Life Stories of Lithuanian Women 1945 - 1970: Adopting and Remembering Soviet Reality
There are some peculiarities in conducting interviews about the Soviet past in post-Soviet space. What details of everyday life do interviewees reveal? And how do life stories shaped during Soviet times, but recalled and reconsidered in the post-communist era influence the interview?
Prof. Dalia Marcinkeviciene is chair of the Women’s Studies Center, and a lecturer in History Department at Vilnius University. Her research interests include Lithuanian family history during the period 1795-1990; theories in Sovietology. Marcinkeviciene was awarded Fulbright (2002-2003) and AAUW (2005-2006) research fellowships. She is an author and editor of three books (published in Lithuanian): Famous Lithuanian Women, the 19th – the Beginning of the 20th Century. Vilnius University Press, 1997; The Society of Married People: Marriage and Divorce in Lithuania, the 19th – the Beginning of the 20th Century. Lithuanian Institute of History, 1999; Life Stories of Lithuanian Women. Vilnius University Press, 2007
Encina Ground Floor Conference Room
Ukraine's Challenges, the West's Response
Mired in political gridlock, battered by economic crisis, and uncertain about its foreign relations, Ukraine faces a difficult year, a year that will end with a presidential election. How is Ukraine coping with these difficulties? And how should the West respond in helping Ukraine meet the challenges before it?
Synopsis
Ambassador Pifer begins his assessment of Ukraine’s challenges by identifying the four key issues it will have to face this coming year. Firstly, Mr. Pifer argues that a serious problem is the incompatible relations between Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yushchenko, and Ukraine’s prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko. Mr Pifer identifies the energy situation as a key battle issue between the two. Most seriously, Mr. Pifer believes that such feuding compromises Ukraine’s ability to deal with serious issues such as energy and the economic crisis. In addition, Russia seems to play the two against each other. Therefore, Mr. Pifer argues that the West begin by getting the two to cooperate on key issues. Mr. Pifer also stresses the need for a coordinated US-EU stance and also proposes the possible revival of a US-Ukraine bi-national commission.
An aspect of Ukraine clearly being affected by this feud is Ukraine’s handling of the economy. Mr. Pifer examines how Ukraine was suddenly hit hard by the global financial crisis in October 2008. This was partly caused by a fall in the global demand for steel, one of Ukraine’s key exports, and led to further inflation and investors avoiding the country. Ukraine also received $16 billion from the IMF on the conditions of having almost no budget deficit and fell short of this condition earlier this year leading to a delay in the transfer of funds from the IMF. While some believe in a possible recovery in 2010, Mr. Pifer argues the West can help in several ways. Firstly, it must push Ukraine to continue to follow IMF conditions to receive the vital funding. Mr. Pifer also proposes an international donor conference for Ukraine to receive the additional money it needs but will not receive from the IMF. He argues for the abolition of Ukraine’s “communist” commercial code and the freer sale of land to get the agricultural market flowing.
Another possible crisis point is Ukraine’s energy situation. Mr. Pifer examines Ukraine’s dependence on Russia and how during the January crisis it did not pass any reserve gas onto its Western neighbors, weakening its international reputation. Mr. Pifer does recognize Ukraine’s efforts to lessen its use of natural gas, particularly due to the increase in prices. However, he argues Ukraine is still very vulnerable, and this is not helped by the fact that Ukraine’s own energy agency is nearing bankruptcy as it maintains unsustainably low prices. Therefore, Mr. Pifer believes the first step forward is, although tough, for energy prices to be raised. Then, the West should offer technical assistance to improve the efficiency of Ukraine’s energy system. Finally, Ukraine should seek EU funding to modernize its pipelines.
The final issue Mr. Pifer addresses is Ukraine’s complex foreign policy. Mr. Pifer explains Ukraine’s difficult relationship with Russia is marred by differences over energy, NATO, and Georgia. Mr. Pifer also cites Russia’s resources in Ukraine to stir tension if it wants to weaken the country. Another serious aspect is Ukraine’s uncertain relationship with the EU consisting of support from the Baltic states and reluctance from the Western states such as France and Germany. Mr. Pifer feels it is important for the West not to give up on Ukraine but to push the country to forge a consistent line between president and prime minister. The US should also let Ukraine know how much support it would receive were it to become involved in an economic conflict with Russia.
Mr. Pifer concludes by stating that the US should be clear that this new attempt at resetting relations might not survive a Russian-initiated crisis with Ukraine.
In answering the audience's multitude of questions, a variety of issues were raised. Discussion included key points such as the receptiveness of Ukrainian leaders to international advice or the impact of Ukraine's membership of the World Trade Organization. One issue Mr. Pifer particularly emphasized was his belief that Ukraine should not be part of NATO as long as public opinion stands against it.
about the speaker
Steven Pifer is a visiting fellow at the
Brookings Institution and a (non-resident) senior adviser with the
Center for
Strategic and International Studies. A retired Foreign Service officer,
his more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S.
relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as on arms
control and security issues. His assignments included deputy assistant
secretary of state in the
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (2001-2004), ambassador to
Ukraine (1998-2000), and special assistant to
the president and National Security Council senior director for Russia,
Ukraine
and Eurasia (1996-1997). He also served
at the U.S. embassies in Warsaw, Moscow and London, as well as with the
U.S.
delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations in
Geneva. He holds a
B.A. in economics from Stanford University, where he
later spent a year as a visiting scholar at Stanford's Institute for
International Studies. He is a member of the Council on Foreign
Relations.
Sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.
Encina Ground Floor Conference Room
Holocaust in Nazi-Occupied Latvia: New Trends in Scholarship
Aivars Stranga is professor and chair of the Department of History
at the University of Latvia. He is the author of seven monographs
and more than 150 scholarly and general publications on Latvian
domestic and foreign policy and international relations between 1918 and
1940, and Latvian foreign
policy from 1991 to 2000. Professor Stranga was a distinguished
visiting professor at Stanford in 2003, teaching courses on Baltic
History and the History of the Holocaust in the Baltics.
Jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, Stanford Humanities Center, Department of History, Taube Center for Jewish Studies, and Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.
Building 360, Conference Room
Stanford University
Latvia in Crisis: Where is a Way Out of It?
Latvia is a country that has come through a crisis before; can it do it again? Professor Stranga examines the current crisis in Latvia, a country much evolved over the past 50 years. He focuses on a variety of social, economic, and political factors in assessing how Latvia can move forward.
Synopsis
Prof. Stranga begins by examining what he calls Latvia’s “first great crisis” from 1929-1933. At the time, Latvia was a democracy, a member of the League of Nations, but critically had no security guarantees and was stuck between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Prof. Stranga explains that this crisis was overcome by the dictatorship of Karlis Ulmanis, whose regime lasted from 1934 until the Nazi occupation. Those years were seen as the ‘Golden Years,’ times of economic flourishing and national freedom from occupation. Prof. Stranga reveals this period had long lasting effects on the national psyche of Latvia.
To Prof. Stranga, Latvia is in a very different situation today. He argues that these are times of very limited sovereignty, particularly for his country. Prof. Stranga explains that this is mainly due to Latvia’s dependence on the EU, NATO, and the IMF which provide economic and military security. Prof. Stranga identifies the effects of Karlis Ulmanis’ regime as the perception in Latvia that a ‘strong man’ is needed to guide Latvia out of its current crisis. However, the necessity for Latvia to remain a democracy is made clear by the help it receives from the organizations mentioned above.
Although the help is clearly needed, Prof. Stranga feels that its consequences are often very painful. The IMF’s conditions for essentially saving Latvia’s economy include cutbacks in medical assistance and a reduction of teachers and schools, facets of public life deeply engrained in Latvia’s culture. In addition, Prof. Stranga examines the question of energy security. He looks particularly at Latvia’s absolute dependence on Russia exhibited by the fact that Gazprom’s first foreign office is in Latvia, and the fact that this has perhaps hindered Latvia’s progress.
At the same time, it seems clear that Prof. Stranga sees this crisis also as an opportunity. Firstly, he argues that now is probably the time to not be shy but to look for alternative energy sources such as nuclear energy, something Prof. Stranga further discussed when answering questions. Moreover, Prof. Stranga believes there are too many bureaucratic positions, and the crisis is an opportunity to cut these off and direct funding elsewhere. In addition, he feels the crisis is a chance to reconstruct exports. In particular, Prof. Stranga would like to see Latvia leaning more towards innovation rather than timber or agriculture. Finally, Prof. Stranga addresses Latvia’s issue of an internally divided society, particularly between Latvians and Russian speakers. He analyzes Latvian Russians’ diminishing impact as Russia’s economy falters but also expresses concern at the fact that Russian influence in Latvia seems to be heavily dependent on Russia’s economic state.
Prof. Stranga kindly takes the time to briefly answer a few questions and raises several issues in the process. Prof. Stranga cites Latvia's population reduction as perhaps the "greatest" problem it faces. However, he feels reassured by the help of the friendly states of Scandinavia and other organizations across the world. At the same time, Prof. Stranga explains such organizations are not having an entirely positive impact. In particular, he argues against the "inhuman" approach of solely focusing on cutting back capital of the IMF which he feels is an assault on Latvian life.
About the speaker
Aivars Stranga is professor and chair of the Department of History at the University of Latvia. He is the author of seven monographs and more than 150 scholarly and general publications on Latvian domestic and foreign policy andinternational relations between 1918 and 1940, and Latvian foreign policy from 1991 to 2000. Professor Stranga was a distinguished visiting professor at Stanford in 2003, teaching courses on Baltic History and the History of the Holocaust in the Baltics.
Jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, Stanford Humanities Center, Department of History, Taube Center for Jewish Studies, and Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.
Encina Ground Floor Conference Room
Latvia and Russia: Battles Around History
Aivars Stranga is professor and chair of the Department of History at the University of Latvia. He is the author of seven monographs
and more than 150 scholarly and general publications on Latvian domestic and foreign policy andinternational relations between 1918 and 1940, and Latvian foreign
policy from 1991 to 2000. Professor Stranga was a distinguished visiting professor at Stanford in 2003, teaching courses on Baltic History and the History of the Holocaust in the Baltics.
Jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, Stanford Humanities Center, Department of History, Taube Center for Jewish Studies, and Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.
CISAC Conference Room
The Forensics of Election Fraud with Application to Russia, Ukraine and Taiwan
Peter Ordeshook is Professor of Political Science at Caltech, member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, author or coauthor of An Introduction to Positive Political Theory; Game Theory and Political Theory; Lessons for Citizens of a New Democracy; Voters, Parties and Elections; A Political Theory Primer; Time Discounting in Social Networks; Designing Federalism; and (forthcoming) The Forensics of Election Fraud.
Encina Ground Floor Conference Room
CISAC's Hecker talks North Korea
Management Science and Engineering Professor Siegfried S. Hecker, an expert on nuclear weapons, recently returned from a visit to North Korea, where he frequently checks on the country's denuclearization process. Hecker has researched extensively in fields of plutonium science-he served as director of Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986 through 1997, and remains an emeritus director to the Laboratory. Through a series of Track Two, non-governmental, non-official visits to North Korea, Hecker has worked closely with the previous and current administration's North Korean negotiations team. The Daily spoke with Hecker about his experiences in the country, and his insight into nuclear issues in North Korea and elsewhere.
The Stanford Daily (SD): This is your sixth visit to North Korea. You made one each year from 2004 to 2009. How is this trip different from the previous ones? Any change in North Korean society, diplomacy?
Siegfried Hecker (SH): We visited North Korea from Tuesday, Feb. 24 to Saturday, Feb. 28, and first of all it was quite a relief from Beijing in that the air was quite clear and that the weather was beautiful. In Beijing, it went day to day from being smoggy to being almost impossibly smoggy. So the first thing that we found when we got off at Pyongyang, was the relief of having reasonably clean air.
Even though it was in February and still quite cold, the greatest impression left is that Pyongyang and the people just looked more prosperous this time than I have seen them look in the past. There were more cars on the road; there were more tractors, especially when we got off into the countryside. The people were better dressed.
Particularly, one of the things I look for is color. Years ago, North Korea, like the Soviet Union, was all drab, gray and black. Now you see lots of colors; lots of down jackets, for example, on little children and women with bright colors from yellow to green to red. There was more construction in Pyongyang. We've seen many cranes working on the ground.
All the way around, while some people believed that North Korea and its economy is sinking, we've actually seen it rising and looking better than we've seen in the past. I would say this is the starkest observation of how it struck differently as the previous times.
[Diplomatically,] we've seen a change of attitude since October 2006, when they conducted a nuclear test. Even though, by technical standards, that nuclear test was of limited success, politically for them it was very successful. So the principal attitude change is one of greater confidence on their part. They now tell us, you must deal with us as a nuclear weapon state. We have demonstrated that we have nuclear weapons. We've tested a nuclear weapon, and so we expect to be treated as a state that has nuclear weapons. That confidence will most likely harden their negotiating position. Then, of course, they're also still trying to get a sense of what the new administration will do. They are entering the negotiations with a new administration from what they considered to be a position of strength.
SD: How is North Korea's disablement process of its nuclear facilities going?
SH: In July 2007, they stopped operations and began disabling the nuclear facilities. When I was there almost exactly one year ago, they showed me the nuclear facilities, allowed me to take photographs of the nuclear facilities to demonstrate that they are disabling those facilities that produce the bomb fuel-the plutonium. Disabling the facilities means making it more difficult to restart. They have finished most of the disablement actions, but still need to complete the unloading of the fuel from the nuclear reactor.
They made the decision last year to slow down the unloading because the other parties did not meet their obligations of providing heavy fuel oil or equivalent energy aid. At this point, Japan and South Korea have not finished their obligations, so the slow-down continues.
If the other parties complete their obligations, then I believe North Korea is prepared to complete the disablement. However, the next important step is to dismantle the facilities-that is, take them apart. The terms of that dismantlement have not yet been negotiated. Subsequently, they will need to give up their nuclear weapons. That seems a long way off now based on their comments.
SD: In one of your reports, you discussed the idea of a scientific fingerprint that could deter North Korea from exporting its plutonium. This is very interesting. Can the method have wider use?
SH: One of the concerns with North Korea would be the possibility of them selling or exporting plutonium or nuclear technologies. We know enough about the North Korean plutonium that we have what you call a scientific fingerprint. The makeup of plutonium is determined by the type of reactor and by how long it was in the reactor. We know that about the North Korean plutonium so we can identify North Korea's plutonium. This should be a deterrent for North Korea ever exporting its plutonium because we would know it came from North Korea.
We, of course, don't know whether or not North Korea would ever want to sell its plutonium, but just in case, the fingerprint represents a deterrent. This fingerprinting of plutonium is not as useful for plutonium from the rest of the world, because there are so many different types of reactors and we know less about their fuels and operating schedules.
SD: Do you think the example of North Korea contributes much to a solution of nuclear problems in other regions-for example, Iran?
SH: Right now, the second nuclear hot spot is Iran, and the difference between North Korea and Iran is that North Korea has declared its nuclear program now to be a weapon's program and has demonstrated that at least it can detonate a nuclear device, even though it wasn't fully successful. Iran, I believe, is developing an option for nuclear weapons but under the umbrella of doing it strictly for civilian purposes. They say, "We're not a nuclear weapon state and we have no intention of developing nuclear weapons," but they are continuing to put most of the capabilities in place should they decide to build weapons.
The dividing line between military and civilian is a very fine line, so North Korea and Iran are two very different problems. However, those countries certainly watch each other and look at the diplomatic responses during each other's negotiations.
SD: Are you advising anyone in the new administration?
SH: We work very closely with the U.S. government on this, although our visits are strictly track two visits, which means non-governmental, non-official visits. I don't go as an official, but rather as a Stanford University employee. In the past, we worked very closely with the previous North Korean negotiations team led by Ambassador Christopher Hill. We have now begun to work with the new team that is just being put in place.
SD: During your visits, you met with North Korean officials in education, public health, and explored possibilities of cooperation in these areas. How do you envision these future exchanges?
SH: We met with officials from the ministry of education and one of the economic universities to discuss potential cooperation in educational and technology exchange. In the past, we have also met with officials from the health ministry. So, in addition to working the nuclear issues, we're very interested in trying to engage the North Korean community in a broader set of activities than simply nuclear, and technology is one of those. They're very interested in material science, biotechnology, information technology, and so we explored the possibility of exchange visits and particularly having some Stanford professors go to North Korea and lecture on those topics.
SD: What classes do you currently teach at Stanford? How do you like being a professor at Stanford?
SH: I have a terrific time-that's one of the reasons why I'm at Stanford. The two classes that I teach are both Management Science and Engineering classes. They both focus on the intersection of technology and policy. One is a very large class, MSE 193/293, that Professor William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, and I teach together. We cover everything from history of technology and warfare to modern times and what the current challenges are in the security arena. Both Prof. Perry and I try to teach that in the spirit of our own experiences in these areas. It's a very, very large class-over 200 students.
Then I teach a course by myself in spring that's exactly the opposite. It's a sophomore seminar, MSE93Q, and I have approximately 16 students. The title is "Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Terrorism," and in essence, it's everything nuclear. So I cover in that 10 weeks the whole nuclear problem. I try to get students to understand the basics of nuclear technology and how that interfaces with the policy issue of nuclear weapons, energy, proliferation and terrorism. We cover topics such as: If you develop nuclear energy, why do you have to be concerned about nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation? What is the connection between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons? That's what we cover in 10 weeks' time, and I've enjoyed the interaction with students immensely.
SD: What do you aim to teach students in the classroom and outside?
SH: Particularly, I want students to understand the intersections of technology and policy. The nuclear field is a very good one to do that because you must understand the basics of nuclear technology to make good policy. And we also now have 60 years of very rich history of the interplay of those two in so many different countries and so many different ways. For example, in both of my classes the students have to write policy papers that show they have at least a basic understanding of the technology, even though they may be social science, political science, international relations majors, but I want them to understand the difference between plutonium and uranium, between fission and fusion, between weapons and energy. That's what I like to be able to contribute to the University.
What I like about the students is how truly interested and dedicated they are and how experienced so many of them are in the international arena. In addition, what's also fascinating is that we have students from all over the world. Whether it is a physics major from Palestine, or somebody who grew up in Iran, Pakistan, India or in China, Vietnam, Africa, they bring a totally different outlook on the world to the table, which then of course helps the rest of the students to understand that this world is much more than just about the United States of America, and Stanford is a great place to do it.