedging:  Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China” was awarded the biennial 2009 Michael Leifer Memorial Prize by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies for the best article published in any of its three journals.

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Encina Hall 3rd Floor Central

616 Serra Street,

Stanford, CA 94305

Cheng-Chwee Kuik Associate Professor of International Relations, National University of Malaysia
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The attack on Mark Lippert, the American ambassador to South Korea, made headlines worldwide on Thursday. Since his arrival in Seoul last October, Lippert received high marks from the Korean people and the media for his accessibility to the public there. Lippert, a Stanford graduate, is a very close friend of President Obama, who has called him “brother,” and attended his ambassadorial swearing-in ceremony.

The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center asked David Straub to discuss the incident and its significance. The associate director of the Korea Program at Stanford, Straub served as a career diplomat at the U.S. embassy in Seoul from 1999 to 2002 and is the author of the forthcoming book about that period called Anti-Americanism in Democratizating South Korea.

What actually happened?

A South Korean extreme left-wing activist, Kim Ki-jong, slashed Ambassador Lippert with a kitchen knife Thursday morning at a public event in Seoul. Koreans at the event immediately wrestled the assailant to the floor, but not before he had inflicted several wounds on the ambassador: a long, deep gash on his cheek and cuts to his wrist and fingers. The ambassador was taken straightway to hospital, where surgeons repaired the damage in a three-hour operation. The prognosis is that he will regain the full use of his fingers in about six months, and that the scar on his face will be barely noticeable in one or two years. His doctors plan to remove the eighty stitches on his cheek on Monday, and, if all is well, release him from the hospital then. But it was a close call. Had the face wound extended only one inch farther down, it would have severed his carotid artery.

How is Ambassador Lippert doing?

He told his doctors on Friday that the facial wound was not bothering him particularly, but he did have some pain in his wrist and fingers. Doctors say he has some nerve damage there but the pain should ease soon. Ambassador Lippert’s response has been laudable. Consistent with the outstanding way he has comported himself in Korea since his arrival, he promptly tweeted on Thursday that he was “Doing well & in great spirits!” I am also aware that he was even responding to email wishes from some Stanford friends on Thursday.

Was Kim acting alone? How was it possible for him to perpetrate this attack?

Kim was the only person who attacked Ambassador Lippert, and he has stated that he acted alone.  Kim was a member of the organization that hosted Ambassador Lippert, but had not been invited to the function. The incident is still being investigated but Korean press reports say that the U.S. embassy declined South Korean police protection some time ago. Korea is considered a relatively safe country for American diplomats. This will all be sorted out in coming days and weeks, and U.S. and South Korean authorities will determine if other security arrangements are needed for Ambassador Lippert. In any event, it does not appear that this was an egregious security or intelligence failure on anyone’s part. Ambassadors are public figures and it’s not possible to provide them with perfect protection.

What was the assailant’s motivation?

Kim said that he wanted to emphasize that the United States is responsible for preventing improved inter-Korean relations because it does such things as participate in the ongoing combined military exercises with South Korean forces. North Korea cites the annual exercises as a pretext for not talking with the South, claiming each year that they are a prelude to an invasion. But Kim is a sad sack figure even within South Korea’s anti-American far left, which is a very small but vocal minority. Kim has been arrested many times in the past for outrageous and violent behavior, such as throwing pieces of concrete at the Japanese ambassador in 2010. He heads his own little NGO, but the Korean left has mostly avoided him because of his bizarre behavior. He even set himself on fire in 2007 near the Blue House to protest an alleged attack on an associate. Although I have never met him, it is my impression that Kim is clearly mentally and emotionally unstable.

How have the Korean government and people responded?

From the people who wrestled the assailant to the ground, to the surgeons and the thousands of people who are wishing Ambassador Lippert well, South Koreans have responded with an outpouring of support. Ambassador Lippert has already conveyed his deep gratitude for that on Twitter. President Park, who is currently on an official visit to the Middle East, telephoned Ambassador Lippert on Thursday; so did Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se. President Obama also called the ambassador to wish him a speedy recovery. Unfortunately, North Korea’s reaction has been very different: its official media applauded the attack as “deserved punishment” for “a warmongering United States.”

There are press reports that South Koreans are worried that this attack could hurt U.S.-Korean relations.

There is indeed considerable concern being expressed in South Korea at the moment that the incident could hurt bilateral relations, but there is no reason at all to believe that will be the case. Top U.S. officials have already stated that the incident will only strengthen U.S.-Korean relations. I recall the reaction in Seoul to the mass shooting by Seung-hui Cho at Virginia Tech in 2007. Cho had grown up in the United States but remained a Korean citizen. Many South Koreans were very fearful that the U.S. government would punish South Koreans, such as by not issuing visas, and that Americans would attack South Koreans on the streets in the United States. Of course, nothing like that happened. Americans understood the tragedy for what it was: not a “Korean” but a fellow human being with severe mental illness and access to guns.

You say that Kim appears to have a mental disability. But there are press reports that he lectured for the South Korean unification ministry’s education institute as well as at a major university in Seoul. How could such a person get those positions?

I am curious and concerned about those reports. For me, the bigger question about that is not Kim’s particular policy views but how someone with such obvious behavioral and apparently mental issues could receive such positions. But he held those jobs several years ago, so perhaps his behavior has become worse in the meantime.

I understand that Kim has already been charged with attempted murder and that Korean authorities are considering whether to charge him under the National Security Law owing to frequent travel to North Korea and possible other links with the North Korean government.

Unless Korean authorities find evidence that Kim was working for North Korea, which I doubt was the case (but which should of course be investigated due to his numerous trips to the country), it would be unfortunate for U.S.-South Korean relations to charge him under the controversial National Security Law. The U.S. government has criticized that law for decades for the McCarthyite way South Korean governments have sometimes implemented it to suppress alleged “pro-North Korean” thinking. Some South Korean leaders are calling the incident “pro-North Korean terrorism” and the work of “pro-North Korean forces.” That seems to me to be unwisely elevating the violent behavior of one deranged person and ascribing to it a significance it does not deserve.

Ambassador Lippert’s Twitter handle is @mwlippert.

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In 2009, President Barack Obama confers with Mark Lippert, the then-National Security Council chief of staff. Since Oct. 2014, Lippert has served as the U.S. ambassador to South Korea.
Flickr/White House - Pete Souza
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The human rights situation in North Korea has gained considerable attention lately, due in part to an official report released by the United Nations last year. The landmark report condemned North Korea for systematic and widespread human rights violations.

Now for three weeks in March, the UN human rights council meets in Geneva for its regular session. North Korea’s human rights situation is a top agenda item, marked by a rare appearance by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Young. In Dec. 2014, the UN General Assembly urged the Security Council to take up the situation of North Korea, including a possible referral of those responsible for prosecution in the International Criminal Court.

Looking beyond UN – U.S. – North Korea engagement, the European Union and its members have long-raised similar concerns. In a new policy brief “North Korean Human Rights: A Long Journey with Little Progress,” Mike Cowin details the human rights situation and institutions involved from a British perspective.

“The DPRK will need to make considerable efforts if it is to undermine more than a handful of the hundreds of testimonies of abuse that have been collected and brought to the world’s attention,” writes Cowin, a former deputy chief of mission at the British Embassy in Pyongyang.

Cowin is the Pantech Fellow in the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Before coming to Stanford, he also served in the embassies in Seoul from 2003 to 2007, and in Tokyo from 1992 to 1997.

The EU and North Korea have held seemingly incompatible positions for the past 11 years, and the March council meetings are unlikely to change that impasse. However, Cowin suggests that the EU should seek ways to have more impact.

“Perhaps the EU, which has often led the world on human rights, could find some way to talk with the DPRK, establishing a mutually acceptable way to restart engagement,” he writes.

Cowin says restarting engagement may take the form of quiet, long-term confidence building.

The Korea Program has published additional works focused on human rights in North Korea, including a paper that looks at living with disabilities in North Korea by Katharina Zellweger and an op-ed by Gi-Wook Shin calling for international consensus on the North Korea problem. Engaging North Korea is also a research focus of the Korea Program, which last year produced a policy paper on North-South Korean relations and the prospect for unification.

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In the past years, different forms of non-democratic rule have expanded, associated with revamped attempts at controlling the media. New mechanisms, including legislative, commercial and technological tools have been used to contain, co-opt and silence critical voices. At the same time, bottom-up pursuits of pushing the boundaries of the permissible and redefining the space for creative critical discourse have intensified, with outspoken journalists and netizens creating new platforms to bypass complex political restrictions. This panel presents a unique discussion on how this cat and mouse game works across non-democratic contexts: in Russia, China, and Turkey. These cases present different degrees of separation from democracy, with China being the furthest, categorized as a full authoritarian regime, Turkey being in between an illiberal democracy and competitive authoritarianism, and Russia positioned in the middle of China and Turkey. Beyond illuminating the specific dynamics of each case, the panel will engage in drawing the parallels and distinctions in control and resistance mechanisms across the three cases. It will further explore and reflect on the recent tendencies of cross-authoritarian diffusion of information management, illustrating how the three regimes and the critical journalists in them may be learning from one another and what that means for our understanding of media in non-democratic contexts. Watch Jaclyn Kerr's discussion of the Russian case.

 
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At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, NATO leaders were clear about the security challenges on the Alliance’s borders. In the East, Russia’s actions threaten our vision of a Europe that is whole, free and at peace.  On the Alliance’s southeastern border, ISIL’s campaign of terror poses a threat to the stability of the Middle East and beyond.  To the south, across the Mediterranean, Libya is becoming increasingly unstable. As the Alliance continues to confront theses current and emerging threats, one thing is clear as we prepare for the 2016 Summit in Warsaw: NATO will adapt, just as it has throughout its 65-year history.

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Douglas Lute, Ambassador of the United States to NATO

 

In August 2013, Douglas E. Lute was sworn-in as the Ambassador of the United States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  From 2007 to 2013, Lute served at the White House under Presidents Bush and Obama, first as the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, and more recently as the Deputy Assistant to the President focusing on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.  In 2010, AMB Lute retired from the U.S. Army as a Lieutenant General after 35 years on active duty.  Prior to the White House, he served as the Director of Operations on the Joint Staff, overseeing U.S. military operations worldwide. He served multiple tours in NATO commands including duty in Germany during the Cold War and commanding U.S. forces in Kosovo.  He holds degrees from the United States Military Academy and Harvard University.

A light lunch will be provided.  Please plan to arrive by 11:30am to allow time to check in at the registration desk, pick up your lunch and be seated by 12:00 noon.

Co-sponsored by The Europe Center, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

 

Douglas Lute United States Ambassador to NATO Speaker
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We can't let partisan infighting destroy what could be a historic nuclear pact. America is the safest when its leaders work together to effectively meet national security and foreign policy challenges. Yet partisan infighting threatens to upend our nation’s best chance to stem the very real Iranian nuclear threat. Read William Perry's critique here.

 

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