The world's energy system seems to have come unhinged. Oil is trading at record high prices because demand keeps rising even as supplies become unreliable. Oil exporters from Iran to Russia and Venezuela are using their petrocash to pursue agendas that undercut western security and interests. Supplies of natural gas also seem less secure than ever.

The root cause of these troubles is dysfunctional energy politics. The countries with the strongest incentives to cut their vulnerability to volatile energy markets - notably America - are unable to act because influential politicians view all serious policies as politically radioactive. Efforts to boost supply have little leverage because the most attractive geological riches are found mainly in countries where state-owned companies control the resources and outsiders have little clout. Thus, the current energy debates are generating a volcano of proposals that have no positive impact on tight markets.

Yet these structural barriers to serious policy remain hidden because the debate labours under the meaningless umbrella of "energy security". Proper policy on oil and gas must start with the distinct uses for these fuels - each requiring its own political strategy.

The effort on oil must focus on transportation. Vehicles and aircraft work best with liquid fuels that can store large quantities of energy in a compact space and flow easily through pipes to engines. Searching for a better substitute is worthwhile, but the effort faces an uphill battle. With today's technologies, no other energy liquid can reliably beat petroleum. Liquids can be made from coal, as South Africa and China are doing. But that approach is costly and has unattractive environmental implications. Brazil and the US have focused on ethanol, which they distill from sugar or grain from crops. However, those programmes, which account for less than 0.5 per cent of the world's energy liquids, have a negligible impact on the oil market. Yet, America is redoubling its ethanol effort because it is politically unbeatable to reward corn growers and grain handlers who are a formidable force in US politics. Indeed, requirements for ethanol in America have created a more rigid fuel supply system that actually raises the price of oil products, although ethanol's backers originally claimed they would cut energy costs. That same political force also blocks imports of cheaper Brazilian ethanol. In principle, a better approach is so-called "cellulosic ethanol", which promises lower costs as it converts whole plants into ethanol rather than just the grain. But like most messiahs, its attraction lies in the future. So far, nobody has made the system work at the scale of a commercial refinery.

The best way to temper oil demand today is by lifting efficiency. Even this economic winner is politically difficult to implement. The US, which consumes one-quarter of the world's oil, has not changed fuel efficiency standards for new cars in 16 years. Every big economy - even China's - has stricter fuel economy rules than America's. Political gridlock has stymied even modest proposals to allow trading of efficiency credits. A trading scheme is politically inconvenient as it could force US carmakers (which make generally inefficient cars) to buy valuable credits from foreign brands. No politican wants to multiply Detroit's problems.

Even better ideas - such as a stiffer petrol tax - stay stuck on opinion pages of newspapers and in academic journals. Despite what is increasingly termed today's "energy crisis", these ideas barely cross the lips of politicians who want to remain viable among the thicket of anti-tax conservatives and pro-Detroit lobbyists.

The approaches needed for natural gas are quite different. In western Europe, which has long depended on imported gas from Russia, Algeria and a few smaller suppliers, the vulnerabilities are particularly stark. In principle, though, gas dependencies are easier to manage than oil because gas has rivals for each of its major uses. In electric power generation, countries must preserve diversity - ensuring, for example, that advanced coal and nuclear technologies remain viable. While "diversity" is motherhood in energy policy, in reality it requires difficult choices. In continental Europe, for example, policy-­makers have not seriously confronted the conflict between the need for diversity while, at the same time, opening the power sector to morecompetition. Historically, companies in competitive power markets have invested heavily in gas because gas plants are smaller and require less capital than coal or nuclear plants.

Gas suppliers who dream of extending their powers forget that it is harder to corner gas markets when users have a choice. Algeria learnt that lesson in 1981 when it left a key pipeline empty in a pricing dispute with Italy - extracting a better price at the time but losing billions of dollars for the future by destroying its reputation as a reliable supplier.

That lesson should be sobering for Russia today. In December, Gazprom, Russia's giant state gas company, cut deliveries to Ukraine, which then siphoned supplies that flow on to Europe. The company rattled its pipes again last month - threatening retaliation if Europe dared try to wean itself from Russia's gas. While Gazprom's management must pander to Russian nationalism (where pipe-rattling is welcome), the company's long-term viability rests on its reliability as a supplier to lucrative west European markets. Similarly, the recent decision by Evo Morales, Bolivia's president, to nationalise his country's gas fields will give him a boost domestically and might generate some instant extra revenue, but it will also encourage his customers in Brazil and Argentina to look elsewhere for energy.

"Resource nationalism" is back in vogue. But for gas suppliers in particular, it usually ends badly - not least because the infrastructure is costly to build and buyers can afford to be choosy. Gas users can further subdue Russia's rattling by multiplying sources of supply. A robust market for liquefied natural gas will help.

The tendency for gridlock in energy politics means that policymakers must focus where tough decisions matter most, such as efficiency in the use of oil and diversity in the application of gas. Yet, prospects for serious policy are poor - not least because the US, which should be a leader, is the most hamstrung. Luckily, the markets are responding on their own - albeit slowly and patchily. Costly oil is encouraging conservation and new supplies; LNG is accelerating, and gas buyers are more wary of Russian gas than they were a decade ago when Russia was seen as a reliable supplier. If the political structure remains dysfunctional on matters of energy, then the best second is perhaps no policy at all.

Before attacking Iraq in March 2003, the United States told the world that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program in defiance of the United Nations. That claim, used to justify the war, was based on assessments provided by the United States intelligence community. But as everyone now knows, those assessments were wrong. So Jeffrey T. Richelson's history of American nuclear intelligence, including our attempts to learn about Iraq's nuclear program, could hardly be more timely.

In "Spying on the Bomb," Richelson, the author of several books on American intelligence, has brought together a huge amount of information about Washington's efforts to track the nuclear weapons projects of other countries. He examines the nuclear projects of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, China, France, Israel, India, South Africa, Taiwan, Libya, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, as well as Iraq. Through interviews and declassified documents as well as secondary works, he sets out briefly what we currently know about those projects and compares that with assessments of the time.

This may sound like heavy going, but Richelson writes with admirable clarity. And along the way he has fascinating stories to tell: about plans to assassinate the German physicist Werner Heisenberg during World War II; about discussions in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations on the possibility of attacking Chinese nuclear installations; about Indian measures to evade the gaze of American reconnaissance satellites; and about the bureaucratic infighting over the estimates on Iraq.

The United States has put an enormous effort into gathering information about the nuclear projects of other countries. After World War II it equipped aircraft with special filters to pick up radioactive debris from nuclear tests for isotopic analysis. It created a network of stations around the world to register the seismic effects of nuclear explosions. Most important, in 1960 it began to launch reconnaissance satellites that could take detailed photographs of nuclear sites in the Soviet Union and China. Richelson occasionally speculates about the role of communications intercepts and of spies, but these appear from his account to have been much less important than the other methods of collecting information.

Through these means the United States has gathered a vast quantity of data, sometimes to surprising effect. Intelligence played a crucial role in the cold war, for instance, by reducing uncertainty about Soviet nuclear forces. Alongside such successes, however, there have been failures. One notable example concerned the first Soviet test, which took place in August 1949, much sooner than the C.I.A. had predicted. Another was the failure to detect Indian preparations for tests in May 1998, even though at an earlier time the United States, with the help of satellite intelligence, had managed to learn about preparations the Indians were making and to head off their tests.

But the most serious failure of all was in Iraq in 2003, because in no other case did the intelligence assessments serve as justification for the use of military force. The information needed for avoiding political surprise is one thing. That needed for preventive war is quite another, if only because of the consequences of making a mistake.

