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Russian president Vladimir Putin is keeping the world guessing as western intelligence says the invasion he ordered of Ukraine has not been as successful or as swift as he had hoped.

Nearly a week into the largest military campaign in Europe since World War Two, Russian forces have encountered fierce resistance from Ukraine while global condemnation has spurred sanctions that have roiled the Russian economy.

Read the rest at Newsweek

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Russian president Vladimir Putin is keeping the world guessing as western intelligence says the invasion he ordered of Ukraine has not been as successful or as swift as he had hoped.

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Rose Gottemoeller
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As Russian forces advance into Ukraine from the north, south and east and lay siege to Kyiv and other major cities, join The Commonwealth Club for an in-depth briefing on the current situation and what may happen in the coming days or weeks. What led Russian President Putin to resort to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and will the Ukrainians be able to hold back the forces arrayed against them? What is Putin’s endgame, and what are the risks to the NATO alliance and neighboring states if the conflict were to escalate?

The battle currently unfolding within Ukraine’s borders is the largest military action in Europe since the end of World War II, and the ensuing refugee crisis from the growing exodus of Ukrainians into neighboring Poland and Romania threatens to destabilize Europe and the NATO alliance, and draw in other nations. It is not only a threat of conventional war, but there are also increasing risks of cyberwarfare, threats to the global economy and the potential of nuclear escalation.

In the midst of this evolving crisis, we turn to the experts. Steven Pifer served as ambassador to Ukraine and is a seasoned policy analyst of Russia and Ukraine. Rose Gottemoeller is an expert on the NATO alliance as well as nuclear threats. Gloria Duffy served as deputy assistant secretary of defense, and is an expert in arms control and U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Moderating the conversation will be Carla Thorson, the new vice president of programs at the Commonwealth Club who worked previously as a Russian and East European analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the RAND Corporation.

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As Russian forces advance into Ukraine from the north, south and east and lay siege to Kyiv and other major cities, join The Commonwealth Club for an in-depth briefing on the current situation and what may happen in the coming days or weeks.

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Melissa Morgan
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The war now being fought in Ukraine has shaken the world and its institutions to the core. With its focus on international affairs and unique relationship to Ukraine and the Ukrainian community, shock and anxiety about the uncertainties of the future have been particulalry keen amongst the students, faculty and staff at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI).

The weekend after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, students came together at the McFaul residence for a teach-in about the unfolding events. In addition to hearing remarks from FSI's director, Michael McFaul, students had an opportunity to share their thoughts, worries and tears for the senseless violence being perpetrated.

Following this evening of solidarity, we asked students from the FSI community to share their feelings about that night and the larger implications of the evolving conflict. Me Me Khant (Master's in International Policy, '22), Anastasiia Malenko (Political Science and Economics, '23), Calli Obern (MIP, '22) and Mikk Raud (MIP, '22) offered their reflections.


Finding Connection in International Solidarity
 

I recently shared a space with a group of Stanford Ukrainian students who bravely shared their stories — feelings of guilt for being abroad, standing up for their friends fighting at home, calling for solidarity for democracy, losing sleep while worrying for families at home, but above all, the feeling of hope & determination that Ukraine will rise victoriously in the end.

I am a student from Myanmar, and I was in a similar space last February when the Burmese military staged a coup against the government and plunged my home country into violence. I heard my Ukrainian peers fully. I’ll never fully understand what the Ukrainians are going through right now, but I felt connected in our suffering and rage.
 

When you are far from home watching your home burn, it’s the tears, it’s the silence, it’s the tremor in your voice, it’s a hug — that reminds you are not alone.
Me Me Khant
MIP Class of 2022 (GOVDEV)


As the evening ended, there was a moment when one of the Ukrainian students came to me to tell me that he was so sorry for #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar. I told him, “Thank you. I am sorry too. I can only imagine what you are going through.” In response he asked, “But you feel it, yeah?”

For a moment, we stood there, teared up, in silence. It was simply powerful. I felt understood. I felt the support. And this was all while I was trying my best to not make this about Myanmar and to give them space for their own grief and trauma. It was not empty words of sympathy. It was a shared moment.

