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Here is Gerhard Casper, standing before 7,000 people gathered in Stanford’s Frost Amphitheater to hear him deliver his first speech as the university’s president.

It’s 1992, the second day of October. Stanford is embroiled in a federal lawsuit over indirect research costs. It is struggling with campus-wide budget cuts and saddled with $160 million in damages caused by the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. University officials are wrestling with controversies over affirmative action, sex discrimination, free speech and diversity.

“What was I to say at my inauguration,” Casper asks in “The Winds of Freedom: Challenges to the University,” a newly published book of selected speeches and extended commentary about those addresses.

“What was I not to say? What were my tasks?”

Casper spent months wrestling with those questions, writing and rewriting his inaugural address. Rather than focus on the university’s troubles with a promise to make them disappear, he instead emphasized Stanford’s role as an institution devoted to teaching, learning and research. He grounded his remarks in Stanford’s motto – translated from his native German as “the wind of freedom blows” – and charted the freedoms most important to a university.

There are eight, he tells his audience.

Among them: an unrestrained pursuit of knowledge, an ability to challenge long-held beliefs and new ideas, and the “freedom to speak plainly, without concealment and to the point.”

“The research enterprise can easily be smothered by internal and external politics, pressures, and red tape,” he tells the crowd. “The wind of freedom has been a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for making our great universities the envy of the world. Without that freedom, that greatness is imperiled.”

Humor and heft

Academic freedom was a recurring theme during his eight years at the helm of Stanford. It was a time in which he navigated the university through turmoil and debates not only faced by Stanford and other American universities, but by the entire country.

With “The Winds of Freedom,” Casper presents seven speeches from his presidency, along with a commencement address he delivered at Yale in 2003. They delve into free expression, campus diversity and affirmative action. They cover the university’s role as a place of research and its relationship to the politics of the day.

A book launch celebration and discussion will be held Feb. 25 at Encina Hall.

The big, weighty ideas often come wrapped in a sense of humor – sometimes self-deprecating – that was the hallmark of a popular and seemingly very accessible president who surely never spoke to the same audience twice.

Casper has done more than merely dust off and repackage his favorite or most important speeches into a book. These are addresses tied together by those notions of academic freedom. And in detailed commentary following the text of each speech, Casper explains what was on his mind when he was writing them.

“I put a lot of effort into my speeches,” Casper says during a conversation in his office at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where he is a senior fellow and served as director from 2012 to 2013. “But if you take the speeches in isolation, you often end up with an abstract notion of what was happening at time. I wanted to use these speeches as an example of the complexity of issues and questions that I had to deal with as president.”

Diversity, identity and valid arguments

So here is Casper welcoming an incoming class in 1993, one year after delivering his inaugural address. It includes white and black and American Indian students. Some are the American children and grandchildren of Mexican and Asian immigrants. Only 5 percent are foreign students, but they hail from 37 countries.

The president is talking about diversity. He shares his own story about coming to America, telling the students about growing up in Germany in the wake of the Nazi regime and moving to California as a 26-year-old in 1964. He pokes fun at the accent he never lost, but reminds the students that “I have acquired an American `cultural identity.’”

He tells them they will all develop their own sense of cultural identity, adding that diversity makes the university a richer place.

“If we at the university were not committed to interactive pluralism, education would become impossible,” he tells the newcomers.

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“No university can thrive unless each member is accepted as an individual and can speak and will be listened to without regard to labels and stereotypes,” he says.

Read out of context today, passages of the speech tuck into the timeless tropes of America as both a mosaic  and a melting pot. It’s OK to assimilate, he tells us. We can still maintain our own identities.

But In Casper’s rearview mirror, the speech becomes a history lesson, a reminder of the American landscape 20 years ago.

“The early 1990s was probably the decade during which multiculturalism and identity politics were most prominent in the United States in general and on American campuses in particular,” he writes in his new book. “When I came to Stanford in 1992, I was ill equipped to deal with some of these issues.”

He goes on to trace the steps Stanford took to address diversity and he shares his thoughts – some scholarly, some personal – on the issues of social and cultural identity. He parses the differences between multiculturalism and diversity.

He discusses the adoption of a new policy on sexual harassment, moves made to increase the number of women on the faculty, and the tensions arising from the university’s struggle to support on-campus ethnic community centers. He revisits the political and ethnically charged student protests that unfolded in the early 1990s.

While he was dealing with the daily fallout of those matters in the president’s office, he was also searching for opportunities to convey his positions and address the issues in his public speeches.

Welcoming the Class of 1997 gave him one of those chances.

“In a university nobody has the right to deny another person’s right to speak his or her mind, to speak plainly, without concealment and to the point,” he tells the incoming students.  “In a university discussion your first question in response to an argument must never be `Does she belong to the right group?’ Instead, the only criterion is `Does she have a valid argument?’”

The lines echo those he used in his inaugural address, and they do so intentionally.

“If you have something you believe in strongly, you must repeat it and repeat it and repeat it,” he says now. “I do that. I plagiarize myself – not because I ran out of things to say, but because it was important to re-emphasize points over and over again.”

Defining academic freedom

So here is Casper in 1998, speaking at Peking University during the school’s centennial celebration. The Chinese government used the occasion to bolster PKU’s standing as a key institution that would lead the country into the 21st Century, and Casper focused his remarks on the role of research-intensive universities and the integrity they must maintain.

“Academic freedom is the sine qua non of the university,” he tells the audience. “Academic freedom means, above all, freedom from politics.” It also means “freedom from pressures to conform within the university,” he says.

Reflecting on that speech in “The Winds of Freedom,” Casper shares an unsettling irony: as he delivered his remarks, he was unaware that a Stanford research associate from China was being held in a Beijing prison under dubious charges of betraying state secrets.

He learned about the matter several months after the event, and writes now about the university’s unsuccessful appeals for the researcher’s release to then-President Jiang Zemin and his subsequent decision not to pursue a plan for Stanford to open a program at PKU at that time.

“I did not think that it was appropriate for me to enter into an agreement with one of China’s most prominent institutions – continue, as it were, as if nothing had happened – while a Stanford researcher was being held in prison without any explanation,” he writes. “I certainly did not take the step to suspend our discussions lightly, since throughout my life, throughout the many years of the Cold War, I had always favored engagement rather than iron curtains.”

“Germans don’t give funny speeches”

Casper gave his first public address at Stanford when he was 53. But he had already spent a lifetime as a speechmaker.

“I had been viewed in high school to have the ability to talk well and address a large audience,” he says. “And clearly, I liked to do it.”

He was elected president of the student council. His principal and history teacher, Erna Stahl, would call him the school’s festredner, or keynote speaker. He was tapped as valedictorian of the Class of 1957.

He discusses his valedictory address – focused on the dearth of German role models – in the preface to “The Winds of Freedom.” He writes about his relationship with Stahl, how he was impressed by her stories of  confronting the Gestapo, and the impact that growing up in post-Nazi Germany had on him.

“We hadn’t done any intensive study of the Third Reich by eleventh grade,” Casper says. “That was due to the fact that the Erna Stahl believed very strongly that going into the politics of the moment – the aftermath of the Nazi period – would not be the best method to teach us the values she wanted us to have. It would have become too quickly biographical and personal and she was very insistent that there needed to be positive values instilled in us to balance against what the Nazis had perpetrated.”

The preface is as close as the book comes to reading like a memoir, and Casper condenses his childhood, education, academic career and personal acknowledgments into 15 pages.

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Photo Credit: L.A. Cicero

While there are only a few lines devoted to his 26 years at the University of Chicago as a law professor, dean and provost, it was in that city where Casper’s innate ability to connect with an audience meshed with his public persona.

“Germans don’t give funny speeches,” he says. “In Germany, jokes undercut your credibility. My speaking style – the self-deprecation, the humor – that was really honed in Chicago. My friends and colleagues had these characteristics, and those elements were brought into my life.”

He learned that a joke does more than solicit a laugh. It can disarm a critic, humanize a speaker and lighten up an otherwise serious speech.

“After all, you want the audience to keep paying attention if you really do have something important to tell them,” he says.

An era begins

So here again is Casper, new to Stanford on that second day of October in 1992 and about to take on the promises and problems of the university.

He opens with a light touch, addressing “fellow members of the first-year class and fellow transfer students.” He suggests with deadpan delivery that he was hired as Stanford’s president because he could properly pronounce the university’s motto as it appears in German on the president’s seal: Die Luft der Freiheit weht.

“Alas, I have bad news for the board of trustees,” he says, turning to look at the board members seated on the stage behind him. The phrase, he says, was originally written in Latin. Not German.

“If, under these circumstances, the trustees would feel it appropriate to renounce their contract with me, I would understand perfectly,” he says, cracking a wide smile for the first time.

“All I ask for is the opportunity to finish this speech.”

And with his first formal words as Stanford’s ninth president, Casper casts himself as a newcomer – an outsider here to lead, learn and speak his mind.

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The Europe Center invites you to the inaugural annual lectures of this series by Adam Tooze, Barton M. Briggs Professor of History, Yale University. On the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War, Adam Tooze will deliver three lectures about the history of the transformation of the global power structure that followed from Imperial Germany’s decision to provoke America’s declaration of war in 1917.  Tooze advances a powerful explanation of why the First World War rearranged political and economic structures across Eurasia and the British Empire, sowed the seeds of revolution in Russia and China, and laid the foundations of a new global order that began to revolve around the United States and the Pacific. These lectures will present an argument for why the fate of effectively the whole of civilization changed in 1917, and why the First World War’s legacy continues to shape our world today.

Titles and venues are listed below.


Wednesday, Apr 30, 2014, 4:00 pm - 5:30 pm
Location: Koret Taube Room, Gunn-SIEPR
“Making Peace in Europe 1917-1919: Brest-Litovsk and Versailles”
Recent events in Ukraine pose the question, is a comprehensive peace for Europe, both East and West, possible? This lecture will address the first moment in which that question was posed, during and after World War I. In light of current events the lecture will focus on the influence of Russian power and powerlessness in shaping both the abortive effort to make peace in the East between Imperial Germany and Soviet Russia at Brest Litovsk - the first treaty to recognize the existence of an independent Ukraine - and the efforts to make peace in the West at Versailles and after. Returning to the period 1917-1923 suggests sobering conclusions about the stability of the order that we have taken for granted since 1991.

 

Thursday, May 1, 2014, 4:00 pm - 5:30 pm
Location: Koret Taube Room, Gunn-SIEPR
“Hegemony: Europe, America and the Problem of Financial Reconstruction, 1916-1933”

Having established itself in the 19th century as the financial center of the world, Europe's sudden impoverishment by World War I came as a dramatic shock. The ensuing trans-Atlantic crises of the 1920s and early 1930s were not only the most severe but the most consequential in the history of Europe and the wider world. But, to this day there is substantial disagreement amongst both social scientists and historians as to the causes of the disaster. Was it American leadership or a failure of cooperation that was to blame? This lecture will argue the case for a revised and historicized version of the hegemonic failure thesis. The absence presence of American influence was crucial in determining Europe's fate.

 

Friday, May 2, 2014, 4:00 pm - 5:30 pm
Location: Bechtel Conference Center
Followed by a reeception, 5:30 pm - 6:15 pm
“Unsettled Lands: The Interwar Crisis of Agrarian Europe”
Until the middle of the twentieth century Europe, like the rest of the world, was majority agrarian. And yet the most influential accounts of the interwar crisis, framed as they were by the industrial and urban world of the later twentieth-century Europe, tended to ignore this evident fact, focusing instead on workers and business-men, politicians and soldiers. This lecture will illustrate how brining the peasantry back in has the potential not only to throw new light on Europe's great epoch of crisis, but to open that history, beyond the Bloodlands to the wider world.

    

Tooze is the author of The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (2006) and Statistics and the German State 1900-1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge (2001), among numerous other scholarly articles on modern European history.

 

April 30th and May 1st: Koret-Taube Conference Center in the Gunn–SIEPR Building (366 Galvez Street).

May 2nd: Bechtel Conference Center in Encina Hall (616 Serra Street).

Adam Tooze Barton M. Briggs Professor of History Speaker Yale University
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Ulrich Wilhelm will be giving a talk on the German and European reaction to the NSA spying revelations.  This will be followed by discussion on the US reaction to the disclosure and the impact to American-European relations.

Ulrich Wilhelm is the Director General of Bayerischer Rundfunk (Bavarian Broadcasting Corporation) in Munich, Germany. From 1991 to 2005, he held positions within various Bavarian ministries as well as within the State Chancellery of the German Federal State of Bavaria. In November 2005, Wilhelm assumed responsibility for the German Federal Government’s Press and Information Office and became the Government Spokesman in his new capacity as a Permanent State Secretary.  Ulrich Wilhelm was elected Director General of Bayerischer Rundfunk in May 2010 and took office in February 2011. He has also served as the representative of Germany’s ARD and ZDF public broadcasting services on the Executive Board of the EBU since 2013.

Oksenberg Conference Room

Ulrich Wilhelm Director General, Bavarian Broadcasting Speaker
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We use retrospectively reported data on smoking behavior of residents of Mainland China and Taiwan to compare and contrast patterns in smoking behavior over the life-course of individuals in these two regions. Because we construct the life-history of smoking for all survey respondents, our data cover an exceptionally long period of time – up to fifty years in both samples. During this period, both societies experienced substantial social and economic changes. The two regions developed at much different rates and the political systems of the two areas evolved in very different ways. More importantly, governments in the two areas set policies that caused the flow of information about the health risks of smoking to differ across the regions and over time. We exploit these differences, using counts of articles in newspapers from 1951 to present, to explore whether and how the arrival of information affected life-course smoking decisions of residents in the two areas. We also present evidence that suggests how prices/taxes and key historical events might have affected decisions to smoke.

Dean Lillard received his PhD in economics from the University of Chicago in 1991. From 1991 to 2012, he was a faculty member and senior research associate in the Department of Policy Analysis and Management at Cornell University. In August 2012 he joined the Department Human Sciences at Ohio State University as an Associate Professor. He is Director and Project Manager of the Cross-National Equivalent File study that produces cross-national data. He is a member of the American Economics Association, the Population Association of America, the International Association for Research on Income and Wealth, the International Health Economics Association, the American Society for Health Economics, a Research Associate at the German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin, Germany, and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He serves on the advisory board of the Danish National Institute for Social Research in Copenhagen, Denmark and the Cross-National Studies: Interdisciplinary Research and Training Program – a collaborative program run by the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN), and together with the Mershon Centre at OSU.

Dean Lillard's current research focuses on health economics, the economics of schooling, and international comparisons of economic behavior. His research in health economics is primarily focused on the economics of the marketing and consumption of cigarettes and alcohol. His research on the economics of schooling includes studies of direct effects of policy on educational outcomes and on the role that education plays in other economic behaviors such as smoking, production of health, and earnings. His cross-national research ranges widely from comparisons of the role that obesity plays in determining labor market outcomes to comparisons of smoking behavior cross-nationally.

Philippines Conference Room

Dean R. Lillard Associate Professor, Department Human Sciences Speaker Ohio State University
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Stanford associate professor of German Studies, Adrian Daub, presents a new study on German opera in his book Tristan's Shadow: Sexuality and the Total Work of Art after Wagner.

For more information, please visit the publication's webpage by clicking on the book title below.

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About the Topic: Re-establishing and strengthening the rule of international law in international affairs was a central Allied aim in the First World War. Revisionism in its many forms has erased this from our memory, and with it the meaning of the war. Imperial Germany’s actions and justifications for its war conduct amounted to proposing an entirely different set of international-legal principles from those that other European states recognized as public law. This talk examines what those principles were and what implications they had for the legal world order.

About the Speaker: Isabel V. Hull received her Ph.D. from Yale University in 1978 and has since then been teaching at Cornell University, where she is the John Stambaugh Professor of History. A German historian, her work has reached backward to 1600 and forward to 1918 and has focused on the history of sexuality, the development of civil society, military culture, and imperial politics and governance. She has recently completed a book comparing Imperial Germany, Great Britain, and France during World War I and the impact of international law on their respective conduct of the war. It will appear in Spring 2014 under the title, A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law in the First World War. Her talk is based on this latest research.

CISAC Conference Room

Isabel Hull John Stambaugh Professor of History, Cornell University Speaker
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REAP co-director Scott Rozelle begins a ten-part series for Caixin Magazine titled, "Inequality 2030: Glimmering Hope in China in a Future Facing Extreme Despair." Rozelle explains why continued high income inequality could spell trouble for China's future growth and stability.

REAP co-director Scott Rozelle begins a ten-part series for Caixin Magazine titled, "Inequality 2030: Glimmering Hope in China in a Future Facing Extreme Despair." Rozelle explains why continued high income inequality could spell trouble for China's future growth and stability.

To read the column in Chinese, click here.

> To read Column 2: China's Inequality Starts During the First 1,000 Days, click here

> To read Column 3: Behind Before They Start - The Preschool Years (Part 1), click here

> To read Column 4: Behind Before They Start - The Preschool Years (Part 2), click here.  

> To read Column 5: How to Cure China's Largest Epidemic, click here.

> To read Column 6: A Tale of Two Travesties, click here

 

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Inequality 2030:

Glimmering Hope in China in a Future Facing Extreme Despair

 

Column 1: Introduction and why we need to worry about inequality

 

Inequality is underrated

China’s growth slowed in 2012 and in the first half of 2013. And, the world is holding its collective breath. Can China’s once white-hot economy be re-ignited and continue to blaze ahead? Or has its economy finally begun its inevitable slow down, a braking that all countries that reach middle income levels of development experience.

While the financial pundits and economic crystal ball gazers are focused on growth rates and world economy spillovers, we are worrying about another indicator: China’s level of inequality. In fact, we believe that what happens to inequality in the future is probably more important in the long run than growth. Whether high or low, we believe the nation’s income distribution will be one of the most important determinants of the quality of life in China in the 2030s.

Why is inequality more important than growth? Of course, nominally both are important. China needs to maintain 6 to 8 percent over the next 10 years. China needs to continue to grow 4 to 6 percent until 2030. However, we believe that as China’s economy matures over the next two decades, growth will slow. The growth rates of healthy, developed economies are never more than 2 to 3 percent. This slowing is inevitable. It is a done deal. Inequality, on the other hand, could be high or low. And, if it is high: China could be in for a troubled adulthood. It could even be headed for stagnation. High inequality could even lead to collapse and the loss of all things good that have been built up over the past three decades.

Remedial learning about Inequality and the Middle Income Trap

So what allows some countries to successfully transition from middle to high income? Solid banking practices: important. Good corporate governance: a must. Competition policy: few would argue. In this part of the column we want to put forth an argument that an equitable income distribution is also a necessary ingredient for long-run, stable growth. The basis of this statement is an empirical regularity that characterizes nearly every case of successful development (during the shift from middle to high income) in the last half of the 20th century.

Since 1945, we can divide the world into three groups of countries. The high income countries, like the US, the UK, Germany and France; the poor and chronically underdeveloped; and the new members of the OECD club. Somewhat surprisingly, over the past 70 years, there have been only 15 or so countries that have graduated from poor to middle to high income. The list includes two East Asian countries/regions (South Korea and Taiwan); four Mediterranean countries (Portugal; Spain; Greece and Israel); six Eastern European countries (Croatia; Slovenia; Slovak Republic; Hungary; Czech Republic and Estonia; and two other countries (Ireland and New Zealand).

Most salient for our column is that in the case of all of these successful countries an equitable income distribution is feature they all share. This is true goingback as early in their development paths as possible. Using a popular measure of inequality, the Gini ratio (where 0 is perfect equality and 100 is perfect inequality), it can be shown that the average Gini ratio of the new members of the OECD club is only 33, a level of the Gini that is relative low. The range of the Gini measures for these successfully graduating countries is from 26 to 39. Not one of the Gini ratios is more than 40. Such a pattern of income distributions suggests that, on average, those countries that were successful in moving from low to middle to higher income not only share a common growth path, successfully took them from middle to high income, all of the nations did so with fairy low levels of inequality.

Such low levels of inequality for the successfully developed countries can be seen to be in stark contrast to the countries in the world that grew, hit middle income status and then ultimately stagnated or collapsed. Argentina, Brazil, Iraq and Mexico are examples of countries that had rapid spurts of growth, joined the ranks of the world’s middle income countries, only to find their growth aspirations squashed. These countries all were striving to become high income, industrialized, developed countries. At some point during the past 70 years, however, each of these countries experienced either dire collapse or long and frustrating stagnation.

What is a characteristic that all of these failed-to-move-up-from-middle-income countries share? When comparing the Gini ratios of these wannabe-but-never-made-it nations with those that successfully graduated, there could not be a greater contrast. Whereas there were no successful developed countries with a Gini ratio over 40, there were no countries that experience growth and stagnation/collapse with Gini ratios under 40. The Gini ratios of Brazil and Mexico and Iraq were all around 50.

So where is China on this list? China’s level of inequality, according to one of the most complete and internationally comparable study done at Beijing Normal University by Professor Li Shi and his colleagues, is among the highest in the world. As of 2007, it was 50 (or 49.7 to be precise). Between 2003 and 2007 it rose more than any country in the world. Others say it is higher—see the work of Li Gan from Sichuan University. Hence, although China has attained middle income status in the past decade, it also is part of a group of countries that is trying to transition to high income status at levels of inequality which have not ever been associated with successful transition—at least not in the past 70 years.

What is the problem with high inequality?

So why is it that inequality is so inimical for a middle income country striving to reach high income? We believe the reason is twofold. The first has to do with the inevitability of growth slow down and expectations. When a country is growing fast (as countries can do when they are moving from poor to middle income—as China has been over the past three decades), even if there is a high level inequality, most people in society have expectations that they will be better off if they stick inside the system. In China during the past several decades, even for those at the lower end of the income distribution, their standard of living is higher now than 10 years ago. Relying on extrapolations from the past, most people believe that they will continue to become better off. At the very least they will tell you that they expect their children will be able to live a better life in the future.

High growth has made these rising expectations possible—even for the poor. There has been enough for all to “go around.” Hence, with positive expectations about being able to get better in the future, even facing long working hours, cruel living conditions and low wages, individuals have chosen to work “inside the system.” For most, working in the system mean that they get a job, save as much as possible and look forward to making even more and having more savings in the future.

This whole system, however, is predicated on growth trickling down to the poor. If growth slows, it is possible that the expectations may not be realized. We believe that it is these expectations that have produced the glue holding society together—despite the high levels of inequality.  The key question or the real fear is that when expectations are popped, individuals may decide to opt out of the system into the informal or even the gray/black economy.

The second problem with high income inequality is that it often is accompanied by high inequality in education, nutrition and health. So why is this a problem? In a high income, developed economy, by definition wages are high. Because wages are high, however, employers will demand that employees are equipped with the requisite skills—math, language, science, English, computer skills—to perform tasks that create earnings that help offset the high wages. If individuals do not have such skills, employers may take actions to layoff such employees or not hire them in the first place. Employers will look to replace labor with capital and/or move low-skilled jobs off shore. The problem with many countries that have grown fast from poor the middle income and are currently trying to push onto high income status is that there was a disconnect between what students learned in the previous decade or so and what job skills are needed. If a high enough proportion of the labor force is not equipped with the skills needed for a high wage economy, a share of the labor force might become unemployable. As before, if this polarization of the labor force occurs, the only choice of those that are unemployable by the formal labor force would be to move into the informal labor force and/or gray/black economy.

While all economies have such polarized segments of their economy, there are several problems facing middle income countries—especially those that had grown fast in recent years. Dealing with large shares of population in an informal economy requires lots of resources—for unemployment insurance, disability, retraining, health, etc. Since these countries have not yet graduated to high income status, by definition, their level of wealth might make it difficult to spend large sums of money to contain disruption out of the informal economy. If the disruption continues, it can lead to escalating violence and unrest, which will require even more resources to contain. Ironically, the very disruption that is being created by the slowing growth could very well lead to a further slowing of growth if fewer resources are spent on productive investments (instead of containment) and if the disruption itself diminishes interest in investment inside the country. In addition, many of those in the informal economy may exhibit particularly unsatisfied behavior (read anger and disaffection) since the may well feel their original expectations were undermined by the formal establishment. If the size of this part of the population is big enough, the country could find itself atop a powder keg.

In summary, then, the problem with inequality is complicated but real. Inequality in the face of slow growth can lead to unfulfilled expectations and diminished opportunities. Individuals can be polarized into two groups: those inside the system and those outside the system. If inequality is particularly great, the number of those outside the system could be large. Since middle income countries are not rich yet, resources may be insufficient to contain the anger and violence of those in the gray/black economies and/or support the needs of those in the informal economy (who are not contributing a lot to the overall economy). If the disruption is large enough, there could be negative feedback onto growth which could serve to further exacerbate the problem. An end point of stagnation or collapse is certainly plausible.

Our column’s real title: 10 ways to battle inequality; 10 ways to save China’s future

This column is going to be a series of ten articles about China’s inequality. It is a column about how managing that inequality may mean the difference between a bright and vibrant China in 2033 and a China teetering on the edge of collapse. Despite the potential doom, however, this is a column of hope because we believe inequality can be managed—given aggressive, enlightened and motivated decisions TODAY … or at least in the very near future.

However, this column is not about inequality today. We are not going to analyze the accuracy of the estimates of income inequality produced by the China National Bureau of Statistics. We are not going to vote for the higher estimate of Li Shi and his group from Beijing Normal University or the even higher one from Sichuan University’s Li Gan. We are simply going to live with the status quo, one that virtually everyone agrees with: China’s income distribution in 2013 is highly unequal.

Instead we are going to be writing about inequality tomorrow. However, one of the most basic axioms of poverty economics—especially given China’s high inequality today—means that we need to be engaged in this battle against high inequality tomorrow today. The axiom that we are talking about has been made famous both by Nobel Laureates who are spinning their advice for the global economy and by retiring economic planners-cum-policy makers as they write their memoirs. The iron rule of income distribution—lets call this Axiom 1, at some point in the future is:

Tomorrow’s income inequality = Today’s income inequality + Today’s human capital inequality.

This simple formula, above all, embodies on important lesson. Tomorrow’s income inequality is what we are interested in. The first installment of our column today has tried to motivate that this has to be low – or at least not too high – for China to enjoy long-run sustained growth and stable prosperity. We also know—by assumption or by common sense—that Today’s income inequality is high. Hence: to get to where we want to go—that is, low income inequality in the 2030s—we have one and only one degree of freedom. We need to put tremendous attention on reducing human capital inequality today.

If you are following our argument, and if you know anything about the gap between health and education in China today, this column would appear to be one of despair. In fact, this column will fuel that despair. Why? Because are going to show that the human capital gap in China today is ugly. Ugly as in wide. The gap is wide for education. The gap is wide for nutrition. The gap is wide for health. It is wide for babies, preschoolers, elementary school kids, those in middle and high school and for the college-bound. If China does not do anything—and, we mean act seriously—about this gap, and you believe in Axiom 1, it may be time for you to begin to plan for the worst in the coming years.

However, this column will also try to be a source of hope. We will discuss a large number of interventions that work. There are actions that can reduce the human capital gaps at all age levels—from infants to those in elite universities. They are proven. Many are cheap. Many are simple. Some need fundamental rethinking. But, when you add up the price tag of them all and you compare it to the possible costs in the future, we believe a War on Rural Education, Nutrition and Health Inequality is the Best Buy that the government can make.

Stay tuned, then, in the coming months—one column per month. We are going to write about inequality in baby health, nutrition and cognitive abilities between infants in the Qingling Mountains in Southern Shaanxi and China’s tiny princes and princesses in the cities in October. We are going to write about preschool inequality in November. December, January and February will examine the health, nutrition and education crises in poor rural elementary schools and in schools in China’s migrant communities. The rest of the months will talk about inequality in middle school, vocational high school, academic high school and college. There is not a lot of pretty about the gaps that exist in each of these age groups. However, as we stated above, we also will offer solutions—ones that we have evaluated; others that others have initiated. Many of them work. Others need more effort. We will try to inform you of the choices and the hope that can be created by trying. Seriously trying.

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This seminar is part of the "European Governance" program series.

After decades of ambiguity towards European integration, the United States is pushing for Europe to become a genuine actor in security and foreign policy. As Vice President Biden put it at the 2013 Munich Security Conference, “a strong and capable Europe is profoundly in America’s interest, and I might add, presumptuously, the world’s interest.”

In principle, Europeans have accepted that closer defense cooperation is essential in order to maintain, and hopefully expand, existing military capabilities, and in order to reinforce mutual trust and contribute to a convergence in common goals and strategic cultures. But the sad reality is that decision-makers have not yet been willing to take the necessary decisions and disagree about what that means. In matters of European security and defense, the gap between rhetoric and policy is wider than in every other area of the European agenda, despite ever-shrinking defense budgets, declining capabilities, and the US “pivot.”

The European Council in December of 2013, focusing on defense and security issues for the first time in many years, will have to deliver ambitious projects - and member states will have to deliver when it comes to their implementation. The European Security Strategy from 2003 is in dire need of an update. And the EU’s new High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, who will assume office in 2014, will have the difficult task of developing a genuine "one voice approach", a common European foreign and security policy.

A number of fundamental issues will need to be addressed: European security policy priorities, the EU level of ambition and, even larger, the purpose and influence of the EU in a world in which we will increasingly struggle to make ourselves heard. Are EU countries ready and willing to truly join forces and pool resources?

The talk will address current efforts to enhance European security and defense policy, the political feasibility of further steps, Germany’s responsibility to push the agenda forward, and what these efforts in European defense and security policy mean for the United States.

 

Wolfgang Ischinger was the Federal Republic of Germany's Ambassador to London from 2006-2008. Prior to this assignment, he was the German Ambassador to the United States of America from 2001 to 2006. In 2007, he also represented the European Union in the Troika negotiations on the future of Kosovo.

Wolfgang Ischinger studied law at the universities of Bonn and Geneva and obtained his law degree in 1972.  He did graduate and postgraduate work at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and at Harvard Law School, Cambridge/USA (M. A., Fletcher School, 1973).

Ambassador Ischinger has published widely on foreign policy, security, and arms control policy as well as on European and transatlantic issues. He is a member of the Trilateral Commission, of the European Council on Foreign Relations, and of the Governing Board of SIPRI, Stockholm. He is Co-Chair of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (Carnegie Endowment) and a member of the Global Zero Commission. He also serves on the Boards of the Atlantic Council of the U. S., of the American Institute of Contemporary German Studies (AICGS), of the American Academy, Berlin and of SWP, Berlin. He is an adjunct professor at the University of Tübingen.

CISAC Conference Room

Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger Career diplomat; Chairman of the Munich Security Conference; Global head of Government Relations at Allianz SE; member of the Supervisory Board of Allianz Deutschland AG, and of the European Advisory Board of Investcorp, London Speaker
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