The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) is pleased to announce that Or Rabinowitz will come to Stanford for the 2022-23 academic year as part of the institute’s new Visiting Fellowship in Israel Studies. Dr. Rabinowitz is currently a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

During her time at Stanford as a visiting fellow in Israel Studies, Dr. Rabinowitz will teach a one quarter long undergraduate course on “Israel: National Security and Nuclear Policy.” She will also organize and run an international workshop on “Deterrence and Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East” in the spring or summer quarters of 2023, and engage with Stanford pre- and postdoctoral fellows and FSI faculty.

Dr. Rabinowitz’s appointment will be based at FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

“Or Rabinowitz is one of Israel’s finest scholars writing about nuclear proliferation, deterrence, and national security policy,” said Scott Sagan, co-director of CISAC.  “Stanford is really fortunate to be able to bring her to campus for a year under this program.”

Dr. Rabinowitz’s current research lies at the intersection of nuclear and intelligence studies, with a focus on Israel’s nuclear program and the role of science and technology in its national security doctrine. Her book, “Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and its Cold War Deals” was published in April 2014 by Oxford University Press, and she has since published articles in International Security, Journal of Strategic Studies, The International History Review and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, among others.

She holds a PhD degree from the War Studies Department of King’s College London, an MA degree in Security Studies and an LLB degree in Law, both from Tel-Aviv University. She is currently conducting a study on intelligence collaboration between allies in the realm of counter-proliferation operations, funded by the Israel Science Foundation.

“I am honored to be joining Stanford this coming academic year, and to share my knowledge about Israel with Stanford’s undergraduates,” said Dr. Rabinowitz. “CISAC is a global leader when it comes to producing new knowledge and insight about the challenges of nuclear proliferation, and being chosen as an Israel Studies Fellow is a true privilege.”

Dr. Rabinowitz’s many awards and honors include being named an Israeli Chevening Scholar by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and receiving The Scouloudi Award from the Institute of Historical Research, University of London. In 2018 she also won the Professor Ya’acov Barsimantov Best Article Award from the Israeli Association for International Studies.

The Visiting Fellowship in Israel Studies was launched in September 2021 with the generous support of Stanford alumni and donors. The search committee included senior fellows from throughout the institute. In addition to bringing to Dr. Rabinowitz to Stanford, the committee selected Dr. Amichai Magen, a scholar of law, government and international relations, as the inaugural Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies. Dr. Magen will also arrive at Stanford in the 2022-2023 academic year.

Following an impromptu video shoot of the audience and brief introduction, Dr. Fukuyama turned the time over to FSI Director Michael McFaul, who delivered the keynote remarks to the graduating class.

Dr. McFaul reflected on the unique journey the 2022 class, from beginning with Zoom classes and remote learning to finally reconvening in-person for projects like the Policy Change Studio capstones and events like former president Barack Obama’s visit to FSI in April 2022.

“You all look better in three dimensions compared to two dimensions,” McFaul assured everyone. He went on to share four lessons he hopes will resonate with the newest FSI alumni:

1. Do Something, Don’t Be Something

The first lesson Dr. McFaul imparted to the graduates was to frame their goals and careers in terms of actions, not titles.

“Don’t think of your career as a place to be,” he said. “Think of your career as an action verb. Figure out what you want to do, then fit the jobs, the companies, and future degrees around those action verbs, not the other way around.” He stressed that any particular job title matters much less than a commitment to a mission, a set of values, or clear, concrete policy things you want to do.

2. Embrace both Uncertainty and Rejection

Speaking from his personal experience, Dr. McFaul shared how his first career plan following his DPhil degree from Oxford ended as a complete bust. As a fresh, young academic, he applied to 22 jobs, and was rejected from all of them. But while his immediate plans may have stalled, the rejections gave him a front row seat to the 1990-91 protests in Moscow, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the burgeoning calls for democratic change in Russia, all which altered the course of his academic, professional, and political life.

“From uncertainty can come opportunity, and from setbacks can come second — and dare I say, better  — chances,” he reminded the graduates.

3. Continue to Invest in Connections

McFaul’s third piece of advice was a cautionary story of what not to do. “After my time at Stanford and Oxford, I didn’t invest time in maintaining friendships, and I regret that,” he candidly told the audience.

He stressed that these connections are not only for the purpose of networking and professional development, though those kinds of connections can lead to instrumental things. But more importantly, McFaul advised the students to develop and nurture relationships with fantastic, interesting people for the sake of allowing those connections to enrich and deepen the well-being and richness of their lives.

4. Keep in Touch with Stanford

Looking across the crowd, Dr. McFaul said, “Most of you are second years. Some of you are fifth years. I am a forty-first year student here at Stanford. I really love learning, and there’s no better place to learn than Stanford.”

He urged the graduates to remain active and invested in the community they have been a part of the last two years. “You have access to some of the most talented professors in the world. Use it! Don’t forget about it,” counseled McFaul.

On to the Future

Building on Dr. McFaul’s remarks, Soomin Jun, the student speaker at the diploma ceremony, asked her fellow classmates to look to the future with a determination to stand up for values and rights, and to not lose the compassion and empathy that have bonded them together as a cohort.

“Let’s not forget to humble ourselves and do good for those next to us and in our communities,” she said. Jun continued, “Let’s not forget that we are far more capable of achieving anything beyond anyone’s imagination. Voice up and stand up for your values and ideas.”

As the 2022 class moves on from their time as MIP students at FSI, five will be staying at Stanford to pursue further studies in political science, environment and resources, public policy, and journalism. Others will remain in the greater Bay Area working on technology policy, energy policy, digital privacy, and statistical programming. Others are heading from the West Coast to the East to work in government, international development, and policy analysis, while four of the class members will be continuing their military careers in Texas, Washington State, Kentucky, and Kosovo.

Wherever they’re bound, the Master’s of International Policy Class of 2022 will not soon be forgotten.

“This class is special to me,” Michael McFaul said. “We here at FSI and MIP have tried to lean into you, and you have repeatedly shown that you are a special class and special group of people together at a special time, and we all feel bonded with you.”

In 2010, the world was introduced to Stuxnet, a sophisticated malware developed by Israel and the United States that successfully targeted and damaged the Iranian uranium enrichment plant in Natanz. Named “the world's first digital weapon,” Stuxnet changed the way the global security and cybersecurity communities—in government, academia, and industry—perceived the range of cyber threats and types of damage that offensive cyber capabilities can deliver.   

While the offensive cyber capabilities of both Iran and Israel have evolved significantly over the past decade, one thing about the Iran-Israel cyber conflict remained consistent: its covert characteristics. 

Read the rest at The National Interest

The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) is pleased to announce that Amichai Magen has been selected as the inaugural Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies. Dr. Magen is currently the head of the MA program in Diplomacy and Conflict Studies, and director of the Program on Democratic Resilience & Development at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy at Reichman University, in Herzliya, Israel.

As a Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies, Dr. Magen will teach courses on Israeli politics, society, and policy, and also on his recent research regarding liberal orders, governance in areas of limited statehood, and political violence. In addition, he will help guide FSI programming related to Israel, advise and engage Stanford students and faculty.

An alumnus of Stanford Law School, where he obtained his JSD in 2008, he has also been a pre-doctoral scholar at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution.

“I’ve had the pleasure of publishing a book with Amichai before, and can attest that he’s a first-rate scholar and academic,” said FSI Director Michael McFaul. “I recall a conversation between us when Amichai was a pre-doctoral fellow at CDDRL, and I told him that once you arrive at Stanford you spend the rest of your life trying to make it back here. I’m delighted that time will come soon.”

The son of refugees from Nazi Germany and Soviet-occupied Latvia, Dr. Magen's scholarship addresses the constitutive elements, vulnerabilities, and evolution of modern liberal political and legal orders – notably statehood, democracy, the rule of law, and regionalism – as well as Israel's place in such orders.

Dr. Magen’s current research examines limited statehood, governance failures, and political violence in the international system, and his book on the subject is forthcoming from Stanford University Press. During his time at Stanford, Dr. Magen will be based at FSI’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

“I am thrilled that CDDRL will have the opportunity to host and welcome back Dr. Amichai Magen,” said Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher Director of Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. “He was an outstanding contributor to the Center in its earliest days, and I know that he will be an outstanding inaugural Israel Fellow. I look forward to working with him again.”

In addition to his academic duties, Dr. Magen has also served on the executive committee of the World Jewish Congress, and is a board member of the International Coalition for Democratic Renewal, the Israel Council on Foreign Relations, and the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration. He regularly briefs diplomats, journalists, and academics from around the world on Israeli political, constitutional, and geopolitical affairs.

“I am delighted to return to Stanford and engage with the many talented faculty and students on this unique campus,” said Dr. Magen. “FSI was my intellectual home as a graduate student at Stanford, and a model academic community that has shaped my subsequent career as a researcher and teacher. This is a real homecoming moment for me, and I am deeply grateful to be granted the opportunity to be a part of this wonderful community once again.”

The Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies program was launched in September 2021 with the generous support of Stanford alumni and donors. The search committee was led by Larry Diamond, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at FSI, and included other senior fellows from throughout the institute.

“In developing and anchoring the program over the next three years, Amichai Magen will bring a brilliant scholarly mind, a great love of teaching, and broad expertise on Israeli politics, society, public policy, and regional relations,” said Diamond. “In addition, he will contribute greatly to the research work of CDDRL with his expertise on governance crises, limited statehood, and challenges to the liberal international order.”

In addition to Dr. Magen, the Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies program plans to bring a second Israeli visiting fellow to teach and conduct research during the next academic year. Media inquiries about the program can be directed to Ari Chasnoff, FSI’s associate director for communications.

[This article originally appeared in Orient XII.]

Political observers have voiced contrasting opinions about the peace treaty between Israel and the Arab Emirates. Some have seen it as a monumental betrayal, others as an historic breakthrough. Actually, the treaty changes nothing in the Middle East political equation, nor does it attenuate in any way the tragic disregard for the rights of the Palestinians which we have witnessed for so many years now. It is simply a strategic arrangement which has short-term advantages for the United Arab Emirates, Israel and the United States but addresses none of the basic issues.

First of all, this peace treaty cannot be regarded as an historic betrayal of Arab positions. The UAE have been working for years to normalize their relations with Israel. The two countries have established high-level contacts in capitals all over the world and have made it known to the international community by organizing their own leaks: they have also sent signals to Western and Arab public opinion. In recent months, the UAE conveyed humanitarian aid to Palestine via the Ben Gurion airport, in co-ordination with Israeli authorities rather than with their Palestinian counterparts. The peace treaty is a normal, organic stage of this process. True, from a legal point of view, it is a decision which goes counter to the Arab peace initiative of 2002. But this latter had already been abandoned just as the Arab League’s sponsorship which went along with it had already been discredited.

At the same, brutal as it may seem, this agreement does not constitute a betrayal of the Palestinians. Their rights have already been sacrificed in the face of Israel’s determination to destroy any prospect of a Palestinian State by laying siege to the Gaza Strip and by gradually annexing the West Bank. The Palestinians have understood that in the Gulf, only Kuwait and Qatar are determined to reject any US sponsored “deal of the century” unless those Israeli policies are abandoned. Though the peace treaty does contain a clause theoretically putting an end to that territorial colonization. It only stops the annexation legally and formally while backing de facto the pursuance of the illegal colonization process.

Nor is the peace treaty an historic breakthrough. The Palestinian struggle has lost much of its political importance in the eyes of the Arab masses during the last three decades. And though it is still capable of sparking an emotional response and remains apolitical issue for Arab public opinion, it generates much less solidarity that it used to do.

DECLINE OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE

This decline has taken place in several stages. The first phase began with the Oslo peace process, which obliged the Palestinians to renounce many of their rights in exchange for the vague promise of a future state, meant to be the fruition of a peace process negotiated under the auspices of the international community. The second phase began with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. By destroying a traditional Arab power, the United States opened the way for Iranian expansion, the new disruptive element in the geopolitics of the region. In the years that followed, Iran considerably extended its strategic power in the Middle East.

Iranian military expansion climaxed in 2013 with the battle of Al-Qusayr in Syria. Before the Syrian civil war began, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, both members of the Sunni axis in the region, faced off against Iran in low intensity clashes in the Gulf area. Al-Qusayr inaugurated a new era in which Iranian military forces could operate openly in Arab countries and provide support for regimes that are their allies. Not only Syria and Iraq, but also Lebanon and Yemen have become arenas of confrontation, fueled as much by sectarian hyperbole as by the principles of realpolitik.

The Sunni Arab states, which form the so-called “moderate” axis in the Middle East, regard such non-governmental actors as Hezbollah, the Houthi movement in Yemen and the militias of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq as auxiliaries in the Iranian war effort. In this context, the containment of Iran comes before the defense of the Palestinians.

The third event which has relegated the Palestinians to the sidelines of regional geopolitics was the Arab Spring. This foregrounded the issues of democratic emancipation and the overthrow of authoritarianism in many countries. The uprisings showed the extent to which the major ideologies of the past, pan-Arabism or its successor, Islamism, had lost much of their emotional appeal with Arab public opinion. Thus, the Palestinian cause became less visible, except in countries hosting large numbers of Palestinian refugees, like Lebanon and Jordan.

Yet while the Palestinians no longer figure high on the foreign policy agenda of most Arab states, the Arab world is certainly not about to plunge headlong into a collective normalization of relations with Israel. The big Arab countries would be likely to meet with strong public resistance. On the other hand, Bahrain, Oman and Mauritania are prepared to follow in the footsteps of the Emirates, and a modest “bandwagon” effect is not out of the question: other Arab countries could become involved in asymmetric exchanges with Israel in order not to be left out of any future settlement and to stay in the good graces of the USA. Short of complete diplomatic recognition, these steps might include the opening of liaison offices and the authorization of bilateral tourism.

For all these reasons, the peace treaty represents neither a tragic betrayal nor an historic breakthrough. From a strategic point of view, it is a calculated move meant only to offer short-term advantages to the three parties concerned.

THE UAE AND THE PRESERVATION OF A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

From the UAE viewpoint, the treaty allows them to stand firm at a time when the Arab counter-revolution is in difficulty and imperils their reputation. Since the Arab Spring, the Emirates, along with Saudi Arabia, are at the forefront of the region’s countries which regard the propagation of democratic uprisings in the Middle East as an existential threat. The UAE are the leader of this counter-revolutionary front which advocates a Middle East of stable authoritarian regimes in which their petroleum resources guarantee them a decisive influence. According to this world view, electoral Islamism and political liberalism are two sides of the same coin; both represent radical changes which endanger the internal legitimacy of these regimes. It was the UAE that launched the counter-revolutionary battle and they cannot afford to lose it.

Recently, however, they have begun to lose ground. The Yemeni conflict has turned into a humanitarian disaster.

The over-confidence placed in certain factions to carry on their proxy war, as with General Khalifa Haftar in Libya, has not been repaid on the battlefield. As with the unwise embargo against Qatar, their diplomatic adventurism did not achieve its goals. Their investments in Egypt, aimed at making the Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi regime a model of the new Arab stability, have also failed to extricate the country from its political and economic stagnancy. In short, there is too much chaos and considering the initial investment, a rate of return much too low.