Beyond making the uncontroversial recommendation that "aggressive and inventive intelligence collection and analysis" should continue, Richelson draws no general conclusions. That is a pity, because his rich material points to issues that cry out for further analysis. He suggests in one or two cases that failures sprang from the mind-set of the intelligence community, but he does not elaborate on this point. He has little to say about relations between policy makers and the intelligence community, even though the quality of intelligence and the use made of it depend heavily on that relationship.

His focus is no less narrow in his discussion of foreign nuclear projects. He concentrates on the programs themselves, paying very little attention to their political context. Does that reflect a technological bias in nuclear intelligence? Would, for example, the prewar assessment of Iraqi nuclear capabilities have been more accurate if it had paid more attention to the broader political and economic circumstances of Hussein's regime?

The task of intelligence has become more complex than it was during the cold war. A single dominant nuclear opponent has now been replaced by a number of nuclear states, along with states and stateless terrorists that are aiming to get their hands on nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the technology needed for producing nuclear weapons has become easier to acquire.

Many critics believe the recent performance of the intelligence community shows it has not responded adequately to this new situation. Richelson does not have much to say on this question; nor does he discuss the likely impact of the current reforms, initiated in response to the Iraq war, on the quality of intelligence. His reticence may imply that he does not think reform is necessary. Still, it is disappointing that he does not draw on his historical survey to discuss whether new approaches are needed for dealing with nuclear threats, and, if so, what those new approaches might be.

It is time to acknowledge that the international community's strategy on Zimbabwe has failed.

Robert G. Mugabe's regime has survived even as the economy deteriorates further (unemployment is above 70 percent, and gross domestic product will decline another 7 percent this year) and personal freedom suffers greater assaults (the recent "drive out the rubbish" campaign left 700,000 people homeless).

Indeed, with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) on the verge of collapse - following a bitter fight over whether to boycott the recent Senate elections and after years of sustained government pressure - the regime has a stronger grasp on power than ever. Doddering though he may be, Mr. Mugabe, who recently turned 82, has foiled the pressure of the United States and Britain and the quiet diplomacy of his neighbors in southern Africa.

Predictions of imminent change still crop up in Western newspapers on the occasion of every new crisis in Zimbabwe. But these predictions have not come to bear, and they likely will not. So long as Mr. Mugabe reigns, his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) regime will survive.

The international community tried to change things. It embarked on a strategy of concerted economic and diplomatic pressure to weaken the Mugabe regime, trying to force it to either back down or submit to the democratic opposition. It's clear that strategy has failed.

It is, therefore, time to focus international attention on the prospect of Zimbabwe's only genuine political opening in the years ahead: the exit of Mr. Mugabe, whether through retirement or death, which will leave the regime internally and externally vulnerable.

Internally, the ZANU-PF regime without Mr. Mugabe at the helm will be uniquely susceptible in an election. In sub-Saharan Africa, opposition candidates have won post-transitional elections only 5 percent of the time against incumbents but 33 percent of the time against regimes' designated successors.

The most important reason for that is the incumbent's exit removes the regime's glue. The regime fractures into competing factions and is left with a substantially reduced capacity to repress the political opposition and rig an election.

In Kenya, after President Daniel T. arap Moi, and in Ghana, after President Jerry J. Rawlings, the regimes did not - could not - resort to all the dirty tactics that they certainly would have used had the incumbents run. In turn, these political openings have tended to galvanize the fractured opposition to successfully cooperate.

A ZANU-PF that is deeply unpopular, badly fractured among ethnic groups and between moderates and hard-liners (the expulsion of the information minister, Jonathan Moyo, is the beginning) and facing a reinvigorated opposition will not likely be able to effectively rig elections, let alone win the popular vote.

It will be critical, then, that presidential elections be held within a year of Mr. Mugabe's exit, before the regime has too much time to consolidate. If Mr. Mugabe's exit does not occur within that window before the 2008 elections, then international, and particularly regional, pressure will be crucial in forcing early elections.

Externally, Mr. Mugabe's exit may prompt genuine regional pressure. Analysts have long emphasized that international pressure requires the support of Zimbabwe's neighbors - especially South Africa - that have significant political and economic leverage. But to the great frustration of Western governments, southern African countries have thus far refused to publicly challenge Mr. Mugabe.

Their reluctance has much to do with Mr. Mugabe's status as a hero of Zimbabwe's anti-colonial struggle and a champion of liberation struggles elsewhere. Southern African nations will have much greater political room to apply real pressure on Zimbabwe when its leader lacks such credentials.

Simultaneously, the prospect of an altogether different level of violence might shake the complacency of southern African nations. Zimbabwe's implosion has not, thus far, been entirely bad for its neighbors. They have benefited from the elimination of economic competition and from the influx of professionals, and they have retained confidence that Mr. Mugabe can keep control.

But there is a real danger, if a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe is not handled adroitly, that elements of the opposition, disaffected war veterans and youth militia and losers in the ZANU-PF factional battle will take up arms and plunge Zimbabwe into civil war.

This specter should push neighboring countries to step up their efforts, especially to press the post-Mugabe regime to hold new presidential elections and encourage moderate elements within ZANU-PF.

Notwithstanding its occasional fulminations against Zimbabwe, the United States has failed in its efforts to unseat Mr. Mugabe's regime. The United States should focus now on his eventual exit by helping the MDC to overcome its bitter infighting and engaging Zimbabwe's neighbors, especially South Africa, in vigorous diplomacy, pushing them to prepare for the occasion.

The stakes could not be higher, for if the post-Mugabe period is the first genuine opportunity for political change in Zimbabwe, it may also be the last for some time.

"The United States is the most powerful since the Roman Empire," stated Stephen Walt, the Belfer Professor of International Affairs and academic dean of the John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, delivering the 2005 Robert G. Wesson Lecture in International Relations Theory and Practice, at the Freeman Spogli Institute on November 16, 2005. America's unmatched power is therefore of great interest and concern to leaders in most other parts of the world, from President Putin in Russia, to President Chirac in France, and President Musharraf in Pakistan. For Americans, however, the key issue is how others are now responding to U.S. power.

Speaking before an audience of Stanford faculty, students, and the broader community, Professor Walt examined three interwoven themes: why other states do not welcome U.S. power; what are the main strategies available to them for dealing with American power? and what should the United States do in response?

As an integral part of his analysis, Walt showed opinion polls demonstrating a striking gap between American views of U.S. primacy and other countries' perceptions of the current U.S. role. For example, although the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes Project found that 79 percent of U.S. citizens believe it is good that "American ideas and customs are spreading around the world," and 70 percent think that U.S. foreign policy takes the interests of other states into account either "a great deal" or "a fair amount," overwhelming majorities overseas say the United States considers the interest of others "not much" or "not at all." Similarly, a 2005 BBC survey of 21 countries found only five, India, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, and South Korea, where a majority of people had "positive" attitudes toward the United States.

There are three major sources of anti-Americanism, Walt explained. First, our sheer power makes other nations nervous. Second, there is a perceived sense of hypocrisy between our words and our actions. The case of nuclear weapons provides a vivid example. We preach nonproliferation, yet accord new respect and policy cooperation with newly nuclear states, such as India. Third, how the United States behaves in the world-what we do-invites antipathy. This latter point is abundantly clear in global opinion polls: Even in regions where anti-Americanism seems most strident, nations and individuals report that they do not object to our values or to what we stand for but rather to what we do.

Other nations, Walt pointed out, can choose a strategy of accommodation to our power or a strategy of resistance. Commonly adopted strategies of accommodation include 'bandwagoning," or realigning foreign policies with U.S. wishes, such as Libya's abandonment of nuclear weapons; "regional balancing"-using U.S. power to balance regional threats; "bonding" to curry favor with the United States; and "penetration," a strategy aimed at infiltrating the American political system to influence foreign policy outcomes.

In contrast, countries that choose to resist American power pursue five strategies:

"balancing" our power, alone or in alliance with others; "asymmetric responses," such as terrorism, which try to exploit specific areas of U.S. vulnerability; "blackmail," like North Korea's efforts to extract concessions from its nuclear weapons program; "balking," or tacit non-cooperation; and "delegitimizing," or attempts to turn others against the legitimacy of our actions or policies.

In light of the growing antipathy to U.S. primacy in so many parts of the world, Walt proposed three major courses of action to produce a more favorable response to U.S. power. First, he urged that we reduce American's military footprint abroad-and especially our ground force deployments-and return to a more traditional policy of regional balancing in cooperation with other nations. This policy would make greater use of American air and naval power and limit American intervention to cases where vital U.S. interests are threatened. Second, we should work harder to defend our international legitimacy and rebuild the U.S. image abroad, through a sustained campaign of public diplomacy and by keeping key American institutions-such as higher education-available to foreign visitors. Third, he advocated a more nuanced approach to America's traditional support for Israel, one that balances our genuine support for Israel's existence with the urgent need to bring a lasting settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

"The more the United States uses its power in an overwhelming and capricious manner," Professor Walt warned, "the more the rest of the world will resist us." Conversely, the more the United States recognizes and respects the interests of others, while using its power to defend its own interests, the more other nations will welcome U.S. power. "The task we face," he advised, "is to rebuild the trust, admiration, and legitimacy the United States once enjoyed, so the rest of the world can focus not on taming U.S. power but on reaping the benefits it can bring."

SEATTLE - There are a billion hungry people in the world. Fifteen thousand children-the equivalent of five times the victims of the World Trade Center bombings-die each day of hunger. Yet it doesn't have to be this way. We can end hunger-if we make a commitment to doing so. The new one-hour documentary Silent Killer: The Unfinished Campaign Against Hunger shows how it can be done. Shot on location in the United States, South Africa, Kenya, Rome, Mexico and Brazil, Silent Killer examines both the problem of hunger and solutions. The documentary and its companion Web site (www.SilentKillerFilm.org) will provide viewers with inspiration and information to become part of the effort to end hunger.

Produced by Hana Jindrova and John de Graaf (Affluenza, Escape from Affluenza), in association with KCTS/Seattle Public Television, Silent Killer will air on several California public television stations as follows:

KTEH/ San Jose: Sunday, October 16 at 5:00 p.m. (please confirm).

KOCE/ Huntington Beach: Sunday, October 23 at 4:00 p.m.

KQED/ San Francisco: Wednesday, November 2 at 11:00 p.m., repeating on

KQED Encore (Digital Channel 189), Thursday, November 3 at 10:00 p.m.

KVCR/ San Bernardino: Thanksgiving evening, Thursday, November 24 at 8 p.m.

KVIE/ Sacramento: Airdate and time to be announced.

KCSM/ San Mateo: Airdate and time to be announced.

(For all other stations, please check local listings).

Narrated by National Public Radio's Scott Simon, the film begins in South Africa's Kalahari Desert, where razor-thin Bushmen use the Hoodia cactus to fend off hunger. But now, a drug firm has patented the Hoodia's appetite-suppressant properties and is using it to make a diet product for obese Americans and Europeans. Hoodia is a metaphor for a world where some people die from too much food, but millions more die from too little.

We discover how serious the problem is in Kenya as we meet Jane Ininda, a scientist who is trying to make agriculture more productive in her country, while her own brother, Salesio, barely survives the drought, poor soils and pests that constantly threaten his crops. Through powerful stories, we come to understand the dimensions of the hunger crisis.

At the World Food Summit in Rome, we learn how activists have been working to end hunger since President John Kennedy declared war on it in 1963. But today, America's commitment to food security is less clear. In fact, world financial commitments to hunger research are now in decline.

But Silent Killer does not leave viewers feeling helpless. A visit to Brazil finds a nation energized by a new campaign called FOME ZERO-Zero Hunger. In the huge city of Belo Horizonte, we meet a remarkable leader and see how, under the programs she supervises, the right to food is guaranteed to all. In the countryside, we are introduced to the Landless Peasants' Movement, which is giving hope to millions of hungry Brazilians.

Can we end hunger, or will it always be with us? Why should we try? What will it take? What are we doing now? Can biotechnology play a role, and if so, how? Is hunger just a problem of distribution, or do we still need to produce more and better crops? These are the questions considered in this exquisitely photographed documentary.

EXPERTS featured in Silent Killer: The Unfinished Campaign Against Hunger and available for press interviews include:

David Beckmann - President, Bread for the World. Since 1991, Reverend David Beckmann has served as president of Bread for the World, a Christian group that lobbies the U.S. government for policy changes to end hunger in the United States and around the world.

Per Pinstrup-Andersen - World Food Prize Laureate 2001. A native of Denmark, Per Pinstrup-Andersen is the H.E. Babcock Professor of Food, Nutrition and Public Policy at Cornell University. He also serves as the chairman of the Science Council of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.

Chris Barrett - Development Economist, Cornell University. Dr. Barrett is a professor of applied economics and management at Cornell University. His focus is on rural communities, primarily in Africa, concentrating on the dynamics of poverty, food security and hunger.

Walter Falcon - Development Economist, Stanford University. Dr. Falcon is the Farnsworth Professor of International Agricultural Policy at Stanford University (emeritus), co-director of the Center for Environmental Science and Policy, and former director of the Stanford Institute for International Studies.

PROGRAM TIE-INS: October 16 is the 25th observance of World Food Day-a worldwide event designed to create awareness, understanding and year-round action to alleviate hunger. (See www.worldfooddayusa.org.) In addition, October 24 is the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and its first agency, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

CREDITS: Silent Killer was produced by Hana Jindrova and John de Graaf in association with KCTS/Seattle Public Television and is narrated by NPR's Scott Simon. Writer: John de Graaf. Photographers/Editors: Diana Wilmar and David Fox. Composer: Michael Bade. Executive Producer: Enrique Cerna, KCTS. Funding was provided by The Rockefeller Foundation.

DISTRIBUTOR: Silent Killer is presented nationally by KCTS/Seattle Public Television and is distributed by the National Educational Telecommunications Association (NETA).

WEB SITE: See www.SilentKillerFilm.org for more information about the film, including a full transcript, in-depth interviews with film characters and experts on hunger, a guide for teachers, a list of hunger facts and myths, a detailed "Take Action" section and additional resources. Color images from the film are posted on the site for press use, along with an online press kit.

For nearly two decades, most major developing countries have struggled to introduce market forces in their electric power systems. In every case, that effort has proceeded more slowly than reformers hoped and the outcomes have been hybrids that are far from the efficiency and organization of the "ideal" textbook model for a marketbased power system.

At the same time, growing concern about global climate change has put the spotlight on the need to build an international regulatory regime that includes strong incentives for key developing countries to control their emissions of greenhouse gases. In most of these countries, the power sector is a large source of emissions that, with effort, could be controlled.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol included mechanisms that would reward developing nations that cut emissions, but so far the performance of these mechanisms has fallen far short of their potential.

Beginning in 2002, the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) at the Stanford Institute for International Studies (SIIS) and the Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad (IIMA) have conducted a set of studies to examine the intersection of these two crucial challenges for the organization of energy infrastructures in the developing world. This research, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, examined power-market reforms and greenhouse-gas emissions in two key states in India. At the same time PESD was conducting a comprehensive study of electricity-market reforms in five developing countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa) as well as detailed analyses of the greenhouse-gas emissions from three provinces in China in conjunction with other research partners.

PESD and IIMA presented their findings at a workshop on January 27-28, 2005, at Stanford University. The workshop brought together scholars studying the organization of the electric-power sector and other infrastructures in developing countries with energy policy makers, technologists, and those studying the effectiveness of international legal regimes, with the aim of not only focusing on new theories that are emerging to explain the organization of the power sector and the design of meaningful international institutions, but also identifying practical implications for investors, regulators, and policymakers.

The workshop offered diagnoses of what has gone wrong and what opportunities have nonetheless emerged. It focused on practical solutions and a look at the prospects for different technologies to meet the growing demand for power while minimizing the ecological footprint of power generation.

One of the key conclusions of the research and the workshop, as discussed by David Victor, director of PESD, is that electricity markets in the developing world have not progressed inexorably and consistently from a state-owned model to an open market-based model. Rather, much as the experience of the past ten years in the United States has demonstrated, reform of electric-power systems has proceeded differentially between parts of the industry and between jurisdictional units, with some segments of the power generation, transmission, and distribution systems still dominated by the state and some segments now fully responsive to signals from the market.

This hybrid condition-with portions of the electricity enterprise deregulated and other portions still fully regulated-has proven to be virtually universal and quite durable as well. For the most part, it also has proven beneficial to the overall operation of the system as well as to climate mitigation due to the fact that introduction of market forces to parts of the system tends to have a spillover effect, helping to improve efficiency in parts of the system that remain under state control.

Tom Heller, SIIS senior fellow, noted that the negotiations leading up to the

development of the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent discussions and experience have

demonstrated that the burden-sharing metaphor-expecting developing nations to

make a proportional investment and effort in reducing greenhouse-gas emissions-

will not be successful. Rather, as gross and per capita energy consumption increases in developing nations, which is occurring especially rapidly in China and India, policies and mechanisms that facilitate investment in efficient and clean energy production, transmission, and end-use infrastructures will need to be developed and rolled out.

The Kyoto Protocol provided a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to encourage such investment. However, the conclusion reached by practitioners developing such projects in China is that CDM is an inefficient and insufficient mechanism for fostering the magnitude of development projects that will be required to help mitigate the environmental effects of energy growth in the developing nations.

Two problems with CDM were raised at the workshop. First, the bureaucratic hurdles facing developers of CDM projects are daunting. To date no such project has received certification. Second, the Kyoto Protocol's current round of reductions targets expires in 2012, and uncertainty regarding the likely direction and form of future U.S. and European initiatives provides a disincentive to investment in CDM projects.

Alberto Chiappa, managing director of Energy Systems International, noted the good news is that in spite of these difficulties, investors are finding opportunities to develop projects to provide cleaner sources of energy and improve end-use energy efficiency. Professor P.R. Shukla of IIMA pointed out that there is a great need to align development and climate concerns if future mechanisms for climate mitigation in the developing world are to be successful.

Douglas Ogden, program officer at the Energy Foundation, noted that China has made a firm commitment to greatly increase the market share of electricity from renewable sources to 5 percent by 2010 and 20 percent by 2020 and in 2008 will adopt an automobile fuel-economy standard 20 percent more efficient than U.S. CAFE standards. Also, both China and India are engaged in developing natural gas markets in sectors traditionally dominated by coal.

Mario Pereira, director of Power Systems Research, discussed Brazil's current efforts to develop economical and efficient electricity supply through biomass-specifically ethanol derived from sugarcane bagasse. The ethanol industry was originally developed as a reaction to the oil shocks of the 1970s. Although the majority of electricity in Brazil is provided by hydroelectric projects, sugarcane ethanol has some important advantages. First, the sugarcane fields are geographically close to major centers of demand, and second, sugarcane thrives during drier periods of the year when hydroelectric production declines. The experience in Brazil thus demonstrates that renewables can provide an economically attractive source of energy for developing nations.

Looking toward the future, PESD has several projects under way pertaining to the

intersection of electricity-market reforms and global climate change. The program is expanding its research on power-market reforms through a set of case studies on independent power producer projects in ten developing nations and is also initiating a set of studies examining the introduction of natural gas to regions in India and China.

Much work remains to be done before the interface between electricity-market reform and global climate change is well understood. As energy markets in the developing world expand, addressing this question will become more and more important if we are to stabilize atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases.