Part of the symposium, "For a Better Democracy: Proportional Representation."
This September, President Biden welcomed Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan and President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea for a weekend summit at Camp David. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and tensions between the U.S. and China over trade, militarization, and Taiwan, the meeting was a notable step in ongoing efforts by the U.S. to increase trilateral cooperation amongst its allies in East Asia.
To contextualize the summit and its implications for the U.S.-South Korea-Japan relationship, Gi-Wook Shin, Daniel Sneider, Thomas Fingar, and Oriana Skylar Mastro — scholars at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) — explain the evolution of the relationship and how the summit may impact the dynamic moving forward.
While South Korea and Japan are both long standing partners and allies with the United States, their bilateral relationship with each other has historically been strained.
In an interview with Asia Experts Forum, Gi-Wook Shin, the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) explained:
“Japanese colonialism was instrumental to the formation of Korean national identity. The Korean peninsula is surrounded by big powers such as China, Japan, and Russia. Even today, these influences are still very strong. A sense of threat is still there.”
In particular, issues stemming from the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula between 1910 and 1945 remain a political third rail in both countries. The use of Korean nationals as forced laborers and soldiers in Japanese industry and the Japanese military remains an unresolved legacy, as do demands for the recognition of and restitution for Korean women who were taken into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1930s and 40s.
In 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court passed a series of rulings requiring Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Nippon Steel of Japan to compensate 14 Korean citizens for their unpaid labor. As of yet, neither company has agreed to comply with the ruling. The South Korean government has since announced plans to compensate survivors who were forced to work in Japanese mines and factories during the wartime period, but this remains a unilateral decision on the part of the Yoon administration, not a bilateral position between South Korea and Japan.
These tensions have ripple effects far outside of East Asia. Writing for Toyo Keizai, Daniel Sneider, an FSI Lecturer in International Policy with a focus on Asia, explains the broader geopolitical implications of these issues:
“The Americans have been urging the two countries to settle these problems in order to ease the way to the kind of security cooperation that has become visible in recent months. Joint military exercises for missile defense and other small steps to intensify trilateral coordination are taking place and a resolution of the history of problems may be key to moving ahead.”
The last year has seen increased efforts to restore more functionality to the South Korea-Japan relationship. President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida met briefly on the sidelines of the September 2022 UN General Assembly meeting in New York, which was followed by respective visits of Yoon to Tokyo in March 2023 and Kishida to Seoul two months later in May, the first such visits in over 11 years.
The Camp David summit, which brought the U.S., South Korea, and Japan together as strategic partners, is the latest step on the hoped-for road to institutionalized security cooperation between the three nations.
Speaking to NBC, Shorenstein Fellow Thomas Fingar explained the significance of the weekend.
“The importance of this [summit] is that it was a genuine trilateral meeting, which means the Japanese and the Koreans are talking to one another as opposed to the U.S. dealing separately with each of them.”
In contrast to the idyllic Camp David setting, the three leaders are faced with a weighty set of issues, noted Sneider, including the crisis triggered by the Ukraine war, North Korea’s aggressive posture, as well as growing concerns about China.
Oriana Skylar Mastro, an FSI Center Fellow and an expert on security, conflict resolution, and the Chinese military elaborated further on the mutual pressures South Korea, Japan, and the United States face:
“Since President Biden came into office, he’s really stressed strengthening alliances and partnerships as a way of protecting U.S. interests abroad. I'm sure there has been much work behind the scenes to try to get these two countries to come together. In terms of the timing [of this summit], it's of course partially because of the accumulation of these concerns over China. I think also the war in Ukraine has done a lot to really open up leaders' eyes to the dangers of having neighbors with territorial hopes and claims that also have strong militaries that could potentially be undeterred from using force. I think it's fair to say that this has also pushed these two countries to rethink their own strategies for security.”
The official summit documents outline both a vision of partnership and offer a variety of practical agreements on everything from annual leadership summits to meetings on economic and cyber security, and a proposal for how to move forward with joint military exercises. Notably, the two-paragraph ‘commitment to consult’ on responses to ‘regional challenges, provocations, and threats affecting our collective interests and security’ — while not a fully embodied collective security agreement — is nonetheless a “stunning achievement,” says Daniel Sneider.
Despite agreeing on a hefty laundry list of shared concerns and security goals, the way forward for additional trilateralization between the United States, Japan, and South Korea is not necessarily clear. Oriana Mastro explained:
“Even though they might have shared threat perceptions, there is still a lot of trust that has to happen between nations for them to take coordinated military approaches. If two countries, for example, exercise together — and that's one of the things that the Biden administration is hoping to get out of this summit: more routine trilateral exercises — you get to learn a lot about another country's military, and that only really happens between friends. That’s also true of intel sharing. When you share intelligence, you’re not only sharing information, you're sharing how you get intelligence, which can also be sensitive. So while they've shared these threats for a while, it hasn't really gotten to the level in which they were willing to take risks in terms of the relationship between South Korea and Japan to become closer in the security space in a way that would help them combat these issues together.”
Besides the challenges of international diplomacy, Yoon, Kishida, and Biden also face domestic hurdles that could hinder further cooperation.
In a comment to the Wall Street Journal, Gi-Wook Shin noted that, “Yoon only entered politics a few years ago. If his party loses the election, I don’t know who will stay with him.” Improving South Korea-Japan relations was a major platform of the Yoon campaign, and backlash against his administration could yield disinterest or even renewed hostility toward continuing his efforts.
Daniel Sneider sees similar challenges for Biden and Kishida. Writing in East Asia Forum, he cautioned:
“President Joe Biden is already embroiled in an election campaign that threatens to bring Donald Trump and his isolationist views back to power. The Camp David summit was barely noticed amid the constant flow of domestic political news, though it mostly received welcome praise in the media. . . Imprisoned by domestic politics, the White House will likely be unable to give substance to this emergent partnership.”
In the case of Kishida, the decision to release wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear site, which came just days after the conclusion of the summit, has been particularly counterproductive. Sneider continued:
“Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been waiting for a bump from the Camp David summit. But he is experiencing a deepening slide in opinion polls. The Fukushima release faces opposition within Japan, including from fishermen and others worried about boycotts of Japanese products in China and South Korea. Talk of an early parliamentary election in Japan, intended to consolidate Kishida’s claim to long-term leadership, is now on hold.”
Where is the trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea relationship headed next? Follow FSI scholars to stay informed about the latest developments. Register to receive alerts to your inbox either weekly or monthly.
The trilateral summit between the United States, South Korea, and Japan was an important marker in deepening coordination among the allies, but work still remains to create a solid security partnership.
Since the first edition of Who Shall Live? (1974), over 100,000 students, teachers, physicians, and general readers from more than a dozen fields have found this book to be a reader-friendly, authoritative introduction to economic concepts applied to health and medical care.
Health care is by far the largest industry in the United States. It is three times larger than education and five times as large as national defense. In 2001, Americans spent over 12,500 per person for hospitals, physicians, drugs and other health care services and goods. Other high-income democracies spend one third less, enjoy three more years of life expectancy, and have more equal access to medical care.
In this book, each of the chapters of the original edition is followed by supplementary readings on such subjects as: "Social Determinants of Health: Caveats and Nuances", "The Structure of Medical Education — It's Time for a Change", and "How to Save 1 Trillion Out of Health Care".
The ten years following publication of the 2nd expanded edition in 2011 were arguably more turbulent for US health and health care than any other ten-year period since World War II. They span the implementation of the Affordable Care Act, the deepening opioid epidemic, and the physical, psychological, and socio-economic traumas of the COVID-19 pandemic.
An important new contribution to this book is to describe and analyze the changes in five sections: "The Affordable Care Act and the Uninsured", "Health Care Expenditures", "Health Outcomes", "The COVID-19 Pandemic", and "Health and Politics". This part includes 24 tables and figures.
This book will be welcomed by students, professionals, and life-long learners to gain increased understanding of the relation between health, economics, and social choice.
Health, Economics and Social Choice
This story was updated on September 18, 2023, to reflect the passing of Victor Fuchs.
It is hardly news that America’s health care system is complicated, expensive, and, in many ways, dysfunctional and that the nation’s health care outcomes are falling behind those of other, even sometimes poorer, countries. The problems of rising costs and disparities in access and outcomes were already well established in 1974, when Victor Fuchs, the late Henry J. Kaiser, Jr., Professor of Economics and of Health Research and Policy at Stanford, first published his seminal book Who Shall Live? Health, Economics and Social Choice. In what turned out to be the first edition of the book, Fuchs applied fundamental concepts from economic theory to health and medical care in an innovative manner that hadn't been attempted previously, presenting an economic framework for addressing health and medical care challenges and emphasizing the importance of choice at both individual and societal levels. The publication became a classic introduction to health economics and is recognized for pioneering the field.
Now a third edition of Who Shall Live? has been released by World Scientific Publishing, co-authored by Karen Eggleston, director of Shorenstein APARC’s Asia Health Policy Program. This edition adds supplemental research and an all-new section that focuses on the decade 2012–21, specifically looking at the Affordable Care Act, the COVID-19 pandemic, the intersection of health and politics, and the state of expenditures and outcomes during that period.
Eggleston was honored to be able to work with Fuchs, who had also been a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, but noted that “it was a little depressing to hear him conclude that the pandemic would not be the 'wake-up call’ for systemic reforms that he has spent a lifetime showing the United States needs.” Fuchs passed away peacefully in his longtime home on Stanford’s campus on September 16, 2023. He was 99.
Part of the story of U.S. health care is its poor showing compared to other, often less-affluent nations. Japan is one of the comparison countries in the updated section on the last decade; in one example, Eggleston describes, “between 2012 and 2019 (pre-pandemic), life expectancy at birth did not increase at all in the United States, while it increased 0.18 years per annum in Japan, and 0.16 years per annum across 10 other high-spending OECD countries.” This is despite the fact that “in 2019, Japan spent only 63% of what the United States spends on healthcare (as a share of GDP)… Why can’t we do better for Americans?”
This question is precisely the one that Who Shall Live? aims to answer—that the state of any health care system is a result of “the necessity of choice at both the individual and social levels.” To shrink the costs of health care in the United States and improve outcomes, different choices have to be made—by patients (in their personal lifestyles and behavior), by physicians, by hospitals, and by the U.S. government.
Asia Health Policy Program Director Karen Eggleston has coauthored the new third edition of Victor Fuch's 'Who Shall Live: Health, Economics, and Social Choice,' an authoritative book considering the great health challenges of our time.
In early 2023 Professor Scott Rozelle, SCCEI Co-Director, was asked to participate in a Track Two diplomacy effort between the US and China focusing on the current state of scholarly exchange between the two countries.
There are many ways to build and maintain relationships between nations, the most official way being through track 1 diplomacy, when communication is directly between governments. However, geopolitical climates can make track 1 diplomacy challenging to achieve or even fruitless, if executed, which brings us to Track Two diplomacy. Track Two diplomacy is when people from one country meet with people from another country, in this case scholars from both the US and China, to talk about a specific issue affecting both nations: “Scholarly Exchange between the US and China.” The delegations typically have the blessing of the governments, and often have the ears of government officials after the meetings, but are not made up of government officials or direct government representatives. This encourages more open conversation and genuine camaraderie between the two delegations.
In July 2023, Professor Rozelle joined a group of ten academics from the US, including both professors and think tank professionals, and traveled to China where they met with 12 scholars from China. The group spent three days at Peking University in discussion and went on several site visits around Beijing (to the Foreign Ministry; Xinhua New Agency; American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing; the US Embassy) where they furthered dialogue on the current state of scholarly exchange and how to improve it.
There were several key takeaways from the meetings:
Scholarly exchange is still occurring but at a much lower level compared with 5 to 10 years ago.
Scholarly exchange is suffering collateral damage from the deteriorating US-China relations.
Challenges to scholarly exchange exist within both countries.
Rozelle remarked, “when we [the 10 academics from the US] got together with our academic colleagues from China, we immediately bonded and opened up with a sense of camaraderie, we almost immediately knew we were facing the same challenges on both sides of the Pacific.”
Through discussion, Rozelle documented 15 different issues that are inhibiting research efforts within China, (such as increased privacy laws, shutting off access to public databases, putting strict limits on access to archives, and more,) and 10 things in the US hindering research (such as, not issuing visas to engineering/biomedicine/science Ph.D students and post-docs from China).
The biggest issue both sides face is the perception that scholarly exchange may compromise national security.
A small fraction of scholarly exchange is related to national security issues, the other share of scholarly exchange is much more related to positive outcomes in research, technology, and national growth. A secular decline of scholarly exchange is going to have large negative impacts on growth, equity and happiness in both countries as well as around the world.
Leaders in both countries need to define what types of scholarly exchange concern national security.
What can be done to improve scholarly exchange? Both countries have stated that scholarly exchange is related to national security, which is what has led to the decline (and prohibition, in some cases,) of scholarly exchange.
The challenge is that there has been no definition or clarification given of what types of scholarly exchange are sensitive to this matter. As a result, lower-level bureaucrats both in the United States and in China have taken risk-averse approaches in implementing these efforts by making it difficult to do almost all research. The two groups of scholars almost unanimously agreed that what is urgently needed is for upper-level leaders in the two countries to officially define what specific topic areas are national security concerns, and which are not.
In early October 2023 the delegation from China will join the US delegation in Washington DC to continue the conversation and strategize on how to foster more scholarly exchange between the two nations.
Rozelle is currently working on producing a brief that will seek to demonstrate both the benefits of US-China scholarly exchange as well as the cost of the disruption. Once published, the brief will be part of the overall effort as well as being linked here.
SCCEI Co-Director Scott Rozelle joined a select group of ten academics from the U.S. to participate in a Track Two diplomacy effort between the U.S. and China. Together, they traveled to Beijing where they met with 12 scholars from China to discuss the current state of scholarly exchange between the two countries, as well as strategies to improve it.
The term “deep state” originally referred to the hidden security bureaucracies in countries like Turkey and Egypt with sinister overtones. The term has been applied by American conservatives to the existing permanent US bureaucracy, which they argue is exerting tyrannical control over citizens and needs to be destroyed root and branch. The fact is that the US administrative state is highly transparent and plays a critical role in delivering services and outcomes that citizens demand. Modern government cannot function without a high degree of delegation to bureaucratic agents; as such the US “deep state” needs to be defended and not vilified. There are several critical mechanisms for democratic principals to exert control over bureaucratic agents. While there are instances of bureaucratic over-reach, the US system provides a number of checks on agency power that are under-utilised. A separate problem lies in under-delegation, where political principals write detailed rules constraining bureaucratic autonomy in ways that hinder effective and timely government action. Future efforts by conservatives to undermine the “deep state” will result in grave weakening of American government and return the country to the 19th century patronage system.
This commentary originally appeared in Shukan Toyokeizai.
Military tensions between China and Taiwan rise, and the U.S. government informs the Japanese government that it wants to deploy U.S. forces in Japan to defend Taiwan. At the same time, China sends a message through various channels that it will not touch Japan at all if it does not cooperate with the U.S. military and remains neutral.
In the event of a Taiwan contingency, It is highly likely that military conflict between China and Taiwan will lead to a decision by the U.S. military to intervene, followed by the deployment of fighter jets and naval vessels from U.S. military bases in Japan. In the process, Japan will be forced to make a major choice.
If U.S. forces are deployed to the area around Taiwan, U.S. bases located in Japan, including Okinawa, will serve as bases. Under the so-called “Far East Clause” of Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, U.S. forces can use Japanese facilities and areas “to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” However, the deployment of U.S. forces under the Far East Clause requires prior consultation with the Japanese side. Nevertheless, there is little chance that the Japanese government will turn the US down for fear of a confrontation with China. If Japan were to refuse at the last minute, the trust between Japan and the U.S. would be damaged, and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty regime would effectively collapse. As a result, Japan would have no choice but to confront China alone. This would be a bad move that would only be a temporary fix.
However, some officials from the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are concerned about how the public would react. From China's point of view, this is a point to take advantage of, and by communicating that "Japan will be safe if it declares its neutrality," it may be able to divide Japan, the U.S., and Taiwan.
The phrase "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency" was introduced by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at a symposium sponsored by a Taiwanese think tank in 2006. This comment was followed by the statement, "It is also a contingency for the Japan-U.S. alliance." How will Japanese public opinion react to the "ultimate choice" in the face of a Taiwan contingency?
An interesting study, part of the Stanford Japan Barometer, conducted by Stanford University sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui and his colleagues examined this issue using a method called conjoint experiments.
The subjects were presented with two scenarios: "In the event of an emergency in Taiwan, under what circumstances would you be more likely to support military involvement by the Self-Defense Forces?" The subjects were presented with two scenarios and asked to choose the one in which they would be more likely to support Japan's military involvement.
In the event of a Taiwan contingency, the researchers presented three options in each of five categories: "Chinese actions," "U.S. actions," "Chinese actions toward Japan," "U.S. actions toward Japan," and "international community reaction. In an experiment in which each of more than 7,000 subjects was asked to answer which of two scenarios in which they were randomly combined would support Japan's military involvement in the event of an emergency in Taiwan. The series of scenarios reflect the opinions of security experts who participated in simulations of a Taiwan contingency conducted by various agencies in the United States. The results show whether support for Japan's military involvement strengthened or weakened when each scenario was presented.
One of these scenarios is precisely related to the aforementioned issue. When China promised Japan that it would not touch Japanese territory, including the Senkaku Islands, support for Japan's military involvement weakened. On the other hand, if China landed on and occupied the Senkaku Islands at the same time as its invasion of Taiwan, support for Japan's military involvement increased. The result is clear: "Japanese people place the highest priority on the impact on Japanese territory," said Professor Tsutsui.
The survey results indicate that Japan is hesitant to fight China but would respond to a request from the U.S. military for logistical support. How will Japan be involved in a Taiwan contingency? Public opinion is not yet settled.
In reality, many experts believe that if U.S. forces deployed from bases in Japan clash with Chinese forces, the next request will be for cover by the Self-Defense Forces. It is quite a narrow pass to say that they will not participate in combat and only provide logistical support.
As for why Japan should get involved in a Taiwan contingency, the debate tends to settle on supply chain issues, particularly in the area of semiconductors, or geopolitical importance. Many Japanese, however, may feel that such reasons alone are not sufficient to make a decision to put the lives of Self-Defense Force personnel on the line and the residents of the Nansei Islands at risk.
The supply chains that Japanese firms have built in East Asia, including China, would also be severely damaged. In addition, Chinese nationalism would flare up violently if it were to fight Japan again. The cost of fighting China as a neighbor is extremely high for Japan.
The issue of money is also unavoidable. In order to prepare for contingencies, we must also consider financing the cost of war.
If the armed conflict with China is prolonged, huge fiscal outlays will be required not only for the continuation of the war but also for the repair of domestic infrastructure. In addition to supplementary budgets, it will be necessary to issue government bonds.
However, Japanese financial institutions alone may not be able to digest the Japanese Government Bonds. For this reason, a simulation by the Japan Strategy Research Forum this year called for the direct underwriting of Japanese Government Bonds by the Bank of Japan.
Junichi Kanda, a Bank of Japan alumnus in the House of Representatives who served as finance minister, opposed this proposal, saying, "It would cause a sudden loss of confidence in Japan's finances and the yen, leading to a significant depreciation of the yen to over 300 yen to the dollar and an increase in interest rates to over 10%. Such an extreme depreciation of the yen would also hinder the purchase of equipment and materials in foreign currency.
Instead, Kanda suggested issuing foreign currency-denominated government bonds for foreigners. However, since there has been no such issuance since 1988, it is necessary to gradually issue these bonds from normal times to develop investors, he said.
The prerequisite is that confidence in Japan's finances is secured. Japan needs to maintain fiscal discipline on a regular basis in case of emergency," said Kanda. Even in peacetime, there is a strong argument in Japan for using government bonds as a source of funds for increased defense spending. If the government cannot even raise taxes, China will question its seriousness. More open and substantive discussions are needed if the Japanese people are to be convinced to accept the costs of a Taiwan contingency.
The ultimate choice that must be made.
What would Americans really think about possible reforms to our democracy and electoral processes if they had a chance to weigh the options under good conditions? Researchers James Fishkin, Alice Siu, and Larry Diamond of the Stanford Deliberative Democracy Lab (DDL), in collaboration with Helena and various partners, have just conducted a national Deliberative Poll® to find out.
America in One Room: Democratic Reform is the third installment of America in One Room (A1R), a Deliberative Polling® project designed to explore Americans’ perspectives on some of our country’s most contentious issues, including voter access, non-partisan election administration, protection against election interference, Supreme Court reform, and more. With the 2024 election on the horizon, the findings from this comprehensive deliberative poll have the potential to reshape the discourse surrounding these important topics.
In a joint press release, DDL shared that poll results showed increased movement toward bipartisan support on a set of previously polarizing issues that are already beginning to drive political debates and candidate platforms as we head into Election 2024.
Before deliberations, participants across party lines reported feeling dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in the U.S., with 65% of Democrats, 81% of Republicans, and 72% of participants overall reporting dissatisfaction. However, deliberating together about potential reforms reduced discontent, with the overall percentage of dissatisfaction dropping 18 points to 54%, and party dissatisfaction dropping 11 points for Democrats and 31 points for Republicans.
Across specific democratic reform topics, there were often strong party differences before deliberation. Discourse resulted in significant depolarization and increased cross-party support on several key issues, including voting rights and ballot access.
Below, Fishkin, the director of DDL; Diamond, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at FSI; and Siu, a senior research scholar and the associate director of DDL, reflect on their findings and what the results indicate about the path forward in strengthening American democracy.
Jim Fishkin: In normal times, the issues of how we register to vote, how and when we cast our ballots, and how we can avoid partisan interference in the elections would not be big issues. But we live in a period of fierce partisan division about our elections, and I was gratified to see this affirmation of basic American values about the non-partisan guardrails of democracy. The movement by Republicans on issues like voting rights for felons was large and surprising. The willingness of Democrats to embrace audits with random samples of ballots and paper records of the votes confirmed by the voter (initially Republican positions) also showed the capacity of dialogue to move opinion.
Larry Diamond: One of the biggest takeaways was the consistent majority support for Ranked Choice Voting in all of its different potential applications. After deliberating, majorities of our sample consistently supported the use of RCV for all kinds of elections — local, state, and national, and in both primaries and in general elections. While Republicans were more wary of this reform, up to 45% of Republicans supported some use of it, for example, in local elections, and 43% of Republicans liked the "final four" or "final five" version, as in Alaska, where there is a single non-partisan primary and then the top four finishers contest in a general election using RCV. I was also struck by the openness to some other electoral reform proposals and the strong gains in support for these (including proportional representation) after deliberation. I was not surprised by how far apart Democrats and Republicans remained on the Electoral College — there is an obvious divergence in partisan interest there.
Alice Siu: We can never predict what participants' opinions will be after deliberation. What surprised me the most was the increase in satisfaction with democracy after deliberation. Prior to deliberation, only 27% of participants expressed satisfaction with the current way democracy is working in the US. After deliberation, this percentage increased to 54%. Furthermore, when looking at satisfaction levels by political parties, we found that Republicans' satisfaction increased from 18 to 50% and Democrats increased from 34 to 46%. We have to keep in mind that participants deliberated together for 12 hours over the course of a weekend or a few weekday evenings. Together after engaging in thoughtful and structured deliberation, they developed a greater satisfaction with democracy, just showing that what our society needs are opportunities to talk and listen to each other.
Diamond: Over and over (this is now our third "America in One Room"), we find that ordinary Americans are hungry for thoughtful and civil discussions with their fellow citizens about the issues we face. And it is possible to have these discussions if you set good conditions and ensure that everyone has access to the same body of balanced and objective information, with a fair presentation of the pro and con arguments for each proposal. Americans do narrow their differences when they can deliberate in this way. But more than that — and quite stunning to us — they also became more hopeful about American democracy. The percentage of Americans who say they are satisfied with the way democracy is working in the US increased from 27% before deliberation to 45% after. And satisfaction among Republicans doubled — from 24% to 50%.
