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Anders Åslund joined the Institute for International Economics in 2006. He has served previously as the director of the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace since 2003 and as codirector of the Carnegie Moscow Center's project on Economies of the Post-Soviet States. He joined the Carnegie Endowment as a senior associate in October 1994. He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. His work examines the transformation of formerly socialist economies to market-based economies. While the central areas of his studies are Russia and Ukraine, he also focuses on the broader implications of economic transition.

Åslund has served as an economic adviser to the governments of Russia and Ukraine and to President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan. He was a professor at the Stockholm School of Economics and director of the Stockholm Institute of East European Economics. He has worked as a Swedish diplomat in Kuwait, Poland, Geneva, and Moscow. He is a member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and an honorary professor of the Kyrgyz National University. He is co-chairman of the Economics Education and Research Consortium and chairman of the Advisory Council of the Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE), Warsaw.

He is the author of Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc (Cambridge University Press, 2001), How Russia Became a Market Economy (Brookings, 1995), Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform, 2d ed. (Cornell University Press, 1991), and Private Enterprise in Eastern Europe: The Non-Agricultural Private Sector in Poland and the GDR, 1945-83 (Macmillan, 1985) and editor or coeditor of several books, including with CDDRL Director, Michael McFaul, Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).

This event is co-sponsored with the Center on Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

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Anders Åslund Senior Fellow Speaker Institute for International Economics
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Siegfried S. Hecker
Gi-Wook Shin
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The international community appears to have been stunned by North Korea's test of a nuclear device. While the media has predominantly focused on the political implications of the test, it is also important to understand exactly what occurred from a technical perspective. On Monday, October 9th, Dr. Gi-Wook Shin, Director of the Korean Studies Program and the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, asked Dr. Siegfried Hecker, Emeritus Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and visiting professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University about the nature of the test executed by North Korea and possible technical implications.

GWS (Gi-Wook Shin): Dr. Hecker, could you please briefly explain the technical dimensions of what has happened? North Korea is claiming great success, but there are some questions about whether this presumed nuclear test was really successful or meaningful.

SH (Siegried Hecker): At this point, as I understand it, the North Koreans have conducted what they call a nuclear test.

South Korea has said seismic signals appear to indicate a 0.5 kiloton, or sub-kiloton, explosion. From reports I have seen, the Australians and the French believe the blast was about 1 kiloton. Thus, three countries have given assessments on the power of the underground explosion, ranging between 0.5 kilotons and 1 kiloton, or 500 and 1000 tons. This likely indicates a nuclear explosion of a relatively low yield, compared to what one would typically expect. Although the Russian defense minister has apparently commented that the explosion was between 5 and 15 kilotons, I have not heard any other nation estimate in this range.

By comparison, the Nagasaki bomb was approximately 20 kilotons, and the initial tests of the five major nuclear powers were all quite large, on this order. Also, when both India and Pakistan tested multiple devices in 1998, some of these tests were of a substantial yield, at least 20 kilotons. But each country also tested three devices that were said to result in explosions of less than a kiloton. Whether these devices did not work or were experimental in nature is still unknown. So, a test on the order of that conducted by North Korea is not unheard of, but it is apparent that the North Korean device produced an explosion considerably smaller than most countries' first nuclear tests.

Regarding the technical dimensions of this event, I would offer two provisos: first, we must give scientists more time to analyze the seismic signals, and second, we must allow more time for analysis of how those seismic signals translate to the yield of the device. This latter task involves a thorough understanding of relevant geology - scientists make models to predict this, but there is always some uncertainty.

GWS: Given the relatively low yield of the test, is it possible that what North Korea has "tested" is not a nuclear device but very powerful conventional weaponry?

SH: It is most likely that this was indeed a nuclear device. There are two plausible explanations for why this test resulted in a relatively low yield. One possibility is that the North Koreans attempted to test a relatively simple nuclear device that was meant to be large, but it did not work quite right. There are two reasons the test of such a device might not have gone as planned. First, the detonators might not have exploded at exactly the right time or the explosive might not have been of the right quality, thus producing a lower yield. Second, if the timing of the "initiator" (additional neutrons that are introduced) was not quite right, this could also decrease the expected yield of the device.

Another possibility is that North Korea was actually trying to test a smaller, much more sophisticated nuclear device, one with a lot of instrumentation to monitor implosion. North Korea could have learned a great deal from such a test, but I would be surprised if the country had really designed the device to be that small.

GWS: This test marks the failure of the disparate policy approaches of South Korea and the United States - neither nation was successful in arresting DPRK nuclear development. But just how advanced North Korea's nuclear program is remains unclear. In the Korean media, there has been debate over whether North Korea's nuclear test was a success or a failure. What do you think?

SH: I would not say that the test failed. It is simply too early to judge, and we do not know exactly what North Korea had hoped to achieve. If North Korea wanted to use this test as a demonstration, then perhaps it was not very successful. It may be the case that the test did not work as well as anticipated if the device in question was a simple nuclear device. If North Korea was testing an advanced designed that was very well instrumented and monitored, it may have learned a great deal from this test.

It is important to wait to see an accurate yield for this test and then to look at the range of possibilities for why it might have been executed. From a scientific perspective, it is important not to overreact and not to go beyond what is actually known.

GWS: You said previously that when India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998, they both set off multiple explosions. Is it correct that North Korea has set off a single explosion?

SH: From what we have learned so far, it appears that North Korea has tested one device. This is what the North Koreans announced they would do. Scientists will have to carefully analyze the seismic signals to be sure, however, as for example, when India tested, it set off two devices simultaneously. We have not yet seen all the seismic evidence.

GWS: If North Korea were to use such a "low yield" device as a weapon in a major metropolis like Seoul, what kind of impact would it have?

SH: A 1 kiloton bomb in a major metropolis, though a relatively "low-yield" nuclear device, would still be devastating and catastrophic. Many thousands would experience instant death, and due to radioactivity, there would also be many delayed deaths. A device of this size would not wipe out the entire city, as was largely the case in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it would cause major, significant damage.

GWS: Based on the scale of the explosion, was this device something that even terrorists could assemble?

SH: One kiloton in terrorist hands would indeed be catastrophic. I am very concerned that North Korea's nuclear material might fall into terrorist hands.

GWS: The possible marriage of this demonstrated nuclear capability and North Korean missiles is extremely dangerous. With reference to the North's nuclear and missile capabilities, is testing useful for making smaller nuclear devices - devices small enough to be placed on a missile?

SH: If North Korea is intent on making a nuclear warhead, this test could be a step in that direction. Making smaller nuclear devices by nature means making more complex nuclear devices. For much of the Cold War, this was a major goal for both the Soviets and the Americans. For North Korea, at this point we cannot say that the test was successful in terms of this aim of miniaturization, though again, North Korean scientists may have learned a lot in this regard. It is extremely difficult to say how soon North Korea could achieve miniaturization with the limited information we have about this test.

Miniaturization is a very big step, and it cannot be accomplished without nuclear testing. This could have been one of the most important reasons that North Korea undertook this test. It must be noted that their missiles are the other part of this equation, and there is not great confidence in the reliability of these missiles, especially those that performed poorly during the July test.

GWS: North Korea has certainly made a political statement with its nuclear test, but from a technical perspective, do you expect additional testing? What is your assessment of North Korea's technical capabilities, in light of your recent visits to the nation?

SH: At this point, North Korea could want another test for two technical reasons. First, if this was a simple device, they will want to fix the problem and demonstrate an explosion of a higher yield. If this was a more advanced design, they may have learned a lot but would still desire another test in order to gain an appropriate level of confidence in the device.

In January 2004, I visited the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and in August 2005, I visited Pyongyang. On the basis of those visits, I would estimate that North Korea has enough plutonium for 6 to 8 nuclear devices, though there is some degree of uncertainty in that estimate. Overall, I estimate the North has 40-50 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, and generally 6-8 kilograms are required for each weapon. I also estimate that North Korea could gain one additional weapon per year, given the current rate of reprocessing.

In terms of skilled people and facilities, North Korea has very good capabilities, up to the point of and including reprocessing plutonium. However, to go from reprocessing plutonium to building the device itself takes a whole new set of engineering and physics skills.

GWS: Given North Korea's limited amount of weapons-grade material, its government would presumably want to conserve as much as possible, right?

SH: Yes, and this is probably one of the reasons North Korea did not set off multiple explosions like India and Pakistan did. North Korea has very limited material, and therefore it will want to be judicious. With this conservation imperative, North Korea will want to fully assess what has been learned from this first test before it attempts a second test.

GWS: From a technical perspective, is it difficult to say how long it may be until North Korea conducts a second test?

SH: Yes, it is very difficult to say, because it depends on factors related to this test about which we are still uncertain. If North Korea was satisfied with this test and all preparations have already been made, a second test could take place within a few days. Yet if the findings from this test surprised North Korea, the device may have to be rebuilt, and that could take weeks or months. One thing we know for sure is that they do not have a lot of weapons-grade material, and they will have to carefully judge how to use it.

GWS: You have said that a major danger from the North Korean nuclear program is the possibility of plutonium transfer. How serious is this possibility? Are you also concerned about transfer of nuclear technology?

SH: Well, a test does mean that there is now less material that could possibly be transferred.

I feel strongly that the principal danger from the North Korean program is the plutonium itself, and the possibility it would find its way to a third party, perhaps into terrorist hands or into the hands of other nations. The reason I believe this is the biggest danger is that North Korea could be restrained by its neighbors from ever actually using a nuclear device, but a third party, especially a non-state actor, may not be "restrainable."

The nuclear test will not have an impact on how marketable the plutonium is. Yet, for the export of nuclear technical know-how, a successful test could make a big difference in the appeal of North Korean technology, especially to a nation like Iran.

GWS: The current nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, when U.S. officials confronted North Korea about its possession of a uranium enrichment, or HEU, program. North Korea has thus far denied having such a program. I understand this type of program is much more difficult to detect. Would a uranium-based device require testing?

SH: North Korea has stated that it does not have an HEU program. My own opinion is they have some type of enrichment program, owing to Pakistani President Musharraf's statements that his nation provided Pyongyang with some of the required technology and equipment. We simply do not know how far North Korea has progressed in this program.

The HEU program is very difficult to detect - there are fewer signatures than for a nuclear reactor and this type of program is easier to conceal, given the smaller size of the facilities required. However, if we assume statements made by A.Q. Khan and President Musharraf are accurate, it may be some time before North Korea can produce significant quantities of HEU.

Once North Korea has accomplished this, a uranium bomb will be easier to make, and North Korean scientists will have more confidence in this type of device without testing.

GWS: All indications are that North Korea will be further isolated after this test. Will this increased isolation impact the country's continued nuclear development?

SH: At this point, from what I saw at Yongbyon, current North Korean operations do not depend on external help or supplies. Thus, isolation makes little difference in this regard. For the uranium program, technical isolation would probably cause a slowdown, because North Korea would benefit from additional technical purchases from the outside world. But the uranium program does not appear to be a centerpiece of North Korea's nuclear efforts.

GWS: After this nuclear test, is the situation more dangerous?

SH: I believe the major threat came around 2003 when North Korea reprocessed a major amount of plutonium, thus crossing the threshold to become a major threat. I have always taken the North Korean threat very seriously, and I believe all the governments and peoples involved should take it very seriously as well. First and foremost, the imperative should be to make sure that nuclear materials stay in North Korea and are not transferred to third parties.

Transcript prepared by Kristin Burke, Shorenstein APARC Research Associate

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Professor Levi received his PhD in the Department of Cinema Studies at New York University. Before coming to Stanford, he was an adjunct professor in the Conservatory of Theater Arts and Film at Purchase College, SUNY, where he taught film and media history and theory, as well as fundamentals of film-making. He also taught film studies at New York University and Hunter College, CUNY.

Levi has written essays on cinema and nationalism, psychoanalytic film theory, and experimental cinema, and he coedited Filosofska igracka (A Philosophical Toy), a selection of Annette Michelson's writings on film and modernist art. His book Disintegration in Frames, about aesthetics and politics in the Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav cinema, is forthcoming.

Levi's teaching brings together his commitment to film as an art form with the study of cinema as a social and cultural phenomenon. His lectures and writing emphasize issues of film style and textual analysis, historical contextualization, and encounters between theory and practice of the moving image. Levi's courses include East European Cinema; Italian Cinema; Film Aesthetics: Editing; Practical Film Analysis; and Cinema/Ideology. He has also made short experimental films and instructional videos.

Sponsored by the Mediterranean Studies Forum, the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, and the Forum on Contemporary Europe.

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Stanford University
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Pavle Levi Assistant Professor of Art & Art History Speaker Stanford University
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Pamela Constable is the deputy foreign editor of The Washington Post. Previously she covered South Asia for The Washington Post for several years from April 1999, with extensive coverage of Afghanistan as well as both India and Pakistan.n She continues to visit and report from Afghanistan.

Before arriving in New Delhi in 1999, Constable worked for The Post from 1994 to 1998 covering immigration and Hispanic affairs in the Washington area, and reported from Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti and Cuba.

Prior to joining The Post, Constable worked for The Boston Globe as deputy Washington bureau chief and foreign policy reporter from June to September 1994. From 1983 until 1992, she was The Globe's roving foreign correspondent, Latin America correspondent and diplomatic correspondent. During this time she reported from Haiti, Chile, Peru, Argentina, Cuba, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico, South Korea, the Philippines, the Soviet Union and Brazil, as well as in Washington.

Her latest book is Fragments of Grace: My Search For Meaning in the Strife of South Asia. She is the co-author with Arturo Valenzuela of A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet and has written articles for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Current History and other publications. She was awarded an Alicia Patterson Fellowship in 1990 and the Maria Moors Cabot Prize for coverage of Latin America in 1993. Constable is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. She received a B.A. from Brown University.

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Pamela Constable The Washington Post Speaker
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Evgeny Kiselev, b.1956, educated in Moscow University, Institute of Asian and African Countries, majored in Middle Eastern Studies, history of modern Iran and Farsi language. He started his career by serving in the Soviet Army in Afghanistan in 1979-1981 as Farsi interpreter. He took to television journalism in 1987 and quickly rose to prominence as television reporter and news anchor during the years of Gorbachev's reforms. In 1993 co-founded NTV, the first independent television company in the history of Russia. For many years NTV was setting up the highest standards of modern broadcasting journalism in Russia and was considered the most popular television channel among Russian newly emergent middle class, educated people, liberal intellectuals, supporters of democratic reforms etc. During the 90s and the early 2000s NTV was famous for its bold and outspoken style of reporting on the major issues, including such touchy ones as the war on Chechnya, political intrigue in the Kremlin, high-level corruption in the government and many others. For more than a decade Evgeny Kiselev was hosting "Itogi" (Results) - a weekly show that combined in-depth reports, journalistic investigations, live interviews with leading politicians and newsmakers, opinion and commentary. It was famous for its outspoken criticism of government policy. "Itogi" was the longest-running political show on Russian television and was closed only due to the events that changed Evgeny Kiselev's career. In 2001, following the election of Vladimir Putin to Russia's presidency, the government started to crack down on independent media. NTV was put under the control of the government after a hostile takeover by Gazprom, Russia's gas monopoly, and Evegeny Kiselev, who by that time was general director of NTV, had to leave the company. He was involved in two other major projects aimed at preserving the independent voice of television in Russia, but both television stations were closed by the government. Evgeny Kiselev remains active as an independent columnist and political analyst, he has a popular weekly program on the "Echo of Moscow", the leading Russian radio station, he also lectures at home and abroad.

His new television project - "Vlast" ("Power"), a show that will concentrate again on Russian politics and power struggle that is already starting in Russia on the eve of the next presidential election in 2008, is scheduled to appear in December on RTVi, the last remaining independent Russian station.

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Evgeny Kiselev Journalist (Former General Director of NTV) Russia Speaker
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Vitali Silitski received his PhD in Political Science from Rutgers University. He worked as an associate professor at the European Humanities University in Minsk, Belarus, a position he was forced to leave in 2003 after publicly criticizing the government of President Alexander Lukashenka. Silitski is currently working on a book titled The Long Road from Tyranny: Post-Communist Authoritarianism and Struggle for Democracy in Serbia and Belarus. Vitali is also a freelance analyst for Freedom House Nations in Transit Report, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Oxford Analytica. In 2004-2005, he was a Reagan-Fascell Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. Vitali will continue as a visiting scholar at CDDRL through early 2007.

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CDDRL
Stanford University
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Visiting Scholar from Belarus 2006 - 2007
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Vitali Silitski received his PhD in Political Science from Rutgers University. He worked as an associate professor at the European Humanities University in Minsk, Belarus, a position he was forced to leave in 2003 after publicly criticizing the government of President Alexander Lukashenka. He is currently working on a book titled The Long Road from Tyranny: Post-Communist Authoritarianism and Struggle for Democracy in Serbia and Belarus. Dr. Silitski is also a freelance analyst for Freedom House Nations in Transit Report, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Oxford Analytica. In 2004-2005, he was a Reagan-Fascell Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy.

Vitali Silitski Visiting Scholar from Belarus Speaker CDDRL
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Stanford Humanities Center
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Humanities and International Studies Fellow
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Martina Winkler graduated in history, law and comparative literature. She completed a dissertation on Czech history, and now focuses on Russian Imperial history. The initial work on her current project on cultures of ownership was done at Stanford, where she spent a year as a Humboldt-fellow at the Center for Russian Studies.

Project Summary

For Russian history, a presumed lack of private property has often been described as a vital reason for economic as well as political backwardness. Rather than following this traditional pattern, Winkler's book Perceptions of Property and Ownership Among the Russian Elite, 18th and 19th Centuries discusses property and ownership as culturally constructed perceptions in contexts of nationalism, politics, economics and gender, and analyses the radical changes of ownership perception in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

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Leonard Weiss is a visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC. He began his professional career as a PhD researcher in mathematical system theory at the Research Institute for Advanced Studies in Baltimore. This was followed by tenured professorships in applied mathematics and electrical engineering at Brown University and the University of Maryland. During this period he published widely in the applied mathematics literature. In 1976 he received a Congressional Science Fellowship that resulted in a career change. For more than two decades he worked for Senator John Glenn as the staff director of both the Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation and the Committee on Governmental Affairs. He was the chief architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 and legislation that created the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. In addition, he led notable investigations of the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan. Since retiring from the Senate staff in 1999, he has published numerous articles on nonproliferation issues for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Arms Control Today, and the Nonproliferation Review. His current research interests include an assessment of the impact on the nonproliferation regime of nuclear trade with non-signers of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and more generally the relationship of energy security concerns with nonproliferation.

For a comprehensive list of Dr. Weiss's publications, click here.

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Bioterrorism is a growing threat. While the U.S. government has spent considerable sums on programs designed to protect the United States from a biological attack, no clear strategy has been articulated to guide planning and expenditures. This talk will present the outlines of a coherent strategy for coping with bioterrorism that includes diplomacy, deterrence and defense, with the emphasis on defense.

Dean Wilkening directs the Science Program at CISAC. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from Harvard University and spent 13 years at the RAND Corporation prior to coming to Stanford in 1996. His major research interests have been nuclear strategy and policy, arms control, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, ballistic missile defense, and conventional force modernization. His most recent research focuses on ballistic missile defense and biological terrorism. His work on missile defense focuses on the broad strategic and political implications of deploying national and theater missile defenses, in particular, the impact of theater missile defense in Northeast Asia, and the technical feasibility of boost-phase interceptors for national and theater missile defense. His work on biological weapons focuses on understanding the scientific and technical uncertainties associated with predicting the outcome of hypothetical airborne biological weapon attacks, with the aim of devising more effective civil defenses, and a reanalysis of the accidental anthrax release in 1979 from a Russian military compound in Sverdlovsk with the aim of improving our understanding of the human effects of inhalation anthrax.

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