October 15, 2010 was the 100th anniversary of the birthday of Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and a key leader in establishing the field of East Asian studies. George R. Packard, president of the United States-Japan Foundation, worked with Reischauer in the 1960s and recently published a biography about him entitled Edwin O. Reischauer and the American Discovery of Japan. Packard spoke at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center on October 28 to share his perspective on Reischauer's life and career.

Reischauer was born to missionary parents in Japan, where he spent the first part of his life. According to Packard, Reischauer had a lifelong appreciation for Japan that deepened with time, but he also recognized that the more time he spent living in and studying Japan, the more that there was for him still to learn. Reischauer attended Oberlin College as an undergraduate and Harvard University as a doctoral student. During World War II, he worked for the U.S. State Department translating intercepted messages.

The Pearl Harbor-era view of Japan in the United States was that of a "treacherous" country-one that still surfaces from time to time, according to Packard. Reischauer's life's work was to improve American education and understanding about Japan. While teaching at Harvard University, Reischauer, along with China studies pioneer John King Fairbank, helped to build the field of East Asian studies in the United States. Packard credits their efforts for changing the British imperial-era designation of the "Far East" to "East Asia." In addition to his works such as Japan, Past and Present and A History of East Asian Civilization, Reischauer was committed to writing about Japan in popular publications like Reader's Digest.

Reischauer served as U.S. Ambassador to Japan from 1961-1966. While there, he helped to diminish the "Occupation mentality" of Americans in Japan and planted the seeds for the eventual return of Okinawa, said Packard. During his time as ambassador, Reischauer suffered many professional and personal setbacks, including the death of President Kennedy, a supporter of his efforts; the escalation of the Vietnam War, for which he drew criticism although he was not a proponent of it; and being stabbed by a deranged student. According to Packard, after the stabbing incident Reischauer was deeply concerned about generating negative sentiment toward Japan, and thus intentionally kept quiet about it to the media. After returning to Harvard University in the late 1960s, Reischauer continued to draw criticism for the Vietnam War and in later decades was labeled as a "Japan apologist."

Despite his critics, the wisdom of Reischauer's work in academia and government rings true today, as evidenced by Japan's place as a global economic power and the successful and significant role that the U.S.-Japan relationship plays in the peace and economic stability of East Asia. 

Beyond his childhood ties to Hawai'i and Indonesia and his self-styled designation as "America's first Pacific President," President Barack Obama has demonstrated significant and genuine interest in Asia and in developing trans-Pacific ties. He embarked on November 5 for the second presidential visit to Asia during his term, and while there he will visit India, Indonesia, South Korea to attend the summit of the Group of 20 (G20), and finally to Japan to attend the annual heads of state meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will travel a week ahead of Obama to attend the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathering and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Vietnam, followed by visits to Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and Australia. Her trip will include an added-in stop to China's Hainan Island. To address major issues surrounding the President's trip to Asia--including the "China question" and historic U.S. bilateral alliances--four scholars from the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) gathered for a public panel discussion on October 27.

Thomas Fingar, Oksenberg/Rohlen Distinguished Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, spoke about the symbolic aspects of Obama's visit, noting the importance of a presidential visit for showing a sense of real commitment to the region and an acknowledgement of the "rise" of countries like China and India. On a more pragmatic side, he also suggested that meeting in person with other leaders is crucial in order to "bring about deliverables." The omission of a visit to China should not be weighed too heavily, Fingar said, pointing out that the President visited China last year. The stops in Japan and South Korea are tied to important multilateral meetings, though they will also reaffirm longstanding ties with those allies, while the visit to India is an indication of growing relations between the two countries. Of particular importance is Obama's participation in the G20 Summit in South Korea and the APEC meeting in Japan because, Fingar stated, a major purpose of the visit is about the "United States having a role in building new multilateral institutions." Finally, while much of the success of the Asia trip rests on how well Obama conducts himself, Fingar expressed confidence that the President would skillfully manage the visit.

During his visit to Indonesia, Obama will meet with Indonesia's President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for a bilateral discussion of such issues as economics, security, and higher education. Donald K. Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum, said that the postponement of earlier-planned visits to Indonesia has lessened some of the enthusiasm for Obama's "homecoming" to Jakarta. China's omission on the trip agenda is noteworthy, he suggested, and Clinton's addition of a stop in Hainan is due, in part, to help alleviate recent tension between the United States and China regarding China's claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea. Clinton's involvement in the EAS is an "important multilateral engagement" for the United States because of the presence of its ally Japan and the fact that the United States and China both have a voice there, unlike the ASEAN Plus Three meetings that do not include the United States. While in recent months the U.S.-China relationship has become more strained, Emmerson asserted that the "United States is not going to get into a cold war with China."

Obama will travel from Indonesia to South Korea for the G20 Summit, another major multilateral engagement during his travels. David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program, described several significant aspects of this time in South Korea. While not technically an organization, Straub said, the Summit is an important forum for the discussion of economic stability and growth. Similar to Fingar, Straub noted the efficacy and significance of in-person meetings. The Summit provides an opportunity for world leaders to have face-to-face discussions on non-economic issues, such as North Korea's political situation. Straub suggested that President Lee Myung-bak's investment in the Summit is based, in part, on raising South Korea's global prestige, which is tied also to increasing the status of the G20 to become the premiere global financial organization. Finally, Straub stated that alongside the G20 meeting, Obama and Lee are expected discuss bilateral relations, which are at an all-time high, including the stalled U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement (Korus FTA). The FTA, which would be the most significant free trade agreement for the United States since NAFTA, has faced opposition and mixed support on both sides.

Obama's visit to India will be the third U.S. presidential visit there in the past decade, which is indicative of changing U.S. perceptions of India brought about through the IT boom and growing economic ties, suggested Daniel C. Sneider, associate director of research for Shorenstein APARC. Sneider pointed to a broader shared agenda despite a lack of clarity on some issues, such as Pakistan, and a focus on India as Asia's "other" growing economy. He stated that he would be watching for the United States and India to work together to emphasize India's role in East Asia, highlighted by India's participation in the EAS. India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has championed a "look east" policy and expressed stronger interest in East Asia, especially China. In terms of Obama's visit to the APEC heads of state conference in Japan, Sneider noted the importance of this trip also for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The newly formed government of Prime Minister Naoto Kan has worked to ease tensions in the alliance and both countries hope to use the visit to bolster a more positive image of the alliance. Certain points of contention, like the move of the U.S. military base on Okinawa, have been put aside for the time being. Sneider stated that recent China-Japan tensions have also served to reinforce the importance of the relationship.

Events during Obama's Asia visit in the next two weeks will help to solidify or possibly call into question his image as the "Pacific President," and undoubtedly influence the role of the United States in Asia for the future.

SPICE curriculum consultants Rennie Moon (Stanford, PhD 2009, International Comparative Education) and Se-Woong Koo (Stanford, PhD Candidate, Religious Studies) recently traveled to Vietnam, August 25 – September 1, 2010, in preparation for the development of a comprehensive curriculum unit, "Legacies of the Vietnam War," for high schools in the U.S. and independent schools abroad. The unit, to be published in 2011, will cover a range of topics, including lessons on post-war politics and economics, the Vietnamese diaspora, environmental legacies of the war, artistic representations of the war, veterans' issues, Vietnamese Amerasians, and post-war U.S-Vietnam relations.

While in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Mr. Koo and Dr. Moon visited non-profits working with Agent Orange victims and landmine survivors, museums and contemporary art spaces, international schools, foreign companies operating within Vietnam's special industrial zones, and Viet Kieu-owned shops and businesses. During these visits, Mr. Koo and Dr. Moon interviewed scholars, veterans, teachers, company managers, art curators, and non-profit activists to compile updated information, materials, resources, and ideas for student activities to take into consideration while developing the unit.

SPICE director, Gary Mukai, is certain that the new unit will add significantly to students' awareness and knowledge of the legacies of the Vietnam War.  He commented that the unit will specifically address the U.S. History Standard 2C, "The student understands the foreign and domestic consequences of U.S. involvement in Vietnam."

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a live debate May 25 between Scott Sagan and Keith Payne, CEO and president of the National Institute for Public Policy. CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization in Washington, D.C.

Scott Sagan's Introductory Statement

I have been asked to address the question: "What should be U.S. declaratory strategic deterrence policy?"

I continue to believe, as I wrote in my 2009 Survival article, that,

"The United States should, after appropriate consultation with allies, move toward a No-First Use declaratory policy by stating that the role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons use by other nuclear weapons states against the United States, our allies, and our armed forces and to be able to respond, with an appropriate range of nuclear retaliation options if necessary in the event that deterrence fails."

I believe that slow but steady movement toward a No-First Use (NFU) doctrine is in the U.S. interest because I think U.S. declaratory policy should have three characteristics.

