Unnatural Selection: Population Control and the Struggle to Remake Humanity
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Matthew Connelly is an Associate Professor of History at Columbia University. Professor Connelly works in contemporary international history, with a particular focus on North-South relations. He received his BA from Columbia in 1990 and his Ph.D. from Yale in 1997. He has written articles for The American Historical Review, Comparative Studies in Society and History, The International Journal of Middle East Studies, and the Revue française d'Histoire d'Outremer, as well as commentaries on foreign policy for The Atlantic Monthly and The National Interest. His current project is a history of the international campaign to control population growth to be published by Harvard University Press.
This seminar is a special International History event cosponsored by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Department of History.
Lane History Corner
Building 200, Room 307
Matthew Connelly
Associate Professor of History
Speaker
Columbia University
Seminars
Cambridge University Press prints "Political Economy of Power Sector Reform"
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Over the last 15 years the world's largest developing countries have initiated market reforms in their electric power sectors from generation to distribution. This book evaluates the experiences of five of those countries - Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa - as they have shifted from state-dominated systems to schemes allowing for a larger private sector role. As well as having the largest power systems in their regions and among the most rapidly rising consumption of electricity in the world, these countries are the locus of massive financial investment and the effects of their power systems are increasingly felt in world fuel markets. In-depth case studies also reveal important variations in reform efforts. This accessible volume explains the origins of these reform efforts and offers a theory as to why - despite diverse backgrounds - reform efforts in all five countries have stalled in similar ways.
-The first study to cover the big emerging economies of China and India whose development will be crucial to world energy markets
-Comprehensive up-to-date reviews and assessments allow readers to learn easily about diverse reform experiences
-Rigorous case study analysis follows sound political science methods without jargon
Contact Rose Kontak or the publisher for purchase.
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CISAC scholar hosts North Korean delegation
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A delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea visited the San Francisco Bay Area March 1-2. Led by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan, the DPRK delegation stopped here on the way to New York for official discussions with Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, as part of the initial steps for implementing the Six-Party Talks' Joint Statement of September 2005.
While in the Bay Area, the DPRK delegation was hosted by a group led by John W. Lewis, who heads Stanford's Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region and who has visited North Korea many times.
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"The fruits of the victory fall mostly to the North Koreans," says Shorenstein APARC's Daniel Sneider
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The six-party agreement reached last week in Beijing to cap North Korea's nuclear program was a triumph for diplomacy. But contrary to much of the conventional wisdom in recent days, the fruits of the victory fall mostly to the North Koreans.
In the short term, the deal will halt the country's production of nuclear materials, limiting its ability to expand a nuclear arsenal tested in October. But for this concession, the North Koreans get to keep that arsenal intact, at least for now, and stand to make significant economic and political gains in relations with the United States, China and South Korea.
Some critics say the Beijing agreement is a lesser version of "the Agreed Framework" reached in 1994 by the Clinton administration, later cast aside by President Bush. Former Clinton-era Defense Secretary William Perry, speaking Tuesday at the Asia Society, characterized the new agreement as "thin gruel," while backing it as "a small but a very important step forward."
The ultimate judgment will await the uncertain implementation of numerous crucial, but still vaguely defined, steps down the road. The North Koreans are certain to exploit every ambiguity in the text and to drag out the phase that calls for actual dismantlement of their nuclear program and weapons.
Unfortunately, the process that led to this moment suggests that this will not go well. Contrary to the administration's version of events, Pyongyang was not dragged to this deal by pressure -- not from Washington and not from North Korea's angry patrons in Beijing.
"We don't have the North Koreans on the ropes," a former senior U.S. intelligence analyst who has watched that closeted country for decades said. "We don't have them on the run."
On the contrary, there is ample evidence that this agreement is yet another demonstration of North Korea's uniquely successful brand of negotiation via escalation: a use of brinkmanship and willingness to go up to and over the line that converts weakness into leverage.
Against that approach, the Bush administration's preference for using tools of coercion and threat, even of pre-emptive war, failed. If anything, it brought about the very opposite outcome than the United States envisioned: it encouraged North Korea to move even more rapidly to develop and test a nuclear weapon.
The pattern of brinkmanship was already clear during the Clinton years -- what Korea expert Scott Snyder famously termed "negotiating on the edge." When confronted, Snyder noted, the North Koreans typically responded by accelerating the crisis, unworried by the consequences. The fear of appearing weak has underlined all North Korean behavior.
The Bush administration came into office almost seeking a confrontation, as the president and many of his advisers were convinced the 1994 deal was fatally flawed. Ironically, the North Koreans thought they were on the verge of strategic breakthrough, after a deal to halt missile tests and preparations for President Clinton to visit Pyongyang in the final weeks of his administration. An improved relationship with the United States would balance the power of its Chinese patron, whom North Korea deeply distrusts, and give it legitimacy in an ongoing struggle with South Korea for leadership on the Korean peninsula.
Instead Bush froze the Clinton framework and sought a new, tougher approach. In January 2002, Bush delivered his famous State of the Union depiction of North Korea as a member of the "axis of evil," along with Iran and Iraq. That October, U.S. negotiators confronted Pyongyang with accusations of cheating by pursuing a clandestine uranium-enrichment program.
The 1994 agreement collapsed amid a tit-for-tat series of escalatory moves -- beginning with a U.S. cutoff of heavy fuel oil and leading to North Korea ousting international inspectors, withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and restarting its reactor and recycling facility to produce plutonium. Bush vowed that the United States would not "be blackmailed."
Meanwhile, preparations for war in Iraq were mounting. The Bush administration was convinced the awesome display of U.S. power would successfully intimidate the other two points on the axis of evil, North Korea and Iran.
"We are hopeful," then senior State Department official John Bolton dryly said as the invasion came to a close, "that a number of regimes will draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq -- that the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is not in their interest."
American threat
The North Korean officials drew an entirely different conclusion: they could not afford to seem weak in the face of what they perceived as an American threat to terminate their regime.
"Only tremendous military deterrent force powerful enough to decisively beat back an attack supported by ultra-modern weapons can avert a war and protect the security of the country," said an official statement issued April 6. "This is the lesson drawn from the Iraqi war."
A drawn-out process of negotiations began later that month, beginning with a three-way meeting in China and moving that summer to six-party talks that also included South Korea, Japan and Russia. The U.S. position was to deny Pyongyang what it wanted most -- direct talks with Washington -- and to demand verified dismantlement of its nuclear program, on the model of Libya, before any rewards, economic or political, were provided.
As the war in Iraq wore on, and the threat of military force became less credible, the administration looked for other coercive tools. It forged a multinational agreement to intercept suspicious cargoes and launched a crackdown on illicit North Korea trafficking in drugs and counterfeit currency and goods, which are believed to be the main source of support for the regime's elite.
The North Koreans countered with their own demands, offering a plan to freeze their nuclear program, with compensation, followed by a coordinated series of reciprocal steps leading toward eliminating the program. Their offers were accompanied by statements that they already had the bomb and were prepared to test it.
When the Bush administration started its second term in 2005, it attempted to escalate pressure -- this time with charges that North Korea was exporting nuclear materials to the Middle East and calls for China to put pressure on its difficult clients. Pyongyang moved to unload a second set of spent fuel from its reactor and reprocess it -- American experts believe North Korea created six to eight bombs worth of plutonium after 2002.
Agreement sours
A return to the bargaining table in September 2005 yielded an agreement on the principles that would underlie a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. But that sign of progress disappeared within hours as both sides sparred over the meaning of a pledge to build nuclear power reactors for North Korea as compensation for it dismantling its nuclear weapons.
The imposition of measures to curb the flow of North Korean "illicit" money through Chinese and other banks added to the acrimony. Administration officials described this as a legal issue driven by Treasury Department efforts to curb counterfeiting. But as Bush admitted recently, it was used as leverage in the nuclear talks.
Throughout the past year, Bush administration officials expressed confidence that these measures were causing serious pain to the North Korean leadership. Some even talked boldly of "turning out the lights" in Pyongyang through such sanctions.
But Pyongyang could read the news from Iraq as well as any American voter. Instead of having its lights turned out, North Koreans put up their own light shows. On July 4, a date chosen with apparent intent, they carried out a test of a battery of ballistic missiles, in defiance of warnings, including one from China. A U.N. resolution condemning the action -- and other steps, including a South Korean suspension of food and fertilizer aid and Chinese attempts to slow trade -- followed.
In October, again in defiance of pressure from all fronts, the North Koreans tested a nuclear device. This prompted another U.N. resolution, backed by China, to impose limited economic sanctions. But although China was clearly angered, there is little evidence it moved to cut off the lifeline of trade, particularly energy supplies.
North Korea's willingness to cross what everyone believed was a "red line" changed the equation permanently. It allowed Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks, stalled for more than a year, but now from a position of strength. At the meeting in December, the North Koreans refused to discuss any other issues unless the U.S. financial sanctions were removed. North Korean officials hinted of preparations for a second test.
The United States blinked, agreeing to hold long-sought direct talks, held in Berlin in mid-January. The talks yielded the outlines of the Beijing deal but also a separate U.S. concession to lift the financial measures within 30 days of signing a broader deal.
The Beijing agreement more closely resembles North Korea's June 2004 freeze proposal than it does the U.S. insistence that dismantling nuclear weapons precede any substantial rewards. Clearly, this is a deal the Bush administration would not have made, says Scott Snyder, "if it were not tied down with so many other problems."
