The SCPKU summer workshop, "Chinese Corporations: A Case Study Workshop" led by Prof. Andrew Walder (Stanford) and Prof. Zheng Lu (Tsinghua) convened in Beijing on June 17^th,  2019. A diverse student body from Stanford, Tsinghua, and Peking University meet three times each week for three weeks to do research on major Chinese corporations.

The 18 student participants in the workshop have their majors in social sciences, management, history, and engineering. Each Stanford student is paired with one Chinese-speaking partner to conduct in-depth case study on two major Chinese companies of their selection.

Each group selects two corporations, one state owned or controlled, the other private or of mixed ownership. Teams investigate the company's founding and history of expansion, including any restructuring, privatization, and listing on domestic or international stock exchanges. Of particular interest are the company’s structure of ownership and control, along with its business strategies. The comparison across state and nonstate owned corporations helps to understand the transformation of the country’s economy over the past 30 years and the inner workings of the Chinese model of development.

Selected Chinese corporations in study include: Huawei and Xiaomi (in telecom equipment and electronics); Greenland Holdings and China Vanke (in real estate); Tencent and JD (in social media and e-commerce); China Merchants Group and Cosco (in finance and shipping); Tsingdao Haier and the Midea Group (in appliances).  Course information can be found here.

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PKUHSC (Peking University Health Science Center) delegation, headed by Prof. Zhan Qimin, Executive Vice President of Peking University and President of Peking University Health Science Center, visited Stanford on May 9, 2019.

Prof. Oi, director of SCPKU (Stanford Center at Peking University) hosted the event for the delegation joined by interested Stanford faculty and researchers.

SCPKU was founded in 2012 with a landmark building on PKU campus.  Over 1000 programs and events have been convened at SCPKU, Stanford has had 78 projects in 40 different departments with some components involving research or training in China, and 3,187 different Chinese co-authors have collaborated on publications with Stanford authors.

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SCPKU has fellows across campus, with the greatest number of faculty from the School of Medicine.  SCPKU will expand Stanford’s role in global education and research and enable all faculty to do research in China.

The PKUHSC delegation presented an overview of PKU Health Science Center, which gave exposure to the Stanford participants for matching their own work with the resources that PKU offered.

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A roundtable introduction/discussion followed Prof Oi’s talk between the members of the delegation and Stanford participants.  Both sides were interested in exploring further partnership in global health, life science, public health and emergency medicine.

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The delegation had a meeting with Dean of the School of Medicine, Lloyd Minor (5^th from right); Mijiza Sanchez (4^th from right), associate Dean, office of Medical Student Affairs.

The delegation also met with Prof. Mark Cullen (4^th from right), Director, Center for Population Health Sciences, Senior Associate Vice Provost for Research, Professor of Medicine, and discussed medical research and population health sciences.

Both sides agreed that a lot more could be done via the SCPKU platform in further exchange and exploration to formulate meaningful collaboration projects.

Stanford participants:   Jean Oi, director of SCPKU; Ann Hsing, research professor of medicine and a co-leader of the Population Sciences Program; Bruce Ling, professor of surgery; Hua Shan, professor of pathology; Jianghong Rao, professor of radiology; Karen Eggleston, senior fellow at FSI; Mathew Strehlow, professor of emergency medicine; Yang Hu, professor of Ophthalmology and Ying Lu, professor of biomedical data science.   PKU delegation members:  Qimin Zhan, executive vice president and president of Peking University Health Science Center; Weimin Wang, vice president of education; Ning Zhang, vice president of research; Jie Qiao, president, Peking University Third Hospital and director of National Clinical Research Center; Xiaojun Huang, director, institute of hematology; Qiudan Sun, director, office of International Cooperation of Peking University Health Science Center.

A U.S. foreign policy that cuts money to nongovernmental organizations performing or promoting abortions abroad has actually led to an increase in abortions, according to Stanford researchers who have conducted the most comprehensive academic study of the policy’s impact.

Eran Bendavid and Grant Miller — both associate professors at Stanford University School of Medicine and core faculty members at Stanford Health Policy — and doctoral candidate Nina Brooks find that abortions increased among women living in African countries where NGOs, such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation, were most vulnerable to the policy’s requirements.

The policy, widely known as the Mexico City Policy, explicitly prohibits U.S. foreign aid from flowing to any NGO that will not abide by the policy’s main condition: no performing or discussing abortion as a method of family planning, even if just in the form of education or counseling.

The policy has been a political hot potato since its inception. Enacted under Ronald Reagan in 1984, it’s been enforced by subsequent Republican administrations while Democrats in the White House revoked the policy within days of taking office.

The study by Brooks, Bendavid and Miller, published June 27 in The Lancet Global Health, looked at the policy’s effects in more than two dozen African countries over a span of 20 years under three presidents: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama. It finds that, when the policy was in place during the Bush years, abortions were 40 percent higher relative to the Clinton and Obama administrations.

When the policy was suspended during Obama’s two terms, the research shows that the upward trend in abortion rates reversed.

“Our research suggests that a policy that is supported by taxpayers ostensibly wishing to drive down abortion rates worldwide does the opposite,” said Bendavid, a faculty affiliate of the Stanford King Center on Global Development, which is part of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR).

A key reason for the uptick in abortions is that many NGOs affected by the policy also provide contraceptives – and funding cuts mean birth control is harder to get, said Brooks.

“By undercutting the ability to supply modern contraceptives, the unintended consequence is that abortion rates increase,” she said.

And the policy’s scope has expanded under the Trump administration. While it originally restricted aid directed only toward providing family planning and reproductive health services, President Trump has extended the policy to cover any group engaged in global health, including organizations providing services for HIV or child health – not just family planning.

Groundbreaking Research

The stakes are high. America is the world’s largest provider of development assistance and spent about $7 billion on international health aid in 2017. Many women in sub-Saharan Africa depend on this aid for contraceptives.

In sub-Saharan Africa, NGOs are often primary providers of family planning services. Two of the world’s largest family planning organizations – International Planned Parenthood Federation and Marie Stopes International – have forfeited large sums of U.S. cash for refusing to comply with the policy, according to news reports.

The research findings were based on records of nearly 750,000 women in 26 sub-Saharan African countries from 1995 to 2014. When the policy was in effect under George W. Bush, contraceptive use fell by 14 percent, pregnancies rose by 12 percent and abortions rose by 40 percent relative to the Clinton and subsequent Obama years – an impact sharply timed with the policy and in proportion to the importance of foreign assistance across sub-Saharan Africa.

The paper is the second study of the rule’s impact by Bendavid and Miller, who are both faculty members of Stanford Health Policy. The research is also one of the very few evidence-based analyses of the policy.

Their earlier research, the first quantitative, large-scale effort to examine the policy’s impacts, looked at a smaller set of African countries during the Clinton and Bush administrations and also found an increase in abortion rates when the policy was enacted in 2001.

“Our latest study strengthened our earlier findings because we were able to look at what happens when the rule was turned off, then on, and then off again,” said Bendavid, referring to the policy’s whipsawing under Clinton, Bush and then Obama.

Miller, who is the director of the King Center and a SIEPR senior fellow, says the team’s research reveals a deeply flawed policy.

“We set out to provide the best and most rigorous evidence on the consequences of this policy,” he said. “What we found is a clear-cut case of government action that everyone on all sides of the abortion debate should agree is not desirable.”

Signs of a Global Pushback

Brooks also notes that their findings may underestimate the rule’s full impact.

“The excess abortions performed due to the policy are more likely to be performed unsafely, potentially harming women beyond pregnancy terminations,” she said.

Under Trump, the international response to U.S. funding cuts has shifted. Norway, Canada and several other countries have pledged to increase funding of international NGOs affected by the policy – though not by enough to cover the expected shortfall, says Miller.

“This shows us,” he said, “that despite the intense partisanship in the U.S. over the rule and its implementation, there are ways that policymakers around the world can offset its effects – by ensuring higher levels of family planning funding, for example.”

Larry Diamond discusses the Chinese Communist Party’s range of influence and interference activities that target the public, civic, and social institutions of democracies, including subnational governments, universities, think tanks, media, corporations, and ethnic Chinese communities. Listen here.

Did the Russian-affiliated groups that interfered with the 2016 U.S. presidential election want to be caught?

“There’s a reason why they paid for Facebook ads in rubles,” Nathaniel Persily, who is a senior fellow at FSI and co-director of the Cyber Policy Center, told FSI Director Michael McFaul on the World Class podcast. “They wanted to be open and notorious.”

Since the election, Americans have become more suspicious of fake news, but they have also become suspicious of real news and journalists in general. Another problem with the Russians’ success in influencing the 2016 election, said Persily, is that Americans will automatically assume that the Russians will do the same thing during the 2020 race.

“Everyone is going to be looking for nefarious influences and shouting them from the rooftops, and that actually serves the [bad actors’] purposes just as much,” Persily said. “Many of the attempts in 2016 were about fostering division and doubt, and I think there’s a lot of appetite for doubt right now in America.”

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Since 2016, Facebook, Twitter and Google have made some important changes to the way they handle advertising, including adding a requirement that all candidate ads and other ads of “national legislative importance” be identified as advertisements on users’ feeds.

But there are no standardized rules or regulations that dictate how tech companies should handle advertisements or posts that contain disinformation, Persily said, and because of this, it is up to those respective companies to make those decisions themselves  — and they aren’t always in agreement. For example, when a video of Nancy Pelosi that was slowed down to make her seem drunk was posted in late May on YouTube and Facebook, YouTube took the video down, but Facebook decided to leave it up.

“The standards that are going to be developed in test cases like these — under conditions which are not as politically incendiary as an election — are going to be the ones that will be rolled out and applied in elections in the U.S. and around the world,” Persily said.

When it comes to election security, the 2020 presidential race will be the next big test for the U.S. government and private-sector companies. But other countries should also be on the lookout for activity from foreign agents and actors in their elections.

“The 2016 election was not just an event, it was a playbook that was written by the Russians,” warned Persily. “That playbook is usable for future elections in the United States as well as around the world, whether it’s between India and Pakistan or China and Taiwan.”

Forty years after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, the two superpowers are competing and contesting every arena, from trade to AI research and from space exploration to maritime rights. Instead of what Americans referred to as engagement and Chinese called reform and opening, many experts and analysts now characterize the relations between the two countries as dangerously brittle. Some see a new kind of Cold War in the making. Such assertions, however, argues Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, “both ignore history and impute a level of fragility that has not existed for many years.”

Fingar reflects on the U.S.-China bilateral relationship in a new article, “Forty years of formal—but not yet normal—relations,” published in the China International Strategy Review. He claims that the relationship is resilient and not destined for conflict, albeit it is beset by a host of aspirational, perceptual, and structural differences.

A political scientist and China specialist who served over two decades in senior government positions, Fingar urges readers to remember that assertions of fragility of the U.S.-China relationship undervalue the strength, scope, and significance of interdependence, shared interests, and constituencies in both countries. These, he says, have a substantial stake in the maintenance of at least minimally cooperative relations.

U.S.-China relations are indeed highly asymmetrical: Chinese citizens and organizations have far greater access to the United States than Americans do to China, notes Fingar. He also recognizes that the troubles that have soured the relationship are more intricate and often more sensitive than those of the past. Decades ago, most of the issues that arose were handled at the governmental level. But now “the number and variety of players with stakes in the relationship and disputes with counterpart actors are much greater.” Furthermore, explains Fingar, the U.S. business community is expressing a stronger voice for government action to change Chinese behavior and is not as consistent an advocate of stability in U.S. policy toward China as it used to be. “This is an extremely important development,” he says, “because it reverses a key dynamic in the U.S.-China relationship.”

Ultimately, however, the two countries and our institutions and people are linked by myriad ties that bring mutual benefits as well as the constraints of interdependence. “I remain confident that we will continue to be able to manage the relationship,” concludes Fingar. He expresses disappointment, though, that normalization of U.S.-China relations remains a work in progress and cautions that merely managing the relationship to prevent it from deteriorating is an unsatisfactory goal that should be unacceptable to both sides. Not only does such a low bar limit what each counterpart can achieve, but it also inhibits the kind of cooperation required to address transnational challenges like climate change, infectious disease, and proliferation of dangerous technologies.