This is why across-movement international solidarity is important. When you are in it together, when vocabulary falls short to describe the immense trauma you are going through, when you are far from home watching your home burn, it’s the tears, it’s the silence, it’s the tremor in your voice, it’s a hug — that reminds you are not alone.

Me Me Khant, Master's in International Policy, Class of 2022

Me Me Khant

Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Student, '22
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Living By the Ideals of Democracy


In political science classes at Stanford, we talk a lot about the ideals of democracy and legitimacy, about sovereignty and independence. Ukrainians don’t just talk about these ideas— they live by them.

A week ago, Russia invaded my home, bringing war to a peaceful democracy. Since then, my days and nights have been full of fear. However, my experience as a Ukrainian living abroad doesn't compare to what my friends and family are going through back home. Even under the constant threat of enemy fire, they still manage to help — collecting humanitarian aid,organizing transportation, coordinating national and local volunteering networks.

This way of living did not begin this month. For centuries, my nation has fought heroically for our independence and distinct cultural identity: our people defended Ukrainian symbols in the face of repressions, broke free of the Soviet Union, and shook off dictators time and time again to re-establish our democracy. For the first time, the world sees our fight. You see us face devastation the post-WWII world vowed would never happen again. As Russians bomb cities —destroying kindergartens, hospitals, orphanages, and schools — you witness our resilience. You watch our people take to the streets and stand against the occupying forces trying to enter our cities, singing the national anthem and telling Russians to leave our land.
 

We talk a lot about the ideals of democracy and legitimacy, about sovereignty and independence. Ukrainians don’t just talk about these ideas— they live by them.
Anastasiia Malenko
Political Science and Economics, '23


This time, our fight is global, and, Ukrainians abroad are united in the fight. In under a week, the Ukrainian community at Stanford has launched a Joint Statement on Russia's War Against Ukraine, obtaining more than 800 signatures so far. We created the StandWithUkraine website with resources in 15 languages on organizations accepting donations, volunteering opportunities, reliable information sources, and templates for political advocacy.

The broader Stanford community has inspired me with their support as well. I appreciated Prof. McFaul's event that brought Ukrainians and MIP students together, especially because it demonstrated the FSI's community's unique ability to help. I hope that this potential can result in concrete actions, including further advocacy, donations, and volunteering. As scholars who have devoted their lives to the study of democracy, your time to act is now: join the fight to save Ukraine and Europe.

Anastasiia Malenko

Anastasiia Malenko

Political Science and Economics, '23
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Uniting Abroad and at Home


As students of international policy, it is easy to distance ourselves from conflicts around the world. We are taught to examine them analytically through an international relations lens, hypothesizing what might be motivating a leader like Putin, Xi, or Biden to act in a certain way. But having the chance to hear from Ukrainian students and leaders across the Stanford community bridged what we study in the classroom and read in the news with what is actually happening to families and friends on the ground.
 

The international community has shown that it can unite and respond when a foreign state violates international laws and norms – and we must not forget this.
Calli Obern
MIP Class of 2022 (ENRE)


Listening to their stories and learning how we can assist, as policy students and citizens, was a reminder that we are not powerless — public opinion and advocacy can push policymakers to stand up for democracy and against violations of sovereignty and human rights.

Unfortunately, there have been too many instances of unnecessary fighting and occupying of foreign land, including by my own country the United States. The international community has shown that it can unite and respond when a foreign state violates international laws and norms – and we must not forget this should future invasions occur anywhere around the world.

Calli Obern, Master's in International Policy ('22)

Calli Obern

Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Student, '22
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Doing All We Can


The tragedy that is unfolding in Ukraine hits especially close to home for me both physically and emotionally – even more so after hearing all the touching stories of our Ukrainian friends at professor McFaul’s house.

I am from Estonia, another country unlucky enough to have an aggressive Russia as a neighbor. Should Putin meet any success in Ukraine, my homeland very well may be picked as the next target. Ironically enough, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has only made NATO stronger, and as a member of the alliance, we should feel safe. But I also cannot overlook the irony and am even ashamed that the cost of NATO unity seems to be the complete destruction of Ukraine, who is essentially doing the fighting for all of us. Thousands of Ukrainian lives have ended, and millions will be emotionally damaged forever.

Emotionally, witnessing the thousands of casualties on both sides as a result of one man’s idea of a parallel universe and disregard of human life is heartbreaking. I also fear we are on the verge of making the same mistakes we have already made in the past. While the West has already done a lot to help Ukraine, are we doing enough? In a few months, after potentially thousands more innocent people have been massacred, will we be able to look our Ukrainian friends in the eyes and truly say we did all we could? As of now, it seems like the answer is no.
 

In a few months, after potentially thousands more innocent people have been massacred, will we be able to look our Ukrainian friends in the eyes and truly say we did all we could?
Mikk Raud
MIP Class of 2022 (CYBER)


We are dealing with consequences, not the cause. While it is controversial to advocate for NATO to get directly militarily involved for the defense of Ukraine, there is a good chance that if we don’t intervene now, we will have to do so at a much higher cost in the future. The risk is huge, given Russia’s nuclear arsenal. In that line of thought, my own Estonia would probably be among the first targets, should a NATO-Russia war break out.

But in moments like this, it is important to have a higher risk tolerance than in times of peace. We are past the diplomatic appeasement period. The Russian Army is not the mighty creature it was portrayed to be and can be defeated. But for that to happen, we must all stand up to it, and support the conditions for the Russian population to stand up and reclaim their country from the dictator. There is no more peace in Europe, and peace elsewhere will also not last if Putin is not stopped now. My heart is broken for Ukraine already. I do not want it to be broken again for Estonia or Latvia, or for Germany and France.

As an international policy student and as a citizen of the free world, I invite all Western decision-makers to ask themselves this: when Ukraine may be in complete rubbles, when a ruthless dictator has gotten his way at the cost of an entire nation and is hungry for more, when the history books are written, will I be able to comfortably say that I did everything I could to prevent it? If the answer is no, then it’s time to get back to work. Long live free Ukraine!

Mikk Raud

Mikk Raud

Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Student, '22
Profile


 

Resources on the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

As the war in Ukraine evolves, the Stanford community is working to provide support and perspectives on the unfolding crisis. Follow the links below to find FSI's resource page of expert analysis from our scholars, and to learn how to get involved with #StandWithUkraine.

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Protestors wave flags in front of San Francisco's Ferry Building against the military coup in Myanmar
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Working from Home While Worrying For Home

About the author: Me Me Khant ’22 was an FSI Global Policy Intern with the The Asia Foundation. She is currently a Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy student at Stanford University.
Working from Home While Worrying For Home
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Statement in Support of Ukraine

We condemn in the strongest terms the unprovoked Russian assault on Ukraine.
Statement in Support of Ukraine
The Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy class of 2023
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Meet the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy Class of 2023

The 2023 class of the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy are finally here on campus and ready to dive into two years of learning, research and policy projects at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
Meet the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy Class of 2023
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Students from the FSI community gather for a teach-in about the Ukraine conflict at the McFaul residence in Palo Alto, CA.
Students from the FSI community gather for a teach-in at the McFaul residence about the conflict unfolding in Ukraine.
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Four students from the FSI community share their thoughts on the conflict in Ukraine, its implications for the world, and the comfort and solidarity they have felt in communing with one another at Stanford.

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For winter quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

                                                                                           

About the Event: Freddy Chen has developed a domestic political theory to explain the consequences of economic shocks for foreign policy. He argues that political leaders have incentives to improve their perceived competence by linking economic grievances to foreign countries. This linkage, in turn, increases public desire for more hawkish foreign policy. Nonetheless, leaders’ ability to make such connections depends on whether they can successfully manipulate information about the culpability for economic shocks. Therefore, the extent to which leaders can control the information environment determines whether an economic shock leads to more aggressive foreign policy. Survey experiments fielded on the American public and a unique sample of U.S. foreign policy analysts show that the information environment shapes elites’ expectations about leaders’ political behavior, public perceptions of leader competence, perceived culpability for the economic shock, and public preferences over foreign policy. Moreover, a cross-national analysis demonstrates that an economic shock tends to increase foreign policy hawkishness if the shock is more foreign-related or if the public has less access to a potential voice of the opposition. This article advances our understanding of the relationship between economic shocks, foreign policy, and public opinion as well as the interactions between domestic politics and international relations, with important implications for both political science research and policymakers.

About the Speaker: Frederick Chen is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and currently a Pre-doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His research focuses on how economics and security can interact to influence international relations, particularly through domestic political mechanisms. His work has appeared in the Journal of Politics and Conflict Management and Peace Science. He received the David A. Lake Award for best paper from the International Political Economy Society. He earned his M.A. in International Relations from Peking University (2016) and B.A. in International Politics from Tsinghua University (2013).

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Frederick R. Chen CISAC
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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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This essay was originally published in Foreign Affairs magazine.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin intensifies his assault on Ukraine, a growing number of U.S. military and foreign policy analysts are voicing concern that China may be emboldened by Russia’s example and try to take Taiwan by force. “If Russia can grab chunks of Ukraine or install a puppet regime and withstand economic sanctions, that could embolden nationalists in China to look to Taiwan and think they could do the same,” Ian Johnson, a China expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, has argued. Representative Michael McCaul, Republican of Texas, made a similar argument in an interview last month, as did retired Army General Jack Keane, who said that Chinese President Xi Jinping sees “weakness in the West and how that can advantage him in terms of his national objectives as well.”

Xi is certainly watching events in Ukraine, but his calculus for whether to use force against Taiwan is shaped primarily by domestic factors, not foreign ones. As I have argued in Foreign Affairs, Chinese leaders are considering “armed reunification” with Taiwan more seriously than at any time in the last 50 years. But Xi will assert Chinese control over the island only if he is confident his military can conduct a successful amphibious invasion and if he believes the timing is right for his own career.


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Shifts in the international environment would be important for Taiwan if they changed Xi’s thinking on either count. But the war in Ukraine has not. Xi’s views about U.S. power and resolve and about the likely international response to an invasion of Taiwan probably remain unchanged. If anything, China’s desire not to invite comparisons with Russia at a time when the world is united against Moscow will lengthen its timeline for taking control of Taiwan, not shorten it.

Too Big to Sanction?

The economic sanctions that the United States, Canada, and many European countries have imposed on Russia give China little reason for pause. To the contrary, these punitive measures simply confirm Beijing’s previous assessments of the possible economic repercussions of using force against Taiwan. Chinese leaders expect the economic costs of an invasion to be heavy but acceptable—partly because of how the international community has responded to Chinese provocations in the past and partly because Beijing’s foreign policy is designed to convince countries to stay out of China’s “internal” affairs, such as the status of Taiwan.

That is not to say the economic measures Washington and its allies have imposed on Russia in recent days are insignificant. The United States and European countries have blocked Russia’s access to most of its foreign currency reserves, making it impossible for Moscow to intervene to prop up its collapsing currency. They have frozen the assets of senior Russian officials, including Putin himself. And they have moved to exclude big Russian banks from SWIFT, the global financial messaging system.

China’s ability to retaliate against the West with economic sanctions of its own is much greater than Russia’s.
Oriana Skylar Mastro

But the United States and its allies could do more to punish Russia. They could bar all transactions with Russia, whether trade or financial. They could seize all Russian assets within their jurisdictions. Washington could announce secondary sanctions on anyone using U.S. dollars for any transaction with Russia. Most important, the United States could use these and other measures to prevent Russia from exporting oil and gas. Letting Russia continue to export oil and gas would be like letting China sell consumer electronics even after it had taken Taiwan by force.

If the United States and its allies have been cautious in their response to Russia, they are likely to be even more restrained when responding to China — and Beijing knows it. China’s ability to retaliate against the West with economic sanctions of its own is much greater than Russia’s. Singapore, which announced trade and banking restrictions against Moscow, trades about $2.5 billion worth of goods with Russia each year — but $57 billion worth of goods with China. China’s leaders likely do not fear U.S.-led economic sanctions in the event of a Taiwan takeover because they probably think that China’s own productive capacity, resources, and friendly partners will allow them to survive on their own, especially since China will soon be the world’s largest economy. They are probably right. China could absorb the types of sanctions being imposed on Russia. And given China’s ability to inflict pain on Western countries, any measures levied against Beijing would likely be softer than those imposed on Moscow.

Taiwan Is Not Ukraine

The Western military response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have an even smaller impact than sanctions on China’s thinking about Taiwan. True, neither the United States nor NATO has deployed troops to fight on Ukraine’s behalf. And U.S. military assistance to Ukraine has been modest: late last month, President Joe Biden instructed the State Department to release up to an additional $350 million worth of weapons from U.S. stocks to Ukraine.

But Russia would have to invade a NATO ally without provoking a U.S. military response for Chinese leaders to seriously question Washington’s commitment to defending Taiwan. Biden has made clear from the beginning of the crisis that his administration will never send troops to Ukraine—a stark contrast with his rhetoric on Taiwan. Just last week, Biden stated unequivocally that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. As a show of support, he also sent to the island a delegation of former U.S. officials led by Mike Mullen, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chinese planners largely assume the United States would intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan.
Oriana Skylar Mastro

In any case, Chinese planners largely assume the United States would intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan. What some of them question is whether the United States could amass enough forces fast enough to blunt a Chinese assault on the island. Ironically, if the United States had launched a military operation in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese leaders would have had further reason to question Washington’s ability to thwart a Chinese assault on Taiwan. The United States does not have the resources to fight the Russians in Europe and prepare adequately for a great-power war in Asia.  

Of course, these facts have not prevented China from trying to manipulate the narrative to undermine Taiwan’s resolve. Chinese state media has been flush with stories about how the United States did not come to Ukraine’s aid and therefore won’t come to Taiwan’s either. Like much of what appears on Chinese state media, however, these stories reflect what Chinese leaders want the world to believe—not what they believe themselves.

Not the Right Time

Chinese leaders are without a doubt considering an attack on Taiwan, but now is not the right time. China’s military is still honing the capabilities it would need to take and hold the island. And Xi is unlikely to take a dangerous gamble on Taiwan before the next Party Congress in late 2022, when he is widely expected to secure a third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi is also working hard to lessen China’s technological dependence on the West, thus minimizing the impact on any further decoupling after a possible war. For all these reasons, an assault on Taiwan before 2025 is unlikely.

If anything, the crisis in Ukraine creates an additional incentive for China to wait. Beijing does not want the world to equate the two scenarios. From China’s perspective, Ukraine is an independent country engaged in a border dispute with Russia. Taiwan, by contrast, “has always been an inalienable part of China’s territory,” as China’s ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Deng Xijun, put it late last month. In other words, linking the two issues would undermine China’s claim to the island.

China also understands that moving against Taiwan now would solidify fears in the West of an axis of autocrats. The United States may not have the resolve to fight a protracted war to defend Taiwan. But suddenly faced with a need to defend freedom and democracy against an authoritarian alliance, Washington could muster a greater military response and convince its allies to do the same. Partly for this reason, China has desperately tried to maintain some semblance of neutrality during the Ukrainian crisis.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has certainly changed aspects of the international order. It has rallied European countries against Russia, prompted Germany to increase defense spending, and even convinced historically neutral countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland to take a stance against Moscow. From China’s perspective, however, nothing Russia or its adversaries have done meaningfully alters the calculus on Taiwan. 

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Oriana Skylar Mastro

Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

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Protesters display placards in front of the Representative Office of the Moscow-Taipei Coordination Commission to protest against Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine on February 25, 2022 in Taipei, Taiwan.
Protesters display placards in front of the Representative Office of the Moscow-Taipei Coordination Commission to protest against Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine on February 25, 2022 in Taipei, Taiwan.
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Russia’s War in Ukraine Doesn’t Presage a Chinese Assault on Taiwan

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Livestream event on March 1, 2022 at 6:30pm PST: "What's Next for Ukraine and Russia?"

This panel discussion will analyze the most recent developments in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and what may lay ahead.

It will be moderated by Francis Fukuyama, director of Stanford’s Ford Dorsey Masters of International Policy Program and Olivier & Nomellini Senior Fellow in International Studies at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), with panelists Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and deputy secretary general of NATO from 2016 to 2019, and Steve Pifer, the William J Perry Fellow at FSI and former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.

 

PANELISTS:

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Rose Gottemoeller

Steven C. Házy Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Steven Pifer

WIlliam J. Perry Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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MODERATOR:

Francis Fukuyama

Francis Fukuyama

Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Full Profile
Francis Fukuyama
Francis Fukuyama

Join via YouTube livesteam

Center for International Security and Cooperation
Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

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William J. Perry Lecturer, Freeman Spogli Institute
Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution
dsg_gottemoeller.jpg

Rose Gottemoeller is the William J. Perry Lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute.

Before joining Stanford Gottemoeller was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019, where she helped to drive forward NATO’s adaptation to new security challenges in Europe and in the fight against terrorism.  Prior to NATO, she served for nearly five years as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, advising the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation and political-military affairs. While Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in 2009 and 2010, she was the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation.

Prior to her government service, she was a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with joint appointments to the Nonproliferation and Russia programs. She served as the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2006 to 2008, and is currently a nonresident fellow in Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program.  

At Stanford, Gottemoeller teaches and mentors students in the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program and the CISAC Honors program; contributes to policy research and outreach activities; and convenes workshops, seminars and other events relating to her areas of expertise, including nuclear security, Russian relations, the NATO alliance, EU cooperation and non-proliferation. 

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Rose Gottemoeller Steven C. Házy Lecturer at CISAC
Steven Pifer WIlliam J. Perry Fellow at CISAC
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Russian forces invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Why is Ukraine strategically important to Russia and the West? What are the broader global implications of this attack? Join Stanford scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies for a discussion of the military invasion of Ukraine and the policy choices facing the United States, NATO, and their allies.

Panelists include Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher Director of the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), Steve Pifer, the William J. Perry Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at CISAC and a former deputy secretary-general of NATO, and Andriy Kohut, Director of the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine and visiting scholar at the Stanford Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

Scott Sagan, co-director of CISAC, senior fellow at FSI, and the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science will moderate.

This event is co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI).

Scott D. Sagan


In-person attendance is limited to Stanford affiliates only.
Attendance by Zoom is open to the public.

Oksenberg Conference Room
Encina Hall, Third Floor, Central
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

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Encina Hall C140
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(650) 736-1820 (650) 724-2996
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Satre Family Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
kathryn_stoner_1_2022_v2.jpg MA, PhD

Kathryn Stoner is the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), and a Senior Fellow at CDDRL and the Center on International Security and Cooperation at FSI. From 2017 to 2021, she served as FSI's Deputy Director. She is Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) at Stanford and she teaches in the Department of Political Science, and in the Program on International Relations, as well as in the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Program. She is also a Senior Fellow (by courtesy) at the Hoover Institution.

Prior to coming to Stanford in 2004, she was on the faculty at Princeton University for nine years, jointly appointed to the Department of Politics and the Princeton School for International and Public Affairs (formerly the Woodrow Wilson School). At Princeton she received the Ralph O. Glendinning Preceptorship awarded to outstanding junior faculty. She also served as a Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and an Assistant Professor of Political Science at McGill University. She has held fellowships at Harvard University as well as the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC. 

In addition to many articles and book chapters on contemporary Russia, she is the author or co-editor of six books: "Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective," written and edited with Michael A. McFaul (Johns Hopkins 2013);  "Autocracy and Democracy in the Post-Communist World," co-edited with Valerie Bunce and Michael A. McFaul (Cambridge, 2010);  "Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia" (Cambridge, 2006); "After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transitions" (Cambridge, 2004), coedited with Michael McFaul; and "Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional" Governance (Princeton, 1997); and "Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order" (Oxford University Press, 2021).

She received a BA (1988) and MA (1989) in Political Science from the University of Toronto, and a PhD in Government from Harvard University (1995). In 2016 she was awarded an honorary doctorate from Iliad State University, Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia.

Download full-resolution headshot; photo credit: Rod Searcey.

Mosbacher Director, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
Professor of Political Science (by courtesy), Stanford University
Senior Fellow (by courtesy), Hoover Institution
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Center for International Security and Cooperation
Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

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William J. Perry Lecturer, Freeman Spogli Institute
Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution
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Rose Gottemoeller is the William J. Perry Lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute.

Before joining Stanford Gottemoeller was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019, where she helped to drive forward NATO’s adaptation to new security challenges in Europe and in the fight against terrorism.  Prior to NATO, she served for nearly five years as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, advising the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation and political-military affairs. While Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in 2009 and 2010, she was the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation.

Prior to her government service, she was a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with joint appointments to the Nonproliferation and Russia programs. She served as the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2006 to 2008, and is currently a nonresident fellow in Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program.  

At Stanford, Gottemoeller teaches and mentors students in the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program and the CISAC Honors program; contributes to policy research and outreach activities; and convenes workshops, seminars and other events relating to her areas of expertise, including nuclear security, Russian relations, the NATO alliance, EU cooperation and non-proliferation. 

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Andriy Kohut
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The faculty and staff of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University condemn in the strongest terms the unprovoked Russian assault on Ukraine.


This attack was not motivated by any legitimate security concerns on the part of Moscow. Rather, it was designed to undermine the current democratically-elected government in Ukraine, and demonstrate the impossibility of democracy anywhere in Russia’s neighborhood. President Putin has stated clearly that he does not believe in Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent, sovereign nation; rather, he believes it is part of a greater Russia. For all the flaws in Ukrainian democracy, the vast majority of Ukrainians cherish their independence and do not want to be absorbed into a kleptocratic dictatorship.

CDDRL has a special relationship with Ukraine. For more than a decade, we have hosted a series of leadership programs that included many, many Ukrainians. These programs include the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program, the Leadership Academy for Development, and the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program. We made these investments in citizens of Ukraine out of a belief that Ukraine constituted the front line in a struggle over democracy globally. There are today about 150 Ukrainian graduates of our different programs, and among them, we have many close friends and colleagues who remain in their country today fighting bravely against Russia’s unprovoked aggression. All of them are in grave danger today. In the coming days and weeks, we will do whatever we can to support them, and can only wish for the best in these very dark times.

We hope that the US government, our NATO allies, and all countries and people who cherish democracy will do their utmost to push back against this Russian aggression, and help to restore an independent, democratic Ukraine.

~ The faculty and staff of CDDRL

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We condemn in the strongest terms the unprovoked Russian assault on Ukraine.

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 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 
 

SEMINAR RECORDING

Virtual only.

Sylvie Kauffmann
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On Wednesday, February 16, at 10:00 a.m. ET, Rep. Stephen F. Lynch, Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, held a virtual virtual hearing to examine Russia’s destabilizing activity in Eastern Europe, including its recent buildup of approximately 130,000 troops along Ukraine’s borders.

The United States has important national security interests in supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as defending the international order that has helped to promote peace and security in Europe since the end of World War II.

While U.S. officials have stated that a Russian invasion of Ukraine could begin “at any time,” President Biden and his Administration remain engaged in an intensive diplomatic effort to support our Ukrainian allies, reassure our NATO partners, and make clear to President Putin that Russia will pay a heavy price for any further aggression against Ukraine.

 

WITNESSES

The Honorable Michael McFaul
Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Director, Transatlantic Security Program
Center for a New American Security

Lieutenant General (ret.) Ben Hodges
Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies
Center for European Policy Analysis

The Honorable Richard Grenell
Former Acting Director of National Intelligence

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On February 16, 2022, FSI Director Michael McFaul testified before the House Comittee on Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security examining Russia’s destabilizing activity in Eastern Europe, including its recent buildup of approximately 130,000 troops along Ukraine’s borders.

Authors
Michael A. McFaul
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