North Korea made its own concessions in the Beijing agreement. But "it doesn't necessarily mean Pyongyang is backing down or preparing to abandon its nuclear weapons," argues Kim Sung Han, a senior analyst at the South Korean Foreign Ministry's research institute.
N. Korea's rewards
Administration officials point out that the initial freeze of North Korea's nuclear program, to be implemented in two months, yields only minor compensation, about 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. But that is not what Pyongyang sees as its real reward. The lifting of financial measures will facilitate its rapidly growing trade with China and South Korea. Even more important, the South Korean government has already signaled it will now lift the ban on large-scale fertilizer and food shipments -- which are crucial to North Korea's spring planting.
Less visible, but no less vital, the North Koreans are trying to hold off a conservative comeback to power in the South Korean presidential election in December. A North-South summit meeting may take place, which would be part of an effort by the progressive South Korean government to shore up its support.
Ultimately, the Beijing agreement may yield a trade of nuclear facilities for economic and political relations, leaving the nuclear arsenal capped but still intact. For some U.S. experts, that is sufficient.
"It will limit the size of the nuclear arsenal and the amount of bomb fuel," observes former Los Alamos nuclear laboratory director and Stanford scholar Siegfried Hecker. And that, he says, should make it less likely North Korea would sell its nuclear materials or expertise to Iran.
The bargain made in Beijing flows inexorably from North Korea's skillful playing of the escalation game. But it may be the best outcome possible, given that North Korea has already crossed the nuclear threshold and that the Bush administration has squandered U.S. power in the deserts of Iraq.
Reprinted with permission from the San Jose Mercury News.
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U.S.-European Relations After the Iraq War
U.S.-European relations hit a dramatic and highly visible low point in the weeks leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. With the exception of the British government, which was, of course, supportive of the enterprise, many long-time U.S. allies – including, most prominently, France and Germany – were openly hostile to the American action. Relations have recovered, to a degree at least on an official level, but disagreements persist and resentments fester on both sides of the Atlantic four years after the onset of the war.
Is the damage that has been inflicted on the relationship irreparable in some sense? Or, as on so many other occasions since the establishment of the trans-Atlantic partnership at the mid-point of the last century, is the current unpleasantness likely to prove transitory? While the arrows point in both directions, the evidence continues to mount that the tensions so much in evidence between the two sides over the course of the last half-decade or so transcend disputes over particular issues. If this is true – which I believe it is – then our differences over Iraq are a reflection of something much deeper that is underway within the relationship, and not, in and of themselves, the cause – or even a cause – of the problem.
The real issue, it seems to me, is not whether relations between the United States and Europe can be repaired. Within limits, they can and will be. The more interesting – and important – question is whether the very nature of the relationship has changed (and is continuing to change) and if so, how, why, and with what implications for the future?
Renner Institut, Vienna
Coit D. Blacker
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Encina Hall
616 Serra Street, C137
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Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Olivier Nomellini Professor Emeritus in International Studies at the School of Humanities and Sciences
Coit Blacker is a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Olivier Nomellini Professor Emeritus in International Studies at the School of Humanities and Sciences, and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education. He served as director of FSI from 2003 to 2012. From 2005 to 2011, he was co-chair of the International Initiative of the Stanford Challenge, and from 2004 to 2007, served as a member of the Development Committee of the university's Board of Trustees.
During the first Clinton administration, Blacker served as special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and senior director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC). At the NSC, he oversaw the implementation of U.S. policy toward Russia and the New Independent States, while also serving as principal staff assistant to the president and the National Security Advisor on matters relating to the former Soviet Union.
Following his government service, Blacker returned to Stanford to resume his research and teaching. From 1998 to 2003, he also co-directed the Aspen Institute's U.S.-Russia Dialogue, which brought together prominent U.S. and Russian specialists on foreign and defense policy for discussion and review of critical issues in the bilateral relationship. He was a study group member of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission) throughout the commission's tenure.
In 2001, Blacker was the recipient of the Laurence and Naomi Carpenter Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching at Stanford.
Blacker holds an honorary doctorate from the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Far Eastern Studies for his work on U.S.-Russian relations. He is a graduate of Occidental College (A.B., Political Science) and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (M.A., M.A.L.D., and Ph.D).
Blacker's association with Stanford began in 1977, when he was awarded a post-doctoral fellowship by the Arms Control and Disarmament Program, the precursor to the Center for International Security and Cooperation at FSI.
Faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Faculty member at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
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Austrian Institute for International Affairs
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FSI Director Blacker discusses trans-Atlantic relations at Vienna's Renner Institut
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On February 7, in Vienna, FSI Director Coit D. Blacker gave a distinguished scholar lecture on "U.S.-European Relations After the Iraq War." The talk, which was held at the Renner Institut and co-sponsored by the U.S. Embassy, focused on critical relations between Europe and the U.S. that extend beyond the current administration in Washington.
Blacker discussed the noted phenomenon of "anti-Americanism," arguing that the critical relations between Europe and the U.S. transcend relatively narrow disputes with particular administrations in power in Washington. Instead, Blacker argued, European disagreements with American foreign policy stem from the distinctly different origins of political institutions on both sides of the Atlantic. Historical origins and evolutions of European national, European Union, and American political cultures have led to fundamentally differing views of international relations and rationales for foreign intervention missions, and such "institutional anti-Americanism," if understood in its historical dimensions, can lead to productive debates.
Blacker's visit to Vienna was the occasion for several events, including teaching at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and renewing and deepening the Stanford-Austria scholarly exchange program hosted by FSI and the University of Vienna. The Program on Austria and Central Europe is administered at FSI by the Forum on Contemporary Europe. The U.S. Ambassador to Austria, her Excellency Susan McCaw, hosted students from Blacker's classes at the Academy, members of the diplomatic corps, and directors of the FSI Forum on Contemporary Europe, for a reception and dinner in honor of Blacker.
The U.S. Embassy Speakers Program is designed to bring U.S. experts from many different fields to Austria to speak on topics related to the United States. The Renner Institute is a leading political academy in Austria for the study of international affairs.
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2007 Robert G. Wesson Lecture: Caesarism in Democratic Politics - Reflections on Max Weber
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The concept of "caesarism" was of considerable importance to Max Weber and, in reading Weber, one cannot help but be struck by the relevance, to our own historical situation. His arguments about what nowadays, we would call "governance" are anything but theoretical as we encounter caesarist tendencies in contemporary politics.
About the Speaker
Born in 1937, Gerhard Casper grew up in Hamburg, the port city on the Elbe River. Mr. Casper studied law at the universities of Freiburg and Hamburg, where, in 1961, he earned his first law degree. He attended Yale Law School, obtaining his Master of Laws degree in 1962. He then returned to Freiburg, where he received his doctorate in 1964. He has been awarded honorary doctorates, most recently in law from Yale and in philosophy from Uppsala.
In the fall of 1964, Mr. Casper emigrated to the United States, spending two years as Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley. In 1966, he joined the faculty of the University of Chicago Law School, and between 1979 and 1987 served as Dean of the Law School. In 1989, Mr. Casper was appointed Provost of the University of Chicago. He served as President of Stanford University from 1992-2000.
Mr. Casper has written and taught primarily in the fields of constitutional law, constitutional history, comparative law, and jurisprudence. From 1977 to 1991, he was an editor of The Supreme Court Review.
His books include a monograph on legal realism (Berlin, 1967), an empirical study of the Supreme Court's workload (Chicago, 1976, with Richard A. Posner), as well as Separating Power (Cambridge, MA, 1997) concerning the separation of powers practices at the end of the 18th century in the United States. About the Stanford presidency, he wrote Cares of the University (Stanford, CA, 1997). He is also the author of numerous scholarly articles and occasional pieces.
He has been elected to membership in the American Law Institute (1977), the International Academy of Comparative Law, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1980), the Orden Pour le mérite für Wissenschaften und Künste (Order Pour le mérite for the Sciences and Arts) (1993), and the American Philosophical Society (1996).
At present, Mr. Casper serves as a successor trustee of Yale University, a member of the Board of Trustees of the Central European University in Budapest, and a member of the Board of Trustees of the American Academy in Berlin. He is also a member of various additional boards, including the Council of the American Law Institute.
Bechtel Conference Center
Gerhard Casper
FSI
Stanford University
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6060
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gcasper@stanford.edu
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
Peter and Helen Bing Professor in Undergraduate Education, Emeritus
Professor of Law, Emeritus
Gerhard Casper was Stanford University’s ninth president. He is the Peter and Helen Bing Professor, emeritus, a professor of law, emeritus, and a professor of political science (by courtesy), emeritus, and a senior fellow at both FSI and SIEPR. From July 2015 to July 2016, he served as president (ad interim) of the American Academy in Berlin. He has written and taught primarily in the fields of constitutional law, constitutional history, comparative law, and jurisprudence. From 1977 to 1991, he was an editor of The Supreme Court Review.
Casper was the president of Stanford University from 1992 to 2000 and served as director of FSI from September 2012 through June 2013. Before coming to Stanford, he was on the faculty of the University of Chicago Law School (starting in 1966), served as dean of the law school from 1979 to 1987, and served as provost of the University of Chicago from 1989 to 1992. From 1964 to 1966, he was an assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley.
His books include a monograph on legal realism (Berlin, 1967), an empirical study of the workload of the U.S. Supreme Court (Chicago, 1976, with Richard A. Posner), as well as Separating Power (Cambridge, MA, 1997) about practices concerning the separation of powers at the end of the 18th century in the United States. From his experiences as the president of Stanford, he wrote Cares of the University (1997). His most recent book, The Winds of Freedom—Addressing Challenges to the University, was published by Yale University Press in February 2014. He is also the author of numerous scholarly articles and occasional papers.
He has been elected to membership in the American Law Institute (1977), the International Academy of Comparative Law, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1980), the Order pour le mérite for the Sciences and Arts (1993), and the American Philosophical Society (1996). From 2000-2008, he served as a successor trustee of Yale University; from 2007-2014, as a trustee of the Committee for Economic Development; and from 2008-2016, as a trustee of the Terra Foundation for American Art. He is a member of international advisory councils at the Israel Democracy Institute (chairman since 2014), the European University at St. Petersburg, and Koç University, Istanbul.
Born in Germany in 1937, he studied law at the universities of Freiburg and Hamburg; in 1961, he earned his first law degree. He attended Yale Law School, obtaining his Master of Laws degree in 1962, and then returned to Freiburg, where he received his doctorate in 1964. He immigrated to the United States in 1964. He has been awarded honorary doctorates, most recently in law from both Yale University and Bard College, and in philosophy from both Uppsala University and the Central European University.
President Emeritus of Stanford University
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Victor, Cullenward discuss climate change in Boston Review
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In Boston Review's January/February 2007 issue, PESD Director David G. Victor and PESD researcher Danny Cullenward discuss why pursuing technologies that burn coal more cleanly is the "only practical approach" to stopping global warming. Their proposal is part of a larger forum on climate change led by MIT meteorology professor Kerry Emanuel.
Almost every facet of modern life - from driving to the grocery store to turning on a light - relies on inexpensive and abundant fossil fuels. When burned for power, these fuels yield emissions of carbon dioxide that accumulate in the atmosphere. They are the leading cause of global warming.
Assuring ample energy services for a growing world economy while protecting the climate will not be simple. The most critical task will be curtailing emissions from coal; it is the most abundant fossil fuel and stands above the others in its carbon effluent. Strong lobbies protect coal in every country where it is used in abundance, and they will block any strategy for protecting the climate that threatens the industry. The only practical approach is to pursue technologies that burn coal much more cleanly.
Such new technologies exist on the drawing board, but governments and regulators are failing to bring designs into practice with deliberate speed. Instead, most of the policy effort to tackle global warming has focused on creating global institutions, such as the Kyoto Protocol, to entice change. Although noble, these global efforts usually fall hostage to the interests of critical countries. After negotiating the Kyoto treaty, for example, the United States refused to sign when it found that it could not easily comply with the provisions. Australia did the same, and Canada is also poised to withdraw. Nor have treaties like Kyoto crafted a viable framework for engaging developing countries; these countries' share of world emissions is rising quickly, yet they are wary of policies that might crimp economic growth.
Breaking the deadlocks that have appeared in the Kyoto process requires, first and foremost, a serious plan by the United States to control its emissions. The United States has a strong historical responsibility for the greenhouse-gas pollution that has accumulated in the atmosphere, but little has been done at the federal level. (A few states are implementing some policies, and they, along with rising political pressure, might help to catalyze a more aggressive federal approach.) It will be difficult, however, for the United States (and other industrial countries) to sustain much effort in cutting emissions unless its economic competitors in China and the other developing countries make some effort as well. Without a strong policy framework to contain emissions throughout the world, levels of greenhouse-gas pollution will reflect only the vagaries in world energy markets. We need a proper strategy for moving away from harmful emissions.
A few years ago, many analysts thought that market forces were already shifting away from coal. They predicted the growth of natural gas, a fuel prized for its cleanliness and flexibility. That vision was good news for the climate because electricity made from natural gas leads to half of the carbon-dioxide emissions of electricity from coal. But natural-gas prices, which tend to track oil prices, have skyrocketed over the past few years, and, unsurprisingly, the vision for the growth of natural has dimmed. Natural-gas plants, which accounted for more than 90 percent of new plants built in the 1990s, are harder to justify in the boardroom. Most analysts now see a surge in the use of coal. One hundred new coal-fired plants are in the planning stages in the United States. Absent an unlikely plunge in gas prices, coal is here to stay.
Despite the challenges of handling coal responsibly, the potential of research and deployment of advanced technologies to help the United States and the major developing countries find common interest on the climate problem is great. In advanced industrialized countries, the vast majority of coal is burned for electricity in large plants managed by professionals - exactly the setting where such technology is usually best applied. In the United States, for example, coal accounts for more than four fifths of all greenhouse-gas emissions from the electricity sector.
Most of the innovative effort in coal is focused on making plants more efficient. Raising the temperature and pressure of steam to a "supercritical" point can yield improvements in efficiency that, all told, can reduce emissions about 20 to 25 percent. Boosting temperature and pressure still again, to "ultra-supercritical" levels, can deliver another slug of efficiency and lower emissions still further. Encouraging investments in this technology is not difficult: most countries and firms are already searching for gains in efficiency that can cut the cost of fuel; a sizeable fraction of new Chinese plants are supercritical; India is a few steps behind, in part because coal is generally cheaper in that country, but even there the first supercritical unit is expected soon. Across the advanced industrialized world, supercritical is the norm, at least for new plants. A few companies are taking further steps, investing in ultra-supercritical units. Two such plants are going up outside Shanghai, using mainly German technology, evidence that the concept of "technology transfer" is becoming meaningless in the parts of the world economy that are tightly integrated. Markets are spreading the best technologies worldwide where their application makes economic sense. In other countries, technologies to gasify coal - which also promise high efficiency - are also being tested.
But power-plant efficiency alone won't account for the necessary deep cuts in emissions. Already the growth in demand for electricity is outstripping the improvements in power plants such that the need for more plants and fuel is rising ever higher, as are emissions. This is spectacularly true in fast-growing China.
A radical redesign of coal plants will be needed if governments want to limit emissions of carbon dioxide. Here, the future is wide open. One track envisions gasifying the coal and collecting the concentrated wastes. Another would use more familiar technologies and separate carbon dioxide from other gases. All approaches require injecting the pollution underground where it is safe from the atmosphere. This is already done at scale in oil and gas production, where injection is used to pressurize fields and boost output. The consequences of injecting the massive quantities of pollution from power plants, however, are another matter. Regulatory systems are not in place or tested, and public acceptance is unknown.
While these technologies can work, they won't be used widely before they progress on two fronts. First, they must become commercially viable. Despite the huge potential of adopting them, it is striking how little money is being spent on advanced coal technologies. The U.S. government has created some financial incentives to build advanced coal plants, but much of that investment is slated for plants that are not actually designed to sequester CO2. In fact, the uncertainty of American policy gives investors in power plants an incentive to build conventional high-carbon technology, because it is more familiar to regulators and bankers. Worse yet, increased emissions today might actually improve a negotiating position in the future when targets for controlling emissions are ratcheted down from whatever is business as usual. Some private firms, such as BP and Xcel, are putting their own money into carbon-free power - but the totality of the private effort is small compared with the size of the problem. There are good mechanisms in place for encouraging public research and private investment in such technologies; the real shortcoming is in the paucity of the effort.
The second problem is that countries such as China, India, and other key developing nations won't spend the extra money to install carbon-free coal. Yet these countries' share of global coal consumption has soared almost 35 percent over the past ten years.
The inescapable conclusion is that the advanced industrialized countries must create a much larger program to test and apply advanced coal technologies. Electricity from plants with sequestration might eventually cost half more than from plants without the technology. That's not free, but it is affordable and is less than the changes in electric rates that many Americans already experience and accept.
State and federal regulators need to create direct incentives - such as a pool of subsidies - to pay the extra cost until the technology is proven and competitive with conventional alternatives. That subsidy, along with strict limits on emissions, will set a path for cutting the carbon from U.S. electricity without eliminating a future for coal. They must also extend the same incentives to the major developing countries, which have no interest in paying higher rates for electricity because their priorities do not rest on controlling CO2. Yet these countries' involvement now is essential. Averting emissions has a global benefit regardless of where the emissions are controlled. And developing countries are especially unlikely to shoulder more of the burden themselves, in the more distant future, unless they are first familiar with the technologies.
Solving the climate problem will be one of the hardest problems for societies to address - it entails complicated and uncertain choices with real costs today, and benefits in the distant future. Yet the stakes are high and the consequences of indecision severe. Serious action must contend with existing political constituencies and aim at existing resources that are most abundant. The technologies needed to make coal viable will not appear automatically. An active policy effort - pursued worldwide and initially financed by the industrialized world - is essential.
Originally published in the January/February 2007 issue of Boston Review.
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Return to Southeast Asia, Lame Duck President Finding a Quiet Pond
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The 14th Informal APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting concluded on Nov. 19, 2006, and the participants had their photo taken in colorful Vietnamese traditional costumes called ao dai. Still in the shadow of the congressional election failure, President George W. Bush, realizing that a stable Asia is very important for the U.S. geostrategy, took advantage of the occasion to enhance the prestige of the United States. Just as American experts said, the Bush administration has probably become a lame duck now, but even a healthy duck needs to find a quiet pond.
"APEC's uniquely trans-Pacific character is an important political reason for U.S. to strengthen the group," Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum of Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University, explained. "While APEC has lagged, East Asian regionalism has boomed. That has been good for East Asia. But U.S. and East Asian interests alike could be hurt if the Pacific Ocean ends up being split between rival Chinese and American spheres of influence."
However, the U.S. effort to save the Doha Round of trade talks with the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement has yielded little. The Doha Round aimed to remove trade barriers in the world but was suspended due to some countries' agriculture protection policies. Washington had wanted to model the Doha Round upon the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement. But U.S. officials never expected that there would be so many differences among the Asia-Pacific leaders, and that the economic development of Pacific Rim countries differ in thousands of ways. Despite the fact that the Hanoi Statement reiterated that supporting the Doha Round was APEC's priority, no material progress has been made.
"The U.S. is urging a last ditch effort to restart the talks through APEC," Professor Charles Morrison, president of the East-West Center located in Hawaii, says. "Whether or not APEC can do more than make a rhetorical statement of support is unsure. I feel that the APEC economies should agree to prepare new offers within a short period of time -- three weeks, for example -- to challenge the Europeans, Brazilians, Indians and others."
United States Steps Out to "Please" ASEAN
Seventeen years after its establishment, APEC now plays a decisive role in the international political arena. It has 40 percent of the world's population, 48 percent of the world trade volume and 56 percent of the world GDP. Since 1989, the economy in this region has grown by 26 percent, compared to only 8 percent economic growth rate in the rest of the world. With the double advantage of economic strength and rapid growth, China, being one of APEC's main economies and its "engine," has fully taken the limelight. On the other hand, the United States has been weighed down with countering terrorism in the Middle East.
"China has done very well in enhancing its relations with Southeast Asia in recent years," Sheldon Simon, professor of the Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Arizona State University, points out. "China has not only established a free trade forum for China and ASEAN countries, but also helped and influenced the area with its economy and culture. But I think that the United States has realized the importance of this area and come back to fasten its friendly relationship with the region."
The United States coming back to Southeast Asia and repairing its relations with the ASEAN countries is partly activated by China's increasing influence in the area.
"The naissance and growth of some democratic countries in Southeast Asia has received sympathetic response of democratic values from Washington," said Simon. "With the traditional friendly relations between the area and the United States, these countries value their friendship with the United States sometimes more than the trust in their neighboring countries. Geopolitics is also very important factor. The Asia-Pacific area is a very important to the world economy and the U.S. power structure. Therefore, the United States will not easily give it up."
Another motive for the United States to foster closer relations in the area is the common interest of countering terrorism. There are still some terrorist groups in Indonesia, the Philippines and southern Thailand.
"President Bush has a perfect attendance record at APEC meetings (Clinton missed two of them), which says that he does take APEC seriously and believes Asia is important to U.S. interests," Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an interview with the Washington Observer Weekly.
Besides attending the APEC summit meetings annually, Washington has recently activated several plans to "please" the ASEAN countries, including setting up a ministerial dialogue system with them and a platform for maintaining contact at the deputy finance minister level, even increased exchanges at the deputy defense secretary level.
The extent of U.S. efforts to foster cordial relations with Southeast Asian countries can also be seen in the increasingly friendly U.S.-Vietnamese economic and trade relations. The Bush administration is not only supporting Vietnam to enter the WTO, but has even proposed giving Vietnam Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status.
"The reason that Bush failed to bring the gift of PNTR status to the APEC Hanoi summit is that the Congress dominated by the Republicans was lacking efficiency and could not pass the proposal in time," Simon explained. "But I think that it will be passed as soon as possible in the next month or by the Democrats who begin to dominate the Congress from next January."
Simon and Cossa both admit that Burma is an unharmonious element in U.S. relations with ASEAN. The Burmese dictatorial military government is really the most typical negative example of democracy for the United States. But ASEAN countries are reluctant to see Burma "punished" by the United States for ideological reasons. So Burma has become a sensitive issue in U.S.-ASEAN relations.
"This is a good way for him to interact with ASEAN since Myanmar is not there and this issue does not have to be addressed," said Cossa.
Simon, an expert of Southeast Asia affairs, points out ASEAN countries should be happy about the advantage they have with China and the United States vying for their attention. Being able to juggle the two big powers, Southeast Asia has gained many practical interests and financial aid for its economy, trade, security, culture and education.
"In a short period, there will not be any serious interest conflicts in the triangle balance of China, the United States and ASEAN," Simon told the Washington Observer Weekly. "ASEAN countries' only worry, if there is any, is an accidental spark in the U.S.-China military interaction in Southeast Asia such as the confrontation across the Taiwan Straits."
