Since the Democratic Party of Japan came to power in August 2009, upsetting fifty years of conservative rule, U.S.-Japan relations have been on rocky ground. It would seem that the DPJ is upending decades old policies, hewing its own path with the United States, China, and the Asia-Pacific region. As Shorenstein APARC Director for Research Daniel Sneider notes, Japan’s new tack not only has caught the United States flat-footed, but also has other countries in the Asia-Pacific worried. Most importantly, Tokyo seems to be making uncharacteristically friendly overtures to Beijing. But it would be wrong to assume that Sino-Japan relations are really much improved. From oil and gas rights in the East China Sea to China’s military modernization there are still plenty of points of contention. Moreover, the much-contested issue of U.S. marines stationed on Okinawa remains the biggest deterrent to North Korean aggression and Chinese expansion – two fears not far from Tokyo’s mind. This is not to say U.S.-Japan relations will return to the status quo, but that the interlocutors are likely to recall the reason for such a persistent alliance.

The dramatic end to Japan's half-century of conservative rule in a late August election led almost immediately to a public spat with the United States. An inward-looking Japan that had reflexively followed the American lead suddenly was no longer an obedient ally.

At a time when the US was trying to woo a recalcitrant China to become a "strategic partner", Japan's insistence on reopening an agreement over US military bases seemed to upset the regional balance. But there are recent signs of a concerted effort on both sides to put underlying strategic interests back in the forefront, propelled in part by the recent eruption of frictions between China and the US.

The row began with the newly elected Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's call for more "equal" relations with the US, his advocacy of an East Asian Community à la the EU, and his focus on repairing ties with China. Put together, some saw a nascent urge to abandon the post-war security alliance. A senior State Department official went so far as to tell the Washington Post in late October that the "the United States had ‘grown comfortable' thinking about Japan as a constant in US relations in Asia. It no longer is, he said, adding that ‘the hardest thing right now is not China, it's Japan.'"

The trigger was growing frustration over the Hatoyama government's handling of the relocation of the US Marine air base at Futenma on Okinawa. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) consistently opposed the deal to relocate the base elsewhere within Okinawa, expressing sympathy for the disproportionate burden of the US military presence in Japan born by Okinawans. American officials were loathe to reopen an agreement that had taken years to negotiate and believed the Japanese government exaggerated its domestic political constraints.

At the same time, Japan seems eager to hew its own course with China, to improve relations and begin to build the foundation for a new Asian community. If one is to believe US officials, alarm bells have been ringing among their allies and others in Asia over the rift with Japan. The talk of building a regional organization that might exclude the US made Singapore, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines and even Vietnam worried that this would only aid Chinese ambitions.

Meanwhile, the Obama administration itself was ardently wooing China. President Obama, on the eve of a trip in November, spoke of creating a "strategic partnership." In Beijing, the President avoided public finger wagging. Discussion of difficult issues such as human rights, Tibet and sanctions against Iran were conducted largely, if at all, behind closed doors.

Given their own pursuit of Chinese partnership, American officials could hardly object to Tokyo's efforts along the same lines. In public, they said this is not a zero sum game, that an easing of Sino-Japanese tensions could aid security and stability in the region for everyone. But some US officials soon saw evidence of Sino-Japanese collusion to push the US out of Asia. Privately they pointed to what was considered a telling moment following a trilateral summit of Chinese, Japanese and South Korean leaders in Tianjin in October. Talking to reporters after the meeting, Hatoyama had spoken about Japan's desire to lessen its "dependence" on the US. American officials considered Hatoyama's actions a gross display of obeisance to the Chinese.

Accusations that Japan was drifting into Chinese arms grew louder after DPJ Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa led a group of about 140 lawmakers on an adulatory visit to China in early December. Then Hatoyama and Ozawa raised hackles when they pushed for the Emperor to receive a visiting Chinese senior official, the heir apparent for leadership, Xi Jinping. However, these depictions of Tokyo lurching toward Beijing ignore the gradual evolution of Japanese policy and the deep-seated rivalry that persists.

Sino-Japanese relations reached a low point five years ago after anti-Japan demonstrations were apparently sanctioned by Chinese authorities. Unresolved wartime historical issues drove those outbursts, prompted by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine, which honors Japan's war dead. Disputes over oil and gas rights in the East China Sea threatened to explode. And China launched a campaign to block Japan's bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council.

Japanese policymakers began to worry about the impact of these tensions on Japan's growing economic interdependence with China. They were critical of Koizumi's one-sided focus on the US-Japan security alliance.

"To weather the wild seas of the 21st century, Japan's diplomacy must have two elements: the Japan-US alliance and a Japan-China entente," wrote Makoto Iokibe, a defense specialist who now heads the Japanese Defense Academy, in the summer of 2006. "A combination of a gas field accord and a depoliticized Yasukuni issue would provide Japan and China with a clear view for the joint management of East Asia."

Beginning in late 2006, a succession of Japanese administrations has made concerted efforts to repair ties with Beijing and Seoul. Though the atmosphere with China has improved, substantive differences remain. In January, Japan's foreign minister warned that Tokyo would take action if China continued to violate a 2008 deal to develop oil and gas fields jointly. When Ozawa met the Chinese defense minister in December, he said the Japanese see China's military modernization as a threat. Ozawa suggested that if such fears were not eased, Japan might be prompted to undertake its own arms build up.

The Hatoyama government has also moved to upgrade ties, including security links, with Asian powers that share a fear of China, including India, Indonesia and South Korea. Ozawa stopped in Seoul after his visit to China where he apologized for Japan's colonial rule in Korea and pledged to push through legislation granting voting rights to Korean residents in Japan, an issue of great importance to Koreans and opposed by conservatives in Japan.

Recent events seem to have caused the US to reassess its handling of relations in Northeast Asia. There is growing evidence of an emboldened China that seems to interpret America's bid for a strategic embrace with the country as a sign of weakness. The authorities in Beijing took a tougher line toward internal dissent, openly clashed with the US at the climate change talks in Copenhagen, balked at cooperation on sanctions against Iran, and brushed off American protests over evidence of cyber attacks on Western firms.

After all this, America has begun to soften its tone toward Tokyo. Officials pledge patience as the new government looks for a solution to the base problem, while also mounting a public effort to convince Japan that the Marine presence in Okinawa is key to "deterrence" of North Korea and China. There is a renewed emphasis on broadening the security agenda to include other issues, from cyber security to climate change. Hatoyama, too, has emphasized that the Japan-US alliance remains "a cornerstone for Japan to enhance its cooperative relations with other Asian countries, including China."

Whether any real lessons have been learned in Tokyo or Washington remains to be seen. But perhaps the turn in Sino-US relations has reminded people in Tokyo and Washington that there remains a strategic purpose to the alliance.

Jenny Aker an Assistant Professor in the Economics Department and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, provided an overview of the welfare impacts of mobile technologies and how current research is testing our assumptions about the benefits of mobile phones for individuals in developing countries.

Mobile phones are used by some of the poorest people in the world; even at the country ranked 160 in the UN's Human Development Index, levels of adoption of mobile phones are at 50%. There are few systematic studies looking at why people adopt mobile technology, but those that exist suggest there are correlations with higher income levels, trading professions and an urban location. Mobile phone coverage across Africa is now extensive. Research shows that roll out by mobile phone companies is determined by factors including the size of population, the costs associated with terrain, quality of road access and the operating environment (whether there exists a competitive liberalized market).

Identifying the positive impact of mobiles can be difficult because they have so many uses, making assessment of costs and benefits problematic. Mobiles are also only pseudo private goods since they are often shared and benefits extend beyond the owner.  Despite these difficulties, a number of researchers have demonstrated the impact of mobile phones in the developing world. Robert Jensen's paper found that the introduction of mobiles into the fishing industry in Kerala, India resulted in reduced price discrepancies and significant welfare benefits in the form of increased profits for fishermen and reduced waste. Similarly, Jenny's own study of grain markets in Niger found that the use of mobile phones reduced price discrepancy and enhanced welfare through increased trader profits and reduced average consumer prices.

As well as these externalities from the IT sector, we are also seeing deliberate attempts to harness the potential of mobile phones, from private sector services (e.g. the provision of mobile money transfers such as M-Pesa) to non-profit development projects using mobiles in diverse contexts including health, governance and market information. Jenny is currently working on a project that will examine how mobiles can improve literacy in Niger. A pilot of Project ABC over the next three years will assess how access to mobile phones can complement traditional literacy lessons by giving people the chance to practice their literacy skills via SMS. Early results suggest significantly higher performance in literacy testing by groups using mobile phones.

If mobiles have genuine welfare impacts then ensuring access becomes a key policy concern. Jenny highlighted the importance of continuing liberalization of telecoms markets in Africa, maintaining fair and transparent legislation and reconsidering ICT taxes (in some countries mobiles are taxed as a luxury good). But while mobiles can enhance the delivery of and access to resources and information, we should be wary of viewing them as a development panacea since they cannot replace basic infrastructure investments such as power and roads.

Varun Rai discusses India's policy options for reducing emissions of global warming gases on the NewsX special: "Can Green Mean Green?"

 

 

Jeremy Carl argues that despite India’s lack of a concrete binding target for significant CO2 emissions reductions, India’s climate commitments come through on other fronts.

Sometimes in diplomacy what is not announced is more revealing than what is. Such is certainly the case in India's recent climate and energy negotiations with the US, as both countries prepare to head to global climate talks in Copenhagen. The occasion of Manmohan Singh's state visit to the US brought the announcement of a flurry of energy and climate-related initiatives. These initiatives were a combination of substance and political theatre, with potentially important initiatives on environmental and regulatory capacity-building and technology partnerships buried under a deep layer of bureaucratic niceties.

What was more noticed was what was not announced: any agreement for India to have a binding target for CO2 emissions reductions, something US and European environmentalists have long claimed is necessary as part of a global effort to stave off severe climate change. And while the Indian government has eventually announced a targeted reduction in what is known as "emissions intensity", CO2 emissions per unit of GDP, that wasn't a big stretch, given India's current annual efficiency improvements. Furthermore, Minister for Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh has made it abundantly clear in Parliament that such targets would be voluntary and not part of a binding international agreement.

With more than 60 world leaders in attendance, we can be assured that Copenhagen will not end in public failure. But the better question is whether the announced success in Copenhagen will have any practical meaning other than determining that diplomats can spin a "success" out of any actual events. Some Indian commentators have seemed to hope for a "success" of that sort - fretting about India being outmanoeuvred on the public stage by China and other developing countries that may be able to strike a more cooperative posture.

While from a tactical standpoint, such concerns are understandable (there is little reason for India to not commit to doing things it would like to do anyway, such as developing more efficient power plants or cars), from the perspective of actually taking leadership in addressing the climate problem, they mean little. In some ways, India is emulating the example of the US from the previous Kyoto climate round: while the US certainly should have been more proactive and engaged, at least the Americans had the integrity not to ratify an agreement that they couldn't keep. Many other nations could not claim that; they either missed their targets entirely, or resorted to bogus accounting tricks to meet their goals.

That India is showing its seriousness by not making climate commitments it won't live by should actually be seen as a mature and responsible decision, not an intransigent one. Does anyone think that China won't walk away from its promise if they have trouble meeting their emissions reduction goals?

As an alternative to the hot air that is likely to come out of Copenhagen, it is instructive to look at the potentially useful energy and climate agreements the US and India did sign during the PM's recent visit. The fact that clean energy was the second item listed behind security issues in the joint communiqué announced by Singh and Obama is clear evidence that both India and the US place a high importance on this aspect of their relationship.

India and the US announced numerous programmes, from the joint deployment of solar electricity in Indian cities to the strengthening of India's environmental regulatory and monitoring capacity - which is sure to be a critical step if India is to make serious and verifiable long-term commitments to emissions reductions. Perhaps most important, at least symbolically, was the announcement of joint scientific R&D work for renewable energy technologies. The Indo-US Clean Energy Research and Deployment Initiative, which promises joint development of new energy technologies and the development of a joint research centre with a public-private funding model, is one such initiative.

Ultimately, despite the bluster of diplomats in Delhi, Washington or Copenhagen, the solutions to the climate change problem must come through a technological revolution in the world's energy infrastructure. And it is here that India, with its burgeoning corps of bright young engineers, could make the biggest impact on climate change mitigation. Circumstances may not permit

India to lead the deal-making in Denmark, but if the Indian government gets serious about turning more of India's brightest young minds towards solving the clean energy problem, then India's contribution to solving the climate change conundrum may be significant indeed.