Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation in Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and research fellow at the Hoover Institution, leads a conversation on international security and cooperation.

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Herb Lin, author of “Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons,” fellow at the Hoover Institution and senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, said there are a few possible reasons: the United States has been helping Ukraine strengthen its cyber infrastructure, U.S. cyber offensive forces may have been disrupting Russian attacks against Ukraine, and the Russians may not be capable of conducting such a large-scale attack.

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Putin has made thinly veiled threats about using nuclear weapons against those who interfere with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The logic of nuclear deterrence suggests that it’s never in the interest of a nuclear power to engage in war with another country possessing nuclear weapons, as that would lead to mutually assured destruction. But preventing nuclear war is not the sole goal of any nuclear power. Putin might well believe that a world without Russia in its rightful position of power is not worth existing. We can’t be sure of what Putin is thinking, or whether his decision making is compromised – all we can do is prepare for the possibility of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, writes Herbert Lin.

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On the third day of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin called a meeting with Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces, and Sergei Shoigu, the minister of defense. Seated at the opposite end of an extraordinarily long table, Putin ordered them to “transfer the deterrence forces of the Russian army”—which include its nuclear weapons—“to a special mode of combat duty.” The directive was aired on Russian national television. As Putin made his announcement, both Gerasimov and Shoigu looked surprised and uneasy.

Read the rest at Foreign Affairs

While the United States and NATO have sided squarely with Ukraine, the victim of an unprovoked invasion by Russia, US and NATO officials have also made clear their desire to avoid a direct military clash with Russia. The Kremlin, despite its blustering, also presumably wishes to avoid war with NATO, particularly at a time when some 70 percent of its ground force units are engaged in Ukraine.

A set of rules appears to be tacitly developing that should reduce the prospect of a NATO-Russia conflict, though risks remain where the rules and red lines may not be clear.

Read the rest at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

On February 24, Vladimir Putin launched the Russian military on what he termed a “special military operation,” his euphemism for a massive invasion of Ukraine. Two weeks later, the Russian military has fallen well short of expectations, in large part due to the Ukrainian army’s courage and tenacity.

The fighting could continue for weeks or longer, taking more lives on top of the thousands already lost. The Kremlin has expressed maximalist demands as the price for a cease-fire and did not react positively when Kyiv hinted at some readiness to compromise. The key question: Will Putin agree to a real negotiation, or will he continue to press on with his war of choice?

TWO WEEKS OF WAR

Putin justified the invasion with a host of falsehoods: People in Donbas in eastern Ukraine had “been facing humiliation and genocide;” Russia sought to “denazify Ukraine” as neo-Nazis had seized power in Kyiv; and Ukraine had gone “as far as to aspire to acquire nuclear weapons.” The lie that Kyiv sought nuclear weapons was particularly pernicious; in the 1990s, Ukraine gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, inherited from the Soviet Union, in large part because Russia committed to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and to not use force against it.

The Russian army launched into Ukrainian territory from multiple directions. After two weeks, Russian forces have made progress in the south, occupying Kherson and isolating Mariupol. However, the Russians have had a more difficult time in the north. The Ukrainians repulsed the effort to make a quick grab of Kyiv and fought fiercely in defense of Chernihiv and Kharkiv.

The fighting has taken a large human toll. As of March 9, the United Nations estimated that more than 500 civilians have been killed (likely a vast undercount) and some 2.1 million refugees have fled the country, numbers that grow by the day, particularly as the Russian military conducts indiscriminate artillery and rocket attacks on major cities. The war has also cost Russia. Its Ministry of Defense reported on March 2 that some 500 Russian soldiers had been killed in action. On March 8, the Pentagon estimated, albeit with “low confidence,” that the war had claimed the lives of 2,000 to 4,000 Russians soldiers.

If the Kremlin was surprised by the underperformance of its military and the resolve of the Ukrainians, it was equally surprised by the Western reaction. NATO has deployed thousands of troops to the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. The United States, European Union, Britain, Canada, and others, including Switzerland, Singapore, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, slapped major financial and other sanctions on Russia, including on its central bank. The ruble crashed, and the central bank, anticipating the coming spike in inflation, doubled its key lending rate to 20%. On March 8, President Joe Biden announced that the United States would ban the import of oil, natural gas, and coal from Russia.

Perhaps most shocking to the Kremlin were the changes in Germany, which in one week swept away five decades of policy toward Russia. Berlin suspended the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline; reversed a policy of not supplying arms to conflict zones in order to send weapons to Ukraine; and dramatically raised defense spending. Germany will hit the NATO-agreed goal of 2% of gross domestic product devoted to defense in its next budget (as opposed to years later) and add a one-time plus-up of 100 billion euros for military needs, more than twice what the country spent on defense in 2021.

THE WAR GOING FORWARD

Russian military operations appear aimed at taking much or all of Ukraine east of a line running from Kyiv in the north to Odesa on the Black Sea. Russian ground forces have not yet entered the western third of the country. Russian units in the north appear to be preparing to attack Kyiv.

The Russian military’s operations plan to date has been described by one knowledgeable analyst as “bizarre” and not exploiting Russian advantages. That said, the Russian military, with some 125 battalion tactical groups in Ukraine, has mass and numbers. If mass and numbers determine who will win this war, Russia will prevail.

That raises the question of Putin’s political goal. If the Russians defeat the Ukrainian military and take Kyiv, Putin presumably wants to put in place a pro-Russian government. Sustaining that government, however, would almost certainly require occupation by Russian military and security forces. They would face a population that is angry, nationalistic and, in many cases, armed — and that would resist. Such an occupation could prove a major drain on an economically weakened Russia.

However, wars are about more than numbers. By all appearances, Ukrainians are highly motivated and determined, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has come into his own as a true and inspiring wartime leader. For now, the question of Russia prevailing remains an “if,” not a “when.” If the Ukrainians hold out, one outcome could be stalemate, with continued fighting but neither side able to dislodge the other. If the military costs pile up on the Russian side, the Kremlin retains the option — though Putin would not want to exercise it — of calling it quits and going home, perhaps somehow proclaiming victory.

A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT?

The Kremlin press spokesman on March 7 laid out a set of demands for a halt to Russian military actions: Ukraine should cease military operations, agree to neutrality and put that in its constitution, accept that Crimea is part of Russia, and recognize the independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” in Donbas. Left unspoken, but almost certainly on the list, is a new government in Kyiv and a prior demand for demilitarization.

It is difficult to see the Zelenskyy government accepting these demands, which might buy it only a cease-fire. (If it did, many Ukrainians could well continue the fight.) Still, on March 8, Zelenskyy suggested he might no longer press for NATO membership and was open to “compromise” on Donbas. He said he would not accept ultimatums and called for a real dialogue with Moscow.

The Kremlin gave no positive reaction to Zelenskyy’s comments. Nothing came from a March 10 meeting between Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Turkey. If Moscow showed interest in a true negotiation with Kyiv, the United States and NATO could also renew their offers to negotiate on arms control, risk reduction, and transparency measures that could make a genuine contribution to European security, including Russia’s. The West could also make clear that, if Russian forces left Ukraine, there would be sanctions relief (though the West might retain some sanctions in place to ensure Moscow’s follow-up).

A settlement effort thus could proceed along three tracks: a negotiation between Kyiv and Moscow, a negotiation on measures to enhance Europe’s security, and a discussion of sanctions relief. Yet those tracks can go nowhere absent a change in the Kremlin’s approach.

Will Putin rethink his objectives? On his current course, a military “victory” would appear to entail a years- or decades-long occupation of a hostile, anti-Russian Ukraine, political isolation from most of the world, and economic sanctions that will devastate the Russian economy. One would think there has to be a better option.

Originally for Brookings Order from Chaos Blog

The Pentagon estimates that 600 Russian missiles have been fired at Ukrainian targets in the first 10 days of war alone. Additionally, the infamous abandoned Chernobyl nuclear plant has been seized by Russian forces and, most recently, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station in Enerhodar has been attacked and occupied by armed Russian soldiers. Zaporizhzhia is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and Russian projectiles started a localized fire in an auxiliary building on the site on March 3, 2020.

Russian forces have also cut off the power supply to the Chernobyl reactor and containment site. This means that spent nuclear fuel is not being cooled at the site in accordance to internationally recognized standards. The head of the Chernobyl nuclear plant has said that the back-up generators have enough fuel to power the site for 48 hours. We can only guess what might happen after that. If this were not enough, there is still ongoing shelling at a nuclear research facility in Kharkiv. The current conditions there are unknown.

Despite these chaotic circumstances, the SaveEcoBot team, in coordination with the Ministry of Environmental Protection, has put a lot of effort into radiation monitoring and informing the public about changes in background radiation. We’ve been set back in this critical work by the damages done to our monitoring equipment by Russians, but Ukrainian technicians are restoring the systems as fast as they can.

The assaults on the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia power plants have already had implications for the environment. The radioactive dust raised by the wheels and trucks of the Russian combat vehicles in the Chernobyl zone has raised the background radiation levels to a hundredfold excess of the normal threshold. Just imagine what chaotic attacks, with Russians shooting, firing missiles, and bombing other parts of Ukrainian territory might lead to. In Ukraine, we have a saying, “мавпа з гранатою,” which means, “Like a monkey with a grenade." Russia is playing the monkey to all of Europe.

Russia continues to assert that its forces are in Ukraine for reasons of safety and security. The takeover of Chernobyl disturbed large amounts of radioactive soil, propelling it into the air. The attack on Zaporizhzhia resulted in a fire on the site of an active nuclear plant. This is not what safety looks like. To pretend that these actions are anything but a dangerous disregard for life is an insult to all sane, rational people. We are all very lucky that none of Zaporizhzhia’s six reactors were hit by the tank shell that started that fire.

Russia, the U.S. and the UK committed 20 years ago to ensure Ukraine’s peaceful sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons program. This agreement was built on the idea that Ukraine without nuclear weapons would never have cause to be the target of any attack. This assurance was guaranteed by the signers of the memorandum.

But Russia’s violent attacks have proven that a nuclear threat still exists in Ukraine. It is not a threat of Ukraine’s making, but one engineered by Russia’s own reckless assault on our civilian nuclear facilities. The consequences of this diabolical action go well beyond a potential environmental catastrophe for Ukraine; our neighbors, including Russia itself, and even countries outside of Europe could all be affected by nuclear fallout carried on high-atmosphere winds across continent and over oceans.

One way to mitigate this threat and to realize security assurances to Ukraine is to implement a no-fly zone over Ukraine. The hesitance of the EU and U.S.  to implement a no-fly zone is understandable. But at the same time, it is critically important to develop options and generate models for other types of no-fly zones beyond the proposals being discussed today. Such alternative options could be the key to helping prevent a Ukrainian tragedy not only in terms of nuclear security, but also in averting a similar tragedy to what the world witnessed in Aleppo.

To do this, Ukraine needs more military support. We have gratefully received strong military support from our allies, but even this bounty is not enough to defend our country. Stinger missiles can shoot down small, low-flying aircraft from a fairly short distance, but are useless against ballistic missiles and high-altitude bombers. We need weapons that can shoot down planes at considerable distances and altitudes, systems to detect and shoot down cruise missiles, and planes to protect our airspace. Early Russian attacks targeted our airports to deplete our air defense capabilities and frustrate our ability to get planes in the air. But we still stand. But if we want to avert a second Chernobyl or another Aleppo, we need to strengthen our air defenses.

We learned in 1939 that making concessions to tyrants is no plan for peace. Putin is a bully. Like all bullies, he will take as much as he can get while treating all harm — including environmental harm — as merely incidental. Like all bullies, he will stop only when he meets strong resistance. Putin and the Russia propaganda machine frame all attempts to stymie Russian aggression as not only a provocation, but a provocation that could trigger a nuclear response. Such veiled threats of nuclear attacks are a form of prior restraint meant to constrain Ukraine’s allies from even suggesting that the Russian invasion is improper. But we must not accept this starkly irrational framework. Nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence, not tools to chill diplomatic criticism.

American analysts say that they expect the Russian attacks to become increasingly more brutal. Any increased risks to civilian and military targets commensurately increases risks to nuclear sites as well. And any compromised nuclear facility in Ukraine inherently becomes an international problem, not just a local one. Like Putin, radioactive fallout does not respect borders.

Just ten days ago, my life changed dramatically. I used to be a successful civil leader and entrepreneur with an innovative business. Now I sleep on the floor of an abandoned building with my gun in hand. My daughter knows exactly how the air raid siren sounds. But we are still Ukrainians. We are still Europeans. We still count on our allies. So to our allies, I say: close the Ukrainian sky. Provide us with enough weapons. We will do the rest.

As the tragedy in Ukraine unfolds before the world with each day darker than the next, Russian saber rattling with nuclear weapons is only a part of the nuclear concern. Reported increases in radiation levels at Chernobyl and fires at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe, with six VVER Russian reactors, are in the headlines. In fact, Ukraine has 15 reactors at four nuclear power plants, which provided about half of its electricity. As war spreads, each of these plants is at risk.

Read the rest at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists