The German Presidency in the EU
Ambassador Scharioth, who joined the Foreign Service in 1976, previously served as state secretary of the Federal Foreign Office (2002-2006), political director and head of the Political Directorate-General (1999-2002), head of the International Security and North America Directorate (1998-1999), head of the Office of the Foreign Minister (1998), head of the Defense and Security Policy Division at the Federal Foreign Office (1996-1997), and chef de cabinet to the NATO secretary-general in Brussels (1993-1996). In addition, he worked in the International Law Division of the Federal Foreign Office (1990-1993), the German Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York (1986-1990), the Policy Planning Staff of the Federal Foreign Office (1982-1986), the German Embassy in Ecuador (1979-1982), and the Asia Division, Press Division and State Secretary's Office at the Federal Foreign Office (1977-1979).
Ambassador Scharioth holds a master's of arts degree, a law degree and a doctorate from the Fletcher School of Diplomacy.
Arrillaga Alumni Center
Lane/Lyons Conference Room
Stanford University
326 Galvez Street
Palo Alto, CA 94305
No Simple Truths About Russia
The second error of omission is a failure to acknowledge the real menu of choices foreign policymakers face, especially when dealing with a revolution in midstream such as Russia's in the '90s. The same Mikhail Gorbachev who let the Warsaw Pact fall apart and helped Germany reunite also let his government loot Soviet gold reserves and allowed his armed forces to kill innocent people in Georgia and the Baltic states. Was [George W. Bush] wrong to deal with such a leader? The same Boris Yeltsin who bombed his parliament in 1993, invaded Chechnya twice and allowed corruption to flourish also destroyed the Soviet empire, introduced markets and democracy to Russia, destroyed thousands of nuclear weapons, acquiesced to NATO expansion and cooperated with the United States to end the Kosovo war.
The Other Half of the Job
An Alliance That Really Works
Camps of Terror, Often Overlooked
Lets Get Serious About Democracy in the Greater Middle East
Conceptualizing Biological Agents as Weapons of Warfare
Carol Atkinson (speaker) retired as a lieutenant colonel from the U.S. Air Force in 2005. While in the military she served in a wide variety of management and operational positions in the fields of intelligence, targeting, and combat assessment. During the Cold War she flew on the Strategic Air Command's nuclear airborne command post as a target analyst. During Operation Desert Storm (1991) she worked on the intelligence staff in Riyadh, and, subsequently, on the contingency planning staff in Dhahran/Khobar, Saudi Arabia. While in the military, she taught at the Air Force Academy and the Air Force's Command and Staff College.
Atkinson holds a PhD in international relations from Duke University, an MA in geography from Indiana University, and a BS from the United States Air Force Academy (5th class with women). She is currently a post-doctoral research fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California. Atkinson's primary research focuses on U.S. military-to-military contacts as channels of international norm diffusion. She is also working on a project examining the influence of educational exchange programs on democratization and a project on the social construction of the biological warfare threat in the United States.
Jessica Weeks (respondent) is a doctoral candidate in the Stanford Department of Political Science. Her research interests include foreign policy decision-making in non-democratic regimes, the settlement of military crises, and the effects of foreign military interventions on target states. She will be a pre-doctoral fellow at CISAC during 2007-2008. Jessica received her BA in political science from The Ohio State University, and an MA in international history and politics from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Ukraine's Victors
Missile Defense: The Russian Reaction
The row over U.S. intentions to deploy elements of its missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic has the potential of bringing U.S.-Russian relations--not to mention bilateral arms control--to a new low. Russia has disapproved of the scheme ever since the United States first went public with the system about two years ago. But despite sounding angry, Russia remained calm, arguing that it already possessed the technology to deal with the interceptors the United States planned to place in Eastern Europe.
Recently, however, Moscow decided to up the ante. Clearly inspired by the assertive and rather confrontational presentation given by President Vladimir Putin at a conference in Munich on February 10, Russian generals started painting a picture of a much harsher response to the possible deployment.