Siu: Headlines often lead with how polarized our society is, but what they fail to tell us is that if people had the opportunity to engage with diverse others, people are capable of having respectful conversations. In fact, after deliberation, agreement with the statement 'I respect their point of view though it is different from mine' increased from 57 to 75%. Among Democrats, this percentage increased from 49 to 73%, and among Republicans, this increased from 73 to 84%. The headlines amplify the perceived polarization in our society, but what it misses is how deliberation can bring our society together in a respectful way.
Fishkin: Dialogue across differences can activate the fundamental values of our democracy and show the way for constructive solutions. The increased support for ranked choice voting and for non-partisan redistricting commissions was particularly noteworthy.
Fishkin: This project identifies practical reforms that have a claim on the values and concerns of the American public if they focus on the issues. I think it can be invoked for non-partisan redistricting commissions, for ranked-choice voting in various contexts, for ethics reform of the Supreme Court, and a host of other issues.
Diamond: It may not have much impact on the 2024 presidential election, but it will give momentum to reformers who are working to expand voting rights, ensure a more transparent non-partisan administration of elections, and institute Ranked Choice Voting and related electoral reforms. I think our results show that people can be persuaded, even across party lines, and it points to certain types of reforms that are more broadly appealing than others. As we analyze the transcripts of the discussions, we will also learn what kinds of arguments resonated with voters and which did not.
Siu: One of the striking results from this installment of A1R is people's concerns about voting accessibility. From restoring voting rights to citizens with felony convictions to strengthening federal standards for election machines and requirements for reporting security incidents, we hope that policymakers see the priorities that registered voters have for ensuring that our elections are fair and transparent.
Siu: This installment of A1R, along with the previous A1R Deliberative Polls, have shown that deliberation can, in fact, reduce political and affective polarization. We must all understand that for our society and for any society around the world, listening to each other, whether we agree or disagree, is really not an option.
Diamond: We now have a second major demonstration in the US of the dramatic utility of the Stanford Online Deliberation Platform, developed by Stanford Professor Ashish Goel and his Crowdsourced Democracy Team. This was the second "America in One Room" to deploy this platform very successfully. When people can deliberate online, it cuts costs dramatically, and yet still, it brings about reductions in polarization and constructive changes in public opinion on many issues. Now the challenge is to figure out how we can scale up deliberation to much larger numbers of Americans and apply the tool to a wider range of issues in jurisdictions across the US as well as globally. International demand for the framework and tools of the Deliberative Democracy Lab keeps growing.
Fishkin: With our technology, we have hopes of spreading this kind of dialogue. I was struck that Republicans, Democrats, and Independents all supported fostering deliberation on contentious topics.
"America in One Room: Democratic Reform" polled participants before and after deliberation to gauge their opinions on democratic reform initiatives, including voter access and voting protections, non-partisan election administration, protecting against election interference, Supreme Court reform, and more. The results show many significant changes toward bipartisan agreement, even on the most contentious issues.
Webinar Description:
The Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE) and Stanford Global Studies (SGS) are excited to offer a professional development workshop for community college instructors who wish to internationalize their curriculum. The workshop will feature a talk by Stanford historian Dr. Bertrand Patenaude on the major famines of modern history, the controversies surrounding them, and the reasons that famine persists in our increasingly globalized world. Workshop participants will receive a copy of Dr. Patenaude’s book Bread + Medicine: American Famine Relief in Soviet Russia, 1921–1923 (Hoover Institution Press, 2023). Published in June, the book recounts how medical intervention, including a large-scale vaccination drive, by the American Relief Administration saved millions of lives in Soviet Russia during the famine of 1921–23.
Register at https: http://bit.ly/474cpK2.
Featured Speaker:
Dr. Bertrand M. Patenaude
Dr. Bertrand M. Patenaude teaches history, international relations, and human rights at Stanford, where he is a Lecturer for the International Relations Program, a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and a Faculty Fellow at the Center for Innovation in Global Health (CIGH). Patenaude teaches courses at the Stanford School of Medicine as a Lecturer at the Center for Biomedical Ethics (SCBE). His seminars range across topics such as United Nations peacekeeping, genocide, famine in the modern world, humanitarian aid, and global health.
Via Zoom Webinar. Registration Link: http://bit.ly/474cpK2
This is an English translation of an article originally published by The Asahi Shimbun.
Stanford University Professor of Sociology Kiyoteru Tsutsui is a recipient of the Suntory Prize for Arts and Sciences and the Ishibashi Tanzan Prize for his book Human Rights and the State (Iwanami Shinsho, 2022). Although he has published many works in English, this was his first publication in Japanese. After earning a master's degree at Kyoto University, he moved to the United States. Before Stanford, he served as a professor at the University of Michigan. “I wanted to make a difference in the United States first,” he says. “I had not thought about publishing in Japanese.”
However, since he joined Stanford in 2020 and has undertaken the role of director of the Japan Program at the University's Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Tsutsui has become increasingly aware of the importance of Japanese studies and publishing in Japanese. He recognizes the decline of Japanese studies and the necessity of revitalizing the field and connecting Japan and the United States. Tsutsui is currently the only professor of Japanese studies at APARC. In the 1990s, there were three or four faculty experts in Japanese studies at the center.
With the popularity of Japanese anime, manga, video games, and other forms of Japanese culture, the number of Japanese-language students in the United States is not decreasing," notes Tsutsui. However, “the departure from Japan in the social sciences is severe.” The reason for this, according to Tsutsui, is that area studies are declining, and there is an increasing emphasis on theories and models. “But Chinese studies are growing, and the subjects of German, French, and other area studies maintain interest.” In 2019, a session titled "The Death of Japanese Studies" was held at the North American Association for Asian Studies, attracting much attention.
Tsutsui worries that the declining interest in Japanese studies could negatively impact public opinion and policymaking toward Japan in the United States. For example, during the Japan-U.S. trade friction of the 1980s, the Japan-U.S. relationship was hardly a focus of Japanese studies scholars in the United States.
Tsutsui works to advance U.S.-Japan dialogue, promote Japanese studies research, and clear up misunderstandings about Japanese affairs. Last year, he launched the Stanford Japan Barometer (SJB), a periodic public opinion survey on political, economic, and social issues concerning contemporary Japan — a project he started in hopes of fostering young researchers’ interest in Japan.
“We have already researched gender and policy and the Taiwan contingency and security,” he says. “In the future, we will continue to cover a wide range of topics in Japanese politics, economy, and society, including techno-media, artificial intelligence, Japan’s declining birthrate, and its Constitution.” Unlike a typical public opinion survey, SJB focuses on types of questions that move people’s opinions. Therefore, SJB asks questions on different issues with different assumptions, comparing people’s responses.
In the case of the questions on same-sex marriage, the respondents randomly received one of eight explanations, such as “In Japanese society, it is a tradition to see marriage as a heterosexual relationship” and “In Japanese society, there is a tradition of toleration towards same-sex relationships stemming back from the Sengoku Period.” The study examined the difference between respondents who received no explanation and those provided with arguments supportive of same-sex marriages. “Our results showed that respondents tend to become more supportive of same-sex marriage when presented with an argument that not allowing same-sex marriage is unfair from the point of view of human rights and gender equality,” Tsutsui explains.
“I hope that many young scholars will eventually participate in the project and that it will provide an opportunity for the next generation of outstanding researchers to enter Japanese studies and increase their opportunities to work abroad.”
Professor Kiyoteru Tsutsui, a recipient of the Suntory Prize for Arts and Letters and the Ishibashi Tanzan Prize, is a member of the third cohort of the U.S.-Japan Next Generation Network, an exchange program of policy experts from the United States and Japan launched in 2009 by the Mansfield Foundation in the United States in cooperation with the Japan Foundation. As a participant in the network, he explores the state of Japanese studies in the United States.
