The Taiwan Relations Act: Too Much or Too Little?
Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305
FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.
FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.
Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.
Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305
From Within and Without: Taiwan’s New Security Challenges
Since 2016, Beijing’s pressure campaign on Taiwan has threatened the island’s international space and domestic tranquility. Few, if any, areas of politics have gone untouched. Whether through attempts to pick off Taiwan’s diplomatic partners or lure away the island’s talent, the full range of PRC statecraft is on display. Taiwan’s political dynamics — especially the solidification of Taiwanese identity and collapse of the Kuomintang — also appear to have driven an aggressive shift in Beijing’s approach to political influence operations to include pressure on international companies. The shift in intensity and tactics raises important questions about Taiwan’s future and dealing with an increasingly powerful PRC.
The Islamization of universities has been the cornerstone of the Iranian regime’s higher educational policy since its ascent to power in 1979. Since the victory of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has relentlessly attempted to control and suppress dissident students and professors in an effort to train a new generation of ideologically driven students. Although the Islamic Republic was successful in co-opting a group of university students by means of ideological and materialistic incentives, a majority of students became less ideological and more critical of both the regime and its staple ideologies. These continuous struggles between the state and universities have given rise to several important questions: Why and how has the Islamic Republic Islamized and controlled universities? To what extent have these strategies succeeded or failed? Why and how have students responded to state domination?
Saeid Golkar is a visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Service at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, and concurrently, a non-resident Senior Fellow on Middle East Policy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA). His research focuses on international and comparative politics of authoritarian regimes with an emphasis on the Middle East. His book, Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Post-revolutionary Iran (Columbia University Press, 2015), was awarded the Washington Institute silver medal prize.
I vividly remember the first time I met Houghton “Buck” Freeman (former Chairman of the Freeman Foundation) in New York City nearly 20 years ago. A short time after this meeting, he and his wife, Doreen (former Trustee of the Freeman Foundation), kindly took the time to visit me at Stanford University. I never imagined then that SPICE would have remained a grantee of the Freeman Foundation for so many years. I am now in touch with their son Graeme Freeman (President), grandson Alec Freeman (Senior Program Officer), and Shereen Goto (Director of Operations and Programs) of the Freeman Foundation. The Freeman Foundation has funded the National Consortium for Teaching about Asia (NCTA) since its inception in 1998, so this year marks its 20th anniversary. SPICE has been honored to contribute to the mission of the NCTA, which is “to encourage and facilitate teaching and learning about East Asia in elementary and secondary schools nationwide.” SPICE recently hosted NCTA summer institutes for middle school teachers (June 20–22, 2018) and high school teachers (July 23–25, 2018).
Rylan Sekiguchi, Gary Mukai, Shereen Goto, Jonas Edman
The NCTA summer institute for high school teachers—organized by Naomi Funahashi and Sabrina Ishimatsu—also featured scholarly lectures, including one on U.S.–Korean relations by the Honorable Kathleen Stephens, former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 2008 to 2011. Her lecture and the recent 2018 North Korea–United States Summit in Singapore stimulated enthusiastic questions from the teachers and fascinating discussions. Sekiguchi, who authored a three-part curricular series on U.S.–South Korean relations, North Korea, and inter-Korean relations, engaged the teachers in the lessons while referencing key points that were made by Ambassador Stephens. Commenting on the institute, Kimberly Gavin, University Preparatory Academy, San Jose, California, noted, “I realized that when it came to East Asian history, there were gaps in my knowledge, and I wanted to have a better understanding of it to be a more effective teacher. Between the readings and the conference itself, I filled up an entire notebook full of information!”
In a post-institute memo, Yoko Sase, The Nueva School, Hillsborough, California, stated, “I want to express my deepest gratitude to the Freeman Foundation for generously supporting us at the East Asia summer institute for middle and high school teachers at SPICE. I was immersed in such a depth of learning from the experts in their fields of East Asia throughout the program. I really appreciate that I not only deepened and expanded my knowledge on East Asia but also actually had the opportunities to practice thoughtfully designed SPICE curriculum lessons. Now I have a toolbox with amazing resources and materials that I have received from the institute, and I’m ready to use it in my classroom! This has been the best professional development I have ever attended!” The NCTA seminars are truly highlights of the year for the SPICE staff and Stanford scholars because it is a key channel through which SPICE curriculum on Asia and U.S.–Asian relations and Stanford scholarship are disseminated to students. Importantly, what an honor it has been to have worked with three generations of the Freeman family.
The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies would like to extend the warmest best wishes to Senior Fellow and Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, David Holloway. After over 30 years as an expert in political science and history at Stanford University, Holloway will retire on September 1, 2018.
David Holloway was co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, science and technology in the Soviet Union, and the relationship between international history and international relations theory. He is best known for his book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) which was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the best books of 1994. Holloway has also actively contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals over the course of his career.
As a member of our institute, Holloway’s quiet warmth and kindness have always been infectious, both inside and outside of the classroom. The depth and insight of his work over the years, not to mention his dedication to FSI and the Stanford Community at large, has been an inspiration. He will be sorely missed. We all wish him the very best with this new chapter in his life and with the completion of his latest book, a complete global history of nuclear weapons, non-proliferation, and international politics, due to be published in 2019.
We caught him to hear his views on recent developments in U.S.-Russia relations one last time and to talk about his time at Stanford.
At the NATO summit, Trump claimed that Germany “is a captive of Russia.” Is there any foundation to this claim?
I don't think so. Trump made the statement in connection with the Nord Stream Oil Pipeline. A lot of people have criticized Germany for building this because it will increase German reliance on Russia. Critics believe that by sending oil through Germany, Russia will potentially have more freedom to interfere in Ukrainian territories. However, the German government has reassured the international community that they would help Ukraine if Russia does use the pipeline to push for recognition of the annexation of Crimea. In Germany’s defense, I think they feel that they have to have economic relations with Russia unless they are in a state of war or close to one – it is the only logical arrangement.
How do you think we can reconcile the disjunction between the U.S. president’s pro-Putin statements and position at the Helsinki press conference with the fact that his administration is implementing sanctions against Russia?
The policies certainly look contradictory. Trump has not said anything critical about Putin (which is remarkable when he is quite willing to say critical things about everybody else), yet, as you say, his administration has imposed tough sanctions. Why is Trump so reluctant to support his own administration? And why is it that he wanted to meet Putin in the first place? We just don’t know.
On a related note, the Chinese claim that Trump is a very good tactician/strategist and that his behavior at the Helsinki summit was “Kissinger-in-reverse.” That is, it was intended to weaken Russia's ties to China by offering better ties with the U.S. and potentially with Western Europe. Thus, the Chinese see Trump’s performance not as a sign of incompetence and incoherence (as many do in the West), but as further evidence of his coherent strategy.
We often ascribe a malicious masterplan or intentional nefariousness to adversaries. For my part, while possible that the president has a master-plan, I think it is most likely that he does not. Trump has created a backlash against Russia in the U.S. which will make it even more difficult for U.S.-Russian relations to improve in years to come.
There have been a number of articles written about Trump’s push for increased allied investment in NATO; he started by pushing for all members to meet the 2 percent GDP investment quota, but then demanded that they invest 4 percent. Is demanding 4 percent feasible?
The truth is that every American president has pushed the European members of NATO to spend more on defense. Even Obama did it. However, Trump has done it much more openly and offensively. I think the push for 4 percent was more a case of showmanship; the stance he was taking was, “You're not even at 2 percent but you should really be at 4 percent!”
What is the impact of all of this? I have certainly seen many Europeans turn around say that the E.U. cannot rely on the U.S. anymore. If we have a Trump administration for another six years and/or a U.S. administration in 2020 that takes a similar line, I think we could well see the end of NATO.
The President’s remarks referred to the fact that only 9 of NATO’s 29 members have reached the 2 percent quota. Yet many NATO advocates are counter-arguing that many of the remaining 21 nations have significantly increased their defense spending. How would you weigh in?
I would agree with NATO advocates and add that the reason why expenditure got so low in the first place is that, after the end of the Cold War, Europe seemed peaceful. I think the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia somewhat changed this perception, and the parts of the continent most under threat are the Baltic States and Georgia. As a side note, we should also remember that NATO troops have fought and died in Iraq and Afghanistan alongside the U.S. It is not that they have been doing nothing.
The President claims he vastly improved U.S.-Russian relations at the Helsinki summit. Others, like FSI Director Michael McFaul, claim that the summit was further evidence that we are in an era of “Hot Peace” with Russia. What do you think?
Before I answer your question, I want to say that I think it is good to have Russian and American leaders talking to each other. These are the two largest nuclear powers; I think that there should be open communication on military issues and nuclear issues most particularly.
The world isn't at stake in the same way it was during the Cold War. Yet, there are still fears of military conflict, and we have a new phenomenon: election hacking. The question of Russian meddling in the last U.S. election is complicated by Trump's relationship with Russia. The press conference at Helsinki was so extraordinary, not least because, if Trump really wanted to open a dialogue with Russia, he greatly damaged his chances by virtue of his own behavior. If, instead, he had insisted that Putin did interfere—openly declared his trust in his own intelligence services—I do not believe that the Russians would have walked away. I believe they have an interest in having a dialogue with the United States.
Some political scientists argue that we are now in a new Cold War in Asia, namely with North Korea and/or a possible North Korean-Chinese alliance. Do you agree?
I think of the Cold War as having three elements. First, after World War II there was a geopolitical element: the USSR wanted to control Eastern Europe both for security reasons and for ideological reasons. Second: the U.S. and its West European allies were motivated to help spread principles of liberal democracy and market capitalism, the Soviet Union’s Communist Party wanted to rule via centralized government control and a centrally-planned economy. Third, we had a military element: the arms race and the build-up of huge military confrontations.
Based on these three elements, I'm inclined to see what's going on now more as a breakdown of the international system created after World War II and that the U.S. had dominated. America is not as powerful as it once was. First, Russia turned out not to be a great fit for the established international system, for a variety of reasons. Second, China has risen to become an economic powerhouse that seeks to extend its influence – not (primarily) by military means but through the “belt and road” initiative investment, by building infrastructure in surrounding states. There was always a difficult relationship between the U.S. and China, but nothing like what the U.S.-Soviet relation was at the height of the Cold War.
With everything that has happened in the last few years, which event is going to prove a truly pivotal point for contemporary history when we look back in 20 or 30 years' time?
I think that the ten-day trip that Trump took to Europe was pivotal. The attacks on NATO, not to mention the way he treated Britain (Theresa May in particular), and what we know about his conduct during his meeting with Putin… I think we may look back on that week as a pivotal moment in the breakup of the transatlantic relationship. I don't know what it portends for U.S.-Russian relations, but I think it has made those relations much worse.
Let’s talk about your career here at Stanford. What brought you to FSI originally?
I had an invitation to come for a visit of three years. I was teaching in Edinburgh at the time, and I got a letter from Condi Rice, who was the assistant director of CISAC back then. After the three years, I decided I wasn’t going back. What was so attractive about FSI was the people. I know it may sound rather cliché, but there was such a great sense of possibility about the place. If you had an idea, instead of hearing people say, “Oh, we've never done it that way,” people would say, “Oh, yeah, let's see if we can help you do that!”
What is your fondest memory from your time at Stanford?
That's very difficult. I think one of my best memories is when Gorbachev came to speak at Stanford back in 1990. He gave a speech in the Stanford Memorial Auditorium, and the place was packed; it was at the height of Gorbo-mania. In the course of the speech he thanked some of us at FSI for helping to bring about the improvement in US-Soviet relations…Bill Perry, Pief Panofsky, Sid Drell, and myself. And that was – that's a pleasant moment to remember.
What advice would you give an undergrad starting at Stanford? And what advice would you give a graduate student hoping to have a career in political science, history, or policy?
To the undergrad, my advice is rather obvious: at Stanford, you have this chance to look around and to try different things, new subjects and programs. Take full advantage of that!
To graduate students: I think most assume that when you choose to be a graduate student, you're choosing to be a specialist in a discipline. That’s true! Yet, at the same time, it is also very important to look around and see what there is outside your discipline, to learn how to communicate with people, particularly ones with other interests and in other fields.
We talk a lot about interdisciplinary work. But truly interdisciplinary work is very difficult. When I came to Stanford, I thought it fantastic that FSI had specialists in such diverse fields all in one place. At the time we had John Lewis who was a China specialist. Sid Drell was a physicist with a lot of experience working on national security issues. Phil Farley spent a long time in the State Department working on arms control issues. I learned a lot from Sid Drell; I wasn't doing physics, but we wrote something together. That kind of possibility and opportunity was incredible. I continued to love this about Stanford over the past 30 years, and I've been very grateful for all of these opportunities.