U.S. declaratory policy should:

a) address the full range of nuclear threats to U.S. national security objectives (not just basic deterrence);

b) be accurate and consistent, reflecting actual military doctrine rather than being mere rhetoric; and

c) U.S. declaratory policy should reflect what U.S. leaders really might want do in the event of a deterrence failure.

In my brief opening remarks, I will explain these three points and outline the logic and evidence that leads me to the conclusion that the benefits of an NFU declaratory policy outweigh its costs.

Point #1: Deterrence is one, but only one critical U.S. national security objective and prudent decisions about declaratory policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons should take into account its likely effects on deterrence of adversaries, bit also the reassurance of allies, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states, the risks of nuclear terrorism, the impact of our declaratory policy on nuclear doctrines of other states; and the prospects for long-term nuclear disarmament. In this sense, the CSIS question (like previous Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) before this latest one) is too narrow in scope and could therefore lead to an excessively narrow, indeed a wrong-headed, answer. Historically, many actions and statements made in the name of deterrence - think of Richard Nixon's Madman Nuclear Alert over Vietnam or George W. Bush's suggestion that "All Options are on the Table" included nuclear preventive strikes on Iran -- might add just a smidgen of deterrence, but can be highly counterproductive with respect to other U.S. nuclear security goals. This is true of the NPR in general: just as war is too important to be left to the generals, nuclear declaratory policy is too important to be left solely to the Pentagon.

Opponents of this broader conception of nuclear posture claim that there is no evidence that U.S. nuclear posture influences others or perceptions that we are honoring our NPT Article VI commitments help with non-proliferation goals. That view is wrong. Let me give just two examples:

1. Evidence to support the point about U.S. disarmament steps helping encourage others to act is seen with Indonesia's decision to ratify CTBT earlier this month:

When Indonesia announced its decision it said it had taken note of the "serious effort" on the part of the current United States Administration in promote disarmament. "We do feel that at this time, what is needed is positive encouragement rather than pressure of a different type that we've been trying to impart in the past," he said, voicing hope that the U.S. will follow suit from his country's actions. "We are also cognizant of some positive aspects of the United States' Nuclear Posture Review."

2. For evidence on the doctrinal influence or mimicry point let me cite India. In January 2003, the BJP government in New Delhi, influenced by the U.S. NPR, adopted a revised, more offensive nuclear doctrine including the explicit threat of Indian nuclear first-use in response to biological or chemical weapons use. "India must consider withdrawing from this [NFU] commitment as the other nuclear weapons-states have not accepted this policy." Although it is too early to know the final result, the Indian government today appears to be reversing course: A group of very senior former officials has stated that, "It is time to review the objectionable parts" of India's nuclear posture and the Foreign Minister has called for universal declarations of NFU.

Point #2: U.S. Strategic Nuclear Declaratory Policy should be consistent with actual U.S. Nuclear Doctrine. That is, U.S. government officials should not misrepresent what its "real" nuclear policy is when it makes public statements about intent and plans. This may seem like an obvious point to some... but history suggests that this principle is not always followed--from Robert McNamara's mid-1960s declaratory statements about Assured Destruction (which often downplayed the heavy Counter-Force emphasis of U.S. doctrine at the time) to the Bush Administration's February 2002 statement in which in the same speech it "reaffirmed" the 1995 Negative Security Assurances not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties to the NPT unless they attack the U.S. or our allies with a NWS and, in the same speech, also stated that, "If a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type of military response. This followed the leaking of the classified portion of the 2001 NPR which reportedly placed Iran, Libya, and Syria on target lists, creating a flurry of negative international press reports.

In an era in which leaks should be considered highly likely, if not inevitable and, at a time in which we want more transparency around the world, the U.S. Government should err on the side of transparency. With multiple audiences present, calculated ambiguity may sometimes be necessary and even helpful; clear contradictions and calculated hypocrisy are not.

Here, I must give the current Administration some credit, for it judged that there was a small set of specific threats that could not currently be met by U.S. and allied conventional forces. It said so clearly in the Nuclear Posture Review and also clearly committed itself to deal with the challenge:

"The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons." (p. ix)

Critics say that this will weaken extended deterrence as key allies will feel abandoned. Evidence so far is to the contrary:

  Japan: Foreign Minister Okada said, in October 2009, "We cannot deny the fact that we are moving in the direction of No-First Use of nuclear weapons. We would like to discuss the issue with Washington." The Japanese 2010 Rev Con statement said, "Japan appreciates and welcomes the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States." "We call on all states possessing nuclear weapons to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies. In this connection, we call on the Nuclear Weapon States to take, as soon as possible, such measures as providing stronger negative security assurances that they will not use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that comply with the NPT." Japanese 2010 NPT Review Conference statement

  This is also the case in NATO: The German, Dutch, Belgian and Norwegian governments have all called for removal of the tactical nuclear weapons on their soil. NATO meetings will address this soon. We should not just assume that the credibility of extended deterrence and reassurance to allies is threatened by NFU declarations or removal of tactical weapons. Instead, we should listen to what our allies are saying and work with them.

Point #3: U.S. declaratory policy should reflect what the U.S. might really want to do if deterrence fails. Doctrine and declaratory policy should be made with an acute awareness that deterrence might fail and not succumb to the common wishful thinking biases that assumes perfect prospects of success. This leads me to appreciate the wise advice that Brent Scowcroft gave to President George H.W. Bush during the first Gulf War to avoid "spoken or unspoken threats to use them (Nuclear Weapons) on the grounds that it is bad practice to threaten something that you have no intention of carrying out."

When an official threatens actions that we have no intention of carrying out it can add a thin sliver of deterrence strength but at the grave cost, if the action occurs anyway, of either cheapening the currency of deterrence or risking the creation of a commitment trap that leads the state to execute an option that it otherwise would deem ill-advised. Here, I think of General Chilton's recent remarks about using nuclear threats to deter cyber attacks, as an example.

Here, I should note that in order to enhance non-proliferation and move slowly in the direction of a nuclear-free world the current NPR adds new NSAs and threatens conventional attacks only against NNWS in compliance with the NPT: "The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations" (p.viii) and promises that its conventional responses would be "devastating" and that, "any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders , would be held fully accountable."

Dr. Payne, in his 2009 article, was critical of the whole goal of nuclear disarmament, despite the U.S. Article VI commitment to work in good faith toward that objective. He has written that, "The continuing threat posed by chemical and biological weapons is a fatal flaw in the logic of the nuclear-disarmament narrative, one that is all but ignored by its proponents.

"In fact, even if all enemies and potential enemies of the United States miraculously gave up their nuclear weapons, the United States would still need to maintain a nuclear deterrent arsenal. Why? Because some enemies reportedly retain other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as chemical and biological weapons, that could inflict enormous civilian casualties...If we also take nuclear deterrence off the table, we may, as Gen. Paul Fouilland, commander of the French Strategic Air Forces, has observed, 'Give a green light' to chemical and biological threats," Dr. Payne states.

I fail to see how a promise of "devastating" conventional responses and a promise that, "Any individuals responsible for the attack, would be held fully accountable" is giving any kind of green light to an adversary contemplating a chem/bio attack.

Furthermore, the only historical evidence that Dr. Payne cites to demonstrate his belief that, "Nuclear weapons threats have unique deterrent qualities" is the alleged success in deterring Iraqi use of Chem/Bio during the 1991 Gulf War:

The preponderance of evidence suggests that this is not right: Saddam did not use his WMD in 1991 because we threatened to march on Baghdad and overthrow his regime if he did that and "promised" to do that if he refrained from using his WMD.

First, look at the Bush, 25 January, 1991, letter to Saddam:

"Should war come it will be a far greater tragedy for you and your country. Let me state too that the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction of Kuwait's oil fields and installations. Further, you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions against any member of the coalition. The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort." Two of the three things that Bush warned about happened...hardly good evidence that vague threats or calculated ambiguity worked as a deterrent.

Second, look at James Baker's memoirs in which he claimed that he "purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation," but also warned Aziz that if Iraq used weapons of mass destruction, "Our objective won't just be the liberation of Kuwait, but the elimination of the current Iraqi regime." Advocates of maintaining calculated ambiguity too often cite the first statement but fail to cite the second Baker statement.

Third, look at what Saddam said under interrogation: "How would Iraq have been described if it had used nuclear weapons? A: "We would have been called stupid." In the May 2004 interrogation: "The WMD was for the defense of Iraq's sovereignty. Iraq demonstrated this with the use of WMD during the Iraq and Iran War, as Iran had threatened the sovereignty of Iraq. Yet, Iraq did not use WMD during the 1991 Gulf War as its sovereignty was not threatened."

In conclusion: I think you will discover today that reasonable people can certainly disagree about how to value and prioritize these different nuclear-related objectives and reasonable people can (and do) disagree about how best to pursue them. But reasonable people should not ignore the full range of U.S. objectives and narrowly conflate deterrence with security, should continue to search for evidence that supports or weakens their assumptions, and should engage in rigorous dialogues like this to help propel the debate forward.