Considering all this, the peace treaty with Israel represents a calculated strategic consolidation. The leadership of the UAE hope to use Israel as a more powerful vector to help them achieve their geopolitical objectives, just as they used Saudi Arabia in the first phase of their counter-revolutionary thrust. The UAE are also protecting themselves against another threat: the shock wave that could result from an internal conflict in Saudi Arabia which would neutralise Mohamed Ben Salman. If this were to occur, the UAE leadership would find itself completely isolated.

Thus, the alliance with Israel offers the UAE some degree of protection in view of their common interests. Both countries share a deep hostility towards Iran and reject the nuclear agreement signed by former US President Obama. Both are equally disappointed by President Trump’s refusal to launch a large-scale military campaign against the Iranian forces. The lack of Trump’s military response in July 2019 after the attack on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities was seen as highly significant. And besides, Israel harbors a silent aversion to the democratization of Arab countries.

ISRAEL SAVES FACE

For Israel, the real advantage of this treaty is not economic. The Emirati leadership will make flashy investments in Israel, if only to show the Palestinians what they missed by turning down the “deal of the century”. But at the end of the day, the financial advantages for Israel will be slender. Trade with the UAE will be overshadowed by the existing exchanges with the USA and the West in general, while conversely the oil-rich UAE have no particular need of Israeli investments.

But Israel benefits from the agreement in other ways. First of all, it adds a little more legitimacy to its role in the regional order of the Middle East, even though it does run the risk of being sucked into the impulsive counter-revolutionary actions of its new peace partner.

Above all, however, Israel can go on pulling the strings in the Palestinians situation. Despite the passing mention in the treaty of a halt to the West Bank annexation process, the Netanyahu government considers this to be merely a temporary pause. The “deal of the century,” drawn up by Donald Trump’s entourage having bogged down this year, in view of the international condemnation of the annexation of the Jordan Valley, this new peace treaty provides an ideal opportunity to save face. Actually, no Israeli colony has been dismantled and no land has been returned to the Palestinians. Yet since the annexation plans have been officially suspended, the Palestinian Authority must remain operative as a political player, which preserves the fiction of a peace process in a bilateral framework.

A PUBLICITY OPERATION FOR TRUMP

A treaty like this is grist to the American mill because it is an excellent PR operation at a time when the presidential campaign is in full swing. The agreement can be passed off as a victory for the Trump administration, and the President can score some points as a successful negotiator. The fulfilment of the White House dream of hosting a peace treaty between Israel and an Arab country provides Trump with an excellent diversion to make voters forget his many governance failings in such areas as the coronavirus pandemic, race relations and other domestic issues.

The peace treaty also serves to hide the fiasco of the “deal of the century.” By claiming to have blocked the controversial annexation plans, the US will try to revive this moribund framework. At the same time, it helps Trump prop up his reputation with certain portions of his electorate. It enables the administration to recover a degree of credibility among liberal Jews who aspire to a collective peace in the Middle East while at the same time reassuring rabid Zionists that Israel’s claims to the West Bank are still on the table.

TOWARDS A “PALESTINIAN SPRING”?

In the last analysis, the real losers here are, as usual, the Palestinians. They will keep up their struggle to obtain the constituent elements of a viable state which include the right of return, a capital in East Jerusalem, and the end of Israel’s illegal occupation of their land. While the UAE, Israel and the USA may derive some short-term advantages from this treaty, the long-term future of the Palestinians is still up in the air.

Left at the periphery of the regional power play, the Palestinian struggle needs a fresh uprising. It is to be hoped that it will not take the form of yet another Intifada but rather that of a Palestinian version of the Arab Spring. This would require a rejuvenation of the Palestinian political establishment, the rise to power of a more responsible and better representative leadership, backed by united resistance on the part of Palestinian society as a whole.

This would also require that the Palestinians appeal to the whole rest of the world, not just the Middle East, because international support for a Palestinian State is still extremely high. Today the recovery of their rights by the people of Palestine is probably not linked to the two-state solution which is indeed no longer a viable option but must be sought henceforth in the framework of a single state.