Turning the Asia-Pacific into a "Gigantic Enterprise?"
"The United States wants to demonstrate its continuing interest in the Asia-Pacific region. It is urging for a study of an Asia Pacific free trade area and support for an APEC business card, and both shifts of approach, illustrate its interest in and support for the APEC process," said Morrison.
An important subject for the APEC Hanoi summit is the "active discussion" of establishing an APEC free trade region. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton proposed for the first time in 1993 the setting up of such an economic zone. Before Bush's visit, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan Bhatia suggested that establishing an APEC free trade zone would be a subject worth serious discussion. But his proposal did not receive a warm response from the host. The Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung stressed that establishing a free trade zone is a long-term objective and will not affect progress of negotiations with the WTO or other bilateral trade agreements.
"Regarding the study of the Asia Pacific free trade area, a number of economies were skeptical because it would be such a large undertaking," said Morrison. A similar plan was once axed in an APEC ministerial statement and the leaders attending this summit do not seem to have much interest in it.
Simon explained Bush's thinking on the subject: "Washington reiterated its intention to establish an Asia-Pacific free trade zone in order to save the precarious WTO Doha Round. Breaking the tariff barriers in the Asia-Pacific region will help continue to press relevant countries to concede in granting agricultural tax subsidies and hopefully open the door to the Doha Round."
The five-year Doha Round was suspended in July this year because six major WTO members -- the United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, Brazil and India -- failed to reach agreement on market access for agricultural and non-agricultural products. Given the situation, the organizer said that the informal APEC economic leaders' meeting would provide a "good opportunity" to help restore the Doha Round talks. However, the Hanoi summit joint declaration just vaguely indicated that APEC will pursue further integration on issues such as energy in 2007. It would be extremely optimistic to expect that APEC will be able to remove all the tariff barriers in the region before 2010. Although the area produces 50 percent of the world's economic value, the styles and stages of economic development, the cultural backgrounds and political systems of the countries in the region vary a great deal, making it very difficult for these Asian countries to eliminate all these discrepancies and become fully integrated.
"Out of different worries, many Southeast Asian countries are actually not interested in the proposal though they do not speak out. Or we may say that it's not time yet now to change the Asia-Pacific region into a gigantic enterprise," Simon told Washington Observer Weekly.
Quite apart from who concedes what in return for what concession over the APEC free trade mechanism, the question arises: What geographical scope should a regional trade arrangement have? Who should be a party to the agreement and who should not?
There would appear to be three different ideas on the table: (a) the APEC-wide free trade area that the United States proposed at the recent summit in Hanoi; (b) the East Asia Summit-wide framework that Japan reportedly favors, which would include ASEAN + 6 (China, Japan, South Korea, India, New Zealand, Australia) but not the United States; and (c) the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea) context that China seems to prefer, in which the exact positions of Tokyo and Beijing are not entirely clear.
"Without discussing the merits or demerits of each of these arrangements, suffice it to note that since ASEAN is common to all of them, the net effect of these alternative ideas is to strengthen the negotiating position of ASEAN," said Emmerson. "Then again, ASEAN will not necessarily be unified as to its preference for the three proposals. It will be interesting to look for the positions to be taken by individual ASEAN countries and for their collective effort to arrive at a single negotiating position, e.g., in the run-up to the ASEAN summit and the second the East Asia Summit in the Philippines next month."
Cossa has hope for 2007. "The U.S. in particular would like to see APEC moving faster, and will look ahead to next year, with Australia in the chair, for some real progress."
American Public Doesn't Share Washington's Interest in Southeast Asia
The prospect of economic and strategic cooperation brought about by APEC made for a lively week in Southeast Asia. But it stirred little response in the United States. According to the interviewed experts of Southeast affairs, the American public is still haunted by the situation in Iraq and the mid-term election. Even the U.S. media framed the event as Bush's first visit to a foreign country since the Republicans were defeated in the mid-term election.
"Because of the Congressional election, President Bush will want to show leadership rather than simply respond to the new Congress. Both Doha and the nuclear proliferation issue are examples," said Morrison.
Cossa holds a different view: "I don't think the elections will have any major impact on what Bush does or how he does it during this trip. Iraq is his legacy. What he does in Asia can make things better or worse at the margins but will likely be overshadowed by Iraq."
Simon echoed the sentiment. "On one hand, the Republican Party's defeat in the election cannot directly influence Bush's trip to Asia. On the other hand, Bush's economic achievements in the Southeast region will not add to his political record. In Asia, only the North Korea issue may sway the public opinion in the United States."
Yan Li, Washington Observer weekly - Issue No. 201, November 22, 2006
Reprinted by Permission February 12, 2007.
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