As a last thought, I remember a conversation I had with John Hennessy when he was Dean of Engineering, and I was director of FSI. I remember telling him that, much to my surprise, a lot of our best supporters were (and continue to be) engineers. He said, “That’s obvious! No engineer thinks that his discipline alone can solve a problem. You have to work with other people when you're doing something!”
Then he said, “Engineers are also not averse to trying to raise money!” [laughter]
The Trump administration's immigration crackdown may be leading to an unintended consequence: a drop-off in benefits enrollment among legal Hispanic immigrants, according to new research by Stanford Health Policy's Marcella Alsan.
This CBS News story about her work notes that an immigration program called Secure Communities, which was rolled out during the Obama administration, is linked to a lower take-up of benefits such as food stamps and health care enrollment.
In a new paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Alsan and Crystal Yang of Harvard Law School found Hispanic households were particularly hard-hit, even those with legal immigration status.
"We find evidence that our results may be driven by deportation fear rather than lack of benefit information or stigma," the researchers wrote. "Though not at personal risk of deportation, Hispanic citizens may fear their participation could expose non-citizens in their network to immigration authorities. We find significant declines in SNAP and ACA enrollment, particularly among mixed-citizenship status households and in areas where deportation fear is highest."
Despite recent studies on leadership, the discipline of International Relations is still reluctant to engage in studies of individual agency in the international structure. Two prominent examples are the leader of the Catholic Church, the pope, and the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (UNSG). Neither of them is a leader in control of considerable hard power, yet both exemplify the puzzle of how institutions, individuals, and moral authority relate in leadership. I argue that it is a combination of individuals in institutions that leads to unexpected and unintended effects such as the evolution of the papacy and the UNSG as instances of moral authorities. While pointing out their potential for moral leadership, this article presents a conceptual framework of how to perceive the Pope and the UNSG in world politics. The article unfolds in three sections: in the first, I look at the potential of comparing the two positions in terms of moral leadership and their emphasis of the common good. In a literature review, I then outline the current state of the literature on the two positions and what it misses. The remainder of the paper proposes a conceptual framework on how the two positions fit into the current literature and what promising future research for International Relations it conceals.
In this article, I argue that there is a startling resonance between Hans Morgenthau’s conception of the political and power and recent analyses of an urbanizing international realm. By making this connection clear, I depart from a mechanistic understanding of politics, which tends to inform both conventional International Relations views and some claims in urban studies pertaining to the rise of global cities as international actors. Turning to Morgenthau’s conception of the political and power also has wider implications for International Relations studies of urbanization: it helps explain a tendency toward depoliticization caused by ignoring the conflictual character of the political. The emphasis on the political, on the other hand, serves as a bridge between International Relations and urbanization studies by creating conditions for the repoliticization of urban space. After illustrating the existential manifestation of the political and its violent outfalls, the remainder of this article turns to its relational and dialogical manifestation that points out the shortcomings of reading the political merely as an existential concept in the context of urbanization.
The unconventional nature of Holy See diplomats rests in the composite character of their ecclesiastical role as the Pope’s representatives and their legal diplomatic status and commencement to ordinary diplomatic practice. Holy See diplomacy is a form of conduct created by a set of mixed secular and religious standards in which agents are guided by practices. I locate this argument within a classical English School and a conventional understanding of practice, diplomacy, and agency while incorporating understandings of the diplomat as a stranger. The article situates a Holy See diplomat’s mode of agency as a hybrid one by nature, located at the intersections of political and religious modes of agency and substantial and relational conceptions of international politics. I probe this conceptual framework of hybrid agency by analysing episodes involving papal diplomats in turmoil-ridden historical episodes, and correspondence with informed agents.
Col. Masahiro Shizu is a global affiliate visiting scholar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) for 2018-19. Shizu has almost 20 years of experience at the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his experience, he has been a member of the Joint Staff Office and the Air Staff Office as well as commanded units of the Japan Air Self Defense Force. Most recently, Shizu was part of the Defense Planning and Policy Department where he was responsible for acquisition of defense equipment and creating future military strategy, operational plans and capabilities.